15. The Nebraska law of 1893, to regulate railroads, classifying freights, fixing rates, etc., is repugnant to the United States constitution and void as prohibiting railroads in that state from receiving reasonable and just compensation, and depriving them of property without due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws.

[Nos. 49-51.] Argued March 4, 5, 1896. Ordered for reargument April 20, 1896. Reargued April 5, 6, 7, 1897. Decided March 7, 1898.

Appeals from a decree of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska in each of the above cases, perpetually er joining the railroad companies from making a schedule of rates for transportation reducing them to those prescribed by the state act of Nebraska, approved April 12, 1893, or from conforming to the provision of said act, and restraining the board of transportation of said state et al. from hearing or determining any complaint against said railroad companies or either of them for or on account of any act done by them or either of them which is forbidden by said act, and from instituting or prosecuting any action or proceeding for violation of said act, and adjudging said act to be void, etc., in actions brought by the above-named appellees against the said appellants in each of the above-named cases, for the relief granted by the said decrees. Affirmed.

See same case below, 64 Fed. Rep., 165.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. John L. Webster, A. S. Churchill and W. A. Dilworth for appellants on first argu

ment.

Messrs. John L. Webster, William J. Bryan and Constantine J. Smyth, attorney-general of Nebraska, for appellants on reargument.

Messrs. J. M. Woolworth and James C. Carter for appellees on first argument and on reargument.

Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellees in the first of the above cases were the plaintiffs below, and are citizens of Massachusetts and stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway company. They sued on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The defendants are the Union Pacific Railway company, the St. Joseph & Grand Island Railroad company, the Omaha & Republican Valley Railroad company, and the Kansas City & Omaha Railroad company-corporations of Nebraska under the control of the Union Pacific Railway company; certain persons, citizens of Nebraska, who hold the offices respectively, of attorney-general, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, state treasurer, and commissioner of public lands and buildings, and constitute the state board of transportation; and James C. Dahlman, Joseph W. Edgerton and Gilbert L. Laws, citizens of Nebraska and secretaries of that board. By a supplemental bill in the same suit, certain persons, receivers of the Union Pacific Railway company, were made defendants.

In the second case, some of the plaintiffs, appellees here, are subjects of Queen Victoria, while the others are citizens of Massachusetts. They are all stockholders of the Chicago & North-Western Railroad company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Illinois, Wisconsin and Iowa, and have sued in that capacity on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated The defendants are the Chicago & North-Western Railroad company; the Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad company, a Nebraska corporation, and the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway company, a corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota and Nebraska, both under the control of the Chicago & NorthWestern Railroad company; and the above officers constituting the state board of transportation, as well as those holding the positions of secretaries of that board.

In the third case, the appellees, Henry L. Higginson and others, citizens of Massachusetts, were the plaintiffs below. They sued on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Illinois and Iowa, and whose lines west of the Missouri river are known as the Burlington & Missouri road. The defendants are the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad company, the persons composing the Nebraska state board of transportation, and the secretaries of that board.

For the sake of brevity, the Union Pacific Railway company will be called the Union Pacific company; the St. Joseph & Grand Island Railroad company, the St. Joseph company; the Omaha & Republican Valley Railroad company, the Omaha company; the Kansas City & Omaha Railroad company, the Kansas City company; the Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad company, the Fremont company; the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway company, the St. Paul company; and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad company, the Burlington company.

Each of these suits was brought July 28, 1893, and involves the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of Nebraska, approved by the governor April 12, 1893, and which took effect August 1, 1893. It was an act "to regulate railroads, to classify freights, to fix reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the transportation of freights upon each of the railroads in the state of Nebraska, and to provide penalties for the violation of this act." Acts of Nebraska, 1893, chapter 21; Compiled Statutes of Nebraska, 1893, chapter 72, article 12. The act is referred to in the record as house roll 33

Prior to the enactment of that statute, the legislature passed an act to regulate railroads, prevent unjust discrimination, provide for a board of transportation, and define its duties, and repeal articles 5 and 8 of chapter 72, entitled "Railroads," of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska, and all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith-the same being chapter 60 of the Session Laws of 1887, and now article 8, of chapter 72, of the Compiled Statutes of Nebraska of 1893. By that act the attorney general, secretary of state, auditor of public accounts, state treasurer, and commissioner of public lands and buildings were constituted a board of transportation, with power to appoint three secretaries to assist in the performance of its duties, and with authority to inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to its provisions and obtain from them the full and complete information necessary to enable the board to perform its duties and carry out the objects for which it was created. It was also provided that, for the purposes of the act, the board should have power to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation, and to that end could invoke the aid of any of the district courts or of the supreme court of the state; and that any court of competent jurisdiction in which such inquiry was carried on could, in case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any common carrier or person subject to the provisions of the act, issue an order requiring such carrier or other person to appear before the board (and produce books and papers if ordered), and give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey the order was punishable by the court as for contempt. The claim that any testimony or evidence might tend to criminate the person giving evidence would not excuse the witness from testifying, but such evidence or testimony could not be used against him on the trial of any criminal proceeding.

