with the contracts upon the entry of new col- | cree the following provisional law for the pur- The language of this decree is very significant, and clearly recognizes some title in the states, for why should commissioners be authorized to contract with the legislatures of the states for the purchase of lands which belonged to the nation? It also clearly recog-tries," etc. mizes the right of the states to sell these vacant lands and apply the proceeds in settlement of the demands made against them by the general apportionment of the revenue law of 1824. It declares that the executive may take the lands he considers suitable for fortifications, arsenals, and for new colonies, and at the same time provides that he shall give the states credit on the amount they owe the confederation. But why should any credit be given if these lands so taken by the executive where the property of the nation, and the states without authority to sell them or receive the proceeds of sales? If during all these years the lands were the property of the nation, were to be held and sold only by the nation, and the proceeds thereof to be accounted for directly to the nation, why should "In the first place, we observe that the law it be decreed that if the nation takes any part has received the implied sanction of congress. of them for arsenals and other public pur- It was adopted in 1859. It has been upon poses, credit for the value thereof is to be en- the statute book for more than twelve years. tered upon the amounts due by the states to It must have been transmitted to congress the nation? We find it difficult to escape the soon after it was enacted, for it was the duty force of this decree of 1830. It indicates that of the secretary of the territory to transmit although the language of the revenue decree to that body copies of all laws, on or before of 1824 is indefinite, and does not in terms the first of the next December in each year. name vacant public lands, yet both the nation The simple disapproval by congress at any and the states understood that its effect was time would have annulled it. It is no unto grant authority to the states to sell such reasonable inference, therefore, that it was lands and appropriate the proceeds in settle-approved by that body." ment of the amounts charged against them [286]by the nation. We see no other way in which to give reasonable force to the language of this decree of 1830, and it must be held to be a national interpretation of the revenue decree of 1824. "To present annually to each one of the houses of the general congress a minute and comprehensive report of the amounts that are received and paid out at the treasuries within their limits, together with a statement of the origin of the one and the other, and touching the different branches of agricul ture, commercial and manufacturing indusAnd also, "To forward to the two chambers (of the federal government) and when they are in recess, to the council of the government, a certified copy of their constitutions, laws, and decrees." It may be assumed that these requirements of the national Constitution were complied with, and that the constitutions, laws and decrees of the state and the proceedings had in reference to these several sales of land were reported to the congress of the nation. We find no act of that congress setting aside such legislation or sales. This is significant,[287] and it is not inappropriate to refer to Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, 446 [20:659, 662], in which it was said: We are not insensible of the fact that the provisions of the act of September 21, 1824, creating the office of commissary general, an act which we had occasion to consider in Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220 [ante, 142] seem to make against the But we are not limited to this authoritative idea of the administration of vacant lands by national exposition of the meaning of the rev- the states, and it is difficult to work out from enue law of 1824. The testimony in the sev-all the statutes a consistent, continuous, and eral cases of a similar nature now before us, harmonious rule. We must in each case enincluding therein the reports of the officers deavor to ascertain what the Mexican govof this government sent to examine the ernment recognized as valid, and when that archives of Mexico, discloses that the state is done the duty of respecting and enforcing of Sonora at least assumed that the revenue the grant arises. Other matters are referred act of 1824 authorized its disposal of the va- to by counsel in their briefs, but it would cant public lands, and acting on that as-needlessly prolong this opinion to refer to sumption did in a multitude of cases make sales thereof. In this connection it may be observed that the Constitution of the state of Sonora, or State of the West, declares, article 47, that the right of selling lands belongs to the state. This Constitution bears date May 11, 1825. Law No. 30 of that state, of May 20, 1825, the law referred to by the treasurer general in the expediente, recites that "the congress has seen fit to de them. Our conclusion is