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to the judgment in the hands of the trustees that it would have
had to the bills before judginent, is a question which we need not
now decide. It is certain that the appellant cannot hold the judg-
ment as against the trustees, any more than it could the bills.
The decree is affirmed.

Mr. T. D. Lincoln for appellant.
Mr. George Hoadly and Mr. Edgar M. Johnson for appellees..

CORRY v. CAMPBELL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OHIO. No 187. Argued February 12, 1878.- Decided February 18, 1878. Affirmed on the authority of Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The only Federal question presented by this record was decided at the present term in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, and the judgment is affirmed upon that authority. We have no power to correct the errors of state courts in respect to the details of assessments made by municipal corporations upon private property to defray the expenses of street improvements. Upon all such questions the action of the state court is final. There can be no doubt but that our jurisdiction is at an end if we find that sufficient provision has been made by law for contesting such a charge, when imposed, by an appropriate adversary proceeding in the ordinary courts of justice. Affirmed.

Mr. John W. Okey, Mr. Thos. L. Young and Mr. Wm. M. Corry for plaintiff in error.

Mr. T. B. Paxton, Mr. E. A. Ferguson and Mr. J. W. Warrington for defendant in error.

HUTCHINSON v. THE NORTHFIELD.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 213. Argued February 7 and 8, 1878.- Decided February 18, 1878.

On a review of the facts it is held that the Northfield was free from fault and the decree below is affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.

The leading facts in this case were concurred in by the District Court and by the Circuit Court. Upon a careful review we are of the opinion that the conclusions reached were correct.

The schooner was free from fault, and her owner is confessedly entitled to his damages for her loss.

The misconduct of the Hunter (the tug) is so clearly established that it would be time wasted to illustrate it, and while the absence of fault on the part of the Northfield is a subject of more strenuous contention, we do not find much difficulty on that point.

The charges against her are, that she ran at too great speed, and that she held her speed too long.

She was a ferry boat running between New York and Staten Island, her ordinary rate of speed being sixteen miles to the hour, or thereabouts. On this occasion she put out of her New York slip at that rate of speed, with a helm partly ported, in the forenoon of a pleasant day, on an ebb tide, with smooth water, heading about southwest, with the tug and its tow on her starboard side and in full view. She made her speed and her course with deliberation and upon the facts as they were before her. Her officers perfectly understood that under the 13th of the sailing rules the responsibility devolved on her of keeping out of the way of the tug. The officers of the tug also perfectly understood that under the 18th of the same rules it was their duty to keep the tug on its course. The officers of each vessel had the right to assume that the other vessel would do its duty, and to make their course and keep their speed upon that assumption. The evidence shows that the two vessels kept their courses and their speed, the tug going from four to six miles per hour, until the Northfield was within some eight hundred or nine hundred feet of the tug, when the latter stopped, so that, as the captain of the lost schooner says, she lay perfectly still on the water and ported her helm. The Northfield at once reversed her engine, but could not check her speed sufficiently to prevent a collision, and struck the schooner just forward of the mizzen rigging, about thirty feet from her stern, the schooner projecting aft of the tug.

If the tug had made thirty feet while the Northfield was making eight hundred feet, between the stopping of the tug and the collision, it is plain there would have been no collision. If the speed of the tug was five miles to the hour, it would have been about one-third of that of the Northfield, if not stopped or checked, and she would have gone one-third of this distance, that is, two hundred and sixty-three feet, before the Northfield could have reached her by traversing the eight hundred feet. All this was evident to the experienced eye of the manager of the Northfield, and no negligence can be charged in relying and acting upon it.

If the tug was moving at the speed of two miles only to the hour, as is assumed in some places, the proposition would not be so manifest, but the fault on the one side and the accurate judgment on the other would be equally certain. The convergence of the lines would have caused no material difference in the position of the vessel.

It is not alleged in the briefs that the failure of the engine of the Northfield to turn on its centre, by which the reverse motion could have been sooner obtained, is evidence of a defective machine, or of improper management of it. It is alleged simply as evidence of unreasonable speed, by which the prompt handling of the vessel was embarrassed.

This depends entirely upon the suggestions already discussed, and if the speed was reasonable, the course correct and the judgment wise, the failure of the engine to act as desired is an incidental result merely and no fault in consequence of it can be charged upon the Northfield.

There was no good reason at any time to suppose that the Northfield intended to cross the bows of the tow. As she came out of her slip she headed to the south, swinging gradually to the west, and for a time her course pointed across the bow of the tow; but this was temporary, and was constantly altering. The attempt thus to cross would have been rash and attended with many dangers, and never was, in fact, entertained for a moment by the Northfield.

