XVII. by post (m). And it may make a difference in the time CHAPTER allowed for presentment if the notes be received by a servant or agent (n). bankers' The same rules which govern the presentment and circu- Of other lation of bank notes also apply to such bankers' paper as may be fairly considered part of the circulation medium paper. of the country. Such are the bills of a country banker on his London correspondent (o). A bill or note on which no time of payment is specified Where no is payable on demand (p). Presentment must be made by the holder or his agent, at a reasonable hour, on a business day, at the proper place, to the person designated by the bill or note as payer or his agent, if, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, such person can be found. A presentment may be made through the Post Office (1). The bill or note must be exhibited to, the person from whom payment is demanded, and delivered up forthwith to the party paying (r). time of payment is specified. How to be made. Presentment for payment should be made during the At what hour. usual hours of business, and, if at a banker's, within banking hours (s). If the party who is to pay the bill be not a banker, presentment may be made at any time of the day, when he may reasonably be expected to be found at his place of residence or business, though it be six, seven, or eight o'clock in the evening (t). And even though there be (m) Williams v. Smith, 2 B. & Ald. 496; 21 R. R. 373. (n) James v. Houlditch, 8 D. & R. 40. (0) Shute v. Robins, M. & M. 133; 3 C. & P. 80. (p) Code, s. 10 (b); Whitlock v. Underwood, 2 B. & C. 157; 3 D. & R. 356. And those words may be added without avoiding the bill. Aldous v. Cornwall, L. R., 3 Q. B. 573; 37 L. J. 201; 9 B. & S. 607; and see the Chapter on the FORM OF BILLS. (1) Code, s. 45 (3) and (8). The Code says, where authorized by agreement or usage. The practice has been twice upheld. See ante, p. 21, note (m). (r) Code, s. 52 (4); Treacher v. Ilinton, 4 B. & Ald. 413; 23 R. R. 325; Crowe v. Clay, 9 Ex. 604. (s) Parker v. Gordon, 7 East, 385; 5 Smith, 358; 8 R. R. 646 ; Elford v. Teed, 1 M. & Sel. 28; Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 224; Whitaker v. Bank of England, 1 C., M. & R. 744 ; 6 C. & P. 700. In this case the bill had been presented at 11A.M., and payment had been refused for want of assets; it was afterwards, on the same day, presented after banking hours, at 6 P.M., assets having in the meantime been received. It was intimated by Lord Abinger, that the bank ought to have apprised the notary who presented the bill of the receipt of assets. (t) Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527; 11 R. R. 787; Morgan v. Darison, 1 Stark, 114. CHAPTER Where, when a note is made payable at a particular place. Where, when a bill is made payable at a particular place. no person within to return an answer (u). Lord Tenterden, C.J.: "As to bankers, it is established, with reference to a well-known rule of trade, that a presentment out of hours of business is not sufficient; but, in other cases, the rule of law is, that the bill must be presented at a reasonable hour. A presentment at twelve o'clock at night, when a person had retired to rest, would be unreasonable; but I cannot say that a presentment between seven and eight in the evening is not a presentment at a reasonable time”(†). Presentment for payment at the right place is as important, in order to charge the antecedent parties, as presentment at the right time. As we have already seen, if a promissory note be made in the body of it, payable at a particular place, presentment for payment there is necessary to charge either maker or indorsers, though it is otherwise if the place of payment be indicated by way of memorandum only, in which case presentment for payment there or elsewhere to the maker will suffice (y). Where a bill was made or accepted payable at a particular place, it was formerly a point much disputed, whether a presentment at that place was necessary in order to charge the acceptor or other parties. At length, it was decided in the House of Lords that an acceptance, payable at a (u) Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188: 1 M. & Ry. 41; 36 R. R. 540. (x) Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188; 1 M. & Ry. 41; 36 R. R. 540; and see Triggs v. Newnham, 10 