same way a private owner might, it is liable to the same extent as he would be for the negligent management thereof to the injury of others. Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, and cases cited. In Bailey v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, supra, the court in speaking of the grant for the erection of the water works, say: "The State, in its sovereign character, has no interest in it. It owns no part of the work. The whole investment under the law, and revenue and profits to be derived therefrom, are a part of the private property of the city, as much so as the lands and houses belonging to it situate within its corporate limits." This language is not inappropriate to the case at bar. It is suggestive of facts of a kindred nature, which contribute toward fixing upon the plaintiff in error, though a municipal corporation, the same liability which private corporations or natural persons would incur for the neglect of their agents or servants in the care and management of their property. Upon the facts disclosed by the record, we are of opinion that there was a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff below, and that the judgment entered on the verdict for the plaintiff should not be reversed. Judgment of the Court of Common Pleas affirmed. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. CRIMINAL LAW-BAWDY HOUSE-CODE CRIM. PROC., § 889-SENTENCE.-The common-law remedy by indictment against a person keeping a bawdy house was not abolished or superseded by the provision of the Code of Crim. Proc. as to disorderly persons (§ 889). It is not essential to the validity of a sentence to imprisonment in a county penitentiary, under the statute authorizing such imprisonment (Laws of 1874, ch. 209, as amended by Laws of 1876, ch. 108, that it shall state that the prisoner is "to be received, kept and employed in the manner prescribed by law and the rules of the penitentiary." That provision of the statute is no part of the sentence, but is simply directory to the keeper of the penitentiary. People v. Sadler, as Superintendent, etc. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Oct. 21, 1884.] PARTNERSHIP-SHARE OF PROFITS DOES NOT MAKE. -Defendants, Hall, Nicoll and Granbery, as parties of the first part, entered into a contract with defendant, The U. S. R. Co., which recited that the parties of the first part contemplated assuming control of said company, when if ever they shall be satisfied that its business was a profitable one, and that it was expedient that some arrangement should be made whereby that question might be determined; in consideration whereof and of the mutual covenants and agreements it was agreed that the parties of the first part, to enable the company to fill its order, should make advances upon assignment of such orders for goods manufactured by the company, as they should approve. Said parties of the first part to collect each of such orders, and out of the proceeds to retain the sum advanced thereon with interest and a proportion of the profits made by the company, the same to be not less than ten per cent of the face of the order. The company also executed to H., N. and G. a chattel mortgage upon its property to secure such advance. In an action to recover for goods sold to the company, held, that the contract did not constitute a copartnership between the parties either inter sese or as to third persons. It is well settled that when a party is only interested in the profits of a business as a means of compensation for services rendered, as was the fact under the contract in the case at bar, or for money advanced, he is not a partner. This question was distinctly presented in Richardson v. Hughitt, 76 N. Y. 55, and it was there held that a person who has no interest in the business of a firm or in the capital invested, save that he is to receive a share of the profits as a compensation for services or for money loaned for the benefit of the business, is not a partner and cannot be held as such by a creditor of the firm. In that case advances were to be made upon personal property, to be manufactured and delivered, for which, when sold, the defendant was to receive one-fourth of the profits and his advances with interest at five and a half per cent. The case cited is directly in point, the same principle is involved and there is a striking analogy in the facts which renders it applicable to the question now considered. We are unable to perceive any distinction existing between the two cases which authorize a holding that is not in point. The case cited was approved and upheld in Curry v. Fowler, 87 N. Y. 33, and the principle decided is fully sustained in Eager v. Crawford, 76 id. 97, and Burnett v. Snyder, id. 344. These cases are conclusive upon the question considered, and none of the decisions in this State are adverse to the doctrine which is therein laid down. We do not deem it necessary, in view of the fact that the law upon the question discussed is well settled in this court, to examine the English authorities bearing upon the subject. Cassedy v. Hall. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Oct. 28, 1884.] PARTNERSHIP-RETIRING PARTNER-LIABILITY TO CREDITOR NOT HAVING NOTICE-ADMISSIONS BY OTHER PARTNERS DO NOT BIND.