active, or more intelligent, but they can be depended upon.

The Cubans are not criminally inclined. Under Spanish rule there were four times as many Spaniards as native whites in the prisons of Cuba in proportion to the total number of inhabitants of each nation in the Island. The Chinese and Spaniards both showed a larger percentage of criminals than the native Cubans of either race. Among the higher class Cubans, especially in the remoter towns, there are many evidences of physical degeneracy due to close intermarriage. Little scrawny men with big bony hands and almost no head at all, are characteristic of this class. But this type is not usually found among the rural or laboring population.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF CUBA

IF the economic development of Cuba holds little promise for the people of the country, they have even less to look for in the political prospect. The period of self-government following freedom from the Spanish yoke has been marked by utter failure to meet the demands and the responsibilities of the situation. The Palma administration, ushered in with the highest hopes and the utmost encouragement, was tainted with corruption and cut short by revolution. The present regime can not boast even that weak element of honesty and ability that its predecessor possessed. To quote La Lucha, of Habana, which was the official organ of the Gomez party, the present condition is characterized by "intranquillity in the country, uneasiness in the towns and cities, hatreds, fears, and absolute lack of confidence in the future.

Our rulers refuse to be convinced that they

are not the owners, but simply the administrators of the public wealth." Insurrection has been staved off on several occasions by means of the strong arm or the greased palm. As the year 1911 approaches its close, the rumblings of revolution are heard in many different parts of the Island at the same time. These are not to be taken as popular indications of resentment against bad government, the Cubans are used to that. They are the organized preparations of the "outs" to unseat the "ins." Such disturbances are natural incidents of a situation which is controlled by professional politicians. There are in Cuba no political parties based on principle. Instead there are a number of cliques, each headed by a leader who holds his followers by promises of patronage in case of success. Experience has taught that the bullet is more effective than the ballot in Cuban politics. A few shots fired at the moon displaced the Palma government. To quote again from La Lucha: "In Cuba nothing can resist the slightest armed movement, because the first subversive cry raised in our fields is, and ever will be, the death knell of our political state." The Administration can not place dependence upon the military forces. The keen

est rivalry and the bitterest feeling exist between the rural guard and the regular army. In case of a civil war, these bodies would surely take opposite sides, and neither has any sentiment of loyalty to the flag, or allegiance to the government. The chief influence to which they would be amenable is the will of their respective commanders, who are politicians and aim to employ the forces under them as political instruments. The most effective defence of the President is found in placating his enemies by substantial concessions, but this method has naturally created fresh opponents with an appetite for sops, and the Chief Executive finds himself well-nigh at the end of his resources.

A country may be greatly prosperous and the mass of its people be miserable in the extreme. Mexico is an example in point. Cuba is another.

Throughout the hardships and hazards of the war of independence the insurrectos were supported by the belief that American enlistment in their cause, upon which they counted for success, would be followed by an era of permanent prosperity for the masses. The man who bore the brunt of the fighting, buoyed by these high hopes, realizes now that he was exploited

by a handful of his own countrymen and deserted by his expected saviour. The desertion was repeated after the need for protection had been emphasized and the exploitation continues in an aggravated form.

On the guajiro falls most heavily the burden of supporting the most expensive and extravagant government in the world. This because that government dare not bear too hardly with taxation upon the great corporations and wealthy property owners. An important part of the game of finesse which is necessary to the life of any administration in Cuba consists in keeping in the good graces of the money interests, for it is in the power of these to stop the fat grazing in the political pastures by forcing American reoccupation, and even perhaps annexation.

So we have one of the most striking of the many anomalies in the Cuban system of administration, the customs duties. Here, in a country with no industries to protect, the tariff exaction is at the rate of $12 per head. In the United States it is no more than $3.50, while in other countries it is considerably less. At first hand the importer pays this tax, but, of course, it ultimately falls upon the consumer. And, as