66

The power to enact the statute whose validity is now assailed, that is the above statute of August 1, 1893, regulating railroads, classifying freights, fixing reasonable maximum rates, etc., in Nebraska, was referred by counsel to the general legislative power of the state as well as to the 4th section of article 11 of the state constitution, which provides: 'Railways heretofore constructed, or that may hereafter be constructed in this state, are hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to all persons for the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. And the legislature may, from time to time, pass laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of passengers and freight on the different railroads in this state. The liability of railroad corporations as common carriers shall never be limited."

By the first section of that statute it is declared that, except as therein otherwise provided, its provisions shall apply to all railroad corporations, railroad companies, and common carriers engaged in Nebraska in the transportation of freight by railroad therein, and also to shipments of property made from any point within the state to any other point within its limits. That section provides: "The term 'railroad' as usel in this act, shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation, receiver, trustee, or other person operating a railroad whether owned or operated under contract, agreement, lease, or otherwise, and the term 'transportation' shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage, and the term 'railroad corporation' contained in this act shall be deemed and taken to mean all corporations, companies, or individuals, now owning or operating, or which may hereafter own or operate, any railroad, in whole or in part, in this state, and the provisions of this act, except as in this act otherwise provided, shall apply to all persons, firms, and companies, and to all associations of persons, whether incorporated or otherwise, that shall do business as common carriers of freight upon any of the lines of railway in this state, the same as to railroad corporations herein mentioned." Section 1.

The second section provides that all freight or property to be transported by any railroad company or companies mentioned in the first section, "from any point in the state of Nebraska to any other point in said state, shall be classified as hereinafter in this section provided, and any other or different classification of freight, which would raise the rates on class or commodity of freights above the rates prescribed in this act, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. The classification established by this act shall be known as the 'Nebraska Classification.' Freights shall be billed at the

actual weight unless otherwise directed in the classification-20,000 pounds shall be a carload, and all excessive weights shall be at the same rate per 100 pou ads, except in carloads of light and bulky articles, and unless otherwise specified in the classification. When the classification makes an article 'released' or 'owner's risk,' the same at carrier's risk will be the next highest rate higher, unless otherwise provided in the classification. Articles rated first class, 'released' or owner's risk, if taken at 'carrier's risk,' will be one and one-half times first class unless otherwise provided in the classification. All articles carried according to this classification at 'owner's risk' of fire, leakage, damage, or breakage must be so receipted for by agents of the railroad, and so considered by owners and shippers. Signing a release contract by a shipper shall not release the railroad company from loss or damage caused by carelessness or negligence of its employes." Section 2.

Following this section, in the body of the statute, are tables of the classification of freights.

The third section is in these words: "That each of the railroads in the state of Nebraska shall charge for the transportation of freight from any point in said state to any other point in said state, no higher or greater rate of charge than is by this act fixed as the reasonable maximum rate for the distance hauled, and the reasonable maximum rates for the transportation of freight by railroad from any point in the state of Nebraska to any other point in said state are declared and established to be as hereinafter in this section fixed for the distance named, and any higher or greater rate for the distance hauled than that herein fixed and established is prohibited and declared to be unlawful; and the reasonable maximum rate herein fixed and established shall be known as the Nebraska Schedule of Reasonable Maximum Rates Section 3.

Here follow tables of the rates prescribed by the statute.

That the full scope of the act may appear, its remaining sections are given as follows: "Sec. 4. All railroads or parts thereof which have been built in this state since the 1st day of January, 1889, or may be built before the 31st day of December, 1899, shall be exempt from the provisions of this act until the 31st day of December, 1899.

"Sec. 5. Whenever any railroad company or companies in this state shall in a proper action, show by competent testimony that the schedule of rates prescribed by the act are unjust and unreasonable, such railroad or railroads shall be exempt therefrom as hereinafter provided. All such actions shall be brought before the supreme court, in the name of the railroad company or companies bringing the same, and against the state of Nebraska, and upon the hearing thereof, if the court shall become satisfied that the rates herein prescribed are unjust in so far as they relate to the railroad bringing the action [it], may issue their [its] order directing the board of transportation to permit such railroad to raise its rates to any sum in the discretion of the board; provided, that in no case shall the rates so raised be fixed at a higher sum than that charged by such railroad on the first day of January, 1893. Whenever any railroad company in this state shall claim the benefit of the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of such railroad company to show to the court all matters pertaining to the management thereof, and if it shall appear that said railroad company is operating branch lines of railroad in connection with its main line, and all included in one system, then in that case, it shall be the duty of the railroad company to show to the court upon which branch or branches, or upon which portion of such system the schedule of rates prescribed in this act is unjust and unreasonable, and oaly such portions shall be exempt from the provisions thereof; provided, that in no case shall a railroad company be allowed to pool the earnings of all the lines operated under one management, where more than one line is so operated, for the purpose of lowering the general average.

