court of the United States for the district of When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does not deprive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of law, within the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 [23: 678]; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. 118 U. S. 9, 26 [28: 889, 895]; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 171 [36: 925, 9301; Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U. S. 655 [39: 845]. This court, therefore, has no authority to decide the main questions, argued at the bar, whether the decision of the supreme court of appeals of West Virginia, in effect, and erroneously, overruled the prior decisions of that court, and of the supreme court of appeals of Virginia before West Virginia became a separate state; and the writ of error must be dismisssed for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Field dissented. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 113-235.) International law-how determined-comity of nations-action on foreign judgment — appearance-foreign practice-judgment, when prima facie evidence-foreign law-reciproci ty-evidence. 1. International law, including questions converning the rights of persons within the dominion of one nation by reason of acts done within the dominion of another, is part of our law, and abould be ascertained and administered by the courts as often as such questions are duly sub mitted to their determination. Where there is no written law upon the sub ject, such as treaty or statute, questions of international law must be determined by judicial decisions, the works of jurists, and the acts and usages of civilized nations. Comity of nations is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla159 U.S. tive, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or others who are under the protection of its laws. Appearance by a citizen of New York having his principal place of business in the city of New York and a storehouse and agent in Paris, where he purchased but did not sell goods, in a suit in a French court, and carrying it on to prevent his property in Paris not in the custody of the court from being taken on judgment, give that court Jurisdiction of his person. 5. Allowing plaintiff to testify without oath or cross-examination, or admitting papers in evidence, in France, according to the laws and practice of that country, is not sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment in this country. 6. 7. 8. A foreign judgment for money in favor of a citizen of the foreign country against a citizen of this country, rendered by a competent court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, upon due allegations and proofs and opportunity to defend according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, whose record is clear and formal, is prima facie evidence, at least, in a suit upon it in this country, and is conclusive on the merits, unless impeached on spécial ground, or shown by international law or the comity of this country not entitled to full faith and credit. Judgments rendered in a foreign country, by the laws of which our judgments are reviewable on the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are only prima facie evidence of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. In the absence of statute or treaty, the comity of this country does not require that judgments of a foreign country be recognized as conclusive in this country, where such foreign country does not give like effect to our own judginents. 9. In an action on a French judgment, evidence by defendant that the French courts give no force and effect to the judgments of this country against French citizens, and that they are there re-examined on the merits, although rendered after proper personal service of process made in this country, is admissible. [Nos. 130, 34.] Argued January 19, 22, 23, 1894. Ordered for reargument before the full bench February 5, 1894. Reargued April 10, 1894. Decided June 3, 1895. THE first of the above cases, No. 130, is in THE error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a judgment of that court in favor of the plaintiffs, Gustave Bertin Guyot as official liquidator of the late firm of Charles Fortin & Co. et al., against Henry Hilton et al., defendants, for the amount of a French judgment recovered by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co. against said defendants. The second of the above cases, No. 34, is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York dismissing a suit in equity brought by said defendants against the plaintiff for an injunction against the prosecution of the first action, etc. The two cases were argued together in this court. In the first cause, being the action at law, the judgment is reversed and cause re. manded with directions for a new trial. In the second action, being the suit in equity, the decree dismissing the suit is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings. See the same case (No. 34) below, 42 Fed. Rep. 249. Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: its clerk at Paris, after hearing the several parties by their counsel, and upon full consideration of the merits, dismissed the appeal of the defendants, confirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the plaintiffs, and ordered upon the plaintiffs' appeal, that they recover the additional sum of 152,528 francs, with 182,849 francs for interest on all the claims allowed, and 12,559 francs for costs and expenses. The first of these two cases was an action at law brought December 18, 1885, in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York, by Gustave Bertin Guyot, as official liquidator of the firm of Charles For- The complaint further alleged that Guyot tin & Co., and by the surviving members of had been duly appointed by the tribunal of that firm, all aliens and citizens of the Repub- commerce of the department of the Seine, oflic of France, against Henry Hilton and Will- ficial liquidator of the firm of Fortin & Co., iam