863

Notes on U. S. Reports.

162 U. S. 625-650

Homicide.-- Jury may consider blood stains, not satisfactorily explained, in deciding fact of murder, p. 620.

Criminal law.- Jury are to weigh and consider defendant's testimony and whether evidence of guilt, if false, p. 621.

Homicide.- Deceased's picture is admissible to prove identity, p. 621.

Criminal law.- Confession, to be admissible, must be voluntary, without compulsion or inducement, p. 623.

Followed in Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 543, 548, 42 L. 573, 575, 18 S. Ct. 187, 189.

Distinguished in Steele v. State, 76 Miss. 394, 24 So. 911, where accused is witness in his own behalf.

Criminal law. That accused is in custody and manacled, does not necessarily make confession involuntary, p. 623.

Approved in dissenting opinion in Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 569, 42 L. 582, 18 S. Ct. 197, majority distinguishing under facts.

Criminal law. Accused's statements may be used at trial, though before he had counsel or knew of his right thereto, p. 624. Distinguished in Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 541, 42 L. 573, 18 S. Ct. 186 (see dissenting opinion in 168 U. S. 573, 42 L. 584, 18 S. Ct. 198) under facts.

Criminal law.- Court may leave to jury to reject confession, if deemed involuntary, where evidence conflicts, p. 624.

Followed in Rosel v. State, 62 N. J. L. 238, 41 Atl. 416.

162 U. S. 625-650, 40 L. 1097, CRAIN v. UNITED STATES. Indictment.- Count may refer to matter in previous count to avoid repetition, p. 633.

Approved in Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 648, 41 L. 295, 16 S. Ct. 1133, where judge's charge limited issue to one of several charges under R. S., § 5286; State v. Fidler, 148 Ind. 222, 47 N. E. 465, where charge covered several offenses punishable alike under same statute.

Indictment that one executed and forged, and caused to be executed and forged, a false affidavit, is not bad for duplicity, p. 634. Criminal law.- Due process requires that accused plead or be ordered to, or plea of not guilty entered, before trial, p. 645. Approved in Dansby v. United States, Indian Ter. - 51 S. W. 1085, and Browning v. State, 54 Neb. 204, 74 N. W. 631, conviction without plea is invalid.

Criminal law.- Record showing that jury tried "the issue joined," does not show that defendant pleaded, p. 645.

Approved in Shelp v. United States, 81 Fed. 701, 48 U. S. App. 387. applying rule in misdemeanor case; Browning v. State. 54

162 U. S. 650-687

Notes on U. S. Reports.

864

Neb. 206, 74 N. W. 632, arraignment and plea are essential to conviction.

Criminal law.- Rule that record must show accused's arraignment and plea is not merely formal within R. S., § 1025, p. 645.

Criminal law. Record of conviction for infamous crime must show taking of every step at trial required by due process, p. 645. Distinguished in Commonwealth v. Crowley, 168 Mass. 223, 46 N. E. 626, verdict including lesser offense well charged is not void. 162 U. S. 650-663, 40 L. 1105, WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. JAMES.

Commerce. State law requiring prompt delivery of telegrams is valid police regulation, even as to messages from other States. p. 653.

Approved in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Powell, 94 Va. 273, 26 S. E. 828, and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Goddin, 94 Va. 515, 27 S. E. 429, both following rule; New York, etc., R. R. v. New York, 165 U. S. 631, 41 L. 854, 17 S. Ct. 419, upholding law regulating heating of cars; Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. 699, 47 U. S. App. 339, and Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 138, 42 L. 692, 18 S. Ct. 291, both upholding law limiting carrier's right to contract against liability; Richmond, etc., R. R. v. Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 316, 42 L. 761, 18 S. Ct. 337, upholding law placing onus of disproving loss of goods upon carrier; Lake Shore, etc., Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 295, 19 S. Ct. 469 (see dissenting opinion in 173 U. S. 324, 19 S. Ct. 480), upholding law requiring interstate trains to stop at certain stations.

Commerce.- Telegraph lines are instruments of commerce within commerce clause, p. 654.

Commerce. Legislation which is mere aid to commerce may be enacted by a State, p. 656.

Commerce.- State's imposition of penalty for telegraph company's neglect of legal duty is not commerce regulation, p. 661.

Approved in Missouri, etc., Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 634, 42 L. 885, 18 S. Ct. 496 (see dissenting opinion in 169 U. S. 642, 42 L. 888, 18 S. Ct. 499), upholding law against importation of diseased cattle; Burgess v. Western Union Tel. Co., 92 Tex. 127, 71 Am. St. Rep. 834, 46 S. W. 795, upholding statute limiting time of suit; Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 231, 20 S. Ct. 103, arguendo.

Telegraphs.- Right of receiver of message to collect statutory penalty for its delayed delivery is unaffected by sender's contract, p. 663.

162 U. S. 664-687, 40 L. 1109, COFFIN v. UNITED STATES. Banks. One aiding national bank officer in defrauding bank need not also be bank officer within R. S., § 5209, p. 666.

865

Notes on U. S. Reports.

162 U. S. 687-715

Banks.-R. S., § 5209, punishing those aiding and abetting defrauding bank officers, construed, p. 667.

Banks.- One cannot aid and abet defrauding bank officer without latter's concurring act, p. 670.

