89. Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U. S. 589, followed. Thompson v. Perrine,
677.
90. Badger v. Ranlett, 106 U. S. 255, followed. Badger v. Ranlett, 677.
91. Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 108 U. S. 18, followed.
Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 678.
CASES DECIDED ON THE FACTS OR WITHOUT OPINION.
1. Affirmed on the authority of several cases of a similar character.
Mineral Point v. Lee, 552.
2. There being no error, the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Supervisors v. Durant, 576.
3. There being no error, the judgment is affirmed. Plant v. Stovall,
584.
4. The decree below is affirmed on the facts. The Eliza Hancox v. Lang-
don, 618.
5. The proof does not make out a case that calls upon this court to over-
rule the judgment of the trial court on questions of fact. Mead v.
Pinyard, 620.
6. Affirmed upon the facts. Mackall v. Richards, 624.
7. The decree below is affirmed upon the facts. Johansson v. Stephanson,
625.
8. The facts stated in the opinion show that there is not a sufficient amount
involved in this case to give this court jurisdiction. Keogh v. Orient
Fire Ins. Co., 639.
9. On the facts, the decree below is reversed in part, and in part affirmed.
Jaeger v. Moore, 641.
10. The finding of the Supreme Court of the State as to the suspension
of General Orders Nos. 60 and 70 is sustained by the evidence.
Burke v. Tregre, 641.
11. In a case of conflicting evidence on a question of fact, the court
affirms the decree of the court below. Case v. Marchand, 642.
12. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed on the facts. Dold
v. United States, 645.
13. On the case made by the pleadings the court will not disturb the
judgment below. North v. McDonald, 649.
14. When the District Court in a State has given a judgment which
involves the finding of a fact in dispute, and that judgment is affirmed
by the Supreme Court of the State, this court will not disturb the
judgment of the latter unless the error be clear. Lammers v. Nissen,
650.
15. This case presents only a question of fact, which was properly decided
in the court below. Ponder v. Delauney, 651.
16. The court finds the disputed facts in favor of the appellee, and enters
a decree accordingly. Fontaine v. McNab, 652.
17. The judgment of the court below is affirmed on the case presented to
this court. United States v. Williams, 652,
18. This decree is affirmed on the facts on the various points stated in
the opinion of the court. Jouan v. Divoll, 657.
19. This case is reversed because this court is not satisfied that the
court below reached a proper conclusion on the facts. Groat v. O'Hare,
660.
20. Affirmed on the facts.
21. Affirmed on the facts.
22. Affirmed on the facts.
23. Affirmed on the facts.
Seward v. Comeau, 665.
Hearst v. Halligan, 669.
Price v. Kelly, 669.
Glover v. Love, 670.
24. The burden of proving this case is on the appellant, but the weight of
the evidence is with the appellee. Mellon v. Delaware, Lackawanna
and Western Railroad Co., 673.
25. Affirmed on the facts. Steever v. Rickman, 678.
See EQUITY, 3;
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1, 2.
1. Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, and Davis v. Weihbold, 139 U. S. 507,
explained and distinguished. Barden v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co.,
288.
2. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409; United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40;
Todd's Case, 13 How. 52; Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697; In
re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222, examined and distinguished. Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 447.
3. Bennett v. Butterworth, 8 How. 124, distinguished. Pittsburgh Locomotive
and Car Works v. Krokuk National Bank, 626.
1. In the bill of lading of a quantity of cases and bales of goods delivered
to the National Steamship Company at Liverpool, and addressed and
consigned to C. in New York, it was provided as follows: "Shipped in
good order and well conditioned
in and upon the steamship
called the Egypt
bound for New York . . . forty-three
being marked and numbered as in the
cases merchandise
margin, and to be delivered subject to the following exceptions and
conditions: . . . The National Steamship Company or its agents
or any of its servants are not to be liable for any damage to any goods
which is capable of being covered by insurance
nor for any
claims for loss
where the loss occurs while the goods are not
actually in the possession of the company. . . The goods to be
taken alongside by the consignee immediately the vessel is ready to
discharge, or otherwise they will be landed by the master and de-
posited at the expense of the consiguee, and at his risk of fire, loss
or injury in the warehouse provided for that purpose, or in the public
store, as the collector of the port of New York shall direct..
The United States Treasury having given permission for goods to
remain forty-eight hours on wharf at New York, any goods so left by
consignee will be at his or their risk of fire, loss or injury." The
Egypt arrived January 31, 1883, was entered at the custom-house at
1.45 P.M. of that day, and, there being no room for her at the pier of
the National Company, where the vessels of that company were usually
unladen, was taken to the pier of the Inman Company. A collector's
permit was given to unload the steamer and to allow the unpermitted
cargo to remain on the wharf for forty-eight hours, upon an agreement
by the steamship company, which was given, that the goods should
be at the sole risk of that company, who would pay to the consignee
or owner the value of such cargo respectively as might be stolen,
burned or otherwise lost. Notice of the time and place of the dis-
charge was then posted upon the bulletin board of the custom-house,
in accordance with custom, but no notice was sent to C., nor did he
have any notice. The cases and bales consigned to him were on the
same day landed on the Inman pier, but he had no knowledge of it,
and had no opportunity to remove the goods on that day; and, if he
had had such knowledge, there was not sufficient time for him to have
entered, paid the duties, obtained the permits for their removal and
removed them. On the night of that day the goods were destroyed
by fire, without any imputed negligence to the National Steamship
Company. Held, (1) that the stipulation in the bill of landing that
respondent should not be liable for a fire happening after unloading
the cargo was reasonable and valid; (2) that the discharge of the
cargo at the Inman pier was not in the eye of the law a deviation such
as to render the carrier an insurer of the goods so unladen; (3) that
if any notice of such unloading was required at all, the bulletin posted
in the custom-house was sufficient under the practice and usages of
the port of New York; (4) that libellants, having taken no steps
upon the faith of the cargo being unladen at respondent's pier, were
not prejudiced by the change; (5) that the agreement of the respon-
dent with the collector of customs to pay the consignee the value of
the goods was not one of which the libellants could avail themselves
as adding to the obligations of their contract with respondent. Con-
stable v. National Steamship Co., 51.
