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Opinion of the Court.

In this case also, as in that, the decision is that
So much of the decree of the Circuit Court as restrains the

defendunts from proceeding under the railroad commission
act to establish reasonable rates and regulations is set aside,
but so much of it as restrains the enforcement of the rates
already established is affirmed. The costs in this court
will be divided between the parties.

REAGAN v. MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY.

REAGAN v. MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

Nos. 1168, 1169.

Submitted April 13, 1894. – Decided May 26, 1894.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., ante, 362, followed.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. C. A. Culberson, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Mr. H. C. Coke, and Mr. W. S. Simkins for appellants in both

cases.

Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. E. B. Kruttschnitt, and Mr. John J. McCook for the Mercantile Trust Company, appellee, in both cases.

Mr. Alexander G. Cochran and Mr. Winslow S. Pierce for the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, appellee in No. 1168, and for the Tyler Southeastern Railway Company, appellee in No. 1169.

Mr. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

These are cases in which, as in those just decided, the tariff established by the Texas Railroad Commission was challenged, and with like result. The St. Louis Southwestern Railway

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Opinion of the Court.

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Company, named in the first of these cases, is called by counsel for defendants in their brief “a reorganized bankrupt concern.” Its road has a total mileage, including main line and branches, of 572 miles. It would seem to be a railroad which was unwisely built, and one whose operating expenses have always exceeded its earnings. Counsel say that “it is familiarly known in Texas as a 'teazer,' and, if it ever passes beyond this interesting but unprofitable stage, even its friends will be surprised.” We are not advised, and we can hardly be expected to take judicial notice of what is meant by the term

teazer,” but it is clearly disclosed by the record that this was an unprofitable road.

The Tyler Southeastern Railway Company, named in the second suit, has a short road of ninety miles, and also appears as a “reorganized bankrupt concern,” and one whose road has been operated with constant loss. In the record in each case is found two annual reports returned to the railroad commission, one for the year ending June 30, 1891, and the other for that ending June 30, 1892. Comparing the statements in these reports, appellants' counsel say that the business of the roads has largely increased since the establishment of the rates made by the commission, and urge that no complaint can be made of action which has resulted so favorably. But an examination shows that the report for the year ending June 30, 1891, includes only the earnings and operating expenses for the single month commencing June 1, 1891, when the new company took possession and commenced operations; and so the enormous increase spoken of is simply the difference between the earnings and expenses for twelve months and those for one month. The bills, with their amendments, allege a decrease in the tonnage as well as a decrease in the rates.

We think, therefore, the cases come within the reasoning of the prior opinions, and that it will not do to hold that, because the roads have been operating in the past at a loss to the owners, it is just and reasonable to so reduce the rates as to increase the amount of that loss. IIence,

The decrees here will be like those ordered in the prior cases.

Opinion of the Court.

REAGAN V. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COM

PANY

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.

No. 1170. Submitted April 13, 1894. – Decided May 26, 1894.

Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, ante, 362, followed.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. C. A. Culberson, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Mr. H. C. Coke, and Mr. W. S. Simkins for appellants.

Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. John J. McCook, Mr. H. B. Turner, and Mr. E. B. Kruttschnitt for the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, appellees.

Mr. George R. Peck and Mr. J. W. Terry for the Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fé Railway Company, appellee.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is controlled by the opinions in the four preceding cases. There are one or two differences of fact, but nothing affecting the merits of the controversy. The Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fé Railroad Company was incorporated by the State of Texas, but a part of its line was constructed through the Indian Territory under authority of an act of Congress. The figures as to earnings, etc., are also different, but they tend to the same result as to the reasonableness of the rates.

A like decree will be entered in this as in the former cases.

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Statement of the Case.

PITTSBURGH, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST.

LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY v. BACKUS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.

No. 899. Argued March 27, 28, 1894. - Decided May 26, 1894.

The act of the legislature of Indiana of March 6, 1891, concerning taxation,

is not obnoxious to the constitutional objections made to it, since the Supreme Court of that State has decided : (1) That the constitution of that State authorizes such a method of

assessing railroad property, which decision is binding on this

court; and (2) That the act gives the railroad companies the right to be heard

before final determination of the question, which construction is

conclusive on this court; and, further, since (3) A tax law which grants to the taxpayer a right to be heard on the

assessment of his property before final judgment provides a due process of law for determining the valuation, although it makes

no provision for a rehearing. When a railroad runs into or through two or more States, its value, for

taxation purposes, in each is fairly estimated by taking that part of the value of the entire road which is measured by the proportion of the

length of the particular part in that State to that of the whole road. The judgment of a state board empowered to fix a valuation for taxation,

cannot be set aside by the testimony of witnesses that the valuation was other than that fixed by the board, where there is no evidence of fraud or of gross error in the system on which the valuations were made.

On March 6, 1891, the legislature of the State of Indiana passed an act entitled “ An act concerning taxation, repealing all laws in conflict therewith, and declaring an emergency," Laws 1891, c. 99, pp. 199 to 291, which, expressly repealing “all laws and parts of laws within the purview of this act," provided in itself a complete and comprehensive system of taxation. By it all property of individuals and ordinary corporations was subject to valuation and assessment by county officers, while the assessment of railroad property was committed to a state board of tax commissioners, composed of the governor, secretary of State, auditor of State, and two appointees of the governor. To this board, in addition to

Statement of the Case.

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the assessment of railroad property, was given the duty of equalizing the assessment of real estate throughout the State, as well as of entertaining appeals from the decisions of the several county boards. This method of assessing railroad property by a state board, as distinguished from the assessment of ordinary property through county officers, was not by this act for the first time introduced into the legislation of Indiana, though by it some changes were made in the organization of the state board, and in the details of proced

ure.

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By section 129 the board was required to “convene in the office of the auditor of State, on the first Monday of August each year, for the

for the purpose of assessing railroad property and equalizing the assessment of real estate, as provided in this act,” and “is hereby given all the powers given to county boards of review.” By section 132 authority was given to adjourn from time to time, with a proviso that “the duration of their sessions shall not exceed forty days.” Section 3 is in these words:

“Sec. 3. All property within the jurisdiction of this state, not expressly exempted, shall be subject to taxation."

In section 4 it is provided : “Shares in corporations, all the property of which is taxable to the corporation itself, shall not be assessed to the shareholder.”

By section 8 personal property was to be listed for taxation as of the first day of April in each year.

The property of railroad corporations was divided into two classes -- railroad track and rolling stock — and by sections 78 and 80 defined as follows:

“Sec. 78. Such right of way, including the superstructures, main, side or second track and turnouts, turn-table, telegraph poles, wires, instruments and other appliances, and the stations and improvements of the railroad company on such right of way, (excepting machinery, stationary engines, and other fixtures, which shall be considered personal property,) shall be held to be real estate for the purpose of taxation, and denominated railroad track.'

“SEC. 80. The movable property belonging to a railroad

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