Approved in dissenting opinion in Gallot v. United States, 87 Fed. 451, majority holding death of principal does not prevent prosecution of abettor.

Criminal law. Instructions embraced in court's general charge are properly refused, p. 672.

Followed in Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 51, 41 L. 630, 17 S. Ct. 241, Baltimore, etc., R. R. v. Hellenthal, 88 Fed. 122, 60 U. S. App. 166, and Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 Fed. 390.

Criminal law.- Instruction to jury to consider whether motive of personal gain induced offense is not as to matter of law, and is properly refused, p. 674.

Criminal law.- Refusal of irrelevant instruction is no error, p. 677.

Bank president, permitting overdrafts which will not be paid, with intent to defraud bank, commits a crime, p. 683.

Approved in People v. Comstock, 115 Mich. 313, 73 N. W. 248, construing State banking law.

Banks.- Making of false entry is concrete offense, not committed where transaction real, though fraudulent, p. 684.

Approved in Agnew v. United States, 165 U. S. 53, 41 L. 630, 17 S. Ct. 242, truthful entry of fraudulent transaction is not false entry.

Banks.- Indictment charging officer and abettors with intent to defraud bank is good, though also charging officer with another intent, p. 686.

Cited in Dow v. United States, 82 Fed. 909, 49 U. S. App. 616, and Spurr v. United States, 87 Fed. 711, 59 U. S. App. 688, court has large discretion in admitting evidence of intent.

Miscellaneous. Cited in Gardes v. United States, 87 Fed. 175, court may require prosecution to elect from numerous counts.

162 U. S. 687-715, 40 L. 1118, PUTNAM v. UNITED STATES. Indictment for fraud by president of G. Bank, and that it did business at Exeter, is satisfied by proof that same is G. Bank of Exeter, p. 691.

Approved in Davis v. State, 105 Ga. 812, 32 S. E. 159, disregarding use of "railroad" instead of "railway" in indictment.

Witness may be asked leading question on direct examination where counsel surprised by his statements, p. 694.

Witness' memory may not be refreshed by reference to testimony by him four months after event, p. 696.

VOL. XII-55

162 U. S. 687-715 Notes on U. S. Reports.

866

Distinguished in Peters v. United States, 94 Fed. 140, court may permit leading questions.

Appeal. Rejection of evidence, as not proper cross-examination, is not error, if not again offered during trial, p. 707.

Criminal law.- Offense against United States, begun in one district and completed in another, is triable in either, p. 708.

Bank president, wrongfully drawing check on deposit in another State and by misrepresentation there procuring acceptance, may be tried in latter, p. 710.

Banks.- National bank president has not power, virtute officil, to check against deposit in another bank, p. 713.

Criminal law.- Sentence being separate on two counts, on which defendant convicted, entire punishment must be undergone, though one conviction set aside, p. 714.

Approved in Selvester v. United States, 170 U. S. 268, 270, 271, 42 L. 1031, 1032, 18 S. Ct. 582, 583, jury may convict on one count and disagree on another.

Distinguished in United States v. Tubbs, 94 Fed. 360, where evt dence received on bad counts was prejudicial in trial of others.

APPENDIX I.

In Memoriam.

HOWELL EDMONDS JACKSON,
DIED AUGUST 8, 1895.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1895.

Present: The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Gray, Mr. Justice Brewer, Mr. Justice Brown, Mr. Justice Shiras, and Mr. Justice White.

The Chief Justice said:

The court reassembles again, saddened by a vacant chair.

Mr Justice Jackson

died at Nashville, Tennessee, on the 8th day of August last. This was followed by the death of Mr. Justice Strong* on the 19th day of the same month, who, during his retirement, had maintained his companionship with the members of the bench he had adorned.

On Monday, November 25, 1895, Mr. Attorney General Harmon addressed the court as follows:

It is with more than a sense of official propriety that I comply with the request of the bar by presenting to the court their resolutions relating to the late Justice Jackson. We of his home circuit knew him best. There were his birthplace and his home. There his first regular judicial work was done, by which he made the reputation that led to the call from across the party wall to a seat beside your honors.

He had an

The active bar always feel some misgivings when a man in public life, even though he has won distinction there, is called to the bench, especially when he has reached middle age. But they soon found that Howell Edmonds Jackson was not so much a senator who had been appointed judge as a judge who had served for a time as senator. His mind, naturally broad and strong, symmetrically developed, controlled by steady purpose, and directed by industry which seemed almost weariless, would have enabled him to fill with credit any place which. requires such qualities. He had so filled the high positions to which the resolutions refer, but he was peculiarly fitted for the duties of a judge. He had in high degree patience to hear and consider and firmness to decide. even temper, judgment unprejudiced toward men or things, and a logical turn of mind which naturally shed irrelevance and sophistry and inclined to accuracy of fact and correctness of conclusion. He loved justice in the concrete as well as in the abstract, and felt the pleasure a strong judge always takes in applying the principles of law to the redress of wrongs; but he knew and loved the system of judicial science too well to wrench or impair it, and unsettle the rights of the great body of the people, in seeking to avoid those occasional hardships against which human law, being necessarily general, cannot provide. So his decisions were of the kind which build and perfect our jurisprudence, and not a *For proceedings on the retirement of Mr. Justice Strong see book 26, p. 5.