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Kindly permit me to state a few reasons for dissenting from your conclusion (Alb. L. J., March 7, p. 181) that "Mr. Tucker is unquestionably right" in accusing our profession of perverting the meaning of the word "enjoined."

1st. Neither the verb "to enjoin" nor its substantive "injunction" is exclusively used, even in legal phraseology, in the sense of prohibition. Justice Story, following Eden and Jeremy, defines injunction as 66 a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ." Eq. Jur., § 861. That the latter signification has obtained the greater prevalence is due to obvious circumstances and exemplifies an ordinary tendency to linguistic expression.

meaning which survives in the common phrase "with-
out let or hindrance." "Prevent" used to mean to
go before, for the purpose of preparing the way, or as-
sisting; its modern signification is precisely the re-
verse. It is an unprofitable task to attempt to confine
the meaning of any active word within the limits pre-
scribed by its origin; enlightened usage is the sole
foundation of authority in such matters; and the
words "enjoin" and "injunction," in the sense to
which Mr. Tucker objects, have long held too firm a
place in the literature of our profession to be now dis-
turbed by any philological fanciers.
Yours very truly,

NEW YORK, March 9, 1885.

A. V. S.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

FIFTEENTH BRADWELL'S REPORTS. We have frequently had occasion to commend this series. Except in Illinois, New York and New Jersey we believe there is no official reporting of the decisions of the intermediate courts of the whole State. The work in this series is faithfully and intelligently done, and the cases are pretty sure to be important and interesting, because they are all reversals. We note in this volume Holmes v. Nooe, p. 164, holding that under the Civil Damage Act exemplary damages may be awarded only when aggravating circumstances are shown, which is in harmony with the holding of our Supreme Court in Rawlins v. Vidvard, 30 Alb. L. J. 424; see also Neu v. MeKechnie, 95 N. Y. 632; S. C., 47 Am. Rep. 89.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, March 10, 1885:

2d. In English, as in German and cognate languages, we find verbs compounded with prepositions, either separable or inseparable. Such words as "forbid " and "gainsay" are examples of the latter; but the former are of far more frequent use. In some cases these separable prepositions are invariable; as, e. g., that of the verb "to refrain from," where the preposition "from" is the only one admissible; in others the preposition is indefinitely variable, and constitutes the element on which the meaning of the verb depends. "To go to" and "to go from," for example, indicate opposite processes; and yet we do not find it necessary to distinguish the preterite forms, in which the preposition is omitted; we get the sense of the connection. We ask, "Did he go to court? or "Did he go from court?" aud the auswer to either question is, "He went" (without the preposition). In like manner, the sense of the verb "to enjoin" depends altogether on the connected preposition-"to" or "from" -expressed or understood with it. If for the sake of distinction in the latter case we are to employ the classic and elegant term "injuncted," similar consid-spondent, v. Rufus G. Starkweather, impleaded, etc., erations will require us in the former to adopt some such form as he "goed." The instances are precisely parallel.

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If there were really a necessity for any change, the good words "restrain" and "prohibition," already in common legal use, would furnish adequate equivalents for "enjoin" and "injunction" without resorting to any such barbarous expedient as Mr. Tucker suggests.

3d. Separable prepositions are frequently omitted, even when they would seem to be necessary to convey the meaning of the writer. For instance, in the closing sentence of the paragraph immediately preceding that which has prompted this letter, you say, "Reforms are rarely accomplished by riding rough-shod over the rights of the minority, a tendency to be guarded sedulously in a republic." The connection clearly shows that your idea was that the tendency referred to was to be sedulously guarded against; but Mr. Tucker would doubtless assert that "of course the writer of the paragraph intended that his words should mean the precise opposite" of what he said or wrote. 4th. The English is a living and progressive language and old words are constantly taking on new meanings. Two centuries ago, for example, the verb "to let," now signifying to allow, means to hinder or obstruct; a

Judgmemt affirmed with costs-John Ackey, executor, appellant, v. Franklin J. Parmenter, respondent. Order of General Term reversed; that of sur rogate affirmed with costs. Opinion by Ruger, C. J.In re Accounting, of Executors of William Tilden.