"Sec. 6. That the board of transportation is hereby empowered and directed to reduce the rates on any class or commodity in the schedule of rates fixed in this act, whenever it shall seem just and reasonable to a majority of said board so to reduce any rate; and said board of transportation is hereby empowered and directed to revise said classification of freight as herein before in this act established, whenever it shall appear to a majority of said board just and reasonable to revise said classification; provided, that said board of transpor tation shall never change the classification in the act established, so that by such change or classification the rates on any freight will become higher or greater than in this act fixed. When any reduction of rates or revision of classification shall be made by said board, it shall be the duty of said board to cause notice thereof to be published two successive weeks in some public newspaper, published in the city of Lincoln, in this state, which notice shall state the date of the taking effect of such change of rate or classification, and said change of rate or classification so made by the said board and published in said notice shall take effect at the time so stated in said notice.

"Sec. 7. That articles not enumerated in said classification in section 2 of this act established, not rated in said schedule of rates in section 3 of this act, shall be classed with analcgous articles in said classification, and where there is any conflict between said classification, and said schedule of maximum rates, said rates shall govern.

"Sec 8. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, or cause to be done, or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby, for all damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act, together with cost of suit and a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in which the same is heard on appeal or otherwise, which shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case; provided, that in all cases demand in writing on said common carrier shall be made for the money damages sustained before suit is brought for recovery under this section, and that no suit shall be brought until the expiration of fifteen days after such demand. "Sec. 9. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, or cause to be done, or permit to be done, any act, matter, or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not less than $1,000, nor more than $5,000 for the first offense; and for the second offense not less than $3,000, nor more than $10,000; and for the third offense not less than $10,000 nor more than $20,000; and for every subsequent offense and conviction thereof, shall be liable to a fine of $25,000; provided, that in all cases under this act either party shall have the right of trial by jury. "Sec. 10. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are repealed."

These cases were heard at the same time, and in the one in which the Union Pacific company, the St. Joseph company, the Omaha company, and the Kansas City company were defendants, it was adjudged in the circuit court-Mr. Justice Brewer presiding-as follows: "That the said railroad companies and each and every of them, and said receivers, be perpetually enjoined and restrained from making or publishing a schedule of rates to be charged by them or any or either of them for the transportation of freight on and over their respective roads in this state from one point to another therein, whereby such rate shall be reduced to those prescribed by the act of the legislature of this state, called in the bill filed therein, House Roll 33,' and entitled 'An Act to Regulate Railroads, to Classify Freights, to Fix Reasonable Maximum Rates to be Charged for the Transportation of Freight upon each of the Railroads in the State of Nebraska, and to Provide Penalties for the Violation of this Act,' approved April 12, 1893, and below those now charged by said companies or either of them or their receivers, or in any wise obeying, observing, or conforming to the provisions, commands, injunctions, and prohibitions of said alleged act; and that the board of transportation of said state and the members and secretaries of said board be in like manner perpetually enjoined and restrained from entertaining, hearing, or determining any complaint to it against said railroad companies, or any or either of them or their receivers, for or on account of any act or thing by either of said companies or their receivers, their officers, agents, servants, or employes, done, suffered, or omitted, which may be forbidden or commanded by said alleged act, and from instituting or prosecuting or causing to be instituted or prosecuted any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, against either of said companies or their receivers for any act or thing done, suffered, or omitted, which may be forbidden or commanded by said act, and particularly from reducing its present rates of charges for transportation of freight to those prescribed in said act, and that the attorney-general of this state be in like manner enjoined from bringing, aiding in bringing, or causing to be brought, any proceeding by way of injunction, mandamus, civil action, or indictment against said companies or either of them or their receivers for or on account of any action or omission on their part commanded or forbidden by the said act. And that a writ of injunction issued out of this court and under the seal thereof, directed to the said defendants, commanding, enjoining, and restraining them as herein before set forth, which injunction shall be perpetual save as hereinafter provided. And it is further declared, adjudged, and decreed that the act above entitled is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, forasmuch as by the provisions of said act the said defendant railroad companies may not exact for the transportation of freight from one point to another within this state, charges which yield to the said companies, or either of them, reasonable compensation for such services. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendants, members of the board of transportation of said state, may hereafter, when the circumstances have changed so that the rates fixed in the said act shall yield to the said companies reasonable compensation for the services aforesaid, apply to this court, by supplemental bill or otherwise, as they may be advised, for a further order in that behalf.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiffs recover of the said defendants their costs to be taxed by the clerk."

