Blackman v. Lehman operation. These are still, as by the law-merchant, if payable to bearer, deemed payable to every holder thereof, and the legal title passes by delivery. Such was the construction of the former statute. The former statute declared instruments payable to any person, or to any corporation, or bearer, should have the effect of creating an obligation or liability in favor only of the person or corporation to whom it was expressly payable. It may well be doubted whether the former statute embraced any instrument payable to bearer only. The present statute embraces not only such an instrument, but every instrument (except bills or notes issued to circulate as money) which is payable to any thing, or to any fictitious person, or bearer; and such instruments are not to be construed as payable to whoever may be the holder, but to the person from whom the consideration moves. If payable to an existing person or bearer, then it is construed as payable to such person, or order. The policy of the statute is to deprive instruments of negotiability, which do not on their face clearly indicate to whom their bligations apply, and from whom title can be securely derived; that title to negotiable instruments, which prevails over the title of the true owner, or over the equities of the original parties, shall be derived only by an indorsement in writing from him to whom they are expressly payable. Such, it is said by Judge STORY, was at one time the law of France; because it was found that bills of exchange, payable to bearer only, or in which a blank was left for the name of the payee, became a cover of fraud and usury. Story on Prom. Notes, § 38. If they had every other not, in obedience to the These bonds are payable to bearer only. ingredient of negotiability, they could statute, be construed otherwise than as payable to the person from whom the consideration moved to the maker, when they were issued. So construing them, the legal title to them could be derived only through his indorsement. These are valid contracts, or engagements to pay money to the person from whom the consideration originally moved, on the happening of the event expressed in them. The legal title to them can be derived only through the indorsement or assignment of that person. Gookin v. Richardson, 11 Ala. 889. Whoever obtains possession of them, without such assignment or indorsement, holds in subordination to it, and in subordination to all prior rights and equities. The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient to support the presVOL. XXXV-9 Blackman v. Lehman. ent action of trover, against the defendants acquiring possession, without title, from his bailee. The defendants are, equally with the bailee, from whom they obtained possession, estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff. Lowremore v. Berry, 19 Ala. 130; Cook v. Patterson, 35 id. 102; Donnell v. Thompson, 13 id. 440. The result of these views is, that the city court erred in charging the jury the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, if they believed the evidence, and in refusing to charge them, on request, that he was entitled to recover. Let the judgment be reversed, and the cause be remanded. ▲ promise of marriage in consideration that the promisee should before marriage have sexual connection with the promisor is void. (See note, p. 68.) A CTION for breach of promise of marriage. The opinion states the facts. The plaintiff had judgment below. McAllister & Bergin, for appellant. Alex. Campbell and D. M. Delmas, for respondent. By the COURT. This is an action for a breach of promise of marriage. The alleged promise is denied by the answer. The plaintiff was examined as a witness in her own behalf, and testified in substance that the agreement between the parties was, that the plaintiff should then presently surrender her person to the defendant, and that in consideration of such surrender the defendant would afterward marry her. "He promised me that if I should give up myself to him, that he should marry me.' "Q. What did you say to that?" Hanks v. Naglee. "A. At first I refused; at last I, of course, gave myself up to him." 1st. Upon well-settled principles the plaintiff should not have recovered upon a contract of this character. As being a contract for illicit cohabitation, it is tainted with immorality. Story on Cont. § 458; Steinfelt v. Levy, 16 Abb. N. S. 26, and other authorities cited in appellant's brief. 2d. But this question was not made below, nor is the record here in such a condition as would, under the settled rules of practice, permit us to determine the case upon this point. 3d. But the court below in stating to the jury "the elements of injury which go to make up the sum total of damage," which the plaintiff might be considered to have sustained, instructed them as follows: "Next, if * the defendant, taking advantage of the promise under which she (the plaintiff) was acting, has had illicit relations, and has seduced the plaintiff, that is another element proper for the jury to consider," etc. But the evidence which we have just detailed, coming as it did from the mouth of the plaintiff herself, shows that this case is not one of the character assumed by the court as the basis for this instruction. It was confessedly not a case in which the defendant, taking advantage of the trust and confidence which may be fairly supposed to exist between parties who have in apparent good faith made mutual promises of marriage, has abused the confidence of a female, and induced her to yield him favors which she might have otherwise withheld. The agreement to yield her person to him was one appearing to have been deliberately made in advance, and when there had been no promise of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that the hypothesis upon which this instruction was based could not be assumed by the jury for the purpose of fixing the amount of damages the plaintiff was to recover. Judgment and order denying a new trial reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Remittitur forthwith. Reversed and remanded. NOTE BY THE REPORTER.- The case of Steinfeld v. Levy, 16 Abb. (N. S.) 26, is exactly in point. The action was in the Brooklyn city court, the opinion by NEILSON, C. J. The court observed: "It is hardly necessary to say that a contract thus grossly immoral would not support the action." "The learned presiding judge seems to have had in view the rule that where a contract is founded on two considerations, one of which is merely void, but not vicious, and the other good, the contract is binding to the extent of the good consideration. He ruled that if in fact mutual concurrent provisions to marry were a part of People v. Ah Ngow. the consideration, the plaintiff could recover. It does not seem to have occurred to him that such a rule would tend to legalize contracts for prostitution, or that the principle in view is never applied to a contract tainted with immorality. Courts of justice will not aid the illicit or corrupt arrangement, or sift one part of it to save the other part." Beaumont v. Reeve, 8 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 483, was assumpsit on a promise, to pay a yearly surn to a woman for her maintenance, in consideration of her seduction by the defendant, of the past illicit intercourse between the parties, of the discontinuance thereof by agreement, and of the injury to the plaintiff. Held, not maintainable. This was on the ground that the moral consideration cannot support assumpsit. See Hook v. Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371; s. c., 34 Am. Rep. 539. PEOPLE V. AH NGOW. (54 Cal. 151.) Criminal law-evidence-flight. In a criminal case no legal presumption of guilt arises from the flight of the accused, but it is a circumstance for the consideration of the jury. YONVICTION of murder. The opinion states the facts. CONVICTION Lyman J. Mowry, for appellant. A. L. Hart, attorney-general, and D. J. Murphy, for respondent. MORRISON, C. J. The defendant was convicted in the court below of the crime of murder in the first degree, for the felonious killing, with premeditation and malice aforethought, of one Wong Ah Sun, and having been adjudged to suffer death, brings this appeal from the judgment, and also from an order denying his motion for a new trial. The homicide was committed in the city and county of San Francisco; and on the trial it was shown in behalf of the prosecution that the defendant fled from said city and county to a remote part of the State immediately after the murder was perpetrated. The court below, charging the jury on the question of flight, used the following language: "The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after a crime is committed with which he is charged, is a circumstance in establishing his guilt, not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt, but a circumstance which the jury may consider |