A pump erected by a tenant and removable without material injury to the freehold, may be taken away by him at the end of his term. Grymes v. Boweren, 4 M. & P. 143. GUARANTEE.

Action on the following guarantee, contained in a letter from the defendant to the plaintiffs: In consideration of your giving credit to L. M. I guarantee to you the payment of any debt which he may contract with you from time to time, as a running balance of account to any amount not exceeding 400l.' The plaintiffs, on the faith of this guarantee, furnished L. M. with goods to an amount far exceeding 4007.; and L. M. becoming embarrassed, assigned his effects in trust for his creditors, when the plaintiffs claimed a debt of 6257. and received a dividend on the whole debt. Held, that the dividend received by the plaintiffs was to be applied ratably to the whole debt, and that the plaintiffs had no right to deduct the whole sum received as a dividend from the gross debt, and hold the defendant liable on the guarantee for the remainder. Bardwell v. Lydall, 7 Bing. 489.

A guarantee in writing for payment of the debt and costs in an action against a third person, if a certain sum was not paid by a certain day, was held not binding, on the ground that the consideration (stay of proceedings) did not appear upon the face of it. (Saunders v. Wakefield, 4 B. & A. 595.) Cole v. Dyer, 1 Tyrw. 304.

INDICTMENT.

If a parish be partly situate in county B. and partly in county C., an indictment for larceny, stating the offence to have been committed at the parish of A. in the county of B.,' is good. R. v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 463.

An indictment for a riot is bad, unless it conclude in terrorem populi. R. v. Hughes, 4 C. & P. 373

An indictment for murder committed abroad by a British subject, must aver that the prisoner and the deceased were subjects of his majesty. The prisoner's own declaration is evidence for the jury that he was such. R. v. Helsham, 4 C. & P. 394. Halves of county bank-notes, sent in a letter, are goods and chattels, and the subjects of an indictment for larceny or embezzleR. v. Mead, 4 C. & P. 535.

ment.

Where persons were charged with a riot and cutting down fences, but the indictment did not conclude in terrorem populi; held, that the defendants could not be convicted of a riot, but might be convicted of an unlawful assembly. R. v. Cox, 4 C. & P .638.

An indictment on the 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30, s. 17, charged that the prisoner on, &c. at, &c. feloniously, &c. set fire to a stack of barley, of the value of, &c. of A. B. then and there being :— held good, although the words of the statute are any stack of corn or grain;' and although it was not stated that the prisoner on, &c. at, &c. then and there set fire to the stack. Held, also, that the property was sufficiently described by the words ' of A. B. R. v. Swatkins, 4 C. & P. 548.

INSURANCE.

A life insurance is, by the general policy of the law, avoided by the execution of the assured for felony. Amicable Assurance Society, app., Bolland, resp., 2 D. & C. 1.

[In the House of Lords; reversing the judgment of the Master of the Rolls.]

The policy contained a stipulation for a return of part of the premium, if sold or laid up, for every uncommenced month.' Held, that this meant a laying up for the season or winter, without being employed again during the current year. Hunter v. Wright, 10 B. & C. 714.

Saloe is a port within the meaning of a policy, mentioning' other ports on the Catalan or Valencian coasts. Sea Ins. Comp. (Scotch) v. Gavin, 2 Dow & Clark, 129.

(Computation of lay days.) The lay days allowed for a ship's discharge are to be reckoned from the time when the vessel arrives at the place where it is usual to unload, and not from the time when she arrives at the entrance of the port, though for the convenience of navigation she may discharge part of her cargo there. Brereton v. Chapman, 7 Bing. 559. (Payment to Broker.) The general rule is, that the broker is the debtor of the underwriter for the premiums, and the underwriter the debtor of the assured for the loss. Where a loss was settled, in part by the underwriter's setting off in account against it money due to him from the broker for premiums, and in part by cash paid to the broker, upon which the name of the underwriter was struck off the policy; and the broker became bankrupt Held, that though the money payment was to be looked upon as payment to the assured, being within the broker's general authority, the assured was still entitled to recover against the underwriter for so much of the loss as was merely set off in account. Evidence was given of a usage to settle in this manner, but it was held not to be binding on a party who was not shown to be cognizant of it. (Bartlett v. Bartland, 10 B. & C. 760. Russell v. Langley, 4 B. & A. 395. Todd v. Reed, 4 B. & A. 210.) Scott v. Irving, 1 B. & Ad. 605.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Covenant by lessee, that he, his executors or assigns, would insure the demised premises, and keep them insured during the term, and deposit the policy with the lessor. The lease contained a proviso of re-entry on breach of any of the covenants. The lessee assigned, and the premises were never insured. On the 30th of September the landlord distrained for rent then due, and afterwards brought ejectment against the assignee, laying the demise on the 24th of October. Held, first, that the covenant to insure, &c. was broken if the premises were uninsured at any one time, and that there was a continuing breach of covenant for any portion of time they remained uninsured, and that it was immaterial whether the covenant ran with the land or not: secondly, that though the distress was a waiver of the forfeiture up to the 30th of September, the landlord was entitled to recover in respect of the forfeiture between that day and the 24th of October. Doe v. Peck, 1 B. & Adol. 428.

LEASE.