-A partner who retires from a firm may be held liable to all persons who had previously dealt with it, and who continued to deal therewith until they have notice or knowledge of his retiremeut. In Parsons on Partn. (2d ed.) 427, it is said: "The reason of the rule is perfectly obvious. They whom he authorizes to think him a part. ner may hold him as such; and being a partner, and being known as a partner, he authorizes all to think him so who do not know that he has ceased to be one. If we suppose no fraud on his part, there is negligence on his part, and of two innocent persons he should suffer whose negligence caused the error." In Story on Part. (7th ed.), § 160, it is said: "Where an 08tensible or known partner retires from the firm, he will still remain liable for all the debts and contracts of the firm, as to all persons who had previously dealt with the firm, and have no notice of his retirement. This is a just result of the principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer from giving credit, he who has misled the confidence of the other, and has been the cause of the credit, either by his representations, or his negligence, or his fraud, ought to suffer instead of the other." But the reason for holding the retired partner goes so far only as to make him responsible to innocent persons who continue to deal with the firm, presumptively on the faith of his presence as a member thereof; and all obligations to such persons created in such dealings bind the retired partner just as fully and thoroughly as if he continued to be a member of the firm. The rule thus defined goes far enough to protect the former dealers with the firm. After a dissolution of a firm by the retirement of one of the members thereof, it is well settled that the surviving members cannot bind him by their admissions (Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17; Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns. 409); and it matters not whether the dealer to whom the admissions were made knew of the dissolution or not. It is sufficient that at the time the admissions were made the parties making them had no right to bind, represent or act for the partner who had retired. In Whitman v. Leonard, 3 Pick. 177, the following language was used by Parker, C. J.: "It is said however that as to a person accustomed to deal with the the partnership, it continued until he had notice of the dissolution; but that must apply to their usual dealings." Pringle v. Leverich. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Oct. 31, 1884.] CONTRACT PAROL EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN - INDORSEMENT ON ENVELOPE-PROOF OF CUSTOM.-In an action to recover the amount of an alleged loan from plaintiff to defendant, the defense was that the loan was negotiated by defendant for and upon collaterals belonging to a discharged principal. Plaintiff proved the delivery of a check to defendant, payable to his order, for the amount of the loan, and produced an envelope in which were the securities upon which the loan was made; upon this was indorsed the date of the transaction, defendant's name and place of business, written by him, the time of the loan, from whom, the amount of the rate of interest, and then a list of the securities. Held, that the indorsement was not a contract, as there was no promise to pay, nor was it an acknowledgment of an indebtedness, or that defendant was the borrower, and that parol evidence was proper to show that fact. Where the language of an instrument is ambiguous, evidence of the surrounding circumstances may be resorted to for the purpose of determining what the real intention is. Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 454. Parol evidence may also be introduced to show that even when a writing purports to be a contract it may not be such. Grierson v. Mason, 60 N. Y. 397. In the case last cited the defendant has proved a contract and the plaintiff proved an instrument which altered the contract. The defendant introduced evidence to show that the instrument was not intended as an alteration of the contract, but was executed with the view of accomplishing a particular purpose. It was then laid down that such evidence was not given to change the written contract by parol, but to establish that such contract had no force, efficacy or effect. That it was not intended to be a contract, and that such evidence did not come within the ordinary rule of introducing parol evidence to contradict written testimony, but tends to explain the circumstances under which such an instrument was executed and delivered. It is also stated that the purpose for which a writing was executed may be proved by parol when not inconsistent with its terms. If the rules stated are applicable where there is a complete contract, much stronger reasons exist for invoking them where the terms of the contract are uncertain and ambiguous, as is the fact in the case at bar. The rule appears to be well established, that even although a contract is made out, if any ambiguity arises in reference to any portion of it, the question presented is one of fact for the consideration of the jury, upon such testimony, either in writing or oral, as the parties