note is given (h). And where a note was made payable to the trustees acting under A.'s will, parol evidence was held admissible to show who they were and what the trusts were (i). A bill or note payable at a certain time after date to the secretary or other officer for the time being of a company was formerly void, the payee being uncertain at the time of making, but now such a bill or note is valid (k). The manager, as well as any other bonâ fide holder, may of course sue in his own name on any bills indorsed in blank belonging to a banking company (7). (h) Robertson v. Sheward, 1 M. & Gran. 511; 1 Scott, N. R. 419. (i) Megginson v. Harper, 4 Tyrwh. 96; 2 Cr. & M. 322; 39 R. R. 784. (k) Storm v. Stirling, 3 E. & B. 832; Yates v. Nash, 29 L. J., C. P. 306; 8 C. B., N. S. 581. But a promissory note to the trustees of a chapel or their (1) Law v. Parnell, 30 L. J. CHAPTER 88 CHAPTER On what substance to be written. In what language. Bills or notes may be printed or written in pencil. BILLS of exchange and promissory notes are usually, but it is apprehended not necessarily, written on paper. It is conceived that they might be written on parchment, linen, cloth, leather, or any other convenient substitute for paper, not being a metallic substance (a). They may be written in any language, and in any form of words. A bill or note, or any other contract, may be printed or written, and in pencil, as well as in ink. "There is," says Abbott, C.J., "no authority for saying, that when the law requires a contract to be in writing, that writing must be (a) See post, as to Metallic Tokens. in ink. There is not any great danger that our decision will induce individuals to adopt the mode of writing by pencil in preference to that in general use. The imperfection of this mode of writing, its liability to obliteration, and the impossibility of proving it when so obliterated, will prevent its being generally adopted" (b). Contracts written and signed in pencil are constantly admitted as written contracts at Nisi Prius (c), and testamentary writings in pencil often in the Ecclesiastical Courts (d). CHAPTER The signature or indorsement of negotiable instruments Signature by may be by a mark (e). It is proper, though not necessary, to superscribe the name of the place where a bill or note is drawn or made; but an instrument is not invalid by reason that it does not specify the place where it is drawn or made, nor where it is payable, Code, s. 3 (4), c. a mark. Superscription of the place where made. Neither is a date in general essential to the validity of a Date. bill or note; and if there be no date, it will be considered to be dated as of the time at which it was made, or rather issued (f); it may also be antedated, postdated, or dated on Sunday or presumably other non-business day (g). (b) Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. 234; 7 Dow. & R. 653; 29 R. R. 225. (c) Jeffrey v. Walton, 1 Stark. 267. (d) Rhymes v. Clarkson, 1 Phil. 22; Green v. Skipworth, 1 Phil. 53; Dickenson v. Dickenson, 2 Phil. 173. (e) George v. Surrey, 1 M. & M. 516; 35 R. R. 755. As to acceptance, see post, Chapter on ACCEPTANCE. (f) At least if the bill reserve interest without more, the interest runs from the date of issue. Code, s. (3); De la Courtier v. Bellamy, 2 Show. 422; Hague v. French, 3 B. & P. 173: Giles v. Browne, 6 M. & S. 73. Parol evidence has been held admissible to show from what time an undated instrument was intended to operate. Davis v. Jones, 25 L. J., C. P. 91; 17 C. B. 625. Under the old pleading, if it was stated to have been drawn on a particular day, but the declaration did not state the date appearing on the bill, that was (g) Code, s. 13 (2); Pasmore v. CHAPTER Subsequent insertion of. Material particular. When a bill is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession of it has a prima facie authority to fill up the omission in any way he thinks fit; this must be done within a reasonable time, and in accordance with the authority, if any, express or implied, in order to charge prior parties (h). A holder in due course is in no case to be prejudiced by the insertion of a wrong or