enlistments, appointments, and commissions of limited time or tenure now existing or which may hereafter exist in the Army of the United States, and in every component thereof, are hereby extended and shall remain in force unless sooner terminated by direction of the President, until six months after the termination of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President on May 27, 1941.

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law and during the unlimited national emergency declared by him on May 27, 1941, the President is hereby authorized to extend for such period beyond twelve consecutive months as he may deem necessary in the interests of national defense, the active military service of any or all members and units of the Reserve components of the Army of the United States and retired personnel of the Regular Army who have been, or who may hereafter be, ordered to active military service under the provisions of the Act approved August 27, 1940, Public Resolution Numbered 96, Seventysixth Congress, but not beyond six months following the termination of said emergency: Provided, That the President may in his discretion order any or all members and units of the Reserve components of the Army of the United States and retired personnel of the Regular Army to active military service under said resolution successively without regard to previous orders or previous service under said resolution. All persons whose active military service is extended hereunder shall be deemed to be serving under the said Act approved August 27, 1940, and shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and benefits extended and conferred thereby.

SEC. 3. The provisions of the Act approved August 27, 1940, Public Resolution Numbered 96, Seventy-sixth Congress, are hereby extended to remain in full force and effect until six months following the termination of the unlimited national emergency declared by the President on May 27, 1941.

SEC. 4. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, enlistments in the Army of the United States without specification of any particular component thereof are authorized. Unless sooner terminated by the President, such enlistments may be for the duration of the unlimited national emergency declared by him on May 27, 1941, and until six months following the termination thereof.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the first witness this morning is General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

General Marshall, we will be very glad for you to begin now, if you are ready.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. WADE H. HAISLIP, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL)

General MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I am a little at a loss as to just what you want me to address myself. You had a rather lengthy statement by me on the various questions involved in the resolutions under consideration-the retention beyond the original period of 12 months of the Reserve components of the Army of the United States, and of the selectees.

The CHAIRMAN. In answer to that, General, I might say this, that you made a statement before the Military Affairs Committee the other day.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A part and portion of that was reduced to writing. General MARSHALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But, unfortunately, that has not as yet been printed or placed in multigraph form for distribution among the members of the committee and some members of the committee have not been provided an opportunity of knowing what you said.

In addition to that, I know you made statements before the House Military Affairs Committee and other committees here on Capitol Hill, but in view of the fact that this hearing relates exclusively to

S. J. Res. 92 and 93, involving the selectees, the National Guard, and reserve officers whom it is proposed to continue in the service, we would like for you to make a full and complete statement, as full and complete as you want, without revealing any military secrets, which record will be for the benefit of the members of the committee who unfortunately are not here but who are detained on other official business, and likewise information for the members of the Senate, many of whom are equally as interested in this important subject as are we of the Military Affairs Committee of the United States Senate.

So, if you will be good enough to proceed, merely bearing in mind that this is for the information of the entire committee and members of the Senate, many of whom have stated to me that they would not be able to be here, but they would like very much to read all the testimony submitted in reference to these two resolutions.

So, if you proceed upon the theory that you have not made any statement upon it at all, I think that would be better, at least in my opinion, from what I have heard and the many inquiries that have been directed to me by various members of the Senate itself.

I might say, in addition to that, that several members of the House have spoken to me and said that they had hoped to be here during these hearings and if they were not they had hoped to have the opportunity of reading your testimony prior to any time that you might be called to testify before the House Military Affairs Committee.

General MARSHALL. Very well, Senator Reynolds; I will endeavor to do as you have requested.

In the first place, the matter before us is of such public importance and the interest of the public and of the Congress is apparently so intense, that it might be well to go back to my original recommendations in my biennial report, covering the period of my stewardship from July 1, 1939, until June 30, 1941. It may clarify the atmosphere for me to explain that I made the specific recommendations regarding the extension of the 12-month period of service for the three categories purely on the basis of a military necessity for the security of the country. The Commander in Chief, that is, the President, had no knowledge that I was going to make them. My report was submitted to the Secretary of War and at the same time was released to the press.