are able to present. See Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N. Y. 460; Field v. Munson, 47 id. 223, and Fabbri v. Ins. Co., 55 id. 133. The cases are numerous which sanction the introduction of evidence which will cast light upon those terms in the contract which are not clear and explicit, and serve to explain what the real intention of the parties was. This rule has been held to apply particularly to insurance cases of an analogous character where the language is uncertain and ambiguous as to the interest intended to be insured, and it is held that parol evidence is admissible to place the court in a position to be able to ascertain what interest the insured has, and what was intended to be covered by the policy. Pitney v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 13. Numerous cases sustain the rule that admissions, whether oral or written, may be explained or contradicted by parol or other evidence. DeLaval lette v. Wendt, 75 N. Y. 580; Juillard v. Chaffee, 92 id. 535; Ellis v. Willard, 9 id. 531; McMaster v. President, etc., 55 id. 228; Stanton v. Miller, 58 id. 203; Smith v. Holland, 61 id. 635. But inasmuch as the question here presented relates to the uncertainty and ambiguity of the indorsement on the envelope, it is unnecessary to invoke the application of this rule in order to sustain the decision of the court allowing the introduction of parol evidence. Defendant proved that the loan was made for the benefit of one K. and upon securities belonging to him; that plaintiff was advised for whom the loan was made; and its secretary asked to whose order the checks should be drawn; also that defendant wrote his name upon the envelope at the request of the secretary after the loan had been made. Held, that the evidence justified a finding that defendant was not the borrower and did not contract to pay the loan. Plaintiff introducing evidence to the effect that its custom was not to take notes for loans, but envelopes similar to the one in question, and that the use of such envelopes was common at the time. Held, that this did not affect the character of the indorsement; that the language employed and the cir cumstances connected with its use could not be altered or changed by proof of such a custom. Union Trust Co. v. Whiton. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided Oct. 31, 1884.] UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-WHEN RIGHT NOT CUT OFF.-The conditional surrender of notes secured by a mortgage does not cut off the right to foreclose the mortgage for their satisfaction in a case where the condition is not fulfilled. Howe v. Lewis, 14 Pick. 329; Davis v. Maynard, 9 Mass. 242; Stover v. Wood, 26 N. J. Eq. 417. It has been held by many courts that a mortgagee cannot, upon a judgment recovered for a debt secured by his mortgage, levy the execution upon the mortgaged property. Atkins v. Sawyer, 1 Pick. 351; Washburn v. Goodwin, 17 id. 137; Tice v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125; Camp v. Coxe, 1 Dev. & B. 52; Waller v. Tate, 4 B. Mon. 529; Powell v. Williams, 14 Ala. 476; Carpenter v. Bowen, 42 Miss. 28; Linville v. Bell, 47 Ind. 547. But whether this be the established rule or not, it requires no authority to show that a sale of the mortgaged premises upon a judgment recovered on a part of the notes secured by the mortgage does not preclude the holder of other notes secured by the same mortgage from proceeding to foreclose it. A sale on such a judgment could only affect the equity of redemption, and would leave the rights of the holder of other notes secured by the mortgage unaffected. Pugh v. Fairmount Gold and Silver Mining Co. Opinion by Woods, J. [Decided Nov. 10, 1884.] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE TO BE CONSTRUED IN HARMONY WITH CONSTITUTION-MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-SUBSCRIPTION TO RAILROAD INVALID SUBSEQUENT ACT LEGALIZING.-(1) That construction of a statute should be adopted, which without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words used, brings it into harmony with the Constitution. Cooley Const. Law, 184, 185; Newland v. Marsh, 19-Ill. 384; People v. Supervisors, 17 N. Y. 241; Colwell v. May, 4 C. E. Green, 249. And such is the rule recognized by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 31, in which it was said: "General words in the act should not be so construed as to give an effect to it beyond the legislative power, and thereby render the act unconstitutional. But if possible, a construction should be given to it that will render it free from con * stitutional objection; and the presumption must be that the Legislature intended to grant such rights as are legitimately within its power." Again in Sykes V. Mayor, 55 Miss. 143: "It ought never to be assumed that the law-making department of the government intended to uşurp or assume power prohibited to it. And such construction (if the words will admit of it) ought to be put on its legislation as will make it consistent with the supreme law." (2) A municipal subscription to the stock of a railroad company, or in aid of the construction of a railroad made without authority previously conferred, may be confirmed and legalized by subsequent legislative