Power v. Cassidy. is capable of being executed by a judicial decree, there is no reason why a court should not execute it. Williams v. Williams, 4 Seld. 524; Owens v. Mis. Soc., 14 N. Y., 408. Had there been a failure to make the selection as provided, for any reason, within the authorities cited, the court would have power to decree the execution of the trust. The first clause in the will gives all the property of the testator to his executrix and executors in trust for certain purposes specified. So much of the estate only as was necessary to carry these purposes into effect passed under this provision, and the remainder was to be divided as directed. The intention of the testator was plainly manifest as to such remainder, and he had a perfect right to make such a disposition of his estate, after it was converted into personalty. The law does not limit or confine trusts as to personal property, except fu reference to the suspension of ownership, and they may be created for any purpose not forbidden by law. Bucklin v. Bucklin, 1 Keyes, 141; Gott v. Cook, 7 Pai. 534. As for the reasons stated the provision in the last clause can be carried into effect, we do not deem it necessary to consider whether it may be regarded as a power in trust under the provisions of the Revised Statutes. 1 R. S. 732, § 74; 734, §§ 95–100. [Omitting other questions.] Judgment affirmed. All concur. NOTE BY THE REPORTER. In Russell v. Allen, 5 Dill, 235, a conveyance of real and personal property, in trust, "for the purpose of founding an institution for the education of youth in St. Louis county, Missouri," was sustained. TREAT, J., said: “In this country, after long doubt and disputation, the doctrine has been established that where a grant or devise for charitable uses has been made, and the donee is capable of executing the trust vested in him, the grant or devise should be upheld if the beneficiary or charitable object is stated in such a manner or with such distinctness that chancery can ascertain what it is, so as to enforce the trust." See Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 1 MoArthur, 605; s. c., 29 Am. Rep. 605; Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60; s. c., 26 Am. Rep. 424. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA. NICHOLSON V. Cox. (83 N. C. 44.) Marriage — jurisdiction — married woman's acceptance of service of process. Jurisdiction of the person of a married woman is acquired by her written admission of service of the summons. M OTION to set aside a judgment. The opinion states the point. J. W. Albertson, for plaintiff. Pruden & Shaw, for defendant. DILLARD, J. The defendant M. I. Jordan, wife of A. S. Jordan, and her husband, became sureties to the bond of Cox as sheriff, and the execution of the bond by the wife was without the written assent of her husband, and the sheriff having made default in not paying over the county taxes to the plaintiff as treasurer, a suit was instituted and the summons was returned into court with an admission of service indorsed thereon, subscribed by Jordan and his wife in their proper handwritings. The suit went to judgment Nicholson v. Cox. by default, and thereupon the defendant M. I. Jordan moved to vacate the judgment as to herself under section 133 of the Code, on the ground of irregularity alleged to consist in the manner of the service of the summons, and upon the ground of surprise and excusable neglect. His honor ruled against the ground of irregularity and in favor of the defendant, the feme covert, on the ground of surprise and excusable neglect, and from that judgment both sides appeal, the defendant assigning error in that his honor held the acceptance of service of the summons by her as legally sufficient to constitute the cause in court as to her. Upon the defendant's appeal the questions are: Can a married woman admit or accept service in writing of a summons by which an action is commenced, and if she can, then is her acceptance in this particular case legally sufficient to authorize the court to proceed to judgment thereon? It is argued that an infant cannot accept service of a summons, but that the same must be served personally in all cases where the infant is without a general or testamentary guardian, and upon the same reason the summons must be served on a married woman. An infant cannot accept or admit service, for the reason that when without a general guardian no proceedings can be had without a guardian appointed ad litem, and no such guardian can be appointed by a court except in conformity to our statute, which, as construed by this court, is mandatory that such appointment can only be made after personal service. Bat. Rev., ch. 17, § 59; Allen v. Shields, 72 N. C. 504; Moore v. Gidney, 75 id. 34. Infancy is a disability and extends to all stages of a suit, including admission of service or acceptance of service as a mode of initiating a suit, as well as all ulterior steps in the course of the same, and this proceeds on the