that at the time of these transactions the several states had authority to make sales of vacant public lands within their limits, and that such sales, unless annulled by the national government, must be considered as grants to be recognized by this government under the terms of the treaty of 1853. We pass, therefore, to a consideration of the effect of the decrees of Santa Anna. The under the express condition of colonizing lands in controversy were obtained from Mexico under what is known as the Gadsden treaty of 1853. This treaty was concluded on December 30, 1853, and ratified June 30, 1854. At the time of the treaty Santa Anna was supreme executive and virtually dictator in Mexico, and the treaty was negotiated with him. On November 25, 1853, only about a month before the signing of the Gadsden treaty, he published this decree: [288] *"Art. 1. It is declared that the public lands, as the exclusive property of the nation, never could have been alienated under any title by virtue of decrees, orders, and en-made by the local governments of the states actments of the legislatures, governments, or or departments and territories of the republocal authorities of the states and territories lic from September, 1821, to that date, are reof the Republic. pealed in all their parts. "Art. 1. The decrees of November 25, 1853, and July 7th, 1854, which submitted to the revision and approval of the supreme government the grants or alienations of public lands "2. Consequently, it is also declared that "Art. 2. Consequently, all the titles issued the sales, cessions, or any other class of alien- during that period by the superior authoriations of said public lands that have been ties of the states or territories under the fedmade without the express order and approval eral system, by virtue of their lawful faculof the general powers in the manner pre-ties, or by those of the departments or terriscribed by the laws are null and of no value tories, under the central system, with express authorization or consent of the supreme govor effect. "3. The officials, authorities, and employ-ernment for the acquisition of said lands, all ees upon whom devolves the execution of this decree, shall proceed as soon as they receive it to recover and take possession, in the name of the nation, of the lands comprehended in the provisions of article 1, and that may be in the possession of corporations or private individuals, whatever may be their prerogatives or position. in conformity with the existing laws for the "Art. 1. The decrees of November 25, 1853, and July 7, 1854, are void." Reynolds, p. 331. And again, on October 16, 1856, a decree "4. The judicial, civil, or administrative was passed while Ignacio Comonfort was authorities shall admit no claims of any kind president, the first article of which is as folnor petitions whose purpose is to obtain in-lows: demnifications from the public treasury for the damages the unlawful holders or owners may allege under the provisions of the preceding article; and they shall preserve their right only against the persons from whom they have the lands they are now compelled to return." Reynolds, p. 324. The court of private land claims was divided. Three of the justices were of opinion that as this government recognized *San-[290] ta Anna in negotiating with ard purchasing On July 5, 1854, he published another de-from him the territory within the Gadsden cree, which was even more specific, contain- purchase, the courts must also recognize his ing these provisions: declarations in respect to titles as authori"Art. 1. The titles of all the alienations of tative, citing in support of these general prop public lands made in the territory of the Re-ositions Wheaton's International Law, §§ public from September, 1821, till date, 31 and 32, and Halleck's International Law, whether by the general authorities or by pages 47 and 62. Without questioning the those of the extinguished states and depart-general propositions laid down in these auments, shall be submitted to the revision of thorities, we are of opinion that too much the supreme government, without which weight was given to the decree of Santa Anna they shall have no value and shall constitute of November 25, 1853, the only one no right of property. nounced before the cession, and that that decree should not be considered as absolutely determinative of individual rights and titles. an "5. The alienations of public lands, of whatever nature they be, that have While it is true that practically Santa been made by the authorities and officials of Anna occupied for the time being the posithe departments without the knowledge and tion of dictator, it must not be forgotten approval of the general government, during that Mexico. since its separation from Spain the epoch when the central system was in in 1821, was assuming to act as a republic force in the Republic, are void. subject to express constitutional limitations. [289] *"6. Those made by said authorities in the While temporary departures are disclosed in epoch of the extinguished federation are like her history, the dominant and continuous wise void; provided