Libbey, citizens of the United States and with full powers according to law and comof the state of New York, and trading as co-mercial usage for the verification and realizapartners in the cities of New York and Paris and elsewhere, under the firm name of A. T. Stewart & Co. The action was upon a judgment recovered in a French court at Paris in the Republic of France by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co. all whose members were French citizens, against Hilton and Libbey, trading as copartners as aforesaid, and citizens of the United States and of the state of New York. The complaint alleged that in 1886 and since, during the time of all the transactions included in the judgment sued on, Hilton and Libbey, as successors to Alexander T. Stewart and Lib bey, under the firm of A. T. Stewart & Co., carried on a general business as merchants in the cities of New York and Paris and else where, and maintained a regular store and place of business at Paris; that during the same time Charles Fortin & Co. carried on the manufacture and sale of gloves at Paris, and the two firms had there large dealings in that business, and controversies arose in the adjustment of accounts between them. The complaint further alleged that between March 1, 1879, and December 1, 1882, five suits were brought by Fortin & Co. against Stewart & Co. for sums alleged to be due, and three suits by Stewart & Co. against Fortin & Co. in the tribunal of commerce of the department of the Seine, a judicial tribunal or court organized and existing under the laws of France, sitting at Paris, and having jurisdiction of suits and controversies between mer 115] chants or traders growing *out of commercial dealings between them; that Stewart & Co. appeared, by their authorized attorneys in all those suits; and that, after full hearing before an arbitrator appointed by that court and be. fore the court itself, and after all the suits had been consolidated by the court, final judgment was rendered on January 20, 1883, that Fortin & Co. recover of Stewart & Co. various sums arising out of the dealings between them, and amounting to 660,847 francs, with interest, and dismissed part of Fortin & Co.'s claim. The complaint further alleged that appeals were taken by both parties from that judgment to the court of appeals of Paris, third section, an appellate court of record, organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of France, and having jurisdiction of appeals from the final judgments of the tribunal of commerce of the department of the Seine, where the amount in dispute exceeded the sum of 1,500 francs; and that the said court of ap peals by a final judgment rendered March 19, 1884, and remaining of record in the office of tion of its property, both real and personal, and to collect and cause to be executed the judgments aforesaid. The complaint further alleged that the judgment of the court of appeals of Paris and the judgment of the tribunal of commerce, as modified by the judgment of the appellate court, still remain in full force and effect; "that the said courts respectively had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversies so submitted to them and of the parties, the said defendants having intervened by [116 their attorneys and counsel and applied for affirmative relief in both courts: that the plaintiffs have hitherto been unable to collect the said judgments or any part thereof, by reason of the absence of the said defendants, they having given up their business in Paris prior to the recovery of the said judgment on appeal, and having left no property within the jurisdiction of the Republic of France, out of which the said judgments might be made;" and that there are still justly due and owing from the defendants to the plaintiffs upon those said judgments certain sums, specified in the complaint, and amounting in all to 1,008,783 francs in the currency of the Republic of France, equivalent to $195,122.47. The defendants in their answer set forth in detail the original contracts and transactions in France between the parties, and the subsequent dealings between them, modifying those contracts; and alleged that the plaintiffs had no just claim against the defendants, but that on the contrary the defendants, upon a just settlement of the accounts, were entitled to recover large sums from the plaintiffs. The answer admitted the proceedings and judgments in the French courts; and that the defendants gave up their business in France before the judgment on appeal, and had no property within the jurisdiction of France, out of which that judgment could be collected. The answer further alleged that the tribunal of commerce of the department of the Seine was a tribunal whose judges were merchants, ship captains, stockbrokers, and persons engaged in commercial pursuits, and of which Charles Fortin had been a member until shortly before the commencement of the litigation. The answer further alleged that in the origi nal suits brought against the defendants by Fortin & Co. the citations were left at their store house in Paris; that they were then residents and citizens of the state of New York, and neither of them at that time or within four years before had been within, or resident or domiciled within, the jurisdiction of that tri- | be competent or admissible in any court or bunal, or owed any allegiance to France; but tribunal of the United States in any suit be117] that they were the owners of property tween the same parties involving the same subsituated in that country, which would by the law ject matter; and it is contrary to natural jusof France have been liable to seizure if they did tice and public policy that the said judgment not appear in that tribunal; and that they un- should be enforced against a citizen of the United willingly, and solely for the purpose of pro- States, and that, if there had been a full and tecting that property, authorized and caused fair trial upon the merits of the controversies an agent to appear for them in those proceed- so pending before said tribunals, no judg