An instrument by which A. agrees to let a house to B. on lease for seven years, subject to the stipulations and covenants in the original lease under which A. holds, and to keep the same until the said lease shall be granted; which lease, when required by B., shall be prepared by A.'s solicitor, but at B.'s expense.' Held to be a lease, not merely an agreement for one. Wilson v. Chisholm, 4 C. & P. 474. Held that an instrument to the following effect was an actual demise and not an agreement for a lease: 'A. agrees to let the premises, situate at, &c. to B. for ten years; he further agrees to build a brew house, and make a cellar at his own expense, at the yearly rent of 351. to be paid half-yearly. The said lessor further agrees to pay the ground-rent, and that he has received this day from B. 47. in earnest.' (5 T. R. 163. 12 East, 268. 15 East, 244. 3 Taunt. 65. 5 B. & A. 321.) Staniforth v. Fox, 1 B. & Ad. 590.

LIBEL.

The surveyor to a society which published yearly an account of

the different classes of ships, &c. the information of merchants, &c. was applied to by a ship owner to survey his ship; he did so, and made a report to the society, who classed and described the ship accordingly: Held, that the ship owner could not sue the members of the society for a libel in misdescribing the ship; nor the surveyor, if he made a correct report. Kerr v. Shedden, 4 C. & P. 528.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

Payment by the executor of one of two makers of a joint and several promissory note, will not take the debt out of the statute of limitations as against the surviving maker. Slater v. Lawson, 1 B. & Adol. 397.

MASTER AND AND SEAMAN.

A sailor serving under articles engaging him (among other things) to serve faithfully during the voyage, and providing for a forfeiture of his wages on breach of any of his engagements, cannot recover any wages if he is left ashore on the voyage by his own fault in being absent, though with no intention of deserting. And it is not a sufficient excuse for such absence that, after having been forbidden to go away by the captain, he obtained leave from an inferior officer. under the plea of nil debet. 489. MERGER.

Such a defence may be proved Sherman v. Bennett, 1 M. & M.

A., tenant in fee, demised to B. for twenty-one years from June 24th, 1814; B. by indenture of Nov. 3, 1814, demised to C. for the residue of his term therein wanting twenty-one days, and in Feb. 1816, by deed poll endorsed on the counterpart of the lease to C. granted the premises to A. to have and to hold for all the time in the counterpart mentioned. A. subsequently conveyed the fee and all his interest in the premises by way of mortgage to the plaintiff. The defendants were the assignees of C. and the action was brought for rent, and on the covenant for not repairing. Held, that the deed poll did not merge the reversion expectant on the underlease to C. in the reversion in fee. 2. That the reversionary interest expectant on the underlease passed to the plaintiff by the conveyance by way of mortgage, though the principal object was to convey the fee; and that the conveyance was well described in the declaration as an assignment of a chattel interest. 3. That the defendants, though they never entered into possession, were liable on the covenants in the underlease to C. (Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 B. & B. 238.) Barton v. Barclay, 7 Bing. 745.

NOLLE PROSEQUI.

A nolle prosequi entered up after judgment, is tantamount to a retraxit, and a bar to a second action for the same cause. Held, also, that it was proveable under the general issue in the second action. (Cooper v. Tiffin, 3 T. R. 511; 1 Wms. Saund. 207 n.) Bowden v. Horne, 7 Bing. 716.

PARTIES.

Assumpsit on a contract of sale. It appeared that C. carried on business at London, others of the plaintiffs at Glasgow, and the rest at Manchester. The three firms had agreed to be jointly interested in the purchase, but that C. should be the actual purchaser, and he gave the order and the broker knew him only. Held, that all the three firms might sue jointly. Cothay v. Fennell, 10 B. & C. 671.

PARTNERSHIP.

On a plea in abatement to an action on a bill of exchange, it was proved that two persons named in the plea were in fact partners with the two defendants sued; but the jury were directed to find for the plaintiff, if they thought, upon the evidence that the plaintiff had reasonable ground to think that the defendants alone constituted the partnership. Held, (overruling Dubois v. Lubert, 5 Taunt. 609.) that this direction was right for the only question on such a plea is, with whom the plaintiff contracted. De Mautort v. Saunders, 1 B. & Adol. 398. Where a bill, accepted by one partner in the partnership name, is applied, with the knowledge of the party taking it, in part only to the separate use of the partner accepting, a secret partner is not liable in respect of that part, but he is liable in respect of the residue which was not so applied with the knowledge of the taker. Wintle v. Crowther, 1 C. & J. 316.

[Bayley B., in delivering judgment, said that Lloyd v. Ashby, 2 C. & P. 138, which was cited for the defendant, was re-considered in Vere v. Ashby, 10 B. & C. 288: the former case was not, however, so far as appears by the report, mentioned on the discussion of the latter.]

The part-owners of a ship not being necessarily partners, one may maintain an action against another for his share of the expenses of the outfit. (10 Ves. 105; 1 Vern. 297; 8 B. & C. 612.) An owner of a vessel cannot either at law or in equity claim any other interest than that which appears on the registry, but if a party holds himself out and deals as owner of a larger share, he is liable to others in that proportion. (2 Meriv. 75; 5 T. R. 709; 3 T. R. 406; 15 Ves. 60.) Helme v. Smith, 7 Bing. 709.

PLEADING.

The plaintiff agreed to let the defendant land on building leases, and to lend him a sum of money to assist him in erecting twenty houses, to be repaid at a specified time. When six of the houses had been built, part of the money having been advanced,