-Order reversed with costs-In re Opening of Flushing Avenue, etc.-Order affirmed with costs-People ex rel. James R. Jessup v. John Kelly and others, commissioners, etc.; Frank D. Crim, executor, re

appellants; In re Petition of New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad to appraise lands of Bennett, etc.; In re Altering, etc., Main street in Sing Sing; Louis Wagner v. John Hodge and others.- -Appeal dismissed with costs-People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. In re Claims of Lykes and others; Reuben Hall, appellant, v. City of Buffalo, respondent.—Motion to put on calendar denied on account of insufficiency of papers, without costs-Chas. F. Holley, respondent, v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., appellant.— Motion to prefer cause granted, without costs-People ex rel. Edward J. Wood, appellant, v. E. Henry Lacomb, respondent; People ex rel. Mason v. McClave.

-Motion to restore cause granted, without costsFranklin M. Miner, administrator, etc., v. City of Buffalo.--Motion to open default denied, $10 costsKeuka Nav. Co. v. Jane Holmes.-Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with costs to the respondents represented on the argument in this court by Mr. Chandler and without costs to any other party-Samuel Weeks and another, appellants, v. Jacob Weeks Cornwell, respondent.. Motion to dismiss granted, unless within thirty days the appellant files an undertaking and pays the costs of this motion-Sarah E. Nichols, administratrix, respondent, v. Charles F. McLean, appellant.

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gians, probably having read Mr. Hopkins' amusing
sarcasms in this journal on the system, are seeking
for an oracular opinion on this vexed topic.
Mr. Nicolai Grevstad, of Minnesota, sends us a
communication on the subject, in which he says:
"But numerous reports of conflicting opinions as
to the working of the jury system in the United
States being circulated in Europe, the Norwegian
people are cast somewhat into confusion as to what
to believe. The undersigned therefore, at the request
of leading Norwegian statesmen, who take a most
prominent part in the present work of law reform
in Norway, in order to prepare a report of as au-
thentic value as possible, takes the liberty to re-
quest your opinion on the system of trial by jury,
as outlined above." And he subjoins an exhaustive
list of questions, with blanks for answers.
gave trial by jury a high character in our answers,
but we feel bound to say that we forgot all about
the "emotional insanity" business, on which we
commented last week, and we now call Mr. Grev-
stad's attention to those comments. Perhaps the
matter will be of less practical importance in the

We

frigid clime of Norway, where, we take it, adultery

and seduction are of much less frequent occurrence than in this country. But at all events we feel that candor dictates this qualification.

Although as we pointed out last week, crime seems decreasing in Great Britain, it cannot be said that this is due to capital punishment. An exchange says: "The average number of executions during the last twenty years has been less than 13 a year. During that time there have been 494 persons condemned to death, of whom 249 were executed and 18 sent to Broadmoor as insane. So that roughly speaking, one-half only of those condemned are, in the result, executed. The largest number hanged in one year was 22, which happened twice- that is, in the years 1876 and 1877, and the smallest number was 4, in 1871." This is in striking contrast with the facts in this country, where crime is frightfully increasing and executions are ten times more frequent than in Great Britain.

tion of the record show it to be dependent upon a judge-made record. I was thinking of advocating in our journal a proper criticism of the court for the benefit of bar, bench and Legislature. If not trespassing too much upon your time I would like to know what course your journal pursues, and what you think of the propriety and utility of such a scheme." We think that criticism of judicial decisions is one of the most important offices of a law journal. We do not think however that defeated attorneys ought to rush into print and criticise the courts in their own cases. They are not competent judges of the merits of their own cases.

We have no "dumb reverence" for our courts. If
their decisions do not commend themselves to our

judgment we never hesitate to say so, and our col-
umns are always open to temperate and disinter-
ested criticism. Occasionally we even let in a
smarting attorney to "swear at the court," but we
generally do it, as the Spartans made their slaves
drunk, for a warning to. the children. The En-
glish law journals are admirable examples in this
matter. Their fearless and frequently severe criti-
cism of the decisions and conduct of the judges
undoubtedly does much toward rendering that ju-
dicial system tolerant and tolerable.
of Mr. Justice Manisty in the late Coleridge-Adams
trial is a fresh example. After all, the bar need
feel no great delicacy or reverence in this respect,
for the courts are overruling themselves and one
another almost every day.

