the sole territory of the United States, and liable to their exclusive legislative power. The State, after this, has no interest in it, except as she is a State of the Union, and only so long as she remains within the Union An act attended with such results to her sisters and herself, absolving her from responsibility for joint contracts, and depriving her of all interest in property and joint acquisitions, and defences necessary to her protection, finds no warrant in the Constitution-none whatever. It is, therefore, wrong and illegal.

Admit then that the Constitution is so defective as to be forced to submit to it, does that prove the act right or legal? Its illegality, its gross violation of duty, its perjured violation on the part of those who are under an oath to "support" the Constitution, are not the less censurable and illegal because there may be no provision for its punishment. Is there no obligation in duty? Is morality not a virtue-immorality a crime? Is patriotism an empty phrase? Is treason the less treason because there is no law or tribunal competent to arrest or punish it? Let the world judge, as it will, the teachers of such a doctrine. Do you doubt its judgment? Good men may for a time lash themselves into passion, overwhelm reason, and give themselves up to the wildest license; but as Heaven is just and as opinion is enlightened, the victims of the madness of the hour will soon see the estimate which the civilized world will place upon their conduct, and shrink with remorse from its sentence.

But the Constitution is not thus fatally impotent. It is true that it contains no power to declare war against a State, but it has every power for the execution of the laws and the enforcement of their penalties. It goes against the individual offender. It makes no appeal to State power to protect it. For that end it is self-sustaining; it is its own protector. If the State places herself between the United States and the offending citizen, and attempts to shield him by force of arms, it is she who declares war upon the United States, not the United States upon her. In such a contingency, the force used by the latter, and which they have a clear right to use, is not in attack but in defence; not war, but

the rightful vindication of rights against unjustifiable and illegal assaults.

It is further maintained that the right to secede actually exists because although it be wrong, it is one that cannot be punished through the only legal proceeding known to the Constitution, and for this the sixth amendment is seriously relied upon. That provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," &c.; and it is said that, as in a seceding State, the Judiciary of the United States is abolished by State power, and her people are with her in feeling, or by their allegiance bound to follow her, whether approving her course or not, there can be no such trial as the Constitution secures to the offender.

If this is so, and is ever to remain so, does it divest the United States of the power admitted to exist before secession, of arresting the offender and holding him until he can be tried. The clause assumes, as is always the case, arrest, accusation first and trial afterwards. The first can be made peaceably, or, if necessary, by force. Suppose it done. Is it illegal because the right to a speedy trial cannot be enjoyed? If not, why not? The fault is not with the United States, but with the State under whose usurpation the party has offended. She, by her act, has deprived him of the right. Is he to be discharged on that account? Novel doctrine! The State commits treason against the United States; all her citizens participate in it; the Courts of the United States are closed; the Judges exiled. The people are prohibited by force from performing their duties. The offender cannot, and for that reason only, be tried. The act is clearly a revolt, and yet it is said that that very treason and revolt in which the party accused is an actor, entitles him to impunity, because the very crime itself deprives him of the right to a speedy trial in the State where he perpetrated it.

To such of my professional friends as may be present, I put it to answer, if they think a ground like that, in the judgment of the esteemed and able Chief Justice of the

United States, would support an application for a habeas corpus. Would any of you, regardful as I know you are of your reputation, venture to make it? And yet, Senators. have ventured to make it. Truly has it been said, with what little wisdom is the world governed.

Further, what is true of treason is equally true of any other crime, and is applicable alike to States and to the United States. Nearly all, if not all, the Constitutions of the former contain a provision that the offenders be tried only in the vicinage where the offences are charged to have been committed. Are they to go unpunished-to be perpetrated with impunity—if, from local partiality or prejudice, a fair trial cannot be had? Gambling houses, cock-fighting, racing, may be fashionable amusements, though prohibited by law. The law is violated—the offence of constant occurrence the whole country sanctions it, deem the prohibition tyrannical and put it at defiance. Has the State no right to enforce it? No, says the perpetrator-no, says our modern jurist. The right to punish is gone, because the power to punish, from the very prevalence and fashion of the crime, does not exist. A trial can only be constitutionally had in the county or district where the offence is committed, and there it cannot be had, as there all are offenders, and they will not sanction or suffer its punishment.

