author of this essay on the recall, Mr. E. B. Wilkins, so thoroughly analyzes the reasons for it, that it is worthy of any lawyers best consideration. We have not asked permission to, nor have we space to publish the whole article, but a few of his reasons for such a law, and that answer the arguments generally advanced against it, are so clear and clean cut that we believe them to be of great interest.

Mr. Wilkins sums up the objections as follows:

"It will be contended by some that the recall of judges might safely be left to the national legislature or the state legislature, but should not be left to the electorate because the electorate would not be so conservative in the exercise of the power to recall judges as their representatives in the legislature. The answer to this is that the electorate of an American State is abundantly conservative and moves very slowly, more slowly than their progressive representatives would move.

A political party is controlled by caucus and in convention, and is easily moved by passion or impulse. The people in their peaceful homes or the quiet seclusion of a voting booth are not so easily moved.

It is harder to persuade a majority of the electorate of a State than to move a legislature. The people have been trained to give the benefit of the doubt to anyone who is assailed, either in public or before a jury, and when in doubt they will always vote "no."

They have had the right of recall in Oregon for ten years and have never used it against a judge, although they recently tried to get a case against a judge, but they failed to get a sufficient number of people to sign the petition to initiate the case.

It is true, of course, that among the people there are some extremists who are very radical and very excitable but they are offset by numbers who cannot be moved. The judgment of the people represents the judgment of the mass, and not the fractional part that may be extreme either in one direction or another.

The reactionary argument that the people are turbu lent, unduly excitable, that they are wild and visionary,

that they are unduly passionate, that they comprise an irresponsible mob unworthy to be trusted with power, comes with poor grace from those who hold their honors, dignities and salaries from these same people.

The long suffering of the people is best evidenced by the forbearance with which the people permit men in public service to give currency and approval to those unfounded and absurd criticisms of the great American electorate." Further along in his Article

Mr. Wilkins says: "If the power of the recall exists the conduct of the judges would never make its use necessary. The moment the recall went into effect the court would promptly discontinue unauthorized, unconstitutional and grossly improper conduct by declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional. The federal courts would no longer, because of their views of public policy amend acts of Congress by inserting words in important statutes which Congress had refused to insert, as the Supreme Court did in substance in its opinion in the Standard Oil case and in the Tobacco Trust case. The courts would no longer deal with undue severity in contempt cases, and government by injunction would cease The right of recall and power of recall would make the recall unnecessary."

BANKRUPTCY CASES.

I

Bankruptcy-Action Against Bankrupt-Trustees

Petition.

Where a trustees petition to compel the bankrupt to turn over assets alleged to have been withheld, only charged that by reason of a prior statement made by the bankrupt August 5, 1010, showing that he had a surplus of $22,815, and that his schedules filed October 13, following indicated a loss of $27,745.76, of which only $19,295.76, had been accounted for, and that the bankrupt necessarily had failed to turn over the balance, it

was subject to a motion to compel the trustee to make his petition more definite and certain, and to state specifically what moneys or property the bankrupt had in his possession or control that he had not surrendered.

2

Compelling Surrendering of Assets-Evidence.

The transcript of the testimony of the bankrupt at his examination before the referee, is admissible on the hearing of the trustees petition to compel the surrender of assets claimed to be in the bankrupt's hands, after the bankrupt had testified that his testimony so given was true. In re Greer, 189 Fed. 511. Arkansas (W. D.) Dist. Court, Aug. 2d, 1911.

1

Bankruptcy-Opposition to Discharge-Costs.

The authority of the court to tax costs when allowed by law against the unsuccessful party, or the successful party for cause, or in part against each of the parties, in proceedings in bankruptcy, did not authorize the taxation of costs of a successful opposition to a bankrupt's discharge against a bankrupt's estate.

2

Successful Opposition-Costs.—

When a bankrupt was entirely without funds and unable to pay costs of a successful opposition to his discharge, the court should not tax such costs against him. In re Kyte, 189 Fed. 531.

A trustee in bankruptcy has no right to set aside contracts made by the bankrupt with money fraudulently obtained, by which an insurance company, in consideration of a cash premium, undertook to pay him annuities beginning at a designated future time, where the company acted in good faith without notice of the source of the funds, since it acquired rights and advantages under the transaction of which it could not be deprived.

33 L. R. A. (N. S. ) 439, 184 Fed. 1

AUTOMOBILES.

Points Decided Sustaining Actions.

Judicial Notice.-Courts will take judicial notice that automobiles by reason of their construction will frighten horses. 78 S. Car. 249, 58 S. E. 766. Dangerous.-Courts will take judicial notice that automobiles are dangerous when run at great rate of speed whether in city or country roads and that accidents may happen to persons driving animals that may become unmanageable by reason of fright.

147 Cal. 523

Danger from Want of Skill That automobiles are more dangerous than street cars or steam railway cars-the latter having fixed tracks, while the automobile may be unskillfully shifted from side to side and strike pedestrians or other objects on either side of its course.

134 Ky. 563, 121 S. W. 471 Courts will also take judicial notice of the fact that an automobile will readily yield to the steering wheel in the hands of a competent driver. 182 Fed. 58

Automobile races, or contests of speed in cities or highways are unlawful and a nuisance per se. 186 N. Y 139 (reversing 109 N. Y. 821 where permission had been granted to hold the race.)

The automobile is a machine confined to no part of the street. It seems too obvious for further remark that the legislature has the same right to protect other users of the highways against these dangers as it has to guard them against the unrestricted movements of a trolley Therefore the provisions of a statute which limit the rate of speed, which require the display of signals and the use of efficient brakes, are all appropriate to preserve safety in the use of the road.

car.

Unwen vs. The State, N. J. L. 529, 64 Atl. 163

POINTS SUSTAINING DEFENSES.

On the other hand courts have decided that an automobile is not inherently a dangerous instrumentality. 145 Wis. 49

That automobiles are not to be placed in the category of ferocious animals, dynamite or other dangerous agencies, and that the owner is not liable to the same extent as the proprietors of such agencies. 75 N. H. 111.

That the operation of an automobile in the highway is not in itself an act of negligence, 165 Ind. Sup. 465

And further that an owner, is not liable to one "who has been injured by the car when driven by another person merely because the owner has made it possible for such person to operate the car upon the highway. 47 Wash. 663; 42 Wis. 49.

The owner of an automobile is not liable for damage done to person or property injured or damaged where without negligence on his part he left his auto standing in the street and the car set in motion by mischievous persons. 84 N. Y. Supp. 292 The reason of the rule is found in the principle of proximate cause' as the act of malicious persons, and not the automobile as the proximate cause of the damage. 131 App. Div. N. Y. 200

Properly conducted the automobile has an equal right with other vehicles in the streets of a city or country highway. The dedication of roads and streets does not restrict any particular mode of travel, and the roads were established for the benefit of the public, which must admit of new methods when general benefit requires it. 34 Mich. 217: 91 N. E. 172; 107 Md. 420; 65 N. Y. Supp. 651.

For a more extended view of the right of action and defense on this important subject, See the new work of Mr. Berkley Davids, published by the Edward Thompson Company, and reviewed in this Journal, in the last August Number, page 65.