ings; and that the suits brought by them ment would have been obtained against said against Fortin & Co. were brought for the Stewart & Co. same purpose, and in order to make a proper defense and to establish counterclaims arising out of the transaction between the parties, and to compel the production and inspection of Fortin & Co.'s books; and that they sought no other affirmative relief in that tribunal. The answer further alleged that pending that litigation the defendants discovered gross frauds in the accounts of Fortin & Co.: that the arbitrator and the tribunal declined to compel Fortin & Co. to produce their books and papers for inspection; and that, if they had been produced, the judgment would not have been obtained against the defendants. "Defendants further answering allege that it is contrary to natural justice that the judg ment herein before mentioned should be enforced without an examination of the merits thereof; that by the laws of the Republic of France, to wit, article 181 [121] of the Royal Ordinance of June 15, 1629, it is provided, namely: 'Judgments rendered, contracts or obligations recognized, in foreign kingdoms and sovereignties, for any cause whatever, shall give rise to no lien or execution in our kingdom. Thus the contracts shall stand for simple promises, and notwithstanding such judgments our subjects against whom they have been rendered may contest their rights anew before our own judges.' "And it is further provided by the laws of France, by article 546 of the Code de Procedure Civile, as follows: Judgments rendered by foreign tribunals shall be capable of execution *in France, only in the manner and in [119 the cases set forth by articles 2123 and 2128 of the Civil Code.' 66 And it is further provided by the laws of France, by article 2128 [2123] of the Code de Procedure Civile [Civil Code]: ‘A lien cannot, in like manner, arise from judgments_rendered in any foreign country, save only as they have been declared in force by a French tribunal, without prejudice, however, to provisions to the contrary, contained in public laws and treaties' [and by article 2128 of that Code: 'Contracts entered into in a foreign country cannot give a lien upon property in France, if there are no provisions contrary to this principle in public laws or in treaties']. The answer further alleged that, without any fault or negligence on the part of the defendants, there was not a full and fair trial of the controversies before the arbitrator, in that no witness was sworn or affirmed; in that Charles Fortin was permitted to make, and did make, statements not under oath, containing many falsehoods; in that the privilege of crossexamination of Fortin and other persons who made statements before the arbitrator was denied to the defendants; and in that extracts from printed newspapers, the knowledge of which was not brought home to the defendants, and letters and other communications in writing between Fortin & Co. and third persons, to which the defendants were neither privy nor party, were received by the arbitrator; that without such improper evidence the judgment would not have been obtained; and that the arbitrator was deceived and misled by the false and fraudulent accounts introduced by Fortin & Co. and by the bearsay testimony given without the solemnity of an oath and That the construction given to said statwithout cross-examination, and by the fraudu-utes by the judicial tribunals of France is such lent suppression of the books and papers. that no comity is displayed toward the judgThe answer further alleged that Fortin & ments of tribunals of foreign countries against Co. made up their statements and accounts false- the citizens of France, when sued upon in 118] ly and fraudulently, and with *intent to said courts of France, and the merits of the deceive the defendants and the arbitrator and controversies upon which the said judgments the said courts of France, and those courts are based are examined anew, unless a treaty were deceived and misled thereby; that, owing to the contrary effect exists between the said to the fraudulent suppression of the books and Republic of France and the country in which papers of Fortin & Co., upon the trial, and such judgment is obtained; that no treaty exists the false statements of Fortin regarding mat- between the said Republic of France and the ters involved in the controversy, the arbitrator United States, by the terms or effect of which and the courts of France "were deceived and the judgments of either country are prevented misled in regard to the merits of the contro from being examined anew upon the merits, versies pending before them and wrongfully when sued upon in the courts of the country decided against said Stewart & Co. as herein other than that in which it is obtained; that before stated; that said judgment hereinbefore the tribunals of the Republic of France give mentioned is fraudulent, and based upon false no force and effect, within the jurisdiction of and fraudulent accounts and statements, and is the said country, to the duly rendered judg erroneous in fact and in law, and is void; ments of courts of competent jurisdiction of that the trial herein before mentioned was not the United States against citizens of France conducted according to the usages and prac-after proper personal service of the process of tice of the common law, and the allegations said courts is made thereon in this country." and proofs given by said Fortin & Co. upon The answer further set up, by way of counwhich said judgment is founded would not terclaim and in detail, various matters arising The answer concluded by demanding that 120]the plaintiffs' *complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants have judgment against them upon the counterclaims amounting to $102,942.91. out of the dealings between the parties; and al- | had been, within four years prior to the com leged that none of the plaintiffs had since 1881 mencement of those suits, domiciled or resibeen residents of the state of New York, or dent within the jurisdiction