form has been altered so as to include the act of God and the king's enemies. Our author considers much at large the authorities regarding the validity, nature, and effect of notices by common carriers, intended to limit their responsibility; upon whom they are obligatory; and the effect of concealment or fraud; and the degree of liability which is imposed on the carrier, notwithstanding such notices; what amounts to a waiver of notice; what will excuse or justify the nondelivery of the goods, and the doctrine of average and contribution. As to passenger carriers on land, after stating some of their duties and obligations, our author remarks,— $598. They are bound to make use of all the ordinary precautions for the safety of passengers on the road.1 This involves a consideration of the duties of the coachman in driving on the road. If he is guilty of any rashness, negligence, or misconduct, or is unskilful, or deviates from the acknowledged custom of the road, the proprietors will be responsible for any injury resulting from his acts. Thus, if the driver drives with reins so loose, that he cannot govern his horses, the proprietors of the coach will be answerable. So, if there is danger in a part of the road, or in a particular passage, and he omits to give due warning to the passengers. So, if he takes the wrong side of the road, and an accident happens from want of proper room.4 So, if by any incaution he comes in collision with another carriage. In short, he must in all cases exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in travelling on the road, to avoid dangers and difficulties, and if he omits it, his principals are liable." And the liability of the coach proprietors will be the same, although the injury to the passenger is caused by his own act, as by leaping from the coach, if there is real danger, and it arises from the careless conduct of the driver.7 3 5 599. There are in England three customary rules or directions for driving; first, that in meeting each party shall bear or keep to the left. The rule in America is the reverse, that each 11 Bell Com. 462. 2 Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. R. 533. 3 Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. R. 167. 4 Wordsworth v. Willan, 4 Esp. R. 273; Waland v. Elkins, 1 Stark. 272. 5 Mayhew v. Boyce, 1 Stark. R. 423; Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. R. 167. Jackson v. Tollett, 2 Stark. R. 37. "Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. R. 493; Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. R. 321. party shall bear or keep to the right. Secondly, that in passing, the foremost person bearing to the left, the other shall pass on the off side. Thirdly, that in crossing, the driver shall bear to the left hand and pass behind the other carriage. But the rule in England is not inflexible, that the driver shall in all cases pass another carriage on the off side. He may, if the street or road is very broad, go on the near side.2 So, if there is no other carriage on the road, whose passage may be interrupted, the driver is not bound to keep the left side of the road according to the rule of the road. In such cases he may go on either side of the road, as he pleases. And if the driver is on the wrong side of the road, the carrier is not answerable for any accident, unless there is some negligence on the part of the driver."' Passenger carriers bind themselves to carry safely those whom they take into their coaches, as far as human care and foresight will go, that is, for the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons; but they are not responsible for accidents, where all reasonable skill and diligence has been employed. After considering the rights, duties, and liabilities of passenger carriers by water, and herein among other things treating of injuries occasioned by collision of ships or vessels, the author lastly treats of another class of bailments, not falling under the heads before mentioned; such as possession of property by captors, by revenue officers, by prize agents, by officers of courts, and by salvors, and states the rules of law relative to them. We have thus endeavored to give a mere sketch of the topics, and some of the most prominent rules and principles of the common law, laid down, or discussed in the work before us. These rules and principles, as well as those of the civil and foreign law, upon the same subject, are fully explained, by apt illustrations, comparisons, and examples, and supported by authorities and general reasoning. All the cases, deemed worthy of any notice, in the English and American law, and all the best authorities in the civil and foreign law, are quoted and 15 Petersd. Abr. Carrier, p. 55, note; and see Wayde v. Carr, 2 Dow & Ryl. 255. 2 Ibid; Wordsworth v. Willan, 4 Esp. R. 273. 3 Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. R. 533; Mayhew v. Boyce, 1 Stark. R. 423. 