showeth that no settlement of the said copartnership accounts hath ever been made between your orator and the said defendant, and that since said dissolution your orator has repeatedly applied to the said defendant to come to a final settlement with respect thereto. And your orator well hoped that said defendant would have complied with so reasonable request, as in justice and equity he ought to have done, but the said defendant absolutely refuses to do so.

And your orator charges that the said defendant hath possessed himself of the said copartnership books, and hath refused to permit your orator to inspect the same, and hath also refused to render to your orator any account of the copartnership moneys received by him.

And your orator charges that he has since the said dissolution, paid the sum of three hundred ($300) dollars in respect of the copartnership debts.

And your orator further charges that upon a just and true settlement of the said accounts it will appear that a considerable balance is due from the said defendant to your orator in respect to the said copartnership balances; but, nevertheless, the said defendant is proceeding to collect in the said copartnership debts and apply the same to his own use, which the said defendant is enabled to do by means of the possession of the books of account as aforesaid.

And your orator charges that the said defendant ought to be restrained by injunction by this honorable court from collecting in the said debts; and that some proper person ought to be appointed by this honorable court for that purpose: Wherefore your orator prays that an account may be taken of all and every of the said late copartnership dealings and transactions until the time of the expiration thereof; and that the said

may be directed to pay to your orator what, if anything, shall upon such account appear to be due from him, your orator being ready and willing, and hereby offering, to pay to the said what, if anything, shall appear

to be due to him from said joint concern; and that some proper person may be appointed to receive and collect all moneys which may be coming to the credit of the said late copartnership; and that the said

may in the meantime be restrained by an order of injunction from this honorable court from collecting and receiving any debts due and owing thereto.

Therefore, may it please your honor to grant your orator not only the writ prayed for, but also a writ of subpoena, directed to the defendant

and com

manding him at a certain time, under, a certain penalty, to appear before your honor, in this court, then and there to answer unto this bill of complaint, and to abide and perform such decree as the court may make in the premises.

Signed

This bill of complaint must be sworn to.

RAILROAD CASES, (PRO. and CON.)

R. R. Owes no Duty.-One who, although intending to board a car, is 1235 yards from the station when the car arrives, is held to have no right to complain that it does not wait a sufficient time to enable the passenger to embark before it proceeds on its journey—not being at the station, the carrier owes him no duty. 31 L. R. A. 442. (N. S.) S. Carolina.

R. R. Responsible.-(This case almost settles the reason for the rule in the above case.)-A city passenger ticket agent of a railroad company is held to have implied authority to guarantee connections by by one of its regular trains, which is necessary to permit an intending passenger to reach its destination at a specified time. 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 229. (Mich.)

Crossing Accident-Speed.-An electric car at the speed of forty or fifty miles an hour, in the country, over a crossing at which decedent was killed may be negligence or not according to the surrounding circumstances but is not negligence per se. 121 N. W. 811.

FT. SMITH WHOLESALE GROCERY COMPANY, Defendant in Error.

(Rendered September 30, 1911.)

Error from the County Court of Le Flore County. Action by the Fort Smith Wholesale Grocery Company against George W. Noble, Judgment for the Plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

1. The act of May 26th, 1908, Session Laws of Oklahoma, p. 558, commonly known as the "Bulk Sales" law, which declares that a sale in bulk shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void as against creditors of the seller unless certain specific conditions have been complied with, is not in contravention of, nor repugnant to, the due process clause, nor the equal protection clause, of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.

2. Neither is said act violative of any of the provisions of the state constitution.

3. The subject to which the said act relates is clearly within the police powers of the state.

4. A chattel mortgage, covering a stock of merchandise, where the mortgagor remains in possession, and has the usual right of redemption, creates a lien only, and does not pass title, and is not a sale, exchange or assignment within the meaning of said act, and is therefore, not within the inhibition of said statute.

SYLLABUS.

ROBERTSON, C.

CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA.

IN RE HABEAS CORPUS OF

ROB MILLSAP.

(Rendered September 26th, 1911.)

No. 2782

Original Application in Habeas Corpus.

Writ Discharged and Prisoner Remanded.

1. In habeas corpus if the process is valid on its face it will be deemed prima facie legal, and the prisoner assumes the burden of impeaching its validity by showing a want of jurisdiction.

2. To constitute larceny of an estry, animus furandi must exist at the time defendant first took possession of the animal

3. The plea of not guilty puts in issue the averment in the indictment of the place where the larceny was com nitted, also the animus furandi, and imposes on the prosecution the necessity of proving the locus delicti and the animus furandi.

4. Where on a plea of not guilty to an indictment for larceny the jury found the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, and, in effect, that the prisoner committed the offense within the jurisdiction of the court, as alleged, he cannot impeach that finding on habeas corpus by showing that the place where the offense was committed is without the jurisdiction of the court.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Wadlington & Wadlington, for petitioner.

Ben Franklin, County Attorney of McClain County, for the State.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY TURNER, C. J.

On June 27th, 1911, pursuant to the prayer of his petition, one of the justices of this Court ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue directed to the Sehriff of McClain County by whom petitioner alleged himself to be illegally restrained of his liberty. He further alleged the cause thereof to be a certain judgment of conviction on an indictment for larceny and sentence thereon of the District court of said county that he be confined in the State Penitentiary for one year-which said judgment he says is void, for want of jurisdiction, and from which, in due time, he prosecuted, by petition in error and case-made his appeal to the Criminal Court of Appeals, which had dismissed the same-the record in said cause is made an exhibit to his petition. The power of this Court to issue this writ and examine the proceedings of the trial court so far as may be necessary to ascertain whether that court exceeded its authority is no longer an open question. Quoting approvingly from ex parte Harlan, 1 Okla. 48, the Court in In Re Patswald, 5 Okla. 789, said:

"The law is well settled that in a case like the present, in which the petitioner is in execution upon a conviction, the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be awarded, if the trial court had jurisdiction of the person and of the crime charged, and did no act beyond the powers conferred upon it. And the proceedings of the trial court will be examined so far as necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. And if it appears that the court transcended its powers, the writ will be granted and the prisoner discharged even after judgment. But if the trial court had jurisdiction and power to convict and sentence, the writ cannot issue to correct more errors."

Hence, as stated in Ex Parte Lange, 16 Wall 163:

"Disclaiming any assertion of a general power of review over the judgments of the inferor courts in criminI cases, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise, we proceed to examine the case as disclosed by the record