enactment, when legislation of that character is not prohibited by the Constitution, and when that which was done would have been legal had it been done under legislative sanction previously given. In Sykes v. Mayor, 55 Miss. 137, it was held that after the Constitution of 1869 took effect, the Legislature could not, by retrospective enactment, make valid an issue of municipal bonds executed prior to the adoption of that instrument, without legislative authority; because, said the court, "the measure of its power was the Constitution of December, 1869, and it could not ratify an act previously done, if at the date it professed to do so, it could not confer power to do it in the first instance. It could authorize a municipal loan conditionally. In order to ratify and legalize a loan previously made, it was bound by the constitutional limitation of its power." Further in the same case: "The idea implied in the ratification of a municipal act performed without previous legislative authority is that the ratifying communicates authority which relates back to and retrospectively vivifies and legalizes the act, as if the power had been previously given. Such statute is of the same import as original authority. * * If the Constitution had altogether denied to the Legislature the delegation of such power to counties, cities, and towns, it is manifest that it could not vitalize and legalize a subscription made before its adoption, and without authority of law. If that be so, it follows that in dealing with the subject at all, it is bound by the limitation of section 14 of article 12 of the Constitution." In Cutler v. Board of Supervisors, 56 Miss. 115, the question was as to the power of the Legislature to ratify and legalize certain municipal bonds issued to a railroad corporation by a county board of supervisors in pursuance of a vote of the people, with interest coupous attached, payable semi-annually. The statute under which the board proceeded authorized bonds with interest payable annually. The people however roted for bonds with interest payable semi-annually. The court sustained the constitutionality of the curative act. It was said: "This is far from being an ef fort to impose a debt on the county without its consent. The agreement of the people of the county to incur the debt, in the precise shape which it assumed, has been expressed. Their representatives, the county authorities, in execution of that will, have delivered the bonds, and the Legislature afterward affirmed. If there has been any departure from the letter of the original authority, it acquiesces in such deviation, cures the irregularity, and makes valid the bonds. The principles announced in Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 776, 789, fully support these views." These doctrines are in accord with the views of this court as indicated in several cases. Ritchie v. Franklin, 22 Wall. 67; Thomson v. Lee Co., 3 id. 327; City of Lamson, 9 id. 485; St. Joseph v. Rogers, 16 id. 663; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 id. 194. Board of Supervisors of Grenada Co. v. Brown. Opinion by Harlan, J. [Decided Nov. 17, 1884.] DEED-VOID-EXECUTED BY ONE NOT DESCRIBED AS GRANTOR.-S., the wife of B., joined with him in a deed to H. of land of B., in trust, for the use of S. during her life, and at any time, on the written request of S., and the written consent of B. to convey it to such person as S. might request or direct in writing with the written consent of B. Afterward B. made a deed of the land to W., in which H. did not join, and in which B. was the only grantor, and S. was not described as a party, but which was signed by S. and bore her seal, and was acknowledged by her in the proper manner. Held, that the latter deed did not convey the legal title to the land, and was not made in execution of the power reserved to S. It needs not much argument or authority to support the conclusiou at which we have arrived. In Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 225, 241, it was held that in order to convey by grant, the party possessing the right must be the grantor, and use apt and proper words to convey to the grantee, and that merely signing, sealing, and acknowledging an instrument, in which another person is grantor, is not sufficient. In the present case, if S. possessed the right, she was not the grantor, and used no words to convey her right. No intention on her part to execute the power she possessed appears in the deed. Warner v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 357, and cases there cited; Story Eq. Jur.. § 1062a. Moreover H. possessed the right, and was not the grantor, and was not requested or directed by S. to convey. 