THE PROJECTED NICARAGUAN CANAL 817 no more allow the passage of a hostile ship than the transit of an army over one of our railroads to the Pacific. This strong utterance was received with polite silence abroad and with baffled wonderment at home. He also proposed to England a modification of the treaty of 1850, but met with a refusal that was barely courteous. Whatever plans he had were defeated by his retirement after the death of Garfield. Frelinghuysen, his successor, carried on negotiations with Great Britain with less aggression but without results, and Cleveland, more conciliatory still, allowed the matter to sleep. At the same time the growing embarrassments of the French company eased the alarms of Americans from that source. The Mari time Com pany But the Nicaraguan project was not forgotten. In 1884 a treaty permitting a canal with American capital was made with Nicaragua in return for a guarantee of the integrity of that state; but Cleveland withdrew it from the senate before it was ratified. Then a private "Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua" was organized, and congress was asked for Nicaragua. a charter. The administration hesitated, fearing international complications, but congress granted the request. Subscriptions came in slowly the French company was then in its direst straits — and the Maritime company could do little more than improve the harbor at its eastern terminus. Next it appealed to congress to guarantee $100,000,000 of its bonds. There was much discussion of the proposition in and out of legislative halls, and finally in 1895 it passed the senate, to be lost in the house. In 1898 the charter lapsed, but it was not doubted that Nicaragua whould renew it, if the American government undertook to bring the enterprise to completion. This was the situation when the war against Spain ran its short and decisive course. It so much enhanced our interest in the Pacific that it could no longer be doubted that an isthmian canal was a necessity. Bulwer Treaty An It was also clear to a vast majority of Americans that the canal when built must be American, and that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty should no longer stand in the way. Negotiations were opened to that end, and in 1901, after one treaty had Claytonbeen rejected, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was ratified in which the arrangement of 1850 was annulled. It said nulled. nothing about fortifications on the canal, and although neutrality was promised by the United States, no other power became a party to the pledge. A unilateral agreement leaves everything to the good faith of the nation making it. THE CANAL AT PANAMA It was believed that the French concession at Panama could be purchased by the United States, and a warm controversy now arose be The Route tween those who favored that route and those who supported the Nicaragua route, the Maritime and the French companies each pushing its own interest vigorously, both in the press and by means of an able lobby. The transcontinental railroads also joined in the fight, trying to impede any action at all. Their position was so obviously selfish that they accomplished little. A commission of engineers, headed by Admiral Walker, was appointed to consider, the two routes. It reported, November 16, 1901, that the Nicaraguan canal could be constructed for $189,864,062 and the Panama canal for $114,233,358, to which latter sum must be added the cost of the French plant, offered at $109,142,500, but valued by the commission at a maximum of $40,000,000. Its report ended by recommending the northern route. This final suggestion seems to have been made to bring the French company to terms, for when it offered to sell for $40,000,000, the report was modified to favor the southern route. The matter then went to congress, which authorized the president by a vote practically unanimous to purchase the French rights if a legal title could be obtained. The bill also authorized the president to secure from Colombia, in which the state of Panama lay, a right of way at least six miles wide, and it provided for a commission to construct the canal. Interest now centered at Bogotá. Secretary Hay negotiated a treaty with the Colombian chargé d'affaires, Herran, granting a ninety-nine years' lease, with right of renewal by the United States, of a canal zone six miles wide, in return for which we were to pay $10,000,000 cash and $250,000 annually. This agreement aroused dissatisfaction among Colombians. "Panama," as Professor Latané says, “was their greatest asset," and they had for many years built high hopes on its development. Besides, their constitution prohibited the alienation of territory by congress and the proposed lease was held to amount to alienation. The agreement, therefore, was rejected unanimously by the congress. President Roosevelt and many Americans believed the rejection was due to corrupt motives, and concluded that the Colombians desired to await the expiration of the French charter in 1904, when they could demand an exorbitant price. Colombia has ever denied that her motive was chiefly mercenary, but her point seems well taken that the amount offered was not in fair proportion to that paid later to the French Colombia Objects. company. The turn events took caused much disquiet at Panama, whose inhabitants were dismayed at the prospect of having the canal go to Nicaragua. The state had long cherished opposition to The Case for the federal authority at Bogotá, charging that the latter Panama. exploited the state to get revenues for the federal govern ment, until Panama was called "the milch cow of the confederation." Moreover, in 1885, Dr. Nuñez, by as high-handed methods as one could THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 819 imagine, had made himself dictator in Colombia and ruled the component states through a