The judgments in these cases are reversed on the authority of American
Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464; Springville v. Thomas, 707.
See DECISIONS WITHOUT OPINIONS;
HABEAS CORPUs, 2;
PRACTICE;
PROHIBITION;
RAILROAD, 10;
TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 3, 15.
The case of Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, distinguished from this case.
Forsyth v. Hammond, 506.
Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, again questioned, as it has not been
approved in subsequent decisions. In re Chapman, 661.
1. So long as the transcript of the record in the Circuit Court is in the
Circuit Court of Appeals, the fact that a mandate from it has gone
down to the Circuit Court, affirming its decree, does not affect the
right of this court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals,
to bring the record here. The Conqueror, 110.
2. An application for a writ of certiorari to bring here for review a record
and judgment entered after the final adjournment of this court, made
at the next term and within a year after the original decree, is made
within time. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, B, 2, 7, 8, 9.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
See INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES ;
SIGNAL SERVICE.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD, 8.
1. After a person had been convicted in a state court of murder, he sued
out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State. On the day
assigned for its hearing it appeared from affidavits that the accused
had escaped from jail, and was at that time a fugitive from justice.
The court thereupon ordered the writ of error dismissed, unless he
should within sixty days surrender himself or be recaptured, and
when that time passed without either happening, the writ was dis-
missed. He was afterwards recaptured, and resentenced to death,
whereupon he sued out this writ of error, assigning as error that the
dismissal of his writ of error by the Supreme Court was a denial of
due process of law. Held, that the dismissal of the writ of error by
the Supreme Court of the State was justified by the abandonment of
his case by the plaintiff in the writ. Allen v. Georgia, 138.
2. Act No. 225 of the legislature of Louisiana of March 15, 1855, exempt-
ing the hall of the Grand Lodge from state and parish taxation, “so
long as it is occupied as a Grand Lodge of the F. & A. Masons," did
not constitute a contract between the State and the complainant, but
was a mere continuing gratuity which the legislature was at liberty
to terminate or withdraw at any time. Grand Lodge F. & A. Masons
v. New Orleans, 143.
3. If such a law be a mere offer of bounty it may be withdrawn at any
time, although the recipients may have incurred expense on the faith
of the offer. Ib.
4. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment refer to all the instru-
mentalities of the State, to its legislative, executive and judicial au-
thorities, and, therefore, whoever by virtue of public position under a
state government deprives another of any right protected by that
amendment against deprivation by the State, violates the constitu-
tional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and
is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 226.
5. The contention that the defendant has been deprived of property with-
out due process of law is not entirely met by the suggestion that he
had due notice of the proceedings for condemnation, appeared, and
was admitted to make defence. The judicial authorities of a State
may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of pro-
cedure in the courts and give the parties interested the fullest oppor-
tunity to be heard, and yet it might be that their action would be
inconsistent with that amendment. Ib.
6. A judgment of a state court, even if authorized by statute, whereby
private property is taken for public use, without compensation made
or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting
in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
7. The clause of the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States declaring that "no fact tried by a jury shall be other- .
wise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to
the rules of the common law" applies to cases coming to this court
from the highest courts of the States in which facts have been found
by a jury. Ib.
8. In a proceeding in a state court for the condemnation of private prop-
erty for public use, the court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter
and of the parties, the judgment ought not to be held in violation of
the due process of law enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, un-
less some rule of law was prescribed for the jury that was in absolute
disregard of the right to just compensation. Ib.
9. A statute of a State, requiring every railroad corporation to stop all
regular passenger trains, running wholly within the State, at its sta-
tions at all county seats long enough to take on and discharge pas-
sengers with safety, is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State, and does not take property of the company without due process
of law; nor does it, as applied to a train connecting with a train of
the same company running into another State, and carrying some
interstate passengers and the United States mail, unconstitutionally
interfere with interstate commerce, or with the transportation of the
mails of the United States. Gladson v. Minnesota, 427.
10. The statute of the Territory of Utah (Compiled Laws of 1888, § 3371,
as amended in 1892) providing that "in all civil cases a verdict may
be rendered on the concurrence therein of nine or more members of
the jury," if not invalid under the Seventh Amendment to the Con-
stitution is so as violating the provision in the act of September 9,
1850, c. 51, admitting Utah as a Territory, that "the Constitution
and laws of the United States are hereby extended over and declared
to be in force in said Territory of Utah, so far as the same or any pro-
visions thereof may be applicable," and the act of April 7, 1874, c.