they were not made for thought was of a popular government under the purpose of extending and promoting col-a constitution which defined rights, duties, onization, which was the purpose proposed and powers. In that aspect the spasmodic by the law of August 18, 1824. decrees made by dictators in the occasional "7. Grants or sales of lands made to pri-interruptions of constitutional government vate individuals, companies, or corporations should not be given conclusive weight in the 171 U. S. determination of rights created during peace- for. The decree of the Court of Private Land ful and regular eras. The devestiture of Claims will be reversed, and the case remandtitles once legally vested is a judicial act. Jed for further proceedings. ROBERT PERRIN, Appt., V. STATES, Crittenden Land & Camou v. United States, 171 U. S. 277 [ante, [No. 30.] In governments subject to ordinary constitutional limitations a mere executive declaration disturbs no rights that have been vested, and simply presents in any given case to the judicial department the inquiry whether the rights claimed to have been UNITED vested were legally so vested. Undoubtedly this government dealing with Mexico, and finding Santa Anna in control, rightfully dealt with him in a political way in the negotiation of a treaty and the purchase of territory, and the judicial department of this government must recognize the action of its executive and political department as controlling. But when the courts are called upon to inquire as to personal rights existing Argued March 16, 17, 1898. Decided May in the ceded territory, a mere declaration by the temporary executive cannot be deemed absolutely and finally controlling. It is unAPPEAL from a decree of the Court of [291]necessary to rest this case upon the fact dis-Private Land Claims decreeing that the closed that these decrees of Santa Anna were claim of the plaintiff, Robert Perrin, to a immediately thereafter revoked. It is not tract of land formerly in the state of Sonora significant that the substance of them was in the Republic of Mexico, but now in the thereafter re-established. We are compelled to inquire whether prior to such decree there were rights vested, rights which the Mexican government recognized, and then determine whether those rights were by such decree ab-manded for further proceedings. solutely destroyed. 31, 1898. territory of Arizona, known and designated as the Rancho San Ygnacio del Babocomari, described in his petition, is invalid, and dismissing the petition. Reserved, and case reThe facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Byron Waters, John T. Mor gan, and J. II. Meredith for appellant. Messrs. Matthew G. Reynolds and John K. Richards, Solicitor General, for appellee. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: Turning to the decree of November 25, 1853, the first and second articles are mere declarations of law. The third article directs the officials to proceed to the execution of the decree and to recover and take possession of the lands coming within the scope of the prior articles. It does not appear that any steps were taken by any officials to carry into execution this decree. Whether this So far as the question of title is concerned particular grant came within the scope of the this case is similar to the one immediately two declarations of law was a question to be preceding. (Camou v. United States, 171 U. Š. considered and determined. On that ques-277 [ante, 163]). For reasons therein stated tion the grantee never was heard. There never was a judicial adjudication that his grant came within the scope of the first two articles. He was never dispossessed. His property was never taken possession of. It is going too far to hold that the mere declaration of a rule of law made by a temporary dictaor, never enforced as against an individual grantee in possession of lands, is to be regarded as operative and determinative of the latter's rights. As for the reasons heretofore mentioned we are of opinion that a valid grant was made in this case, we think this arbitrary declaration by a temporary dictator was not potent to destroy the title. The decree of the court of private land claims must therefore be reversed. As shown by the statement of facts the survey of the land ciaimed in the petition is in excess of the four sitios granted and paid for. While the excess is not so great as in many cases, yet we think the rule laid down in Ely's Administrator v. United States, 171 U. S. 220 [ante, 142] should control, and that this government discharges its full duty under the treaty when it recognizes a grant as valid to the amount of land paid the decree of the court of private land claims will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. It is true, as suggested in its opinion, the court of private land claims thought that there was no sufficient location of the tract in controversy, and that probably the grant was void for uncertainty in the description of the property. It may be that this conclusion was right. At the same time, in view of what has been recently said by this court in respect to boundaries, description and area, we think that justice requires that we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Perhaps the claimants may be able to satisfactorily identify a tract not larger than the area purchased and paid for which should equitably be recognized as the tract granted. [292] (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 293-312.) Rights under mining claim-end lines-declarations of superintendent-end lines must be straight. 