unauthorized date (i). When a bill or note payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or when the acceptance of a bill payable at a fixed period after sight is undated, any holder may insert therein the true date of issue or acceptance, and the bill or note will be payable accordingly; and should he by mistake in good faith insert a wrong date, the bill or note is not avoided, but will be good and payable as of that date (k). The date expressed on a bill or note of the accepting, making, drawing, or indorsing, as the case may be, is prima facie the true date, unless the contrary be proved (1). The date is a material particular of a bill or note, and any alteration of it, without the assent of all parties liable thereon, avoids the instrument, except as against the parties making or authorizing the alteration, or assenting thereto, and subsequent indorsers (m). The usual allegation that a bill or note was made on a particular day is not matter of description, and the day need not be proved as laid (n). It would have been otherwise if the declaration went on to describe the instrument as bearing date on a particular day. 9 Geo. 4, c. 23, be postdated. All (h) Code, s. 20 (1) and (2). Rose v. Rowcroft, 4 Camp. 245. This rule applies to written documents in general. Sinclair v. Baggaley, M. & W. 312; Davis, v. Lowndes, 7 Scott, N. R. 213; Potez v. Glossop, 2 Ex. 195; Harrison v. Clifton, 17 L. J., Ex. 233; Butler v. Mountgarret, 7 H. L. Ca. 647. Aliter, where an I O U was tendered by assignees of a bankrupt as evidence of a petitioning creditor's debt. Wright v. Lainson, 2 M. & W. 739; 6 Dowl. 146. See post, (m) Code, s. 64. (n) Coxon v. Lyon, 2 Camp. 307, n.; Smith v. Lord, 14 L. J., Q. B. 112; 2 D. & L. 759. Misdescription of the date of a bill in an agreement is immaterial if the bill were in existence and present. For "præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis" (o). CHAPTER VI. The time of payment is regularly and usually stated in the Time of paybeginning of the note or bill; but, if no time be expressed, ment. the instrument will be payable on demand (p). A bill or note must be payable either on demand, or else at a fixed or determinable future time. There is no limitation as to the length of time. "If a bill of exchange be made payable at never so distant day, if it be a day that must come, it is no objection to the bill" (q). The time is fixed or determinable if the bill or note be payable at a fixed period after date or sight, or on, or at a fixed period after, the happening of a specified inevitable event; but an instrument payable on a contingency is not a bill or note, and the happening of the event does not cure the defect (r). The expression after sight, on a bill of exchange, means after acceptance, or protest for non-acceptance, and not after a mere private exhibition to the drawee, for the sight must appear in a legal way (s). But if a note is made after sight, the expression merely imports that payment is not to be demanded till it has been again exhibited to the maker(); for a note being incapable of acceptance, the word "sight" must, on a note, bear a different meaning from the same word on a bill. (0) Way v. Hearne, 32 L. J. 34. (P) Whitlock v. Underwood, 3 Dowl. & R. 356; 2 B. & C. 157 ; Down v. Halling, 4 B. & C. 333; 6 Dowl. & R. 455; 2 C. & P. 11; Bayley, 5th ed. 109; and the words may be added without avoiding the instrument. Aldous v. Cornwell, L. R., 3 Q. B. 573 ; 37 L. J. 201. But on a motion to set aside an annuity, the Court will not assume that even a Bank of England note, or a draft on a banker, is payable on demand. See the cases collected in Abbott v. Douglas, 1 C. B. 491. Code, s. 10 (1). (9) Per Willes, C.J., in Colehan v. Cooke, Willes, 396. Code, ss. 3, 11, and 89, "At sight" or "on presentation" are the same as on demand. Sect. 10. (r) Code, s. 11. A bill or note cannot therefore be drawn pay- (s) Marius, 19, cited by Lord (t) Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323; 11 R. R. 594; Sturdy v. Henderson, B. & Ald. 592 ; Sutton v. Toomer, 7 B. & C. 416; 1 M. & Ry. 125; Dixon v. Nuttall, 1 C., M. & R. 307; 6 C. & P. 320. |