at such time as may comply with the limitations or requirements of said provision in that respect. If there is a general election within such period, such municipal authorities can properly, and should submit it for ratification or rejection at such election." Under the general statute regulating cities of the first class, the legislative authority of a city is vested in the city council, presided over by a mayor, with power to cast a deciding vote in case of a tie. At the first session of the second legislature, an act was passed entitled, "An act regulating the time, manner and means of holding elections." Section 1, article 4 of that act, (Sess. Laws, 1909, p. 268) in so far as it applies to the calling of special elections for the adoption of municipal charters, is virtually a re-enactment of the foregoing provision of the Constitution as coustrued in the Scales case. Said section in part reads: "Whenever the council of any city of the first class or the board of trustees of any incorporated town or village shall deem it advisable, they may, by resolution or ordinance, authorize the mayor or president of the board of trustees to call a special election for the purpose of submitting to the qualified electors, the question of the issuance of the bonds of said city or town or the granting oi any franchise or for any purpose other than the election of officers." When such order is made by the council, it is then by the same section made the duty of the mayor to issue his proclamation calling the election and setting forth there the proposition to be voted upon, time of opening and closing the polls, the number and location of the polling places, and the name of the officers who shall conduct the election. It is clear from the agreed facts in the instant case that the special election for voting upon the charter was not called by the authority provided by section 3a, article 18 of the Constitution, as construed in the Scales case, or as provided by section 1 of the act of 1909, supra. The effect upon the validity of a special election of the failure of the authorities whose duty it is under the law to call same, is stated in section 370 of the last edition of Dillon on Municipal Corporations as follows: "Where the law fixes no time, but leaves the time and place to be fixed by some authority named therein, it is essential to the validity of the election that it be called and the time and place thereof fixed by the agency designated by law, and none other; as where the mayor and city council are the designated authority, neither the mayor alone nor the city council alone has power to call such election; if either neglect its duty, mandamus is the remedy." This general statement of the law is supported by numerous decided cases, and no case holding the contrary has been cited, and we have been unable to find any. The time of holding special elections for voting upon proposed municipal charters is not fixed in this state by law, and the authority to order such elections is vested in the legislative authority of municipal corporations, which, in cities of the first class, is the city council. It is true that certain limitations as to the time within which such elections shall be called are by the Constitution imposed upon that authority; but such limitations do not themselves constitute an order for an election upon any specific charter, nor fix the time for holding same. The duty of the city council, in the absence of a general election within the time prescribed by the Constitution to call a special election for the purpose of submitting the proposed charter, is mandatory; but the remedy for failure to perform such duty is by mandamus, and not by substituting the act of another authority not designated by law. Stephens vs. People ex rel. 89 IH. 337. Courts are anxious rather to sustain than to defeat the popular will as expressed at elections, where the general public has participated; but, they cannot, to accomplish this result, overturn well settled principles of law. It follows that the election for voting upon the charter is void, and that there has never been any valid adoption of the charter. This conclusion requires a reversal of the judgment of the lower court, and will require the rendition of a judgment in favor of plaintiff in error, respondent below, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider the other questions raised by the petition in error and discussed in the briefs of counsel. Turner, C. J.; Williams, Kane and Dunn, J. J., concur. THE LAWTON RAPID TRANSIT RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error. VS. No. 1324. THE CITY OF LAWTON, ET AL., Defendants in Error. (Rendered September 12th, 1911.) Error from the District Court of Comanche County. I. Where an issue joined is specifically found by the court in favor of plaintiff, and the evidence reasonably tends to support the finding, such finding will not be disturbed on review in this court. 2. In a proceeding to condemn land, pursuant to c. 15, art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9, of Snyder's Stats. of Okla., 1909, the interest of the district judge as a resident taxpayer of the petitioning municipality is not such an "interest" within the contemplation of sec. 2012 of said statutes as will disqualify him to act upon the petition and try the cause. 