We are of the opinion that the Northfield was free from fault, and that the decree should be Affirmed.

Mr. Henry J. Scudder and Mr. James C. Carter for appellant. Mr. W. A. Beach and Mr. Miles Beach for appellee.

CLARK v. BEECHER.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 214. Argued February 8, 1878. Decided March 25, 1878.

A decree setting aside a conveyance by a bankrupt to his wife as fraudulent is sustained; but it is also held that a personal decree against her for rents, issues and profits, and for the use and occupation of the premises was

error.

MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.

The bill charges that a fraudulent settlement was made by

Abraham Clark, the bankrupt, upon the appellant, his wife. Circuit Court decreed against her and she brought the case here for review.

Recently several of these cases in their aspects of both fact and law have been very fully considered by this court.

Each controversy must necessarily depend for its termination. upon its own facts and circumstances. The rules of law which apply are well settled. In this case nothing could be gained either to the profession or the parties by going in detail over the facts or the law, however elaborately the work was done.

We, therefore, deem it sufficient to say that we are satisfied with the judgment of the Circuit Court upon the main point brought before it for consideration. We think the conveyance complained of was properly condemned as fraudulent, and, therefore, held to be void.

But it is equally clear that the personal decree against the appellant for the rents, issues and profits, and the use and occupation of the premises, was erroneous.

Upon this subject it is sufficient to refer to the opinion of this court in the cases of Phipps v. Sedgwick, and of Place v. Sedgwick, 95 U. S. 3, and to the opinion in the United States Trust Company v. Sedgwick, 97 U. S. 304, just delivered.

This case will be remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to modify the decree in conformity to this opinion.

Mr. Luther R. Marsh and Mr. W. F. Shepherd for appellant.
Mr. Francis N. Bangs for appellee.

STRONG v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 87. Submitted January 14, 1878. - Decided February 11, 1878.

By the terms of a charter party to the United States, the owner of a vessel undertook to keep her tight, staunch, strong and sound, and her machinery, boilers and everything pertaining to her in perfect working order, and to provide her with everything necessary for efficient seaservice. The government undertook to deliver the vessel to the owner in New York at the expiration of the charter party in as good condition as she was at the signing of it, ordinary wear and tear, damage by the elements, bursting of boilers, breaking of machinery excepted. The vessel was injured and sunk by a marine risk assumed by the charterer while engaged in the transportation of stores and men in the waters of North Carolina. She was raised and taken to New Berne, where she was tem

porarily repaired by the government; but, being found out of order, was discharged at Port Royal by the government, and taken to New York by the owner. Held, that by reason of the failure of the owner to keep the vessel tight, staunch, strong and sound, the government was relieved from its liability to deliver the vessel to the owner in New York.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

In this action upon a charter party, executed March 15, 1862, between Strong and the United States, for the use of his steamer Ocean Wave, he asks judgment for the amount he expended in repairing her after she had been discharged from the service of the government, and also for per-diem compensation, at the rate fixed in the contract, for the time occupied in taking her from Port Royal, North Carolina, to New York, and in repairing her.

The Court of Claims was equally divided upon the question of his right to recover, and his petition was dismissed.

By the terms of the charter party the government was entitled to the whole and exclusive use of the steamer during the term she was in its service. To the extent of her capacity, it was the duty of Strong to receive and transport all the "passengers" and the "stores, wares and merchandise" which the government might send to her. Her use was not limited to any particular waters, and as it was clearly within the contemplation of the contracting parties that she would be employed in aid of the military forces then engaged in the war for the maintenance of the Union, sending her to the waters of North Carolina and there employing her for the transportation of stores and men were clearly authorized by the charter party. Munitions of war were "stores," and soldiers, "passengers," within the meaning of that instrument.

Nor was it an unauthorized use of the vessel to send her up the Neuse River with other boats, on the expedition ordered in December, 1862, by General Foster, of the Federal forces. Before starting, a thirty-pound Parrott gun and its carriage, such as are used on naval vessels, together with ammunition for the gun, and seventeen artillerymen, with their small arms and provisions for the expedition were put on board. The presence of the artilleryinen on the vessel was certainly not inconsistent with the terms of the charter party. In reference to the gun, it is claimed by Strong that the vessel had not the capacity to bear safely such a heavy piece of artillery, and, consequently, that such a use of her was prohibited by the charter party. Her captain objected at the time to the gun being placed on her, but his objections were disregarded. It is not stated in the findings whether the gun was placed on the

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