The recommendations were dictated by military necessity. I tried to keep as wide a separation as possible between military necessity, the sole basis for my recommendations and political considerations which are matters for the decision of the President and the Congress. Senator AUSTIN. Would you permit a question at this point? General, I would like to ask if you in that report express the conviction that, from the military point of view, the national interest was then imperiled.

General MARSHALL. I did so in those very words. I felt that affairs had reached a critical state from a military viewpoint several months ago, and that no more time could be lost without giving the public and the Congress my military opinion of the situation.

As I stated before your committee the other day, sir, some weeks back a report was made to the Secretary of War who, in turn, transmitted it to the President, recommending that action be taken immediately on the basis of our belief, our feeling, that the national

interests were imperiled and that the existence of a national emergency should be declared.

In my biennial report of a few days ago I endeavored to the best of my ability to keep the issue of the state of readiness of the Army for service entirely clear of other implications. As a matter of fact, however, the reactions of the press, which have had a great deal to do with present public sentiment distorted the report to indicate that I was talking about an A. E. F., which was an absurd deduction so far as I can read my own statement.

I was talking about the state of readiness of the Army for whatever service might be required of it and I stated in the report that questions of where it might be employed or when it might be employed were matters that the President and the Congress would decide. I submitted that the question of the readiness for service in the Army should not be confused with those political considerations.

However, as I have already stated, quite the contrary reaction developed and, so far as I can tell, largely because of a superficial study of the report on the part of the press, I fail to see how anyone could read my report and get an idea that I was talking about an A. E. F. I was not, inferentially or in any otherwise.

When the Congress passed Public Resolution 96 on August 27, 1940, and later, on September 16, passed the Selective Training and Service Act, the purpose was first to build up a military force adequate to guarantee our security and, second, to establish at least on an experimental basis for 5 years a new military system in time of peace. At that time we had a force of approximately 175,000 men on active duty, some 20,000 of whom were in the air service and 45,000 of whom were on foreign service. After deducting those men and also the number always necessary for overhead, there remained a pitifully small number of troops in the United States and even that small number was scattered throughout the country.

Senator AUSTIN. At that point would you permit an interruption? I have heard criticisms which conveyed the charge that selectees had been infiltrated into ordinary units and sent away to outlying possessions of the United States in order to force the hand of Congress to the extent of obtaining either the resolution declaring that the national interest is imperiled or amendments such as these that we are considering today; what would you say about that?

General MARSHALL. Senator Austin, exactly the opposite has been the case. I have been personally responsible for the assignments to foreign service. With the greatest reluctance I was forced to the conclusion that in certain specific cases we must send units upon foreign service which were National Guard units or which had in their ranks selective-service men. In order to hold these categories to the absolute minimum, we almost destroyed the divisions of the Regular Army in order to provide the troops required.

Consider, for example, the Sixth Division, one of our nine Regular Army infantry divisions in the continental United States. We virtually eliminated 50 percent of that division in order to provide garrisons for the bases from Newfoundland to Trinidad. We will have to rebuild that division all over again.

When it became necessary to increase the antiaircraft protection of Hawaii some time ago, we had nothing else available at the time but a National Guard regiment. We could not send a Regular regiment

for the reason that the few we had, had been expanded to the point where they contained in some cases, 80 percent selectees, and they were not then in a state of training appropriate for that assignment. There was the additional reason that the small professional personnel then in the ranks was urgently needed for the training of the new units that were being organized in various parts of the United States.

So I had to authorize the sending of a National Guard antiaircraft regiment to Hawaii. This is a specific example. Incidentally, relief must be provided for that regiment, sailing from San Francisco by August 1, in order to start the other on its way home by August 15. That will allow it 10 days or 2 weeks for the complicated procedure of demobilization in accoradnce with the terms of the present law.

We have a further complication in that the National Guard regiment has in its ranks selectees who have a longer period of service. Just what is to be done with them if the Guard unit is demobilized I can not tell you at the moment. The problem is being worked on in the War Department. It is probable that the selectees will be left in Hawaii and assigned to other units but they will have to be brought home 3 or 4 months later.

