6. A citizen of another State who feels himself aggrieved and injured by
the rates prescribed by that commission may seek his remedy in
equity against the commissioners in the Circuit Court of the United
States in Texas, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over such a
suit under the statutes regulating its general jurisdiction, with the
assent of Texas, expressed in the act creating the commission. Such
a suit is not a suit against the State of Texas. Ib.
7. It is within the power of a court of equity in such case to decree that
the rates so established by the commission are unreasonable and un-
just, and to restrain their enforcement; but it is not within its power
to establish rates itself, or to restrain the commission from again
establishing rates. Ib.
8. The act of the legislature of Indiana of March 6, 1891, concerning
taxation is not obnoxious to the constitutional objections made to it,
since the Supreme Court of that State has decided: (1) That the
constitution of that State authorizes such a method of assessing rail-
road property, which decision is binding on this court; and (2) that
the act gives the railroad companies the right to be heard before
final determination of the question, which construction is conclusive
on this court; and, further, since (3) a tax law which grants to the
taxpayer a right to be heard on the assessment of his property before
final judgment provides a due process of law for determining the
valuation, although it makes no provision for a rehearing. Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Backus, 421.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1, 4, 7, 8, 9;
TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 2;
TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION, 1, 2.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 10.
The acceptance by a supernumerary officer in the Continental line of an
appointment in the regiment of guards authorized by the State of
Virginia took him out of the line and put him into the new organiza-
tion. Williams v. United States, 648.
1. A stipulation between a telegraph company and the sender of a mes-
sage, that the company shall not be liable for mistakes in the trans-
mission or delivery of a message, beyond the sum received for sending
it, unless the sender orders it to be repeated by being telegraphed
back to the originating office for comparison, and pays half that sum
in addition, is reasonable and valid. Primrose v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 1.
2. The appellant has failed to prove the renewal of his contract with the
appellee, which alleged renewal is the foundation of the remedy
sought for by his bill. Smith v. Washington Gas Light Co., 559.
3. When a charter party provides that the hirer of the vessel need not
make good any loss arising from ordinary wear and tear, a finding by
the court that repairs sued for resulted from ordinary wear and tear
is a bar to recovery.
White v. United States, 661.
4. Money paid to a person on a vessel chartered to the government by the
owner of the vessel cannot be recovered from the United States unless
authorized by them. Ib.
5. A contract with the United States for the delivery of postage stamps to
it construed. Continental Bank Note Co. v. United States, 671.
See ADMIRALTY, 8;
COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
1. An indictment for murder which charges that the offence was com-
mitted on board of an American vessel on the high seas, within the
jurisdiction of the court and within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States, sufficiently avers the locality of the
offence. St. Clair v. United States, 134.
2. An indictment which charges that A, B and C, acting jointly, killed
and murdered D, is sufficient to authorize the conviction of one,
though the others may be acquitted. Ib.
3. A charge in an indictment that the accused did then and there, pirati-
cally, wilfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought, strike and
beat the said D, then and there giving to said D several grievous,
damaging and mortal wounds, and did then and there, to wit, at the
time and place last above mentioned, him, the said D, cast and throw
from and out of the said vessel into the sea, and plunge, sink and
drown him, the said D, in the sea aforesaid, sufficiently charges that
the throwing into the sea was done wilfully, feloniously and with
malice aforethought. Ib.
4. An indictment being found after the trial jury had been properly dis-
charged, the court may order a venire to issue for persons to serve as
jurors, and may further direct the marshal to summon talesmen. Ib.
5. Rule 63 of the court below is not inconsistent with any settled principle
of criminal law, and does not interfere with the selection of impartial
juries. Ib.
6. Circumstances attending a particular transaction under investigation
by a jury, if so interwoven with each other and with the principal
facts that they cannot well be separated without depriving the jury of
proof that is essential in order to reach a just conclusion, are admissi-
ble in evidence. Ib.
7. On the trial under an indictment charging that A, B and C, acting
jointly, killed and murdered D, without charging that they were co-
conspirators, evidence of the acts of B and C are admissible against
A, if part of the res gesta. Ib.
8. A party may show that the testimony of one of his witnesses has taken
him by surprise, and that it is contrary to the examination of him pre-
paratory to the trial, or to what the party had reason to believe that the
witness would testify; or that the witness had been recently brought
under the influence of the other party and had deceived the party
calling him. Ib.
9. The certificate of the vessel's registry and proof that she carried the
flag of the United States were properly admitted on the trial of this
case, and established a prima facie case of proper registry under the
laws of the United States, and of the nationality of the vessel and its
owners. 1b.