military oligarchy whose daring use of power in elections and elsewhere reduced republican forms of government to a farce. At the time, therefore, when Panama saw passing away her opportunity of realizing the dream of centuries, the construction of the canal which would make her the center of the trade routes of the New World, she was filled with resentment for ancient wrongs which struck at the root of her rights as a state. The new grievance did not create the spirit of revolt: it only ripened it. Revolt Planned. Early in 1903 a revolutionary junto was organized in the town of Panama on the western side of the isthmus, at its head Señor Arango and Dr. Amador. Although they could count on the friendship of most of the Panamans, they were so weak that they could not succeed without the aid of the United States; but they believed that would be given, at least covertly, through our desire to get the canal route. They also needed money to raise troops and buy arms and ammunition. They hoped to get this from the Panama railroad, an American enterprise, which also had reason to desire that the canal be built in Panama. Dr. Amador went to New York to try to get funds at railroad headquarters; but his departure was known in Bogotá, and a hint that aid to the conspirators would lead to confiscation of the railroad charter destroyed that hope. One other powerful interest desired the canal dug at the isthmus, the French company. It so happened that as Dr. Amador was turned away from the railroad offices there arrived in New York the agent of the French company, Bunau-Varilla. He grasped the situation at once and agreed to furnish the desired funds if he was made the minister from the new state to Washington. Dr. Amador was overjoyed and readily promised what was asked. He then visited Washington, interviewed Secretary Hay, from whom he got no open encouragement, but left convinced that if a revolution were accomplished, President Roosevelt would recognize the de facto government. From Washington he returned to Panama, where it soon began to be Bunauwhispered about that a revolution would occur on Novem- the Rescue. ber 4, 1903. This rumor was reported to the United States by the American consul, and on November 2 the gunboat Nashville arrived at Colon. It came to protect American property, in view of the prospects of disturbances; but its presence gave courage to the timid ones, who saw in it a promise of the support of the United States. Varilla to When, as was believed, the blow was about to fall, that is to say, on November 3, there landed at Colon 450 Colombian soldiers commanded by four generals. The leaders proceeded at once The Blow to Panama, where the plot had its center, giving orders Struck. for the soldiers to follow. Three Colombian gunboats were off Panama to coöperate with the army, but the revolutionists expected them to support the revolt. Arrived at their destination, the generals with their staffs were made prisoners by the junto's army, now numbering about 100 men. Two of the gunboats declared for the same side, and the other steamed away after firing three shots, one of which killed a Chinamen, the only blood spilt in the revolution. Meanwhile, the force at Colon prepared to go to the defense of their leaders, but the railroad demanded money for transportation. The soldiers had no funds, but the officer in command threatened to seize the trains and go without delay. The company's officers sympathized with the revolt. By the treaty between the United States and Colom, bia, the former nation was bound to protect the free operation of the road, and the commander of the Nashville landed 50 marines to prevent the seizure of the railroad by the Colombians. He also announced that he would not allow the transportation of troops by either side, since that would precipitate a conflict and interfere with the free transit of the isthmus. Had the Colombian commander been enterprising and earnest, he would have found a means of getting to Panama, only 49 miles away. After two days in Colon, he embarked his troops on a mail ship and departed. It was reported that he received a bribe of $8000 from the revolutionists, and that when his men discovered the fact, they despoiled him of the money and set him ashore at Kingston without funds. The captured generals were sent out of the country a few days later. By this time several American men-of-war were in the harbors of Colon and Panama. They came to protect property and keep transit open. But when they gave notice that, in compliance with orders from Washington, they would not allow troops to land within 50 miles of Panama, their presence took other significance. Colombia could not subdue the revolt without fighting the United States, and submitted to the inevitable with bitter feelings. November 4, the junto held meetings, organized a republic of Panama, deposed the officers representing the Colombian authority, and in Its Success. A Panama stalled a government of their own. Their proceedings were approved by a mass meeting in the town of Panama. November 6, the United States recognized the independence of the new republic, and on the same day Bunau-Varilla was appointed its first minister at Washington. All was done by cable, and he entered upon his duties with such despatch that by November 18 he had concluded the Hay-Bunau-Varilla convention, by which we guaranteed the integrity of Panama and received in full sovereignty a strip of land ten miles wide from sea to sea for the construction of a canal. For this concession we agreed to pay $10,000,000 in cash and $250,000 a year beginning in 1913. Our share in these events was resented by Colombia, which had the support of most South American states. Friends of President Roosevelt justified his action on the ground that it was necessary to keep transit open and to protect property, but it is hard to treat such |