Moore, 249; 1 C. & P. 631; 28 R. R. 678. In America it is held, that business hours, except in the case of banks, range through the whole day, down to the hours of rest in the evening. Where a note was made payable at a bank, a demand made at the bank upon the proper day after banking hours, the officers being there, and a refusal, the cashier stating that no funds were deposited for the purpose; held that the demand was sufficient. See Byles on Bills, 6th American edition, p. 330. (y) Ante, p. 14. Code, s. 87; Saunderson v. Bowes, 14 East, 500; 13 R. R. 299; Howe v. Bowes, 16 East, 112; 14 R. R. 319; Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165; 21 R. R. 91: Williams v. Waring, 10 B. & C. 2:34 R. R. 306; Emblin v. Dartnell, 12 M. & W. 830: Spindler v. Grellett, 17 L. J., Ex. 6; 1 Ex. 384; Nichols v. Bowes, 2 Camp. 498. And this though the place be mentioned in a distinct sentence, preceded by a full stop. Tanderdouckt v. Thelluson, 19 L. J., C. P. 13: 8 C. B. 812; and so, too, in a debenture, Thorn v. City Rice Mills, L. R., 40 Ch. D. 357. The memorandum is no part of the note, Eron v. Russell, 4 M. & S. 505, though preceded by the words "payable at ;" Masters v. Barretto, 19 L. J., C. P. 50; 8 C. B. 433; Price v. Mitchell, 4 Camp. 200; 16 R. R. 775; though Lord Ellenborough held differently in Trecothick V. Edwin, 1 Stark. 468. The repealed stat. 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, did not extend to promissory notes. XVII. particular place, was a qualified acceptance, rendering it CHAPTER necessary, in an action against the acceptor, to aver and prove presentment at such place (z). This decision occasioned the passing of the 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, now repealed, by which it was enacted, that an acceptance, payable at a particular place, was a general acceptance, unless expressed to be payable there only, and not otherwise. or elsewhere. On this statute it has been decided, that an acceptance is general, though the bill be made payable at a particular place by the drawer, and not by the acceptor (a). A declaration in an action against the acceptor, alleging a bill to be accepted payable at a banker's, need not aver presentment at the house of that banker. "Since the Statute," said the Court of Error, "a bill drawn generally on a party may be accepted in three different forms, ie., either first, generally; or, secondly, payable at a particular banker's; or, thirdly, payable at a particular banker's and not elsewhere. If the drawee accepts in the second form, payable at a banker's, he undertakes, since the statute, to pay the bill at maturity when presented for payment, either to himself or at the banker's. Here the bill was accepted according to the second of these three forms" (b). This statute is repealed, and substantially re-enacted by the Code, with but slight variation. Where a place of payment is specified, or the address of the drawee or acceptor is given in the bill, it must be presented there in order to charge the antecedent parties (c). (-) Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165 2 Bligh, 391; 21 R. R. 91. (a) Selby v. Eden, 3 Bing. 611; 11 Moo. 511; Fayle v. Bird, 6 B. & C. 531; 9 Dowl. & R. 639; 2 C. & P. 303; Roach v. Johnston, H. & J. 246; ante, p. 265. 92. (b) Halstead v. Skelton, 5 Q. B. (c) Code, s. 45 (4) a and b.. Bernstein v. Usher, 11 T. L. R. 356. As against the acceptor unless he insert the words "only and not elsewhere," it will be a general acceptance, Code, s. 19 (2) c, and presentment there, or indeed anywhere, is not necessary to charge him, sect. 52 (1); and even if he do insert those words, an omission to present there on the proper day will not discharge him (though it will the drawer and indorsers, B.B.E. sect. 45), provided a subsequent 19 CHAPTER In an action against the indorser. Where neither a place of payment nor address are given in the bill, it must be presented at his place of business, if known, and if not, at his ordinary residence, if known; in any other case to him wherever he can be found, or at his last known place of business or residence (d). When a bill or note is presented at the proper place, and after the exercise of reasonable diligence no person authorized to pay or refuse payment can be found there, no further presentment to the drawee, or acceptor, or maker, is