4 Crofts v. Waterhouse, 3 Bing. R. 319, 321. commented upon. Those cases and authorities, which are contradictory, are critically examined, and such as are sound, or as have been established as law, are distinguished from those which are erroneous, or have been doubted, or overruled. The principles, which have been adopted and established in each of these various systems of jurisprudence, under each branch of the law of bailments, are presented to the reader at one view, and may serve as a perpetual commentary upon each other. Every thing, regarding this subject, which is really valuable, in either system, may be found in this work. The plan and execution of it deserve the highest commendation. It is a book, which, from its intrinsic merit, and preeminent utility, will readily find its way into the library of every accomplished practical lawyer, and for its various learning and sound doctrines, will be read and admired by every learned jurist. DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS. Digest of the principal cases in 1 LEIGH'S REPORTS, Virginia. ABSENT DEFENDANTS. The mode of service of process against an absent defendant, provided by Stat. 1821, ch. 59, sec. 3, by leaving a copy with his attorney, is not to be restricted to those cases only in which the defendant has property in Maine; but extends to all cases where the process is by orignal summons. Nelson v. Omaley, 6 Greenleaf, 218. ACTION. 1. If a judgment debtor, whose land has been taken by extent, pays part of the debt in order to redeem the land, but fails to pay the residue, whereby the land is lost, he cannot recover back the money thus paid. Morton v. Chandler, 6 Greenleaf, 142. 2. A promissory note given by the maker and accepted by the payee in satisfaction of a book debt due from a third person, and with his consent, is a discharge of such debt; and the liability thus incurred by the maker of the note, forms a good ground of action against the party relieved, to recover the amount of the debt, though the note has not been paid. McLellan v. Crofton, 6 Greenleaf, 307. 3. An action for slander is not taken away, though the statute creating the offence charged, be repealed. French v. Creath, 1 Breese, 156. ACTION ON THE CASE. Where one was arrested upon a writ sued out for a pretended and groundless cause of action, with a view to compel the party to do certain things; but not succeeding, the plaintiff suppressed the writ; it was held that the remedy of the party injured was not by an action of trespass vi et armis; but by an action of the case for malicious prosecution. Plummer v. Dennett, 6 Green leaf, 421. ACTIONS REAL. The right of a tenant to an easement in the land, is no objection to the demandant's recovery in a writ of entry. Blake v. Clark, 6 Greenleaf, 436. ADMINISTRATOR. An administrator has no power to compel an indentured servant to attend to his business; he has only the custody of the servant for safe keeping until his time of service can be sold. v. Joy, 1 Breese, 207. AGENT AND FACTOR. Phoebe 1. An agent having discretionary power to adjust and collect an unliquidated demand, settled it by taking a negotiable note payable to his principal, which he afterwards pledged as collateral security for a debt of his own. It was held that his authority did not extend so far as to justify the pledge; and that the pledgee, after demand and refusal, was liable in trover for the Held also, that any payments to the agent, made before notice of the termination of his authority, were good. Jones v. Farley, 6 Greenleaf, 226. note. 2. Where one of two tenants in common of a quantity of boards shipped them for sale to his own factors, in a distant port, who sold them on credit, in the usual manner, taking a note therefor payable to themselves, and passed the amount to the credit of their principal, who was largely their debtor; and who paid over half the proceeds of sale to his co-tenant; and the purchaser became insolvent before the maturity of his note; after which the factors and their principal settled a further account, in which no notice was taken of this bad debt; nor was it charged back to the principal till the settlement of a third account, more than eight months after the maturity of the note and the insolvency of the maker; of whom payment could not, by any means, be obtained; at which settlement a large balance, due to the factors, was carried to a new account, and still remained unpaid; —and the principal gave no notice of these events to his co-tenant till some time after the last of them had transpired; it was held — that the acceptance of the moiety originally paid over to the co-tenant, was a ratification by him, of the act of the other in making the shipment and consignment for sale; that here was sufficient diligence, both on the part of the factors, and of the consignor ; that the latter was justly charged with the whole sum by his factors; and might well |