2 Perry Trusts, $ 778. Batchelor v. Brereton. Opinion by Blatchford, J. [Decided Dec. 1, 1884.] CORRESPONDENCE. COURT OF APPEALS CALENDAR. I have been somewhat surprised to observe that the very interesting discussion on the subject of relief to the Court of Appeals, which was carried on in your columns a year ago, has not this year been renewed. It is not because the danger then dreaded has passed away. On the contrary, what was then only a safe prediction has now become a disastrous reality. The present calendar of the court has 782 causes already upon it, which will be added to during the year by appeals from orders and from certain preferred causes; and the court, with all possible diligence, does not annually dispose of more than about half of the number of cases that will thus be brought before it. If it disposes of the first 400 cases on its printed calendar, it will get by next December to cases where the return was filed in December, 1883. Of the appeals from judgments not preferred the first that will be reached in the regular order are cases where returns were filed in the latter part of 1882. In other words, the court is now more than two years behind on its ordinary work, and is rapidly and steadily falling still further behind hand. What is to be done? The evil grows by what it feeds on, for delay always tempts debtors defeated in the courts below to take frivolous appeals for the sake of that delay alone. If any relief is to be afforded to the court, and to the suitors who have business before it, that relief should be afforded at once. Two kinds of remedies have been proposed: one by increasing the number of judges; the other by limiting the number of appeals. As to increasing the number of judges, it is quite apparent that that remedy not only involves an amendment to the Constitution, but that to be really efficacious there must be a division of the court into two or more branches of equal powers. The evils of such a division seem to me too obvious for extended comment. Possibly an increase of two judges to the force of the court might enable it to do a little more work than at present. The other remedy, of discouraging appeals, seems to me to be in the right direction. That the Court of Appeals should not be called on to decide any but substantial and serious controversies, involving important or novel principles of law, every one will admit; but how to rid it of frivolous appeals is a matter upon which it will be difficult to secure an agreement. The methods thus far suggested are either by a limitation the amount involved, which is entirely wrong in principle, or by putting it in the power of the courts below to refuse leave to appeal, which is open to the same objection, and would probably prove ineffectual in practice. Now the chief inducement to making frivolous appeals is undoubtedly the fact that the appellant is enabled to remain in possession of the subject of the litigation during the whole period of the pendency of the appeal. He may have the verdict of a jury against him, and the well-considered judgment of a General Term, but if he can get a couple of easy friends who will swear through their qualifications, he files his bond and gets the delay of years as a matter of course. At the end of some indefinite period, if the case is affirmed, the respondent has a judgment which may or may not be collectible against the judgment debtor, and he has the materials for a law suit against the sureties. No lawyer needs to be told how this fata] | facility for postponing the evil day of payment multiplies appeals, and how frequently the threat of "hanging up" a case for years is used by debtors to force needy creditors into settlements of just debts. And there are few lawyers who do not know of cases that have gone to the Court of Appeals only to end in vain attempts to collect judgments against a principal and sureties. All become alike insolvent during the pendency of the appeal. No one can doubt that if defeated debtors were compelled to pay up after the decision of a General Term against them, they would not be so ready to appeal. I would not of course deprive defeated debtors of their right to appeal. I would only restrict their power to oblain a stay of proceedings by abolishing entirely undertakings to stay execution, pending an ap peal to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the General Term was a judgment of affirmance. It the appellant preferred not to trust the ability of the respondent to make restitution in case of reversal, he could pay the amount with interest, etc., into court (as under § 1306 of the Code), and so get a stay; but I would in such cases allow the respondent to withdraw the fund on giving an undertaking for restitution, with sufficient sureties. Similar principles might be extended to appeals from the affirmance of judgments directing the delivery of property, or the recovery of a chattel or of real property. The respondent, not the appellant, should have possession during the pendency of an appeal to the Court of Appeals on giving a bond against waste or the like. The result of some such provisions would probably be not only to discourage many frivolous appeals, but to induce greater care in the argument and decision of cases at General Term, and also to remove some of the inducements to defending cases solely for purposes of delay. The debtor now takes all the chances of success in the Court of Appeals, and meanwhile borrows money of his successful creditor at the absurdly low rate of six per cent interest and costs. A judgment debtor who can obtain a loan for two or three years on such terms must be foolish indeed if he does not appeal. The argument against the plan I suggest will of course be that inasmuch as many cases are reversed in the Court of Appeals, the