3. On trial to a jury to assess damages in a proceeding to condemn land, pursuant to c. 15, art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9, of Snyder's Stats. of Okla., a report of the United States Geological Surve issued by the Department of the Interior is not admissable in evidence where the same pertains to a dam site other than the one sought to be condemned. 4. On trial to a jury to assess damages in a proceeding to condemn land, pursuant to c. 15, art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9, of Snyder's Stats. of Okla., testimony offered to show mere possible or imaginary uses or speculative schemes of the owner with reference to the land sought to be condemned is inadmissable i evidence. 5. A booklet purporting to advertise as a health resort the land sought to be condemned, pursuant to said sections, not "for anything that appears in the book, but just to show the status of the land, and what they had done prior to that time with regard to it," is inadmissable in evidence. 6. Where, after introducing evidence tending to prove that at the time the proceedings to condemn were com menced the most profitable use to which the tract could be put was for farming purposes, it was not error to permit the witness to testify, in effect, that its value for that purpose at that time was $3 per acre. 7. In a proceeding to condemn land, pursuant to c 15, art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9, of Snyder's Stats. of Okla., on trial to a jury to assess damages, it was not error for the court to exclude testimony offered to prove the revenue derived by the city from the water used from the dam in question from the date of the first taking of water therefrom up to the time of the trial. 8. In a proceeding to condemn land, pursuant to c. 15, art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9 of Snyder's Stats. of Okla., on trial to a jury to assess damages, it was not error for the court to exclude testimony offered to prove, for the purpose of showing an admission against the interest of the city, in effect, an offer of the property to the city, in the shape of a proposed written contract, with certain reservations, for $25,000; and a further offer to prove an order of the city council of the petitioning municipality approving said proposed contract, and that said order had been vetoed by the mayor on grounds other than that the value stated in said contract was excessive. (Syllabus by the Court.) J. Elmer Thomas, Stevens & Meyers, Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error. Charles C. Black, Attorney for Defendants in Error. OPINION OF THE COURT, BY TURNER, C. J.: On January 22nd, 1908, on the filing of the petition of defendant in error, the City of Lawton, a city of the first class, in the District Court of Comanche County, the District Judge of that county appointed commissioners to condemn, for the use of said city, among others, certain lands belonging to plaintiff in error, necessary to enable petitioner to construct a dam across Medicine Creek and impound and flow back its waters and connect the same with the pumping plant of said city-some 12 miles away-by pipe line across said lands, for the purpose of furnishing said city with a water supply-pursuant to c. 15, Art. 10 and sections 1370 to 1374, inclusive, of c. 20, art. 9 of Snyders' Stats. of Okla. On February 26th, 1908, said commissioners filed their report and awarded defendant: "For taking of the north half of the northwest 1-4 ofsaid Sec. 18, Twp. 3 N, R. 12 W. I. M., by the City of Lawton for purpose of dam site and storage of water, etc. For the right of way for the pipe line as described in said foregoing notice, the sum of For the taking and diverting of water and for the damage to the residue of said land caused by the taking of land and water and right of way and for full compensation for all other damage done or to be done by the construction of dam and impounding of water and taking of land and water and right of way, the sum of $ 800.00 50.00 2,150.00 On March 18th, 1908, defendant, feeling aggrieved, in due time made proper application for a trial by jury and later sought to and did disqualify said district judge, the Honorable T. J. Johnson, by reason of interest on the ground that he was at that time a property owner and taxpayer in said city. Later Honorable G. A. Brown, judge of Eighteenth district, was duly assigned by the then Chief Justice of this Court, to sit in judgment on said cause, whereupon defendant moved the court, in effect, to dismiss all proceedings had in the cause prior to that time on the ground that said former judge being as well disqualified at the time said proceedings were had as when he so certified, all orders made by him were void. After said motion and an application for a change of venue were overruled there was trial to the jury and judgment for defendant for $4,000.00, to reverse which defendant brings the case here. As to the error that "There was no bona fide effort at amicable adjustment on the part of the city, required by the statute as a condition precedent to instituting this proceeding," it is sufficient to say that as that issue joined is specifically found by the court in favor of plaintiff and |