HUMOR.

Most noble Judge, hear the plaintiff, Ella Brown,
Who donning her best, has come up town,

Not as of yore, on work is she bent,

But imploring justice, defendant won,t repent.
And these constitute her cause of action,
Enough? You to drive her to distraction.

FIRST.

The plaintiff at the age of just nineteen,
Was as fair a damsel as ever was seen,

T, was then the defendant, dashing Henry Brown,
Wooed and won her in old Muskogee town.

On the 12 day of November, Nineteen hundred and four,
The gallant Henry, called at her mothers door.

He vowed his love for her should never fail,
And he would tote in juicy possums by the tail.
He would furnish her things to her hearts content,
So long as he had a dollar, dime or cent.
With such wonderful eloquence, Sir Henry pled,
That Ella consented and straightway they were wed,
Two years in Muskogee lived Mr. and Mrs. Brown,
When they heard of Sapulpa, the magical town.
To the wonderful City they started by rail,
But to them the trains pace seemed slow as a snail.
The marvelous Sapulpa was reached at last,

And six more years have faded into the past.

In Creek County, Okla. plaintiff lived more than a year,
The year next preceeding, now do you hear.
To this one time happy home of yore,
Came pratteling children numbering four.
Of these, three survive unto this good day,
Namely, Venore, Jessie and Ona May.
The first a girl of six, second a boy of four,
Third a baby girl, bout a year or little more,

SECOND.

Plaintiff further states, that during all this time,

She has been a loving wife, keepiny dutifully in line: Not so with the defendant, Henry Brown,

He has been a rounder in the good old town.

Scattered his affections to the Oklahoma breeze,

Staying out late at night, doing as he please.

Broke the loving promises he eight years ago did plight,
Then centered his affections on a girl that isn't white,
She's dusky Georgia May―――, last name unknown,
(I'm telling his short-comings in an undertone.)

And just because he's guilty and I've found he is'nt true, He says he'll kill me with his pistol and kick me with his shoe.

This year, on unlucky Friday, April twenty-six,

He carried out his plan of beating me with sticks.
The big end of a buggy whip, is what the villian used,
And from my head and arms, the blood did freely ooze.
From such inhuman treatment, I'd like to get relieved,
And this I'm entitled to, if my story is believed.
I'd like you to enjoin him and make him stay away,
And let me live at home with my babies day by day.
The house-hold goods I'd like to have and alimony if
you please,

Better give the coin to me, he'll fling it to the breeze,
He's young and stout and able to work and hustle,
That's better than licking me, to exercise his muscle.
Lots 25 and 26, Block two, Westport Addition to Sapul-
pa, I own,

(The deed was made to Henry, but I want it for my home, Now dont forget my Lawyers, they helped me out in this, An attorney fee, PENDENTE LITE, I'm sure will not come in amiss.

THEREFORE, Judge, to you, plaintiff prays for decree, That from the bonds of matrimony, ever set her free; Also the children, to feed and clothe and send to school, She'll teach them good manners, and to observe the golden rule.

As from her fireside, defendant so frequently did roam, She'd like to have the house and lots, to make her earthly home,

And the house-hold goods in it she'll need,

And for these she will ever plead;

And to her lawyers, a hundred dollar fee, without subtraction,

Also, please charge up to Henry, the costs of this action. Hughes & Miller,

Attorneys for plaintiff.

THE

OKLAHOMA

LAW JOURNAL

EDITED AND PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY

D. H. FERNANDES, GUTHRIE, Oklahoma.

June, 1912.

VOL. 10:

No. 12

THE LAWYER AND HIS MORAL DUTY.

