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BURR v. MYERS.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 223. Argued March 24, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880.

The court has no jurisdiction in this case.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. The matters in dispute on this appeal are those presented by the exceptions to the master's report. These are:

First exception

Second exception. First item.

Second item
Third item
Fourth item

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17.50

117.55

273.76

Total as of February 25, 1873

$1773.76

The addition of interest to this amount from the date at which the master made up the account until the decree below will not make the value of the amount in dispute equal to that necessary to give us jurisdiction. Appeal dismissed.

Mr. C. H. Armes for appellant.

Mr. John F. Hanna and Mr. James M. Johnston for appellee.

DALLAS COUNTY v. HUIDEKOPER.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 225. Argued March 25, 1880.- Decided April 5, 1880.

County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, and Smith v. Clark County, 54 Missouri, 59, followed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. We think the only question in this case was settled by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Smith v. County of Clark, 54 Mo. 59, where it was held on a petition for rehearing, after the case had been once decided, p. 81, that "whether the corporation had a legal existence or not when the subscription was made, is a question that cannot be raised in a collateral proceeding." In this case, as in that, the corporation "did exist as a matter of fact, and was in the exercise of all its chartered franchises when the

subscription was made and the bonds issued.” That cases like this, was a suit upon coupons for interest attached to bonds issued by the county in payment for its subscription to the capital stock of a railroad corporation, and the point made was, "that the charter of the company had ceased before the company was organized.” That, the court said, was "a question between the State and the company,” and gave judgment against the county. We had occasion to consider the same question in County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U. S. 272, 276, and held the same way.

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. S. H. Boyd, Mr. A. D. Matthews and Mr. B. L. Brush for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Joseph Shippen for defendant in error.

DALLAS COUNTY V. HUIDEKOPER.

SAME V. DAVOL.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No8. 224 and 226. Argued March 25, 1880.

Decided April 6, 1880.

Dallas County v. Huidekoper, ante, 664, followed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

These are suits in equity to enjoin the collection of judgments against Dallas County on coupons for interest attached to the same class of bonds just considered in Dallas County v. Huidekoper, No. 225, ante, 654, and relief is asked on the ground that the charter of the railroad company had expired before any organization was effected under it, and that this fact was not known to the county until after the judgment was rendered. After what has been said in the other case, it is clear that the bills were properly dismissed without considering the power of a court of equity to sustain such a suit, and the decree in each of the cases is consequently

Afirmed.

Mr. S. H. Boyd, Mr. A. D. Matthews and Mr. B. L. Brush for appellant.

Mr. Joseph Shippen for appellees.

BANK OF THE REPUBLIC v. MILLARD.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 240. Submitted October 27, 1879. – Decided November 3, 1879.
Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, followed.

MOTION TO DISMISS. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The value of the inatter in dispute in this case is less than twenty-five hundred dollars, and, therefore, under our ruling in Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, the judgment is not now reviewable here. The special allowance of a writ of error to reverse a former judgment in the same cause, under which a reversal was had, cannot be made applicable to this writ, because the case as now presented is entirely different from what it was before. In fact, after the case went back, it was made to conform to what, as was suggested in the opinion reported in 10 Wall. 157, might perhaps entitle the plaintiff to recover.

The motion to dismiss is granted, each party to pay his own costs.

Dismissed. Mr. J. H. Bradley for plaintiff in error. Mr. R. D. Mussey for defendant in error.

GAGE v. CARRAHER.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 243. Submitted April 6, 1880. — Decided April 12, 1880. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, followed.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The order remanding this cause to the state court is affirmed on the authority of Meyer v. Construction Co., 100 U. S. 457. Carraher occupies one side of the controversy about which the suit is brought, that is to say, the title to the property in question, and Portia Gage, Henry H. Gage and John Forsythe the other. Henry H. Gage and Forsythe are citizens of the same State with Carraher. There is no controversy in the suit which is wholly between citizens of different States and which can be fully determined as between them.

Affirmed. Mr. Henry D. Beam for appellant. Mr. James E. Munroe and Mr. W. C. Goudy for appellee.

THE LOUISVILLE, GIBSON, Claimant, v. HALLIDAY.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

us.

No. 278. Argued April 23, 1880.– Decided April 26, 1880. The findings of fact by the Circuit Court in an admiralty suit are conclu

sive upon this court. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

It is conceded that upon the facts found by the Circuit Court the decree appealed from was right. That finding is conclusive upon

The Abbotsford, 98 U. S. 440. No exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court in the progress of the trial.

An appeal in admiralty from the District Court to the Circuit Court vacates the decree appealed from. The case is heard de novo in the Circuit Court, without any regard to what was done below. An entire new decree is entered, which the Circuit Court carries into execution. The cause is not remanded to the District Court. After the suit once.gets into the Circuit Court it is proceeded with substantially in the same way as it would have been if originally begun in that court. The Lucille, 19 Wall. 74; Montgomery v. Anderson, 21 How. 388; Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch, 283.

Afirmed. Mr. T. D. Lincoln for appellants. Mr. William B. Gilbert for appellee.

JOUAN V. DIVOLL.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 485. Submitted December 22, 1879. -- Decided January 5, 1880. This decree is affirmed on the facts on the various points stated in the opin

ion of the court. Mr. Chief JustICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court.

We think the evidence shows that Divoll was induced to make his purchase from Cooke on the representation of Jouan that Cooke was the owner of one-half the claim. For this reason Jouan is now estopped from denying Cooke's title. As Jouan and Cooke have settled all their disputes, and Jouan has been released by Cooke from all further liability to him under the original assignment, Cooke's representatives are not necessary parties to this suit. This objection does not seem to have been maile below.

VOL. CLIV-42

By the terms of the assignment to Cooke he was bound to pay all costs and expenses incurred in prosecuting the claim. It was right, therefore, to deduct from Divoll's share of the money recovered a corresponding share of the expenses. The decree is

Affirmed.

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No. 943. Submitted January 21, 1880. - Decided March 2, 1880.

The court, being satisfied that the various matters detailed in the opinion

were part and parcel of a scheme devised to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their debts, affirms the decree of the court below in this case.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE Waite delivered the opinion of the court. After a careful consideration of this case, we are entirely satisfied that the consideration of the note executed by William W. Woodfolk to his son, William Woodfolk, on which alone the title of the son to the property in controversy depends, was fictitious, and that the confession of judgment by the father in favor of the son, and the purchase of the property in controversy by the son under execution, were but parts of a scheme devised by the father and son through which it was hoped soinething might be saved from the wreck of the father's fortune at the expense of his bona fide creditors. There is no dispute about the law applicable to these facts, and as it will serve no useful purpose to discuss the evidence in detail, a further opinion on this point will not be delivered.

The purchase of the property at tax sale by the son was, as we think, under the circumstances, nothing more in legal effect than payment of the taxes, so far as the rights of this appellant are concerned. We cannot divest ourselves of the conviction that it was part and parcel of the scheme devised to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their debts.

Decree affirmed. Mr. T. D. W. Yonley for appellants.

Mr. 4. II. Garland for appellee.

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