2. If a railroad company, for its own convenience and the convenience of
its customers, is in the habit of issuing bills of lading for cotton de-
livered to a compress company, to be compressed before actual delivery
to the railroad company, with no intention on the part of the shipper
or of the carrier that the liability of the carrier shall attach before
delivery on its cars, and the cotton is destroyed by fire while in the
hands of the compress company, the railroad company is not liable for
the value of the cotton, so destroyed, to an assignee of the bill of lad-
ing without notice of the agreement and course of dealing between
the shipper and the carrier. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mc-
Fadden, 155.
3. It is the duty of a carrier who offers barges for service to have them
often examined and thoroughly inspected, so as to be sure of their
condition. Northern Belle v. Robson, 571.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See ADMIRALTY, 2, 3.
1. A judgment of the highest court of a State, by which the purchaser, at
an administrator's sale under order of a probate court, of land of a
living person, who had no notice of its proceedings, is held to be en-
titled to the land as against him, deprives him of his property without
due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and is reviewable by this court on
writ of error. Scott v. McNeal, 34.
2. This company was incorporated under an act of the legislature of Ken-
tucky, approved February 17, 1846, with authority to construct a
bridge across the Ohio at Cincinnati. The third section of the act
required its confirmation by the State of Ohio, before the corporation
should open its books for subscription; and the eighth section de-
clared that "the president and directors shall have the rights to fix
the rates of toll for passing over said bridge, and to collect the same
from all and every person or persons passing thereon, with their
goods, carriages or animals of every description or kind; provided,
however, that the said company shall lay before the legislature of
this State a correct statement of the costs of said bridge, and an
annual statement of the tolls received for passing the same, and also
the cost of keeping the said bridge in repair, and of the other ex-
penses of the company; and the said president and directors shall,
from time to time, reduce the rates of toll, so that the net profits of
the said bridge shall not exceed fifteen per cent per annum, after the
proper deductions are made for repairs and charges of other descrip-
tions." By an act of the legislature of Ohio, enacted March 9,
1849, this company was made a body corporate and politic of that
State, "with the same franchises, rights and privileges, and sub-
ject to the same duties and liabilities," as were specified in its
original incorporation. Some subsequent legislation took place not
affecting the matter in issue here. The bridge was completed in
1867 at a cost much in excess of what had been contemplated, and
has never earned 15 per cent on its cost. On the 31st of March,
1890, the legislature of Kentucky guacted that it should be unlawful
to charge, collect, demand or receive for passage over the bridge
spanning the Ohio River, constructed under such act of incorporation,
any toll, fare or compensation greater than, or in excess of, certain
rates prescribed by the act, which were much less than the directors
had fixed upon under the eighth section of the act of incorporation,
and made it obligatory upon the company to maintain an office and sell
tickets in Kentucky at those rates. The company refusing to comply
with the requirements of this act, an indictment was found against it.
This was demurred to, and such proceedings were had thereafter
that the defendant was adjudged guilty and fined $1000, and the
judgment was sustained as constitutional by the Court of Appeals of
the State. The case being brought here by writ of error, it is by the
whole court Held, that the Kentucky act of March 3, 1890, in its effect
upon the Bridge Company, violated the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States.
3. The judges concurring in the opinion of the court, (BROWN, HARLAN,
BREWER, SHIRAS and JACKSON, JJ.,) after reviewing in detail the
course of the decisions, announce the following as their grounds for
concurring in this result and in the judgment: (1) That the traffic
across the river was interstate commerce; (2) that the bridge was
an instrument of such commerce; (3) that the statute was an
attempted regulation of such commerce, which the State had no con-
stitutional power to make; (4) that Congress alone possesses the
requisite power to enact a uniform scale of charges in such a case, the
authority of the State being limited to fixing tolls on such channels
of commerce as are exclusively within its territory.
4. The minority of the court (consisting of FULLER, C. J., and FIELD,
GRAY and WHITE, JJ.) gave the reasons for their concurrence in the
result and the judgment as follows: (1) The several States have the
power to establish and regulate ferries and bridges, and the rates of
toll thereon, whether within one State, or between two adjoining
States, subject to the paramount authority of Congress over interstate
commerce. (2) By the concurrent acts of the legislature of Ken-
tucky in 1846, and of the legislature of Ohio in 1849, this bridge
company was made a corporation of each State, and authorized to fix
rates of toll. (3) Congress, by the act of February 17, 1865, c. 39,
declared this bridge "to be, when completed in accordance with the
laws of the States of Ohio and Kentucky, a lawful structure; " but
made no provision as to toils; and thereby manifested the intention
of Congress that the rates of toll should be as established by the two
States. (4) The original acts of incorporation constituted a contract
between the corporation and both States, which could not be altered
by the one State without the consent of the other. Covington & Cin-
cinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 204.
5. Without passing upon the validity of the 5th and 14th sections of the
act of the legislature of Texas of April 3, 1891, establishing a rail-
road commission with power to classify and regulate rates, the re-
mainder of the act is a valid and constitutional exercise of the
state sovereignty, and the commission created thereby is an adminis-
trative board, created for carrying into effect the will of the State, as
expressed by its legislation. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 362.
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