of those courts; within the jurisdiction of that state, but the that they had a purchasing agent and a storedefendants were and always had been resi- house in Paris, but only as a means or facility dents of that state. to aid in the transaction of their principal business, which was in New York, and they were never otherwise engaged in business in France; that neither of them owed allegiance to France, but they were the owners of property there, which would, according to the laws of France, have been liable to seizure if they had not apunwillingly, and solely for the purpose of protecting their property within the jurisdiction of the French tribunal, authorized an agent to appear, and he did appear in the proceedings before it; and that their motion to compel an The plaintiffs filed a replication to so much of the answer as made counterclaims, deny-peared to answer in those suits; that they ing its allegations, and setting up in bar thereof the judgment sued on. The defendants, on June 22, 1888, filed a bill in equity against the plaintiffs, setting forth the same matters as in their answer to the action at law, and praying for a discov-inspection of the plaintiff's books, as well as ery, and for an injunction against the prosecution of the action. To that bill a plea was filed, setting up the French judgments; and upon a hearing the bill was dismissed. 42 Fed. Rep. 249. From the decree dismissing the bill an appeal was taken, which was the second case now before this court. The action at law afterwards came on for trial by a jury; and the plaintiffs put in the records of the proceedings and judgments in the French courts; and evidence that the jurisdiction of those courts was as alleged in the complaint and that the practice followed and the method of examining the witnesses were according to the French law; and also proved the title of Guyot as liquidator. the suits brought by the defendants in France, was necessary by way of defense or counterclaim to the suits there brought by the plaintiffs against them. Among the matters which the defendants alleged and offered to prove in order to show that the French judgments were procured by fraud were that Fortin & Co., with intent to deceive and defraud the defendants and the arbitrator, and the courts of France, entered in their books, and presented to the defendants, and to the French courts, accounts, bearing upon the transactions in controversy, which were false and fraudulent, and contained excessive and fraudulent charges against the defendants, in various particulars specified; that the deIt was admitted by both parties that, for fendants *made due application to the tri-[122 several years prior to 1876, the firm of Alex-bunal of commerce to compel Fortin & Co. to ander T. Stewart & Co. composed of Stewart and Libbey, conducted their business as merchants in the city of New York, with branches in other cities of America and Europe; that both parties were citizens and residents of the city and state of New York during the entire period mentioned in the complaint; and that in April, 1876, Stewart died, and Hilton and Libbey formed a partnership to continue the business under the same firm name, and became the owners of all the property and rights of the old firm. The defendants made numerous offers of evidence in support of all the specific allegations of fact in their answer, including the allega tions as to the law and comity of France. The plaintiffs, in their brief filed in this court, admitted that most of these offers "were offers to prove matters in support of the defenses, and counterclaims set up by the defendants in the cases tried before the French courts, and which 121] or most of which would have been relevant and competent if the plaintiffs in error are not concluded by the result of those litigations, and have now the right to try those issues, either on the ground that the French judgments are only prima facie evidence of the correctness of those judgments, or on the ground that the case is within the exception of a judgment ob tained by fraud." The defendants, in order to show that they should not be concluded by having appeared and litigated in the suits brought against them by the plaintiff in the French courts, offered to prove that they were residents and citizens of the state of New York, and neither of them allow their account books and letter books to be inspected by the defendants, and the application was opposed by Fortin & Co., and denied by the tribunal; that the discovery and inspection of those books were necessary to determine the truth of the controversies between the parties; that, before the tribunal of commerce, Charles Fortin was permitted to and did give in evidence statements not under oath, relating to the merits of the controversies there pending. and falsely represented that a certain written contract, made in 1873, between Stewart & Co. and Fortin & Co. concerning their dealings, was not intended by the parties to be operative according to its terms; and, in support of that false representation, made statements as to admissions by Stewart in a private conversation with him; and that the defendants could not deny those statements, because Stewart was dead, and they were not protected from the effect of Fortin's statements by the privilege of cross-examining him under oath; and that the French judgments were based upon false and fraudulent accounts presented and statements made by Fortin & Co. before the tribunal of commerce during the trial before it. The records of the judgments of the French courts, put in evidence by the plaintiffs, showed that all the matters now relied on to show fraud were contested in and considered by those courts. The plaintiffs objected to all the evidence offered by the defendants, on the grounds that the matters offered to be proved were irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent; that, in re spect to them, the defendants were concluded by the judgment sued on and given in evidence; and that none of those matters, if proved, would be a defense to this action upon that judgment. The court declined to admit any of the evidence so offered by the defendants, and directed a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $277,775.44, being the amount of the French judgment and interest. The defendants, having duly excepted to the rulings and direction of the court, sued out a writ of error. 