What do we know has occurred? The United States, by the very letter of the Constitution, are authorized to prohibit, by punishment, the African slave trade. They are also empowered, in order to preserve the peace of the country, and maintain its honor, to restrain our citizens from warring upon other nations with whom we are at peace. Laws for both purposes have long existed, and their Constitutionality never questioned. The trade has, nevertheless, been carried on, and hostile enterprises set on foot. The parties have been arrested.

In some cases indictments could not be obtained, because an impartial, honest Grand Jury could not be found. In others such a petit jury, for the same cause, could not be had to convict. In others the offender has been rescued. The power to punish, therefore, in these instances, did not

exist. The citizens of the only constitutional place for trial and punishment practically set at naught the laws. They acknowledged a higher law. They thought the slave trade moral-the breach of the neutrality acts, patriotism. The one extended the area of a favored institution, and in time would Christianize its victims-the other extended the area of freedom, and in time would make liberty universal.

But the acts, notwithstanding, were crimes, and should be punished. No, say our modern constitutional expounders. No, say Senators. They are not crimes, whatever may be the law on the statute book, because there is no potential legal mode to try and punish them, the mere machinery of the law, in that particular, is defective, the whole vicinage being tainted, and participating or sympathizing with the offence and offender, impunity is secured, and impunity converts crime into virtue.

As well might the thief or murderer who so cunningly steal or kills as to escape detection, rely upon his cunning as a moral and legal justification. The whole theory shocks common sense. It is not punishment which makes the crime. It is the wrong, the illegality of its perpetration. The question of punishment arises after the crime is committed, and exists wholly irrespective of subsequent detection and punishment. If, then, secession is a crime—is treason against the United States-it will remain so forever, whether the latter succeeds in dealing with it as the law requires or not.

Again, it is maintained that the right to secede exists, first, because it is reserved; secondly, because it is not prohibited.

It is said to be reserved. For this the ninth and tenth articles of the Constitution are relied upon.

The first is evidently designed to exclude the conclusion that the enumeration in the instrument of certain rights to the people, the citizens, as such, in their individual character, is to be held "to deny or disparage others retained by the people." It has nothing to do with State sovereignty or power at all.

The second, so far from sustaining the doctrine, clearly refutes it. It is read as if it reserved to the States, or the people, all rights not prohibited by it to the States. Such is not, however, its language or its purpose.

It certainly does not reserve rights prohibited, but it does more, and if it had not, the whole scheme of government would have failed at once. Certain powers, with a view to the benefit of all, were found indispensable to be vested in the Government. For want of these, the whole were suffering great, and, as was believed, if not obviated, fatal mischief. These powers in their very nature were such as the States could not beneficially exercise. They were to be vested, therefore, if to exist at all, in the Government. To reserve them to the States, or the people of the States, would destroy the very object of placing them elsewhere. The amendment, therefore, does not do such a silly, suicidal act. The powers delegated are not reserved. On the contrary, these, by the very words of the amendment, are as clearly excluded as the power prohibited.

The language is "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution," &c. are reserved. A delegated power consequently, like a prohibited power, is not within the reservation.

If, therefore, the Constitution delegates to the Government certain powers to be executed in a State, she has no right to resist them under this amendment. The fact of delegation, as well as the fact of express prohibition, is the exclusion of all State power.

If then the Constitution is in any sense a compact, it is a compact creating and establishing a government, and its powers are as supreme and exclusive as if they had been vested and established by the whole people in the aggregate.

But it is in no sense a compact, except as every government is a compact, implied in the correlative obligations of protection and allegiance. This is clear upon the authority of the great names that assisted in forming it.

The doctrine of compact in the days of South Carolina nullification, (she has been before restive and troublesome, perhaps from not having much else to do than to theorize