a rectangle 1 yard by 4 yards, and therefore might have struck the same plate on a battle ship. While it is thought that these results are such that they are likely to be rarely duplicated, it is believed that they may be considered indicative of the beneficial results to be obtained from the adoption of the practice of blending powder."

The results of practice with guns below 6 inches in caliber have not as a rule, been satisfactory. It is believed that this can be correctly attributed to two causes; first, that the carriages of these guns are not equipped for the use of quadrant elevations, and, second, that in many cases the handling of these guns has been faulty, in that corrections based on observation of fire have either not been made or have been made separately for each gun by the gun pointer. It is believed that guns of all calibers should be laid by quadrant elevations and the use of tangent sight elevations discarded. I have recommended, therefore, that all carriages not equipped for using quadrant elevations be so equipped, and the Ordnance Department is now engaged in the work of carrying out this recommendation.

Actual battle conditions will be more closely simulated in target practice this year than before, in that the second service practice of the year will be fire-command practice, which has heretofore been held with subcaliber charges only. This practice is particularly valuable to field officers of Coast Artillery in affording them an opportunity to exercise fire control under the conditions that would obtain in action. There is, however, one phase of naval attack against which the Coast Artillery has been unable to simulate a defense by actual firing—that is, a night attack. While night practice is not of so much importance with large-caliber guns and mortars, which are provided with an accurate system of fire direction, it is considered as absolutely necessary for the attainment of a proper standard of efficiency with smallcaliber guns, to which the adopted system of fire direction is not applicable, and which must depend, therefore, on a system based on the accurate observation and correction of fire.

For the successful application of such a system actual firing under all the conditions that will be met in action is a necessity. As these guns are provided for the defense of the mine fields and for the prevention of torpedo-boat destroyers or other small swift vessels slipping into the harbor (both of which forms of attack are far more likely to occur at night than during the day), it is evident that the practice with these guns can not be confined with safety to day firing. This practice could it is thought be conducted without danger to shipping by announcing beforehand to all concerned the dates and hours of the practice, and as but one hour on each of several occasions during the year would be required, it is believed that the slight inconvenience to shipping would be far more than offset by the increased value of the coast defenses.

THE MILITIA AND COAST DEFENSE.

In my last annual report I pointed out that the organized militia of the country could be utilized to great advantage in the defense of the coast line. It was suggested in that report that if one half of

a Since writing the above one record of practice has been received which is even better than that cited and one other nearly as good.

the total personnel required to provide one manning body-one shiftfor the guns and mortars now mounted or to be mounted in the United States proper was made up of regular Coast Artillery, the remaining half might well be supplied from the organized militia of the seacoast States. It was indicated, also, that the small bodies of infantry troops, called "artillery supports," required to protect the land approaches of the batteries against a sudden attack of small landing parties from ships in action against the batteries might well be supplied from the organized militia of these States.

It was further urged that the War Department take up this question with the authorities of the several States with a view to engaging their interest in the matter and to developing, if possible, practical cooperation between the regular Coast Artillery and the militia of the coast States in all matters affecting coast defense.

Pursuant to instructions from the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief of Artillery, in February, 1907, submitted a memorandum on this subject which presented a tentative definite scheme for the cooperation of the regular Coast Artillery and the organized militia in coast-defense work. This memorandum was approved by the Secretary of War and published for the information and guidance of all concerned in Circular No. 17, War Department, 1907.

A salient feature of this scheme is to encourage the organized militia of the seacoast States to participate annually in joint practical coast-defense exercises with the regular Coast Artillery. It was thought that if a certain portion of the organized militia could be set apart as coast artillery in each seaboard State, and if this portion could be brought into close affiliation with the regular Coast Artillery in drill, instruction, and in practical coast-defense exercises, such militia could be easily and expeditiously brought to a fair degree of efficiency in serving the big coast guns and mortars, the range and position-finding accessories, the power and light installations, the electrical communication system, and in planting and serving the submarine mines.

A second important feature of this scheme provides that" artillery supports" be provided from the militia infantry of the coast States for the defense of the land approaches of each fort. It was suggested that certain infantry troops be set apart in each coast State for the land defense of those forts which are located on the shore line of the State, and that such field guns and machine guns as might be necessary in each case to supplement the infantry defense should be kept on hand in store at the forts, respectively.

The scheme further contemplated that the militia troops assigned as coast artillery would, after proper instruction, be assigned permanently to the service of some battery of guns or mortars or to other artillery material, and that thereby they would become in time of peace intimately familiar with the service of the material and the special hydrographic features of the water approaches in front of the batteries.

It also contemplated that the militia assigned to defend the land. approaches to the batteries from the rear should be permanently assigned to the particular locality, would determine the best lines of defense to lay down, arrange the details in regard to constructing intrenchments and redoubts on the outbreak of war, and work out the personnel required and the field and machine guns neces

sary. Circular No. 17 shows, in the table attached thereto, some of these details. They have been entered in a purely tentative way merely as an illustration as to how the details should be worked out. It should be understood in considering this table that the special study of each locality will develop modifications of the numbers of infantry indicated in the table as required for artillery supports and the number of field guns and machine guns to be used in connection therewith. Furthermore, as the interests being defended change, the details of the defensive scheme will change also.

A copy of Circular No. 17 was sent by the War Department to the governor of each coast State, and the cooperation of the State authorities invited in carrying out the scheme proposed in the circular. The replies received indicate much interest on the part of the State authorities in coast-defense measures, and many expressed the opinion that the scheme was feasible and stated that they desired to cooperate. The Chief of Artillery was instructed subsequently to arrange a series of joint army and militia coast-defense exercises for the summer of 1907, in accordance with the scheme presented in Circular No. 17, and invitations were extended to all of the coast States to designate troops to participate therein, in accordance with the authority contained in Section IX of the act of Congress approved January 21, 1903 (G. O. No. 7, A. G. O., 1903). Each coast State was asked to assign a certain number of companies to act as “artillery reserves and a certain other number of companies to act as "artillery supports." The plan for the exercises provided that each regular coast artillery company should be linked for drill and instruction purposes with a militia company acting as coast artillery, and that the officers and men of these two linked companies should affiliate as closely as possible in all matters pertaining to their duties; it was contemplated that each officer and each man of the regular companies would act as the coach and tutor of the corresponding officer and man of the linked militia company. It was the theory that by this policy instruction would be most expeditiously given and good fellowship would develop between the regulars and militia.

The plan for the exercises further provided that regular officers of the cavalry and infantry should be detailed to instruct the artillery supports, in a general way, in the duties of outposts, patrols, and particularly in their duties in repelling an attack on the coast batteries from the rear.

All of the coast States, except Delaware, Virginia, and North Carolina, responded favorably to the invitation of the War Department. These States gave as the reason for not participating that arrangements had been made for their troops to go to the Jamestown Exposition, and that the trips would operate to make it impracticable to accept the invitation. Texas wished to participate, but owing to the fact that the defenses of Galveston have not yet been rehabilitated since the storm of 1900, no coast-defense exercises could be held at Galveston, and it was too far to transport the Texas troops to the nearest places at which exercises were to be held, at San Diego, Cal., on the west, and at Pensacola, Fla., on the east.

Owing to the destruction wrought along the Gulf coast by the storms of last fall, it was impracticable to hold any exercises at New Orleans or Mobile. The authorities of Alabama requested that the