A shifty promoter called on a Detroit legal light. "Can't you find a hole for me to crawl out through?" he asked. "Of course, I can," replied the equally shifty lawyer. there's a little-preliminary-to be settled first." "What is that?" "But-ahem "I shall require a retainer of $1,000 to find the hole-before you start to crawl." An unmarried mother had obtained an order of court in one of the Southern states against a well-to do business man for the payment of certain monies monthly on account of the support of her child, the order providing that he should make this "involuntary donation" until the child became of the age of fourteen years. When that day occurred, the daughter called for the usual stipend. As it was handed her, the gentleman remarked: "Take this to your mother, Bertha, and tell her I am no longer your father." As the girl turned the money over to her mother, she repeated what her "father" had said. "Well," said the mother, "you go back and tell the gentleman that he never was." Hon. Chas. A. Enslow, a well-known Wisconsin lawyer, was recently making a trip from New Orleans to Washington. While in the smoking car of a Southern Railway train he was talking about ambition. "Yes, gentlemen,' he said,' "real ambition starts in childhood. And if we obey its impulsion we not only attain to it, but we actually go far beyond it. Yes, our ambition is gratified beyond our wildest dreams." "Yes, gentlemen," said a military-looking gentleman who was also a passenger. "I had in my childhood an ambition. I desired to become a pirate." "Well," said Lawyer Enslow, "you are pretty close to it, are you not? I believe you are General Amer, manager of the St. Charles Hotel in New Orleans." A young married man in New Orleans, who we will call Albert, was generally bossed by his wife. He was out with a party of friends who wanted him to go to a prize fight, and later have a little bird and a cold bottle. He declared he wanted to do it, but he had promised his wife he would be home for dinner. "I'll fix it for you," said one of the party. "Let-me-see-your wife's name is Bertha, eh?" He stepped into a booth and used the phone. Emerging, he said: "It's all right, old chap; your wife says you can stay." "How in the world did you manage to bring her around?" asked the amazed husband. "Easy; just told her you were roaring drunk, and should I bring you home or keep you here. Come on now, let's go." But Albert had fainted. LIMITATION OF POLICE POWERS Paper Read By Chas. E. George at Boston, Mass., May 23, 1919, Before the Legislative Procedure Section of the American Bureau of Reference. Police powers have their origin in the law of necessity, which, being strictly construed, is that of self defense. "There exists a power," says Dwarris (1) "by which private property may be taken, used or destroyed for the benefit of others; this is called the police power, sometimes called the law of over-ruling necessity." Even in a despotic government no unlimited law or authority exists, while in a constitutional government limitation is the abiding principle exhibited in its highest form in the Constitution, as the deliberative judgment of the people, moderating every claim, right or use of power. "If I were asked," said a noted California constitutional lawyer, "to define the limits to the so-called police powers, I would say anywhere within reasonable construction, not fixed by the Constitution, so that injury or consequences shall not follow to the majority." This same definition is found in many authoritative cases. (2) It cannot be denied that there are limitations of the power of government which arise out of the essential nature of all free government, implied reservations of individual rights. There are recognized within certain limits the doctrine of extra-constitutional powers and restraints whether expressly embodied in constitutions or not. (3) Today the various States are confronted with the question whether the Legislature has the power to regulate the manner in which private property may be used. May prescriptions be made and enforced legally restricting its use, or requiring its use only under certain defined conditions. Also whether the use of private proiperty may be required in such manner as will seemingly create a private monopoly by reason of such use in strict accordance with the regulation. We opine that the leading cases touching this proposition decided by the United States Suppreme Court are those of Slaughter House cases and New Orleans Gas Co., vs. Louisiana L. Co. (4). A much later decision is found in the (1) Potter's Dwarris Chap. XIV. (2) 1 Kent Com. 447-8. 18 Eq. cases (L. R.) 176. Farrington v. Tenn. 95 U. S. 683, (3) Prentice Police Powers 271. (4) Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 115 U. S. 668-111 U. S. 750. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana L. Co. 115 U. S 665 Fernow case, decided in February, 1919, by the Supreme Court of Illinois. (5) In this last case the police power of the State is more clearly defined than in any other case so far reported. The statute of 1917 was herein attacked as a violation of the property rights of the defendant in contravention of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute forbade, under penalty, the possession of any motor vehicle from which the manufacturer's identification number or mark has been removed or on which it has been defaced, covered or destroyed for the purpose of concealing the identity of the vehicle. The plaintiff was convicted under this act of having removed the manufacturer's serial numbers from ten automobiles and having new ones put on. He attacked the constitutionality of the law on the ground of its being class legislation and an unwarranted cxercise of