80, "concerning the practice in territorial courts, and appeals there-
from," which provided that no party "shall be deprived of the right
of trial by jury in cases cognizable at common law." American Pub-
lishing Co. v. Fisher, 464.
11. Litigants in common law actions in the courts of that Territory, while
it remained a Territory, had a right to trial by jury, which involved
unanimity in the verdict, and this right could not be taken away by
territorial legislation. Ib.
12. The power of a State to change the rule in respect of unanimity of
juries is not before the court in this case. lb.
13. The matter of the territorial boundaries of a municipal corporation is
local in its nature, and, as a rule, is to be finally and absolutely de-
termined by the authorities of the State. Forsyth v. Hammond, 506.
14. The construction of the constitution and laws of a State by its courts
is, as a general rule, binding on Federal courts. Ib.
15. The legislation contained in sections 102 and 104 of the Revised Stat-
utes was originally enacted "more effectually to enforce the attend-
ance of witnesses on the summons of either House of Congress, and
to compel them to discover testimony"; and, when reasonably con-
strued, is not open to the objection that it conflicts with the provisions
of the Constitution. In re Chapman, 661.
16. Congress possesses the constitutional power to enact a statute to enforce
the attendance of witnesses, and to compel them to make disclosure
of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge their legisla-
tive functions. lb.
17. While Congress cannot divest itself or either of its Houses of the in-
herent power to punish for contempt, it may provide that contumacy
in a witness called to testify in a matter properly under consideration
by either House, and deliberately refusing to answer questions per-
tinent thereto, shall be a misdemeanor against the United States.
Ib.
18. A state statute providing that no dog shall be entitled to the protec-
tion of the law unless placed upon the assessment rolls, and that in a
civil action for killing a dog the owner cannot recover beyond the value
fixed by himself in the last assessment preceding the killing, is within
the police power of the State. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton
Railroad Co., 698.
See JURISDICTION, B, 10, 11; C, 5;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;
RAILROAD, 1 to 6, 9;
TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 3, 5.
CONTRACT.
See ADMIRALTY, 11;
RAILROAD, 9.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE AND COMMERCE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
CONTUMACY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17.
CORPORATION.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 10, 11.
If the trial court gives the law fully and accurately, covering all the
ground necessary to advise the jury of the rights of the parties, it is
not necessary to instruct them in the very language of counsel.
Carter v. Ruddy, 493.
CRIMINAL LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
HABEAS CORPUS, 3.
1. A foreign built vessel, purchased by a citizen of the United States, and
brought into the waters thereof, is not taxable under the tariff laws of
the United States. The Conqueror, 110.
2. Rev. Stat. § 970, which provides that "when, in any prosecution com-
menced on account of the seizure of any vessel, goods, wares or
merchandise, made by any collector or other officer, under any act of
Congress authorizing such seizure, judgment is rendered for the
claimant, but it appears to the court that there was reasonable cause
of seizure, the court shall cause a proper certificate thereof to be
entered, and the claimant shall not, in such case, be entitled to costs,
nor shall the person who made the seizure, nor the prosecutor, be
liable to suit or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution: pro-
vided, That the vessel, goods, wares or merchandise be, after judgment,
forthwith returned to such claimant or his agent," only affords the
collector immunity against a judgment for damages in cases where
proceedings against the vessel were instituted upon information filed
by the United States, for a fine or forfeiture incurred by the vessel
itself. Ib.
3. A collector of customs who seizes a foreign built vessel purchased by a
citizen of the United States and brought by him into their waters, and
holds the same on the claim that it is taxable for duties under the
tariff laws, is not protected against a judgment for damages, by a
certificate of probable cause. Ib.
The errors alleged were frivolous, and the writ of error was sued out for
delay, for which, in affirming the judgment, ten per cent damages are
allowed under clause 2 of Rule 23. Nelson v. Flint, 276.
See RAILROAD, 11.
DECEASED PERSONS' ESTATES.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
DEMURRAGE.
See ADMIRALTY, 4 to 7.
1. In the District of Columbia a non-resident minor, having an interest in
real estate situated therein, may, by the appointment of a guardian
ad litem by the proper court, and without service of personal process
upon him, be subjected to a decree providing for the sale of the land for
the payment of the debts of the decedent owner, and partitioning the
surplus, if any, after such payment. Manson v. Duncanson, 533.
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