1. The right to follow a vein on the dip is limited by the end lines of the mining claim, in case of a patent under the act of 1866, as well as in case of a location under the act of 1872. 2. The end lines of a mining claim under the act of 1866 must be the end lines of all the veins found within the surface boundaries which are given to the locator by the act of APPEAL from a decree of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirming as modified the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, which was mainly in favor of the complainant, Austin Walrath, in an action brought by him against the Champion Mining Company, for a perpetual injunction, restraining defendants and their agents and servants from entering upon certain lands in the county of Nevada, state of California, and mining therein, and from extracting or removing therefrom any gold bearing quartz. Affirmed. See same case below, 44 U. S. App. 291, 72 Fed. Rep. 978, 19 C. C. A. 323. Statement by Mr. Justice McKenna: This action, brought in the superior court of Nevada county, California, involves title to a triangular shaped section of what is known as the “Contact," "Ural" or "Back" ledge of gold-bearing ore, situated in the same county, claimed by appellant to be a portion of the Providence Mine, to which complainant has title through a patent from the United States, and by appellee, a corporation, to be a part of the New Years Extension Mine owned by it. The relative situation of the two properties and the portion of the ledge in controversy is shown by the following figure No. 1; the disputed section being contained between the lines thereon marked "Line claimed by Providence" and "Line claimed by Champion." [See cut on opposite page.] The figures marked "New Years" and "New Years Extension" represent the surface of the mining properties owned by defendant. while that marked "Providence Mine" represents the surface of the patented ground of the plaintiff. The action was brought May 24, 1892, to recover $300,000 damages for ore extracted from the ledge and carried away by the defendant, and for an injunction against further trespasses thereon. Upen motion of appellee the action was removed to the United States circuit court, as involving a Federal question, where the conplainant recast his pleadings so as to separate the action into a bill in equity, upon which the action is now proceeding, and an action at law for the damages alleged. The suit in equity was tried in the circuit court and decided mainly in favor of the appellee. From this decree the appellant appealed to the court of appeals for the ninth circuit.[296] where it was modified, and, as modified, aifirmed. The appellant now brings the case to this court upon writ of error from the court of uppeals. The appellant's title is deraigned as follows: In 1857, under the miners' rules and customs then in force, thirty-one locators located 3,100 feet of the Providence or Granite lode. By mesne conveyances the title to this location became vested in the Providence Gold & Silver Mining Company and on April 28, 1871, that company obtained a patent to 3,100 feet of the lode and for surface ground as described in the patent. The title thus granted to the Providence Gold & Silver Mining Company was, before the commencement of this suit, vested in the appellant. The ledge, as granted by the patent, extends 30 feet north of the north surface line of the location and some 680 feet south of the south surface line. The patent conveyed only the Providence ledge and the surface ground. All other ledges contained within the surface lines were expressly reserved. It is also contended by appellants that, by the act of Congress of May 10, 1872, exclusive possession of all the surface included within the lines of the location was granted to the owners of the Providence, together with all other lodes or ledges having their tops or apexes within such surface lines. This grant, of course, included the Contact vein, subsequently discovered within said boundaries, and now constituting the bone of contention in this action. NOTE.-A8 to ownership of mines; United As to title to water by appropriation; comStates statutes as to; right of support of sur- mon-law rule; rule of mining states,—see note face,-see note to United States v. Castillero, to Atchison v. Peterson. 22: 414. 17: 448. 170 171 U. S. [295] The Contact vein is shown in the figure, fendant, the Champion Mining Company, and crosses the surface line f-g of the Provi- made a location upon the Contact vein called dence location. the New Years Extension Mine. This location overlapped, both as to surface ground On September 29, 1877, the appellee and de |