Ser. II. is, the greater Variety of Parts there are

which thus tend to fome one End, the ftronger is the Proof that fuch End was defigned. However, when the inward Frame of Man is confidered as any Guide in Morals, the utmoft Caution must be used that none make Peculiarities in their own Temper, or any thing which is the Effect of particular Customs, though obfervable in feveral, the Standard of what is common to the Species; and above all, that the highcft Principle be not forgot or excluded, That to which belongs the Adjustment and Correction of all other inward Movements and Affections: Which Principle will of Courfe have fome Influence, but which being in Nature fupream, as fhall now be fhown, ought to prefide over and govern all the reft. The Difficulty of rightly obferving the two former Cautions; the Appearance there is of fome fmall Diversity amongst Mankind with respect to this Faculty, with respect to their natural Sense of moral Good and Evil; and the Attention necellary to furvey with any Exactneis what paflès within, have occafioned that it is not to much agreed what is the Standard of the internal Nature of Man, as of his external

Form

Form.

Neither is this laft exactly fetled, Ser. II. yet we understand one another when we fpeak of the Shape of a Humane Body; fo likewife we do when we speak of the Heart and inward Principles, how far soe. ver the Standard is from being exact or precisely fixt. There is therefore Ground for an Attempt of fhewing Men to themselves, of fhewing them what Course of Life and Behaviour their real Nature points out and would lead them to. Now Obligations of Virtue fhown, and Motives to the Practice of it enforced, from a Review of the Nature of Man, are to be confidered as an Appeal to each particular Perfon's Heart and natural Confcience: As the external Senfes are appealed to for the Proof of things cognizable by them. Since then our inward Feelings, and the Perceptions we receive from our external Senfes are equally real; to argue from the former to Life and Conduct, is as little liable to Exception, as to argue from the latter to abfolute fpeculative Truth. A Man can as little doubt whether his Eyes were given him to fee with, as he can doubt of the Truth of the Science of Opticks, deduced from ocular Experiments: And allowing the inward Feeling

Shame,

Ser. II. Shame, a Man can as little doubt whether

it was given him to prevent his doing shameful Actions, as he can doubt whether his Eyes were given him to guide his Steps. And as to these inward Feelings themselves, that they are real, that Man has in his Nature Paffions and Affections, can no more be queftioned, than that he has external Senfes. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken; though to a Degree liable to greater Miftakes than the latter.

There can be no doubt that feveral Propenfions or Inftincts, feveral Principles in the Heart of Man, carry him to Society, and to contribute to the Happiness of it, in a Senfe and a Manner in which no inward Principle leads him to Evil. Thefe Principles, Propenfions or Inftincts which lead him to do Good, are approved of by a certain Faculty within, quite diftinct from thefe Propenfions themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing Difcourse.

But it may be faid, "What is all this, "though true, to the Purpose of Virtue " and Religion? Thefe require, not only "that we do good to others when we are "led this Way, by Benevolence or Re"flection,

flection, happening to be ftronger then o- Ser. II. "ther Principles, Paffions, or Appetites; "but likewife that the whole Character be "formed upon Thought and Reflection;

66

that every Action be directed by fome "determinate Rule, fome other Rule than "the Strength and Prevalency of any Principle or Paffion. What Sign is there in "our Nature (for the Inquiry is only about "what is to be collected from thence) that "this was intended by its Author? Or how "does fo various and fickle a Temper as "that of Man appear adapted thereto? It

may indeed be abfurd and unnatural for

"Men to act without any Reflection; nay "without Regard to that particular Kind of "Reflection which you call Confcience, "because this does belong to our Nature: "For as there never was a Man but who "approved one Place, Profpect, Building, "before another; fo it does not appear that "that there ever was a Man who would "not have approved an Action of Huma

nity rather than of Cruelty, Interest and "Paffion being quite out of the Cafe. But "Intereft and Paffion do come in, and are "often too strong for and prevail over Re"flection and Conscience. Now as Brutes

Ser. II." have various Inftincts, by which they are "carried on to the End the Author of their "Nature intended them for: Is not Man " in the fame Condition, with this Diffe"rence only, that to his Instincts (i. e. Appetites and Paffions) is added the Principle of Reflection or Confcience? And "as Brutes act agreeably to their Nature, in following that Principle or particular In"ftinct which for the prefent is strongest " in them: Docs not Man likewife act a"greeably to his Nature, or obey the Law " of his Creation, by following that Prin"ciple, be it Paffion or Conscience, which "for the prefent happens to be strongest in

him? Thus different Men are by their "particular Nature hurried on to pursue "Honour, or Riches, or Pleasure: There "are alfo Perfons whofe Temper leads them "in an uncommon Degree to Kindness, "Compaffion, doing Good to their Fellow"Creatures; as there are others who are given to fufpend their Judgment, to weigh " and confider Things, and to act upon Thought and Reflection. Let every one "then quietly follow his Nature, as Passi on, Reflection, Appetite, the feveral Parts "of it, happen to be ftrongeft: But let

not