mail trains, express trains, or other trains, whether freight or passenger, engaged in interstate commerce, or carrying passengers or freight between or among the states; and from in any manner interfering with, hindering or stopping any trains carrying the mail; and from in any manner interfering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping any engines, cars, or rolling stock of any of said companies engaged in interstate commerce, or in connection with the carriage of passengers or freight between or among the states, and from in any manner interfering with, injuring or destroying any of the property of any of the said railroads engaged in or for the purpose of, or in connection with, interstate commerce or the carriage of the mails of the United States or the transportation of passengers or freight between or among the states; and from entering upon the grounds or premises of any of said railroads for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping any of said mail trains, passenger or freight trains engaged in interstate commerce, or in the transportation of passengers or freight between or among the states, or for the purpose of interfering with, injuring or destroying any of said property so engaged in or used in connection with interstate commerce or the transportation of passengers or property between or among the states; and from injuring or destroying any part of the tracks, roadbeds or road, or permanent structures of said railroads; and from injuring, destroying, or in any way interfering with any of the signals or switches of any said railroads; and from displacing or extinguishing any of the signals of any of said railroads, and from spiking, locking, or in any manner fastening any of the switches of any of said railroads, and from uncoupling or in any way hampering or obstructing the control by any of said railroads of any of the cars, engines, or parts of trains of any of said railroads engaged in interstate commerce or in the transportation of passengers or freight between and among the states, or engaged in carrying any of the mails of the United States; and from com pelling or inducing or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence, any of the employees of any of said railroads to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties as employees of any of said railroads in connection with the interstate business or commerce of such railroads or the carriage of the United States mail by such railroads, or the transportation of passengers or property between or among the states; and from compelling or inducing or attempting to compel or induce by threats, intimidation, force or violence any of the employees of any of said railroads who are employed by such railroads and engaged in its service in the conduct of interstate business, or in the operation of any of its trains carrying the mail of the United States, or doing interstate business, or the transportation of passengers and freight between and among the states, to leave the service of such railroads, and from preventing any person whatever, by threats, intimidation, force or violence from entering the service of any of said railroads and doing the work thereof in the carrying of the mails of the United States, or the transportation of passengers and freight between and among the states; and from doing any act whatever in furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain either of said railroad companies or receivers in the free and unhindered control and handling of interstate commerce over the lines of said railroads, and of transportation of persons and freight between and among the states; and from ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or abetting in any manner whatever, any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid. And it is further ordered that the aforesaid injunction shall be in force and binding upon such of said defendants as are named in said bill from and after the service upon them severally of said writ by delivering to them severally a copy of said writ or by reading the same to them and the service upon them respectively of the writ of subpoena herein, and shall be binding upon said defendants. whose names are alleged to be unknown, from and after the service of such writ upon them respectively by the reading of the same to them or by the publication thereof by posting or printing, and after service of subpoena upon any of said defendants named herein shall be binding upon said defendants and upon all other persons whatsoever who are not named herein from and after the time when they shall severally have knowledge of the entry of such order and the existence of said injunction. (Signature of the Judge.) The above is principally taken from Street's Federal Equity Practice, the latest, best and most reliable work on the subject. In using the above form, it will be of great aid in the details to re-read and examine such cases as: In re Debs, 158 U. S. 570; Black vs. H. G. Allen, 42 Fed. 618, and the Hay Market Riot Cases. CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA. T. J. CROWELL, Plaintiff in Error, VS. Case No. A-620 STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error. Filed September 5th, 1911. Appeal from District Court of Wagoner County. John H. King, trial Judge. Affirmed Where the information was for stealing two mules under Sec. 2606 Sny. Stat., and the verdict was guilty as charged in the information, the fact that the court adjudged the defendant guilty of grand larceny was not reversible error, since the word larceny, if properly used could not injure the defendant; the record furnishing a complete protection against another prosecution for the same offense and the judgment will on appeal be modified and corrected under Sec. 6955 Snyder,s Stat., so as to conform to the charge in the information and the verdict. (Continued on page 104.) CURRENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME W. H. MITCHELL, Plaintiff in Error. VS: N. M. CARTER, Defendant in Error. No. 2796. (Rendered September 12th, 1911.) Error from the District Court of Logan County. I The adoption by a city of the first class of a new charter under the provisions of section 3a, article 18 of the Constitution, does not create a new corporation, and does not destroy the corporate entity nor affects the identity of the formerly existing corporation, although different powers are possessed by the corporation under its new charter and different officers administer its affairs. 2 Where a mandamus proceeding is brought by the commissioner of public safety under a new charter, purported to have been adopted under the provisions of section 3a, article 18 of the Constitution, against the chief of police under the former charter of a city of the first class to require respondent to deliver up to relator, as his successor in office under the new charter, the property and paraphernalia pertaining to the office of chief of police, respondent may plead as a defense that the new charter has never been legally adopted, and that the office, by virtue of which relator claims the right to the possession of said property does not exist. 3 The election for the adoption or rejection by the elec tors of a city of the first class of a new charter under the provisions of section 3a, article 18 of the Constitution, must, by reason of said section of the Constitution and section 1, article 4 of an act entitled, “An act regulating the time, manner and means of holding elections," (Sess. Laws, 1909, p. 268) be ordered by the city council; and, an election called by the mayor, without any act of the city council ordering or authorizing the same, is invalid. (SYLLABUS BY THE COURT James Hepburn, W. H. Chappell and Devereaux & Hildreth, Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Burford & Burford and Ben F. Hegler, City Attorney, Attorneys for Defendant in Error. Plaintiff in error seeks by this proceeding to reverse a judgment of the trial court awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus to defendant in error against him. Defendant in error filed his petition in the lower court, praying that an alternative writ of mandamus issue to plaintiff in error, commanding him to surrender to defendant in error the city prison, furniture, dockets and office paraphernalia belonging to the city of Guthrie and pertaining to the office of city marshal or chief of police The trial was upon ai agreed statement of facts, and upon facts admitted by the alternative writ and the return thereto. Prior to May 4, 1911, Guthrie was an incorporated city of the first class, existing under and with its form of government and powers fixed by the general statute regulating the organization and defining the powers of cities of the first class. Prior to that date, the electors of the city, at an election held fot that purpose, had selected a board of freeholders, to prepare and form for the city a special charter as authorized by section 3a, article 19, Constitution. A special election was authorized by the city council, and was ordered to be held, and was called by the mayor for May 4th, 1911, for the purpose of voting upon a certain bond proposition, submitted by the council to the voters of the city. The mayor also, without any action on the part of the city council authorizing or directing him, designated the same 'date for voting upon the approval or rejection of the proposed charter, and issued his proclamation calling a special election on that date for the purpose, and he named as the officers to |