I spoke the other day of another regiment that I authorized to be sent out of the United States because there was no other unit available in an acceptable state of training.

I referred to the Coast Artillery regiment of the National Guard which we had to send to Alaska. We had to reinforce that garrison and do it quickly.

It was done in the way I have described. That regiment must be returned from Alaska and the deadline for its relief to start north is about August 5. If there happen to be bad fogs at that time I may find myself in technical violation of the law.

There is no other National Guard unit available for that particular relief. Therefore I will have to send a Regular unit with some 40 to 50 percent of selectees in its ranks, because there are no 3-year men available. The selectees will have to return 4 months lateranother needless move and in the middle of the winter, at that.

I have spoken of two very small units. If we had the purpose that has been mentioned, we would have sent a large number of National Guard men and selectees out of the United States and would have produced deliberately an impossible situation. On the contrary, we have acted in good faith throughout. We have tried our level best to comply with all of the provisions of the law. And I would like to add, at the expense of repetition, that we have been trying in every way to find a workable solution but without success.

I came finally to the conclusion that I had to come out firmly, plainly, publicly, with the request for immediate action in the part of Congress in the shortest possible period of time.

Senator AUSTIN. The deadline is indicated in your answer to be around August first; is that right?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator AUSTIN. That is to say, this legislation, if agreed to, ought to be all completed by August first?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. There are a great many other involvements that complicate it still more. If the National Guard

is to be demobilized, we will have to create a large number of new units. That is a tremendous organizational problem. We have all

the plans completed, but we must have a definite decision. We considered that June 1 was our deadline on the decision as to the future of the National Guard.

However, we did not have a decision on June 1. It is now the middle of July and still we have no decision. Right now I would like to add this statement which I think everyone should keep clearly in mind: We are threatened today by a military force which has been built up on the system of first, drastic training of boys, then a very strict military-training period in labor battalions, followed by a period of intensive military instruction culminating in a series of actual campaigns, with which we are all familiar. That program produces a military force of a very high order containing nothing but skilled veterans. We have been doing our best to build an Army only since last fall-only since last fall. We can do a wonderful job in that respect, I believe, if we are permitted to go ahead. We can make ourselves so strong defensively that I believe all our interests can be safeguarded, but we must continue to proceed in the same publicspirited manner that marked the passage of Public Resolution 96 and the Selective Training and Service Act late last Summer.

I regarded that legislation even with all the limiting amendments, as a very remarkable piece of work in time of peace in a democracy, behind two great oceans. However, I submit, that to stop in the middle of the program when the situation as we see it is grave and critical would be disastrous.

We are working against a time schedule. We have seen nation after nation go down, one after the other, in front of a concentrated effort, each one lulled, presumably, into negative action, until all the guns were turned on them and it was too late.

We have the basis for protective action in the Selective Training and Service Act to meet this threat. There we have the foundation of the entire matter. The whole issue at stake is simply this: Is the situation critical? Is there an emergency?

I say distinctly that such an emergency now exists. Unfortunately, it is not in the national interest to make a public statement of all we know. Such an action would defeat part of our purpose. It might even produce a reaction of public opinion as did the sinking of the Maine or the Zimmerman note. We wish to avoid that.

Senator BRIDGES. General, may I ask you a question there?

As Chief of Staff of the armies of the United States do you believe the safety of this country would be imperiled or might be imperiledI will not say would be but might be imperiled-if the Congress fails to authorize the continuation of these draftees for more than the 12 months' service?

General MARSHALL. I do, emphatically, believe that it is quite possible, that the safety of this country might be imperiled.

Senator AUSTIN. May I ask you one other question along that same line?

The portion of the Draft Act that precedes immediately that portion which relates to time of service and training also limits the number who can be kept in active training or service in the land forces of the United States at any one time to 900,000.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator AUSTIN. I want to have you go on record regarding your opinion whether the national interest would be imperiled if Congress fails to take the lid off that limitation.