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and our troops would be in no condition to improve it; that the attack was unnecessary, because they could easily gain the left and rear of the enemy; that it would compel the enemy to change front and abandon his position.

"General Hood called up Captain Hamilton of his staff, and requested me to repeat the protest to him. He directed Hamilton to find Longstreet as soon as possible, to deliver the protest, and say to him that he

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POSITION OF UNION AND CONFEDERATE TROOPS, 3.30 P.M., JULY 2.

[Hood] indorsed it fully. Hamilton rode off at once, but in about ten minutes returned, accompanied by one of General Longstreet's staff-officers, who said to General Hood in my hearing, 'General Longstreet orders that you begin the attack at once.' Hood turned to me and merely said, 'You hear the order.' I at once moved my brigade to the assault.. General Longstreet has since said that he repeatedly advised against a front attack, and suggested a movement by our right flank. He may

have thought, after the rejection of this advice by General Lee, that it was useless to press the matter further."

Longstreet had eight brigades, and Anderson five-thirteen in allwith the brigades of Hill's Corps in reserve, which were moving to attack the six brigades of the Third Corps. To understand the battle, we are to keep in mind the uncertainty of General Meade as to the intentions of Lee. From Little Round Top Confederate troops could be seen moving south, while from Cemetery Hill I could see those north of the town moving east. With this uncertainty before him, General Meade was holding the Fifth Corps in reserve not far from his headquarters, that he might use it in any direction. The line of defence which General Meade had selected was along the ridge from the cemetery to Little Round Top, but the Third Corps was not on the ridge; it was in front of it, and made a sharp angle at the peach orchard. General Hunt, commanding the artillery, rode along the line with General Sickles to the peach orchard, and down to Little Round Top. With his quick eye he saw that the peach orchard was quite as high as the ground along the ridge between the position of the Second Corps and Little Round Top; that it would be a position where the Confederates might plant their artillery and pour a destructive fire upon the Union line. For that reason it might be desirable to hold it; but the line there turned a right angle, and that was a disadvantage. This is what General Hunt says in regard to it:

"The salient line proposed by General Sickles, although much longer, afforded excellent positions for our artillery; its occupation would cramp the movements of the enemy, bring us nearer his lines, and afford us facilities for taking the offensive. It was, in my judgment, the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive with a prospect of decisive results. But General Meade had not, until the arrival of the Sixth Corps, a sufficient number of troops at his disposal to risk such an extension of his lines; it would have required both the Third and Fifth corps, and left him without any reserve. Had he known that Lee's attack would be postponed till 4 P.M. he might have occupied the line in the morning; but he did not know this, expected an attack at any moment, and, in view of the vast risks involved, adopted a defensive policy and ordered the occupation of the safe line."(*)

It was at this moment that the troops of Ewell were moving east towards Culp's Hill, upon which the batteries on Cemetery Hill opened fire; it was also the moment of the encounter between the sharp-shooters and Hood.

General Meade rode down to the peach orchard and examined the line, at the suggestion of General Hunt, who says:

"I was here met by Captain Randolph, the Third Corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line. Seeing Generals Meade and Sickles not far off in conversation, and supposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once to the Reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to draw on the same source."

There were one hundred and eight guns in the Reserve Artillery, which could be summoned for use on any part of the field, in addition to the two hundred and twelve attached to the several corps.

General Sickles had stationed Ward's brigade, with four guns of Smith's New York Battery, on the rocky ridge west of the Devil's Den, to hold the extreme left of his line and the approach to Little Round Top. He had stationed Winslow's New York Battery on the eastern edge of a wheat-field east of Rose's house, between Ward's brigade and De Trobriand's brigade, which was located in the woods west of the wheat-field with part of Burling's brigade. This brings us to the gap extending from the woods to the peach orchard-quite a distance along the road, where there was not a regiment of infantry. The other regiments of Burling's brigade, together with Graham's brigade and Clark's New Jersey Battery, held the line in the peach orchard facing south towards Rose's house. Humphreys's division of the Third Corps, with several batteries, held the Emmettsburg road northward to Codori's house. It was too late to make any change in the line, for the Confederate batteries were opening fire, and the battle must begin with the troops as they stood. Lee's army consisted of forty brigades, and eighteen of them were in position to take part in the attack upon the six brigades of the Third Corps, which must look to the Second and Fifth corps for assistance.

The horses of the Union Reserve Artillery had eaten their oats, the cannoneers were resting beneath the shade of the trees, smoking their pipes and playing cards, when an aide arrived from General Hunt with an order to Colonel McGilvery for more batteries. Hart's Fifteenth New York, Phillips's Fifth Massachusetts, and Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts went out past Trostle's house; Hart's to take position in the peach orchard, Phillips's and Bigelow's to fill the gap along the road leading eastward from the orchard.

The sun was going down the western sky-a lovely summer afternoon. The swallows were twittering around the eaves of Mrs. Leister's humble home, unmindful of the coming and going of men on horseback. Fleecy

[graphic][subsumed]

BIGELOW'S, PHILLIPS'S, AND CLARK'S BATTERIES GOING INTO POSITION.

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