We must take issue with Dean Ferdinand Larande and Dr. A. G. DeLapradelle, Professor of International Law, both of the Paris Law Faculty, who are quoted in an opinion that the late German Emperor may be extradited from Holland and tried in an International Court to be established, for crimes committed by his armies during the late world conflict.

A careful study of the law of nations, of the constitutional theory of citizenship and the rights of sovereigns, reveal no such rule of legal action favoring the views of these eminent French

savants.

First it must be considered that citizenship is in no sense contractual in its nature, but is in fact a relation sui generis. The theory of a criminal compact between the sovereign and his people, holding that during the period of war the ruler may be properly charged as an accessory to the rapine or murder committed by his soldiers, is without the merit even of sociological argument.

Under the principles of territorial jurisdiction, the safety of William Hohenzollern in Holland from extradition is assured under the law of today. The Law of Nations recognizes certain forms or attributes of legal legitimacy as applying to a resident alien. One is that the exile shall not be given up for a political crime. The diplomatic protection of the late Emperor is a duty incumbant on the part of Holland, as well as on the part of the United States; to see that there be no open violation of international law such as is proposed. The right of William Hohenzollern to protection is not a subjective one, it is rather the reflex of an objective one. It is not a favor or a gratuity. The late Emperor was at the head of a de facto government, exercising supreme authority, the nation over which he ruled is responsible for his each and every act, but he is not in any sense responsible for the act of the state or of individuals over which he exercised sovereignity. Bear in mind that authorization or ratification of the act of the individual, whether high or low has its own political reason so far as the state goes, releases that individual liability and transfers it to the state.

from

International law is but a usage or customs adopted as a compact between countries. If violated, no penalty can be enforced save by armed force. As a political matter the guilt of the ex-Kaiser can be determined by a commission, but as a judicial matter no court can be now created which could enforce its finding.

Disregarding all questions of moral essence, confining the question purely to legal responsibility, no extraditable crime can be charged against the late Emperor. If he is not guilty under the civil or common law as it was written and recognized during the period of the war, then it must follow that no law can be now created by any nation or combination of nations or governments that can impose criminal responsibility upon him. Such act or acts would be ex post facto and void.

Nor can a court be now created having jurisdiction of the subject matters arising out of that period August 1914 to November 11, 1918, if there was no such tribunal having complete perfect and recognized jurisdiction during that period. The suggestion that an international tribunal can now be created having jurisdiction of acts committed in the past when such acts were not properly triable in any then existent court is against all reason and law. The Hague Arbitration Court which was founded in 1899 could

not dispose of the issue which it is attempted to raise. In that tribunal, no penalty is provided for. Will it be contended that the Hague Court could now be invested with penalties which it could apply to matters now coming before it, when the acts themselves furnishing the relative subject matter of cases submitted had to do with a period in the past when the penalties were non existent. Such action would be anti jurisdical. There must be a generally recognized penalty on the part of the state aggrieved for the commission of acts in order that punishment may follow.

A state of war interdicts all intercourse between enemies, it prohibits and sets aside both the rules of commercial and criminal laws.

By the Brussels protocol of July 22, 1908, piracy and slavery are made offenses against the law of civilized nations. Will it be contended if such were not an existing fact that an international arbitral commission created in 1919 would have jurisdiction to punish by confiscation or otherwise this obnoxious enterprise if committed in 1916 or 1917? We think not.

In re Brig Lawrence (U. S.) vs. Great Britain February 8, 1853, Moore's Arbitration, pages 24-25, we find: That this American vessel put into the British port of Freetown in Africa; was there seized and libelled as equipped for the slave trade. It was held that the owners could not invoke the protection of their government because at the time of the condemnation the slave trade was prohibited by all civilized nations. Bates who voiced the opinion of the Commission, in a note gave his reasoning as based upon the existing law, and in no sense upon an agreement which was signed after the seizure which made the offense charged a crime. It was Cicero who said:

"Laws are silent in the midst of arms."

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

How can this be defined? It means, as we sense it, that law rather than force shall prevail on the ocean highways at all times.

Shall the ships of a neutral nation be overhauled and the mails of neutrals violated when destined for neutral ports It has been done in the past under the specific plea of vital necessity.

For the reign of force on the high seas a reign of law must be su

stituted. Else "Freedom of the Seas" will be a by-word, farcial in the extreme. Freedom, as civilization in this twentieth century understands it, means liberty regulated by law, sustained by the organized will of society. True freedom of the seas cannot rest upon the needs of or the will of any one nation or a selfish combination of powers.

The land of this sphere is largely occupied and owned by individuals, who in turn compose nations. We speak of "Our Country" as we do of "my farm." The oceans are the peculiar property of no set of men or nations. No state in modern history has pretended to exercise jurisdiction over the high seas outside the three-mile coast limit.

By the rules of international law-by the laws of nature and of God-the high seas, in the very nature of things, are intended as common highways for all mankind; the people of all nations being free to come and go in their craft across the waters' surface without delay, toll or hindrance. It was to maintain inviolate this unwritten law that the United States entered the war against the Central Powers. There can be no mistake on this point.

At the Peace Table in 1919 will be defined the rights of neutrals. It will be an understanding alike plain to Germany and England. It will be a solemn pact in which all the civilized peoples of the earth will be made parties, and by that agreement in days to come each nation must be bound. In time of peace the principle of perfect freedom of the seas is not challenged. It is in time of war between nations which have access to the seas that outlawry begins and that the rights of neutrals are raped by belligerent powers. The navies of the waring people raid and destroy each other's ships of trade and of war as legitimate warfare. Yet this in no way should interfere with the rights of neutrals to transit on the seas or the right to trade with other neutrals, even if their neighbors are at each other's throats and are killing at wholesale. The fact that war has broken out does not increase the rights of belligerents to the oceans over times of peace.

"Freedom of the Seas" has to do with the rights of neutrals to carry on their trade and commerce on the ocean highways without lawless interference by belligerents. The rights of neutrals cannot henceforth be eliminated simply because in the great war which has just closed those rights were temporarily wiped out. What those rights were in detail it is not necessary to inquire. They are virtually all gone. Between Germany on the one side and the Allies on