theory to prevent fraud. No such reason exists now to hold the admission or acceptance of service of a summons by a married woman as inoperative. She has now the capacity to have and hold her real and personal property, owned at the marriage, as well as her acquisitions during the coverture, as a separate estate, and is competent to contract so as to affect her property within certain limits, under the Constitution of 1868, art. 10, § 6, and under the marriage act, chapter 69 of Battle's Revisal. And a feme covert is answerable out of her own estate for her debts and other causes of action before the marriage as well as Gooch v. McGee. on the contracts she is authorized to make during the marriage, and in suits to enforce that liability, while it is required that the husband be joined she is expressly made competent by section 15 of the marriage act, supra, to represent herself if she will as a feme sole, or with her consent to be represented by her husband. The ability to defend an action being thus conferred, no good reason can be suggested as it seems to us, why her enlarged capacity in this respect should not be held to extend to any and all things usual and admissible to constitute a cause in court, such as appearing without summons, or the admission and acceptance of the service of a summons, as in the case of all other persons sui juris. It is our opinion therefore that the acceptance of service of the summons by a married woman will suffice to give the court jurisdiction of the person, and authorize further proceedings according to the course and practice of the court. [Omitting minor considerations.] The judgment of the court below holding the acceptance of service sufficient is affirmed, and this will be certified. Judgment affirmed. No error. GOOCH V. MCGEE. (83 N. C. 59.) Corporation-real estate acquired by eminent domain — sale of, în execution. Where a public corporation, in exercise of a delegated right of eminent domain, acquires real estate necessary for public use, such real estate can be sold on execution against the corporation, only subject to the performance of the duties and obligations of the corporation. A CTION to recover land. The opinion states the point. The plaintiff had judgment below. Day & Zollicoffer, Gilliam & Gatling, Mullen & Moore and J. B. Batchelor, for plaintiff. Thos. N. Hill, for defendant. SMITH, C. J. The plaintiff purchased at a sale under execution against the Roanoke navigation company, certain land which had Gooch v. McGee. been theretofore condemned for its use, under the provisions of the act of incorporation, including the bed covered by the waters of the canal, at its terminus near Welden, and in this suit seeks to recover possession. The defendant had leased the land from the company for a period which had expired before the day of sale, but still continued in posession, refusing to surrender to the plaintiff. Under an act of the general assembly entitled "An act for the dissolution of the Roanoke navigation company," passed at the session of 1874-75, ch. 198, proceedings had been instituted in the Superior Court of Halifax and the complaint filed, but no further action taken at the date of sale. Two objections are urged for the appellant: 1. That the proceeding to annul the corporation and dispose of its property directed by the statute supersedes and renders nugatory the interference of a creditor, and that no title passed by the sheriff's deed; and 2. That the canal bed, as severable from its general property and franchise, is not subject to execution. We propose to consider the last proposition first. In State v Rives, 5 Ired. 297, a sale of so much of the road bed of the Portsmouth and Roanoke railroad company as was within the county of Northampton, under an execution at the instance of a judgment creditor, was held to be legal, and the purchaser to have acquired title to the land. This was because of the assumed want of any other remedy for the creditor, and by force of the statute which authorized a plaintiff to sue out against a corporation debtor, "a distringas or fieri facias, as he may think proper, and the said writs of distringas or fieri facias may be levied as well on the current money as on the goods, chattels, lands and tenements of the said corporation." Rev. Stat., ch. 26, § 5. The result of upholding this diversion of the property from the original and intended purposes of its condemnation to the use of the company, and the injustice done the former owner, whose damages were lessened by the advantages to be derived from the construction of the proposed improvement, conducted the mind of the late chief justice who presided at the trial in the Superior Court, to the conclusion that the sale was not authorized by law. In delivering the overruling opinion in this court, RUFFIN, C. J., declaring that "the legislature can prescribe what shall or shall not be the subject of execution," proceeds to say: "We agree that the franchise cannot be sold. It |