necessary (e). A personal demand on the drawee or acceptor or maker is not in general necessary (f), but where a bill is drawn upon or accepted, or a note made, by two or more persons who are not partners, if no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made to all of them (g). Where the drawee or acceptor of a bill, or the maker of a note, is dead, if no place of payment be specified, presentment must be made to his personal representative, if there be one, and he can with reasonable diligence be found (h). In an action against the drawer, or other indorser, if the bill be accepted, and payable at a particular place named by the acceptor, it is still necessary to prove presentment there if traversed (i). So, if the bill be drawn, payable at a particular place, presentment must be made there in order to charge the drawer. "The doubt," says Tindal, C.J., "which had been formed before the statute, as to the effect of an acceptance, payable at a particular place, was confined to the case where the question arose between the holder and the acceptor; in cases between the indorsee and the drawer, upon a special acceptance by the drawee, no doubt appears to have existed, but that a presentment at a place specially designated in the acceptance was necessary, in order to make the drawer liable upon the dishonour of the bill by the acceptor. Still less did the doubt ever extend to cases where the drawer directed, by the body of the bill, that the money should be paid in a particular place. Such, then, being the state of the drawer's liability at the time the (d) Code, s. 45 (4) c and d. (f) Matthews v. Haydon, 2 Byles on business is insufficient. (g) Code, s. 45 (6). (i) Gibb v. Mather, 8 Bing. 214 1 M. & Se. 387; 2 C. & J. 254; 34 R. R. 688; Saul v. Jones, 28 L. J., Q. B. 37; 1 E. & E. 59. XVII. statute was passed, it must still remain the same, unless CHAPTER that statute has made an alteration therein. But it appears to us that the statute neither intended to alter, nor has it in any manner altered, the liability of drawers of bills of exchange, but that it is confined in its operation to the case of acceptance alone" (k). If the bill be made payable at a banker's a presentment should be made there (). And if the bill be accepted payable at a banker's, which banker happens to become the holder at its maturity, that fact alone amounts to presentment, and no other proof is necessary (m). If a bill be made payable in a particular town, a presentment at all the banking houses there will suffice (n); if at one of two towns a presentment at either (0); if a particular house be pointed out by the bill as the acceptor's residence, a presentment to any inmate (p), or, if the house be shut up, at the door, will suffice (q). But where a bill is accepted, payable at a particular Pleading. place (7), it is not necessary in an action against the drawer to state the acceptance as such, and, therefore, not necessary to state it to be at a particular place, nor to allege presentment at that place. Such a presentment as the acceptance requires is merely matter of evidence (s). But if the special acceptance were alleged in the declaration, it might be necessary to state in an action against a drawer or indorser such a presentment as the acceptance required, though a general allegation might suffice after verdict (). If a bill (k) Gibb v. Mather, ubi supra. See Parks v. Edge, 1 C. & M. 429; 3 Tyrw. 364; Harris v. Parker, 3 Tyrw. 370; Walter v. Cubley, 2 C. & M. 151; 4 Tyrw. 87; 39 R. R. 739; Boydell v. Harkness, 3 C. B. 168. (1) Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509; 3 R. R. 492; Harris v. Parker, 3 Tyrw. 370. (m) Bailey v. Porter, 14 M. & W. 44. (n) Hardy v. Wood roofe, 2 Stark. 319; 20 R. R. 689. (0) Beeching v. Gower, Holt, N. P. C. 313; 17 R. R. 644. (p) Burton v. Jones, 1 M. & G. 83. (4) Hine v. Allely, 4 B. & Ad. 624; 1 N. & M. 433; 38 R. R. 330. () In an action against the acceptor, the bill may be described as payable at a particular place, (8) Parks v. Edye, 1 C. & M. (t) Lyon v. Holt, 5 M. & W. 250. The sufficiency, however, of such a general allegation, even after verdict, did not seem to be perfectly clear, at all events where no issue was taken on the presentment. In an action against the drawer, where the bill was drawn and accepted payable in London, but there was no traverse of the |