The above decree was in accordance with the prayer for relief. A similar decree was rendered in each of the other cases.

The present appeals were prosecuted by the defendants constituting the state board of transportation, as well as by the defendants who are secretaries of that board.

The first question to be considered is one common to all the cases. While it was not objected at the argument that there had been any departure from the ninety-fourth equity rule, it was contended that the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law, and that the circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, was therefore without jurisdiction. This objection is based upon the fifth section of the Nebraska statute authorizing any railroad company to show, in a proper action brought in the supreme court of the state, that the rates therein prescribed are unreasonable and unjust, and, if that court found such to be the fact, to obtain an order upon the board of transportation permitting the rates to be raised to any sum in the discretion of that board, provided that in no case should they be fixed at a higher sum than was charged by the company on the 1st day of January, 1893. This section, it is contended, took from the circuit court of the United States its equity jurisdiction in respect of the rates prescribed and required the dismissal of the bills.

We cannot accept this view of the equity jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States. The adequacy or inadequacy of a remedy at law for the protection of the rights of one entitled upon any ground to invoke the powers of a federal court is not to be conclusively determined by the statutes of the particular state in which suit may be brought. One who is entitled to sue in the federal circuit court may invoke its jurisdiction in equity whenever the established principles and rules of equity permit such a suit in that court; and he cannot be deprived of that right by reason of his being allowed to sue at law in a state court on the same cause of action. It is true that an enlargement of equitable rights arising from the statutes of a state may be administered by the circuit courts of the United States. Case of Broderick's Will [Kieley v. McGlynn], 88 U. S., 21 Wall., 503, 520 [22:599, 606]; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S., 15, 24 [28:52, 56]; Dick v Foraker, 155 U. S., 404, 415 [39:201, 205]; Bardon v. Land & River Improv. Co., 157 U. S., 327, 330 [39:719, 721]; Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S., 375, 405 [39:1022, 1032]. But if the case in its essence be one cognizable in equity, the plaintiff-the required value being in dispute-may invoke the equity powers of the proper circuit court of the United States whenever jurisdiction attaches by reason of diverse citizenship or upon any other ground of ederal jurisdiction. Payne v. Hook, 74 U. S., 7 Wall., 425, 430 [19:260, 262]; McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. 8., 201, 205 [30:932, 933]. A party by going into a national court does not, this court has said, lose any right or appropriate remedy of which he might have availed himself in the state courts of the same locality; that the wise policy of the constitution gives him a choice of tribunals. Davis v. Gray, 83 U. S., 16 Wall., 203, 221 [21:447, 453]; Cowley v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 159 U. S, 569, 583 [40:263, 267]. So, "whenever a citizen of a state can go into the courts of a state to defend his property against the illegal acts of its officers, a citizen of another state may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to maintain a like defense. A state cannot tie up a citizen of another state, having property rights within its territory invaded by unauthorized acts of its own officers, to suits for redress in its own courts." Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (No. 1), 154 U. 8, 362, 391 [38:1014, 1021], 4 Inters. Com. Rep., 560]; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. 8., 202, 204 [37:1052, 1053]; Cowles v. Mercer County [Mercer County Supers. v. Cowles], 74 U. 8, 7 Wall., 118 [19:86]; Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U S., 529 [33:766]; Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S., 106 [35:358]; Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S., 529 [37:546]; Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S., 451 [37:804].

In these cases the plaintiffs, stockholders in the corporations named, ask a decree enjoining the enforcement of certain rates for transportation upon the ground that the statute prescribing them is repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Under the principles which in the federal system distinguish cases in law from those in equity, the circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, can make a comprehensive decree covering the whole ground of controversy, and thus avoid the multiplicity of suits that would inevitably arise under the statute. The carrier is made liable, not only to individual persons for every act, matter or thing prohibited by the statute, and for every omission to do any act, matter or thing required to be done, but to a fine of from $1,000 to $5,000 for the first offense, from $5,000 to $10,000 for the second offense, from $10,000 to $20,000 for the third offense, and $25,000 for every subsequent offense The transactions along the line of any one of these railroads, out of which causes of action might arise under the statute, are so numerous and varied that the interference of equity could well be justified upon the ground that a general decree, according to the prayer of the bills, would avoid a multiplicity of suits and give a remedy more certain and efficacious than could be given in any proceeding instituted against the company in