123] *The writ of error in the action at law and the appeal in the suit in equity were argued together in this court in January, 1894, and, by direction of the court, were reargued in April, 1894. Messrs. James C. Carter and Elihu Root for plaintiffs in error and appellants: There is scarcely any doctrine of the law which, so far as respects formal and exact statement, is in a more unreduced and uncertain condition than that which relates to the question what force and effect should be given by the courts of one nation to the judgments rendered by the courts of another nation. In the learned notes to the Dutchess of Kingston's Case, in 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. 424, a very minute_reference is made to the various decisions in England and in this country, and some attempt made to group and classify them, but the reader will scarcely gain any assistance from them, and will, after perusal, feel certain of one thing only, viz., that the subject is involved in great confusion. The natural and obvious method of doing justice between two contending parties is to examine their allegations, to ascertain the facts respecting the matter in dispute, and to declare the law arising upon these facts. But it would be an intolerable burden and expense, both to the public and to the parties, if the courts of the same country could be continually vexed with trials of the same controversy. Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis lilium. It is necessary that some limitation should be imposed; and the conclusion of state policy in this country and in England has been that the parties should be allowed one full and fair opportunity to try their grievances, and one alone. But justice, nevertheless, is, as it always must be, the overruling consideration; and the doctrine would never have been adopted unless the conclusion had been thought to be a safe one, that the judgment in the first and only trial allowed would be, in the vast majority of cases, a sound and righteous one. The court must be clothed with complete jurisdiction over the subject-matter. It must also be clothed with complete jurisdiction over the parties. Very numerous rules have been framed for the purpose of securing a righteous judgment after the court has acquired jurisdiction; such as that evidence must be on oath, witnesses subjected to cross-examination, hearsay excluded, irrelevant matters excluded, and appeals and reviews allowed for the purpose of correcting possible error. exact issues are raised and it is those, and those only, which are decided by the judgment. There are other rules framed to prevent the use of any judgment for the purpose of precluding future inquiry, except to the extent of the precise scope and effect of the judgment. Under these rules a judgment can never be employed as an estoppel beyond what has been directly decided by it. The object of every judicial inquiry is to ascertain, declare, and enforce justice between the parties. Whenever any former judgment cannot be with certainty assumed to have really done justice between the parties, the reason for allowing it to be an estoppel fails, and the use of it as such should therefore not be permitted. What is actually administered among men is that approach to absolute justice which imperfect natures can understand and which can be made practicable in the actual business of life. Whenever a court in the United States refuses to adjudicate upon the rights growing out of an original transaction on the ground that some other tribunal has previously adjudicated upon them, or accepts as the basis of its own adjudication the results which have been reached by another tribunal, it does it upon the ground that the judgment of the other tribunal is, in effect, in accordance with justice, according to our conceptions of justice. The doctrine of the conclusiveness of domestic judgments rests upon two principal considerations: First. That there is a reasonably safe assurance that the the former judg ment, reached only after the employment of precautions carefully devised for the elimination of error, is just and right; Second. The prime importance of the maxim, interest reipublica ut sit finis litium, which deems it a satisfaction of the duty of government to furnish remedial justice, if one fair opportunity has been given. Both of these considerations are wanting in the case of foreign judgments. Except in the case of England and some of her colonies where the national standards of justice and also the methods of procedure very much resemble our own, we can have no full assurance that a just conclusion has been reached. Jury trials, exclusion of improper evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, etc., are matters to which comparatively little attention is given. The maxim, interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium, applies to our own nation only. It is no part of our policy to restrict litigation in the world generally. In the case where a foreign judgment is set up as conclusive, we have not as yet afforded the one fair opportunity to litigate the question upon its original merits, which it is the obligation of government to furnish. The suggestion that the comity of nations. requires conclusive force to be given to foreign judgments, inasmuch as otherwise they will not give like force to our judgments, is wholly insufficient. This comity does, indeed, have a place in this branch of the law, but by no The plaintiff is also required to state pre- means the force thus suggested. We can cisely what his demands are, and the defendant never allow the assumption that Morocco or must make his answer to them. In this way | Turkey or Russia or even Germany, Italy, or |