police power of the State in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court disposed of these objections and upheld the act. It pointed out that the automobile is frequently used as a means of committing crime, that the identification marks in question are useful in aiding the detection of crime. Therefore, the law is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state. In the exercse of its police power it is proper for the state to make a specific act a crime or misdemeanor irrespective of the guilty knowledge or intent of the person who does it. The burden is thus placed on the individual of ascertaining at his peril whether or not his acts or omissions are within the law. The act is not void by reason of undue discrimination, since other vehicles are not used, as are motor vehicles, in aiding of criminal practices, and there is not the same necessity for imposing a like restriction upon them. We cannot find in any of the Constitutions, Federal or State, any restriction upon the right of the government to arbitrarily exercise its police powers so as to restrict crime, promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people. Each State may legislate so as to increase its industries, develop its resources and prescribe safe and sane regulations for the safety of society. (6) It is a well supported rule of law that the power to make municipal regulations has never been surrendered by the States, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States, while the Supreme Court of (5) People v. Fernow, 122 N. E. 155. (6) Stevenson Iron Co. v. Kibble. 205 U. S. 537. 51 L. Ed. 920 Moore v Mo 159 E. S. 673-40 L. Ed. 301. the United State has held that a State Legislature may properly enact regulations to prevent the spread of crime. (7) It is the purpose of this survey to discuss briefly the regulations which may constitutionally be enacted as applying to automobiles or motor vehicles. These enactments seem to be needed more largely than in other directions. What measures are necessary to regulate traffic or trade in automobiles or their use? The word "regulate" when used in this respect means to govern, direct or control by rule or restriction, to subject to governing principles of law. (8) The fact that a business or trade is lawful does not exempt it from reasonable regulation. (9) The right to use the public highway is not an absolute and unqualified right, but it is subject to limitation and control by the Legislature whenever necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, morals and general welfare of the people, and no constitutional guaranty is violated by such an exercise of the police power of the State. (10) Every person who operates or uses a motor vehicle must be regarded as exercising a privilege and not an unrestricted right. (11) The law requiring the registration of automobiles, etc., is a valid regulation. It does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This amendment, comprehensive as it is, was not designed to interfere with the exercise by the State of its police power for the protection of the people. (12) Can a constitutional requirement be enacted and enforced requiring each owner of an automobile to have a certificate of ownership, such certificate to be in the nature of a title policy issued by a private company? (13) This having been settled affirmatively, let us consider the terms "personal liberty" and "due process of law." The first means the right of the citizen to be free from physical restraint; to be free in the (7) Plumly v. Mass. 155 U. S. 461. 39 L. Ed. 223. State v. Gish 168 Iowa 70. (8) Miller v. Jones 80 Ala. 89-96. Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Garrity 115 Ill. 155-163. Higgins v. Mitchell Co. 6 Kan. App 314-16. Rochester v. West 29 App. Div. 125. Hill v. St. Louis 159 Mo. 159, 171. State v. McCame 72 Tenn. 1-13. Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196. Ex parte Lorenzen 128 Calif 431. Com. v. Gilbert 100 Mass 157. (9) Gundling v. Chicago 177 U. S. 183-8. Hopper v. Stack 69 N. J. L. 562. Meyers of Calif. App. 528 (10) State v Phillips 107 Me. 249 (1910). (13) Unwen v. State 73 N. J. L. 529. Ex parte 194 U. S. 361. People v. Otis employment of all his faculties; to live and work where he will; to acquire property and use it in a lawful manner. (14) Civil liberty is plain and unadorned natural liberty so far restrained by human agencies (and no further) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantages of the public. (15) "Due process of law" or "law of the land" are interchangeable phrases. (16) They mean a law which transgresses no constitutional right, which is in accord with American institutions, and the policies of a republican form of government which gives every man his day in court. Closely allied, imperious, and oft-times appearing arbitrary, but irresistible if sustained by reason and the courts, police powers are first to be considered in their origin and development. From this basis can be seen their limitations on the ground of police policy and its obligations. With the responsibility for the exercise of these powers we have nothing here to do. Ritchie v. People 155 (14) Helena v. Dwyer 64 Ark. 424. In re Morgan 26 Colo. 415. Ill. 98. Pinkerton v. Verberg 78 Mich. 573. Booth v. Ill. 184 U. S. 425. (15) 1 Blk. Com. 125. People v. Warden of Prison 157 N. Y. 116. Chicago v. Banker 112 Ill. App. 94-99 Bassette v. People 193 11. 334. (16) Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Humes 115 U. S. 512. Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) 518. 81. 4 L. Ed. 629 Harding v. People 160 Ill. 459 Ames v Port Huron 11 Mich. 139. Stratton v. Morris 89 Tenn. 497. Janes v. Reynolds 2 Tex. 250. Quinsby v. Hazen 54 Vt. 132. |