of 1856 to the same state for similar purposes. | purchase of such lands at a price not less than Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Forsythe, 71 the minimum price of public lands, viz., $1.25 per acre. 20. A mistake in the plat filed by a railroad company with the Secretary of the Interior, whereby the route is described by a wrong survey, does not defeat the right of the railroad company to public lands as against another railroad company which has not been misled or prejudiced in any manner by the mistake. Washington & I. R. Co. v. Cœur d'Alene R. ~& Nav. Co. 346 Id. 29. Indian reservations existing by force of a treaty are not subject to the general grant of authority conferred upon the President by the act of Congress of March 1, 1847, to set apart for public uses such portion of lands within a land district then created as were necessary. Spalding v. Chandler, 469 30. An Indian reservation accepted by both 21. A survey for a line of railroad, made be- parties to an Indian treaty providing therefor, fore the organization of the railroad company, although it may have been selected by one which subsequently adopted it, can give no party and acquiesced in by the other, is as efright to the company under the act of Congress fectual to prevent a pre-emption claim to any of March 3, 1875, granting public lands to rail- part of it as if the reservation was specifically roads. ld. designated by boundaries in the treaty itself. Id. 31. The failure of Congress to regard the rights of the Indians in making a grant of lands for a canal across an Indian reservation held by the Indians under a treaty does not prevent the continued existence of such portions of the reservation as were not embraced in the grant for canal purposes, so as to prevent any pre 22. The latest official measurement of the area of land granted for railroads, if not charged to have been fraudulently made, may be accepted by the court as the best, if not conclusive, evidence, of the quantity, where the question arises between the United States and the railroad for which the grant was made, without the intervention of the rights of third parties, although a map made many years be-emption claim thereto. fore was accepted by the government and was long unquestioned. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co. . United States, 177 23. For the construction of less than 10 consecutive miles of a railroad which is never completed, no land can be patented under the land grant of 1864 to Iowa, which provides for patents on the completion of each section of 10 consecutive miles certified by the governor, and for patenting all the lands under the grant when the road is completed. Id. Desert lands. 24. The price of $1.25 per acre, fixed for the sale of desert lands by the act of Congress of March 3, 1877, chap. 107, does not apply to such lands in the alternate sections reserved to the United States along the line of railroads to which grants are made, but as to these the proviso of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2357, making the price $2.50 per acre, must control. United States v. Healey, 369 25. Entries of desert lands begun before the passage of the act of Congress of 1891 authorizing them to be sold at $1.25 per acre are not affected by that statute. Swamp lands. Id. 26. A pre-empter in 1872 of land which was then swamp and overflowed was not chargeable with knowledge of the fact that it was in like condition years before so as to be excluded by the act of Congress of 1849 from sale under the general land laws. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Smith, Indian lands. 77 27. The location of Chippewa half-breed scrip under the treaty with the Chippewa Indians made September 30, 1854, construed with the act of Congress of December 19, 1854, must be in the territory ceded by that treaty. Fee v. Brown, 1086 28. Innocent holders of Chippewa half-breed scrip, who have made locations thereon outside of the territory ceded by the Chippewas, are by the act of Congress of June 8, 1872 (U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2368), given a primary right of Id. 32. On the extinguishment of an Indian reservation during the operation of the act of Congress of Sept. 4, 1841, land included therein remains reserved from pre-emption, by § 10 of that act (5 Stat. at L. 456). Id. Texas lands. 33. A vendor of a right in public lands in Texas under applications for their purchase cannot maintain an action for breach of the contract when he has not filed the surveys, maps, and field notes of the land within the prescribed time, as he was required to do by law in order to make his claim valid against the state, and as his contract provided that he should do. Telfener v. Russ, 930 34. A survey not actually made in the field, but made up from office documents, is not sufficient under the Texas act of 1879 relating to purchases of the public lands. QUO WARRANTO. See TAXES, 9. RAILROADS. Id. As Carriers, see CARRIERS. See also COMMERCE, 1; CORPORATIONS, 3-5, 7-9; EJECTMENT, 3; EMINENT DOMAIN, 3, 4; ESTOPPEL, 1; EVIDENCE, 57; JUDGMENT, 5; JUDICIAL SALE, 3; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; PUBLIC LANDS, 7, 9-24; TAXES, 15-17; Towns, 1; TRIAL, 9. 1. To make a purchase of one railroad by the owner of a parallel line valid, the former must have power to sell as well as the latter power to buy. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky. 849 2. The power to purchase or consolidate a railroad with another line cannot be inferred from such indefinite language as "to unite or Id. connect with such road.' 3. Contemporaneous construction of the charter of a railroad company, which ratified the purchase of a few short local lines, is not sufficient to justify the company in consolidat- | RELEASE. 4. A right of a railroad company to "purchase and hold any road constructed by another company," given by Ky. act Jan. 17, 1856, § 3, together with the right to extend any "branch road" under the provisions of § 13 of the act, which refers only to branch roads, the cost of which should be charged upon the branch line only, is to be limited to the purchase of branch roads, and not extended to the purchase of parallel roads. Id. due which are subsequently collected is in1. A release of back damages and royalties cluded in a release made in general terms and expressly applying to subsequent receipts on claims for damages and for licenses. Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Washburn & M. Mfg. Co. 205 2. A business corporation whose affairs are managed by a president and board of directors will not be relieved in equity against the operation of a release in consideration of $10,000 and certain royalties and agreements by the other party, on the ground that the consideration is insufficient, although it may appear that much more than $10,000 was due. Id. 103. 5. Ratification by the state, of the acquisi. tion by a railroad company of local lines parallel to certain branch lines of the main road, REMITTITUR. See APPEAL AND ERROR, does not indicate an attempt to approve the purchase of parallel and competing through lines, especially where a statute limits the power to consolidate or lease to roads so connected as to form a continuous line. RATES. See CARRIERS. REAL PROPERTY. Id. As to Boundary of Land, see BOUNDARIES. Constructive notice is not given by the record of an instrument which is not executed with the formalities required by law in order to entitle it to be recorded. Lynch v. Murphy. 688 REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See also 1. The removal of a prosecution of a colored person from a state court to a Federal court cannot be had because jury commissioners or other subordinate officers exclude colored citizens from juries because of their race, wherethis is not done by authority derived from the Constitution and laws of the state. Gibson v. Mississippi, 1075 a state statute which is not applicable to the 2. The organization of a grand jury under case furnishes no ground for removing the cause into a Federal court, unless the statute whose provisions were followed, either exRECEIVERS. See also BANKS, 2; COURTS, pressly or by necessary operation, denied the 6, 21, 2. The failure to obtain an order of the court for a contract by a receiver will not defeat liability on the contract, where the work under it is directed to be done by the court without any formal order, and the validity of a claim thereon subsequently declared by the court, with full knowledge of the facts. ld. 3. Receivers who permit work on a building which was in course of erection when the receivership commenced, to continue without interruption, may be liable for the work so done according to the terms of the contract under which it was done. Id. 4. A preferred claim against a building in the hands of a receiver may be sustained for work in constructing it which was commenced before the receivership, and completed in good faith for the benefit of the property in the receiver's hands in order to prevent the build ing from becoming a total loss,-especially when a mortgage on the property in his hands does not cover the building. RECITALS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 5. Id. RECORD. See COURTS, 3; CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 6; EVIDENCE, 30; MINES, 1; REAL PROPERTY. accused some Federal right. Id. 3. Upon removal to a Federal court of a special proceeding to set aside a judgment, brought in a territorial court under Wash. Code, 436, petitioner loses no right to which he would have been entitled had the case not been removed. Cowley v. Northern P. R. Co.. 263: 7. After removal of a case to a Federal court | there is nothing to show that she will not do so on the ground that one party is a corporation until a collision becomes inevitable. created by the laws of the United States, the fact that such party ceased to take an active part in the case does not defeat the jurisdiction of the Federal court. Washington & I. R. Co. v. Cœur d'Alene R. & Nav. Co. 346 REPRIEVE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13. RES JUDICATA. See JUDGMENT. ROYALTIES. See RELEASE, 1; PATENTS, 8-12. RULES. Id. 5. After a single blast is given by a preferred steamer when vessels are on crossing courses in inland waters, she is not required to change her course, but the signal means only her intent to keep her course and throw upon the Id. other steamer the duty of avoiding her. SOLDIER. See ARMY AND NAVY. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 1. Specific performance by a part owner of land, of a contract made by a real-estate broker, cannot be enforced unless he held himself out as the sole owner or as having authority from Amendment of Equity Rule 51, see APPEN- his co-owners to sell the whole. Cochran v. DIX III, p. 1134. Blout, 729 2. One who has only partially disabled himself from carrying out his contract may be held to specific performance so far as it can be en forced, and to pay compensation in damages for the deficiency. Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 383 3. Failure of a vendor to tender an abstract of title as he agreed to do does not relieve the purchaser from the necessity of performance or offer to perform on his part, as a condition of specific performance in his favor. Kelsey v. Crowther, STATES. A scroll or rectangle containing the word "seal," opposite the signature of a corporation by its president, will be deemed to be the proper and common seal of the company, in the Boundaries of, see BOUNDARIES, 5–12. absence of evidence to the contrary. Jacksonville M. P. R. & Nav. Co. v. Hooper, 515 See also ESTOPPEL, 1. 1017 SECRETARY OF INTERIOR. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See CON MANDAMUS. SETTLEMENT. See EVIDENCE, 16. SHIPPING. See also CONTRACTS, 2. 1. In case of disaster to a ship, the master has by maritime law as understood in England the right, and by our law the duty, to tranship the goods and send them on by another vessel if one can be had. Harrison v. Fortlage, 616 2. A dredged entrance to a harbor is as much a part of the inland waters of the United States as the harbor within the entrance within the meaning of the act of Congress of March 3, 1885, which excepts harbors and inland waters from the Revised International Regulations ap plicable to the high seas and coast waters. The Delaware, 771 3. The liability of one vessel to another in case of collision is not affected by the act of Congress of February 13, 1893, limiting the liability of a vessel, her owner, agent, or charterer, for damage or loss resulting from errors in navigation or management of the vessel, if due diligence has been exercised to make her seaworthy; but the object of the act is to modify the relations between the vessel and cargo. Id. 4. The vessel having the right of way in a harbor or inland waters, when vessels are on crossing courses, is not in fault, after giving a signal that she intends to keep her course, for failing to stop and reverse because the other vessel is taking no measures to avoid her, if TRACTS, 3. prehensive enough to include such lands, were | acceptance was after a constitutional prohibiinoperative as to them. Central P. R. Co. v. tion of exemptions, is not such a calling in Nevada, 1057 question of the existence of the corporation or a collateral attack upon the charter as to be in the nature of quo warranto in which the state must act through its attorney general. Planters' F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, Memphis, 667 STOCKHOLDERS. See CORPORATIONS, 6. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT. TAXES. See also APPEAL AND ERROR, 84, 35; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6; EVIDENCE, 11, 12; JUDGMENT, 2; JUDICIAL SALE, 4; STATUTES, 5. 1. A state statute providing for the assessment of back taxes on real estate, without making it apply to personal property also, does not violate the Federal Constitution. Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 247 2. Opportunity to question the validity or the amount of a tax, either before the amount is determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection, is sufficient to make due process of law in the imposition of a tax or assessment upon property according to its value. Id. 3. A provision for the assessment of previously omitted property by an auditor, without directing him to act upon actual view or providing for revision by a board of equalization, while such view and revision are provided in case of the assessment of property generally by county assessors, does not infringe the constitutional rights of the property owner. Id. 4. The existence of a well-founded doubt is equivalent to a denial of the claim to an exemption from taxes. Phonix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, Memphis, 660 Corporations. 13. A change from the business of insurance to that of banking is such a material and radical change that, when made after the state Constitution has prohibited exemptions, the legislature will have no power to continue in favor of a company exercising an exclusively banking business an exemption granted by charter to the insurance company. Memphis City Bank v. Tennessee, Memphis, 664 5. There is a clear distinction between the capital stock of a corporation and its shares of stock in the hands of individual shareholders, with respect to taxation, so that the taxation of the one property is not the taxation of the 14. An exemption of shares of stock in the other. Shelby County v. Union & P. Bank, hands of shareholders from any other tax is 650 given by a bank charter which gives the bank 6. Many years' delay in accepting a charter a lien on stock for debts due it from stockwhich contains an exemption from taxation is holders, and imposes "an annual tax of of 1 fatal to the exemption, although the legislature per cent on each share of capital stock which recognizes the existence of the corporation un- shall be in lieu of all other taxes." Bank of der the charter, when before the acceptance a Commerce v. Tennessee, Memphis, 645 constitutional provision has prohibited such Railroads. exemptions. Planters F. & M. Ins. Co. Tennessee, Memphis, 667 15. The state franchise of one of the Pacific railroad companies is not destroyed by nor merged in the Federal right granted by the Acts of Congress so as to preclude the state from taxing the corporation upon the franchise derived from the state. Central P. R. Co. v. California, 903; Southern P. R. Co. v. California, 7. Immunity from taxation is not granted to a corporation by language giving it "all the rights and privileges" of a company to which had been given "all the rights, privileges, and immunities" of a prior company having such exemption. Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, Memphis, 660 8. An act giving a corporation all the "pow. ers, rights, reservations, restrictions, and liabilities" of another company, does not give an exemption from taxation which the latter may possess. Home Ins. & T. Co. v. Tennessee,fornia, Memphis, 929 16. The fact that a sworn statement of property for taxation made by a railroad company was filled out in a printed blank prepared by the tax officers does not relieve the corporation from the effect of such statement that the property was taxable. Central P. R. Co. v. Cali 903 669 17. The exemption from taxation until "sold and conveyed," of lands granted to a railroad by Minn. act May 22, 1857, which required in consideration a payment of 3 per cent of the 9. A suit against a corporation for taxes, based on a denial of the right to an exemption provided by charter, for the reason that the 19. The possibility that public lands included in a grant may turn out to be mineral lands cannot be a defense to a claim for taxes ap plicable to the entire grant, so long as the grantee claims the right of possession. Id. TELEGRAPHS. See also COMMERCE, 2; 1. An action for a penalty for delay in delivering a telegram is unaffected by any stipulation as to liability for mistakes in its transmission, contained in the contract under which it is sent. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. James, own corporate officers and employees required to maintain such telegraph line. Id. 7. The right to give one telegraph company & monopoly of the use of its road way for telegraphic purposes was not conferred upon the Union Pacific Railroad Company by the act of Congress commonly known as the Idaho act of July 2, 1864, or by any other act of Congress. Id. 8. A contract giving the Western Union Telegraph Company as against all other telegraph companies the exclusive right to control the roadway of the Union Pacific Railway Company for telegraphic purposes. so far as that can be done without interfering with the ordinary operations of the railway company, is invalid and contrary to the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, providing that any telegraph company accepting the provisions of the act may operate a line along any of the military or post roads of the United States. United States v. Union P. R. Co. TERRITORIES. See DOWER, 1105 TESTIMONIO. See DEFINITIONS, 2. 2. Telegrams sent on behalf of the govern- TEXAS. See BOUNDARIES, 8-12. ment by a telegraph company which owns a line along a railroad route, and also operates TOWNS. under a contract a line built by government aid TIMBER. See PUBLIC LANDS, 4. 319 torial division of the state, with no express 1. A township created by law as a terrigrant of corporate powers, and with no definition or restriction of the purposes for which it is created, may in the discretion of the legislature, at any time, be given such corporate powers appropriate to be vested in a territorial corporation for the benefit of its inhabitants as the legislature may see fit. Folsom v. TownId. ship 96, 4. An arrangement with telegraph companies to place their lines upon and along the route of the Pacific Railroad, which was permitted by the acts of Congress of 1862 and 1864 giving aid to such road, and which it was provided, should be a fulfilment of provisions in regard to the construction of lines of telegraph, did not affect the power of Congress under its reserved power to require the railroad company itself to maintain or operate in the future, by its officers and employees alone, telegraph lines on its main roads and branches. United States V. Union P. R. Co. 319 278 2. The fact that townships in South Carolina had under existing statutes no other corporate right or duty except to subscribe to a railroad and assess taxes to pay the subscription under the act of 1885, which declared them to be corporations, does not make this statute unconstitutional on the ground that such townships could not have any corporate purposes. Id. TRADEMARK. The fact that a trademark bears its owner's own name and portrait does not render it unassignable to another. Dr. S. A. Richmond Nervine Co. v. Richmond, 155 TREATY. See BOUNDARIES, 7; INDIANS; 5. Reservation of authority to add to, alter. amend, or repeal the acts of Congress of 1 and 1864 in aid of the Pacific Railroad authorizes Congress to require the Union Pacific Rail way Company, possessing the rights and powers of its constitutent companies, to maintain and operate by and through its own officers and employees telegraph lines for railroad, governmental, commercial, and other 1. The denial of a right to a jury trial in a purposes, and to exercise itself the telegraphic state court, although by erroneous construction franchises conferred upon it. Id. of the laws of the state, does not deny a right protected by the Constitution of the United States. Iowa C. R. Co. v. Iowa, 467 6. A transfer of its telegraphic franchises granted by the government of the United States cannot be lawfully made by the Union Pacific Railway Company, which under the act of Congress of 1888 is by and through its TRIAL. 2. The fact that an alien sat upon a jury, when no exception to him was taken until after he was sworn, where statutes allow exceptions |