mere fact of an affirmance at | General Term ought not to be taken as so conclusive an adjudication that a debtor should be compelled to part with his property at an inconvenient season. The proportion of cases reversed after affirmance at General Term cannot be exactly stated, because the reports do not in all cases state the action of the General Term. With cases where the appeal is from a judgment of reversal, I have nothing to do. But taking the last four volumes of New York Reports I find 357 cases affirmed, 135 reversed, 10 modified, and 51 appeals dismissed. Of the judgments either affirmed or reversed absolutely the proportion would be about 73 per cent affirmed to 27 per cent reversed. Now wise legislators seek to attain, not flawless perfection, but such a state of things as shall on the whole work out the best results. Are we then to legislate for the 135 reversals or for the 357 affirmances? Surely for the latter. It may no doubt be hard on a party, unjustly defeated below, to part with his property while he is seeking redress; but it is just as hard, and three times more common, for the party justly successful below to be deprived of his property while his wealthy adversary invokes "the law's delay." Of course the figures here given do not accurately measure the proportions of cases to be affected. Of the 135 cases reversed, some are cases where the General Term has reversed the judgment or order below. In other words, out of the 492 cases in question, the rule I suggest would have done good, or no harm, in more than 357; while it could only have worked hardship in less than 135. Besides where the judgment below was only for costs, the hardship would be infinitesimal in most cases. The statistics above referred to show another remarkable feature. The decisions in the last four volumes of the Court of Appeals may be thus classified: 64 88 66 66 66 87 109 46 93 N. Y., 33 cases reversed, 73 affirmed. 94 N. Y., 36 95 N. Y., 31 96 N. Y., 35 It will be observed that while the number of revers. als reported remains nearly constant, the number of affirmances has of late greatly increased. This would seem to indicate just what is to be expected in the present condition of affairs, to wit: a marked increase in the number of frivolous appeals, which the court usually disposes of by affirmance, without opinion. On going back to 83 N. Y., the present increase in affirmances is very clearly shown for the numbers there are 35 cases reversed to only 63 affirmed. I do not think that the adoption of my suggestions would prove a panacea for all the ills of which the court is suffering. It is merely one of several reme dies which might all be administered together, and which, though not separately very important, would together work a considerable change for the better. I would, for instance, increase largely the present costs of appeal. I would limit the right of appeal from orders which "decide an interlocutory application or a question of practice "-perhaps by allowing such ap peals only when leave was given by the court below. It might be well also to refuse costs below to the plaintiff where his recovery was such that the action might have been brought in the County Court or other similar tribunal. Such a rule would work no hardship at this end of the State, as the excellent record of our City Court shows. How it would do in other parts of the State I do not know, but it would seem to be reasonable, and would certainly be effective in relieving both the Court of Appeals and the Trial Terms of the Supreme Court and Superior City Courts. Whatever plan is adopted, it must be one that is selfexecuting. We can leave nothing to the discretion of judges in this matter. It has long been the rule that judges must cut down and limit the verbosity of cases on appeal, but the rule is continually and persistently disregarded. The Court of Appeals has power to award damages for delay, and it is understood that in fifteen years they have not once exercised that power. Before any plan of relief is submitted to the Legislature the judges of the Court of Appeals must be prepared to express their opinion. A plan, carefully considered and worked out in all its details, would doubtless command the immediate approval of the Legislature and the governor, if assented to by the judges of the court, aud till their assent is secured no relief is possible. Meanwhile, discussion is not without its value. NEW YORK, Feb. 5, 1885. Y. POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CANDIDATES FOR JUDGESHIP. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The proposed bill, to prohibit the soliciting of politi cal assessments from judges or candidates for judicial offices and the payments of such assessments by such candidates, has been received with so much favor by gentlemen whose judgment is entitled to great respect, that I am encouraged to press it and to urge others to promote it. The evils sought to be corrected may not exist elsewhere, but in the First Department they have grown until they have become glaring and disgraceful. I will instance examples of these evils. It is the common report, and my information leads me to believe the report to be true, that it is the practice here for party managers to request a political contribution, of a fixed amount, from such of the judges in office as were elected by the party to which the party managers belong. The request is made annually and it is more than a request, because there is an implied threat that if the request is not complied with the judge will forfeit the support of the party managers. I have also heard it said that in some cases there has been an understanding, that an annual contribution should be made as a condition of receiving the nomination. Within six years a bid of $25,000 was made, to my knowledge, for a nomination for a judgeship. The bid was declined, but the gentleman who received the nomination was compelled to apply to his friends for loans of money to enable him to pay the required assessment. The bidder referred to was not discouraged by the first failure and has renewed the offer on more than one occasion since, happily without suc cess. In a conversation last summer with one of our judges, whom I have heard described, and justly, I think, as the best all-round judge in this department, he remarked that if his term of office was about expiring be could not hope for a renomination, because he could not pay the assessment of $25,000, which would be required. The nominations for judicial offices at the election in November last occasioned much discussion and gossip among the bar. It is said that of the unsuccessful candidates one was assessed and paid $30,000, another $25,000. I have referred to some of the most glaring of the evils, and I have no doubt that other examples could be given and substantiated. It is to correct such evils that the measure was designed. It has been suggested that one effect of the measure would be to restrict the candidates to unscrupulous men who would not hesitate to defeat the letter and spirit of the proposed bill by devices which honest men would not resort to. There is some force in the objection, but I think there are sanctions in the measure which would stop such practices. For example, the unscrupulous candidate will be exposed to many dangers; the grand jury, the press, and the zeal of the party managers of the unsuccessful party. Moreover the unsuccesful candidate will be prone to suspect his successful rival. One conviction under the proposed law would be likely to make the unscrupulous man besitate. I inclose a copy of the proposed bill in the form in which I think it should be adopted. Very truly yours, NEW YORK, Feb. 10, 1885. ARTEMAS H. ADAMS. A Bill to Prohibit and Punish Soliciting from Judicial Officers or Candidates for Judicial Offices, and the Payment by such Candidates of Assessments, Subscriptions or Contributions for Political Purposes. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows: SECTION 1. No person shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or be in any manner concerned in soliciting any assessment, subscription, or contribution in money or property, of any kind or value whatsoever, for any political purpose from any person holding the office of judge or justice of any of the courts named in Article First of Title 1 of Chapter 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure; or from any person who is a nominee or candidate for election to the office of judge or justice of any of said courts. SEC. 2. Any person who shall violate the provisions of the next preceding section of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine, not less than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not less than one year, or both. SEC. 3. Any person, being a nominee or candidate for election to the office of judge or justice of any of the courts referred to in section one, who shall within three months prior to his election or appointment to any such office, directly or indirectly subscribe or pay, or promise to pay, or who shall cause or induce any other person to subscribe or pay, or promise to pay, any assessment, subscription or contribution, in money or property of any kind or value whatsoever, for any political purpose, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine, not less than one thousand dollars, and by imprisonment for not less than one year, and shall also forfeit his office. INCONSISTENT DECISIONS-DENIALS ON INFORMATION Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In the case of Pratt Manufacturing Co. v. Jordan Iron and Chemical Co., 33 Hun, 143, the General Term of the First Department, Daniels, Davis, and Brady, JJ., are reported as holding that an answer denying the allegations of the complaint on information and belief, is bad, and should be stricken out. In the 21st of Hun, in the case of Brotherton v. Downey, p. 436, the General Term of the same department, Davis, Barrett, and Ingalls, JJ., held that such a denial was not only proper, but that a party had no right to interpose an unqualified denial in a verified answer, unless it be founded upon personal knowledge, and that where he has no positive knowledge, but has knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, he is not only permitted, but "bound at his peril" to deny upon information and belief. In the case first cited, reported 33 Hun, 143, no allusion is made to the prior decision in Brotherton v. Downey. |