If the lawyer conceives of his professional work only as a means of making a livelihood, if he wholly identifies himself with his client's interests, and in all respects subordinates his own individuality to that of his employer, if he regards the number of cases won and the net income for the year as the only standards of success, perhaps he will be little interested in and little perplexed by questions of public duty. But fortunately the Bar as a whole is unwilling to submit to such a view of the attorney's status and is not ready to accept theory that society has extended to certain of its members the privilige of following a high and responsible calling for the sole purpose of enabling them to make a living. While it may be true that in some measure we have, consciously, yilded to the commercial spirit, it is equally true that upon the whole we have been unwilling, in theory at least, to let go the great traditions of our profession by which we are primarily ministers of justice, and the emoluments which we receive are but incidents of a service deemed to be highly honorable. Tendencies there are. however, in our modern life, in the very nature of certain common forms of professional employment, and in our adversary system of trying out the facts, which unmistakably make for the practical abandonment of the idea that a lawyer performs official functions; made unless these are held

in check, while the theory that he is an officer of the court may remain as a convenient fiction, the lawyer will in fact cease to be a public officer and become an agent only for interests wholly private. It is in the recogntion and discharge of the larger, though unfortunately less insistent, obligations to society implied in the official status of the lawyer that we are most in danger of falling short. Care must be taken lest we forget that before we became attorneys in the case we were responsible officers of the court and lest our proper loyalty to the truth give place to an immoderate and unrestrained zeal for the success of our client's cause, whether it be just or not.

That in the matter of judicial perjury the lawyer must himself refrain from participation or instigation we all admit, but does mere inaction upon his part fully meet the demands of duty and absolve him of all responsibility for the prevalence of the evil? May not complacency sometimes fall dangerously near to complicity? And granting that the attorney does not engage to become the spiritual guide of his client or his witness, and rests under no obligation to them-to restrain them from wilfully falsifying the facts, does it necessarily follow that his public duty extends no farther? If, as we have assumed, judicial prejury is widely prevalent, and if it pollutes the stream of justice and is a constant menace to the right administration of the law. can the bar remain inactive and be justified? These questions, espe cially as they relate to duty in its larger aspects as implied in the lawyer's official status, are of deep concern, and will I am confident, upon fair consideration, be answered in the negative. To be sure, specific rules may not be formulated prescribing when and under what circumstances action shall be taken or what shall be done. Professional duty is often too delicate in its nature for articulation in formal rules. But with a just conception of our general responsibility, we may depend upon the monitions of a vigilant conscience and a high sense of honor for suggestions of appropriate action, as the occasion presents itself. But, rules or no rules, it is of prime importance that there be a realization of the grav

ity of the evil and an aroused consciousness of our responsibility. The first great need is that the bar as a whole take an attitude and cultivate a spirit, not of resignation to the seeming inevitable, or of good-natured complacency, but aggressively hostile to the in trusion in any form of perjured testimony into our courts. It may well be, as is sometimes charged, that the courts themselves are in a degree to blame, in failing more often to direct criminal prosecutions where the offense is committed in their presence. A practical presentation of that subject would be of interest, but we are just now concerned with the distinctive responsibility of the bar.

Not by way of defense of the courts, but to accentuate the point I urge, it may be remarked that of necessity who occupy the bench come very little into intimate retion with litigants and their witnesses, and the influence which they can exert is therefore in the main necessari. ly restricted to the formal proceedings that may prop. erly be taken in court. But criminal prrosecutions for perjury are beset with the most serious difficulties, as any one who has had anything to do with them will read ily affirm, and unless reinforced by a powerful public sentiment make little headway in permanently dislodging a crime that has become strongly intrenched in custom. In a few instances, where the perjury has been committed in open court, as is most frequently ently the case, the offender has been proceeded against and summarily punished as for contempt, and doubtless a remedy of this character, if frequently invoked, could be made more effective than trials upon indictment before a jury. But if it be conceded that such a method of procedure is at present without legal objections, already there exists a strong popular current of antagonism to the power of the courts summarily to punish for contempt without a jury trial, and unless such power is sparingly exercised it is in danger of being entirely withdrawn. My point is that, assuming all fidelity upon the part of the courts in inflicting criminal punishment, whenever practicable, the relief thus afforded is likely to be highly dissappointing. In the absence of a proper