10. When no exception is taken on the trial of a person accused of crime
to the action of the court below on a particular matter, that action is
not subject to review here, although the statutes and practice of the
State in which the trial takes place provide otherwise. Ib.
11. In criminal proceedings all parts of the record must be interpreted
together, so as to give effect to every part, if possible, and a deficiency
in one part may be supplied by what appears elsewhere in the record.
lb. ·
12. The indictment in this case is sufficient. United States v. Cook, 555.
1. In an action by the sender of a cipher message against a telegraph
company, which is not informed, by the message or otherwise, of the
nature, importance or extent of the transaction to which it relates, or
of the position which the plaintiff would probably occupy if the mes-
sage were correctly transmitted, the measure of damages for mistakes
in its transmission or delivery is the sum paid for sending it. Prim-
rose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1.
2. In an action by the representatives of a railroad employé against the
company, to recover damages for the death of the employé, caused by
an accident while in its employ, which is tried in a different State
from that in which the contract of employment was made and in
which the accident took place, the right to recover and the limit of
the amount of the judgment are governed by the lex loci, and not by
the lex fori. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 190.
When a deed contains a specific description of the land conveyed, by metes
and bounds, and a general description referring to the land as the
same land set off to B, and by B afterwards disposed of to A, the
second description is intended to describe generally what had been
before described by metes and bounds; and if, in an action of eject-
ment brought by a grantee of A, as plaintiff, the description by metes
and bounds does not include the land sued for, it cannot be claimed
under the general description. Prentice v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co., 163.
1. When two parties acquire title to the same tract of land from the same
grantor, if the later grantee takes his deed with knowledge that the
first grantee is in possession of the land, and has enclosed it, and is
cultivating it, he is chargeable with knowledge of all the equitable
rights of the first grantee with which an inquiry would have put him
in possession. Horbach v. Porter, 549.
2. To justify a decree for the specific performance of a parol contract for
the sale of real estate, the contract sought to be enforced, and its per-
formance on the part of the vendee must be clearly proved; and in
this case it is not so proved in several particulars. Rogers Locomotive
Works v. Helm, 610.
3. In a suit in equity to set aside a sale of personal property as induced
by false representations, a decree in favor of the plaintiff will be sus-
tained if the representations proved are of the same general character
as those averred in the bill, though not in its precise language. Tur-
ner v. Ward, 618.
4. The court, being satisfied that the various matters detailed in the opin-
ion were part and parcel of a scheme devised to hinder and delay
creditors in the collection of their debts, affirms the decree of the
court below in this case. Woodfolk v. Seddon, 658.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 8, 9;
LOCAL LAW, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 7.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
A court of probate, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the probate of
wills and the administration of the estates of deceased persons, has
no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of the estate of a living
person; and its orders, made after public notice, appointing an admin-
istrator of the estate of a person who is in fact alive, although he has
been absent and not heard from for seven years, and licensing the
administrator to sell his land for payment of his debts, are void, and
the purchaser at the sale takes no title, as against him. Scott v.
McNeal, 34.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1.
FORT DEARBORN ADDITION TO CHICAGO.
1. Under the operation of the act of the legislature of Illinois of February
27, 1833, for the making and recording of town plats, the interest in
and control of the United States over the streets, alleys and commons
in the Fort Dearborn addition to Chicago ceased with the record of
the plat thereof and the sale of the adjoining lots. United States v.
Illinois Central Railroad Co., 225.
2. When a resort is made by individuals, or by the government of the
United States to the mode provided by the statute of a State where
real property is situated, for the transfer of its title, the effect and
conditions prescribed by the statute will apply, and such operation
will be given to the instrument of conveyance as is there desig-
nated. Ib.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4, 12.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
1. The twelfth section of the Interstate Commerce Act authorizing the
Circuit Courts of the United States to use their process in aid of
inquiries before the Commission established by that act, is not in
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as imposing on
judicial tribunals duties not judicial in their nature. Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. Brimson, 447.
2. A petition filed under that section in the Circuit Court of the United
States against a witness, duly summoned to testify before the Com-
mission, to compel him to testify or to produce books, documents and
papers relating to the matter under investigation before that body,
makes a case or controversy to which the judicial power of the United
States extends.
3. As every citizen is bound to obey the law and to yield obedience to the
constituted authorities acting within the law, the power conferred
upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to require the attendance
and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, papers and
documents relating to a matter under investigation by it, imposes
upon any one summoned by that body to appear and testify the duty
of appearing and testifying, and upon any one required to produce
such books, papers and documents the duty of producing them, if the
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