The course

The report of the first annual meeting of the

Georgia Bar Association, held at Atlanta last August, contains much of interest on the subject of judicial reform. The chairman of the committee on that subject, Judge Bleckley, observed in his report: "In the administration of justice there ought to be correctness, celerity and cheapness. The second alone is the topic of this report. Time is the increasing factor - the growing element of modern life. Progress is the realization, in short time, of what formerly occupied long time. At least this is one form of progress, and that form with which we of the nineteenth century are in immediate contact a century that if measured by results in some of the spheres of human activity, might well count for a thousand years. How is it with practical remedial jurisprudence? Is it up with, or is it behind the age? Compare it with other business, public or private; with operations of the war department, the navy, the treasury, the post-office, the interior; with commerce, manufactures, banking, transportation, mining, farming; with the venerable and conservative vocations of teaching and preaching; with any thing, and what A correspondent writes us: "I write to ask your is its relative position? The main bulk of worldopinion about the advisability and utility of a work is ahead of it; several branches of that work, proper review and criticism by a State law journal for instance, the postal service, general transportaof the decisions of the Supreme Court of that tion, commerce and manufactures, are so far in adState. In this State we never do such a thing, our vance that the law seems to crawl whilst they go reverence keeping us dumb, though the decision of on wings. Is this relative backwardness a necesthe court may be judge-made law, and the quota-sary condition, rooted in the nature of things, or is

VOL. 31-No. 12.

most liberal compensation is meted out in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois and Louisiana.” We print the table in another column. To the salaries of our own judges should be added a certain allowance for expenses, $1,200 a year, we believe, and the fact should be noted that in the city of New York the judges get $15,000 a year.

it attributable to deficient energy and enterprise on the part of the legal profession? Can it be possible the law is to become obsolete; that the ages are to outgrow it; and that though sufficing for the past, it is not equal to the demands of the future? Will it be Bradstreeted as a failure? Surely this supposition cannot be entertained. And if not, the conclusion is imminent that either directly or indirectly, we lawyers are responsible for the wide chasm that separates the effective administration of the law from those industries, public and private, Mr. Tucker's comments on the legal use of the with which it ought to be abreast. Is it fit that a verb "enjoin" have called out considerable discus body of men so numerous, so cultivated, so capa- sion. Our correspondents think Mr. Tucker wrong. ble, should suffer their quota of labor, their distinc-| But they do not convert us. There is no doubt tive calling, to remain hopelessly behind? Let a that the best legal writers, such as Kent and Story, noble, manly pride answer in the negative." Judge use the word in the sense criticised by Mr. Tucker. Bleckley's plan for the collection of notes, and the Webster gives this sense of the word, and cites like, is that the judgment shall be dispensed with, Kent. It is significant however that Worcester and that "the original writing shall be registered, does not give it. There is no doubt too that in filed and remain in the clerk's office, and that an the course of time certain words have come to have execution founded upon it be issued by the clerk, just the contrary of their original meaning; "let" and enforced by the sheriff. What would warrant is a familiar example. But what Mr. Tucker coma judgment on mere inspection is intrinsically as plains of is that the same word is used to mean worthy of confidence without a judgment as with two exactly opposite things to do and not to do. it. Relatively to the execution, it at last, is the This verbal blowing hot and cold in the same real producer, and the judgment a superfluous breath is certainly indefensible. It is "overworkmiddle-man." We regard this scheme as impolitic. ing" the verb to quote Rufus Choate. We have Suppose that the note is forged, or that the consid- plenty of good words to express the desired meaneration has failed, or that there are offsets, or that ing" prohibit," "restrain," "forbid." There is it has been paid what then? Our system in this no need of corrupting and vulgarizing the language State is a fair and efficient one. The discussion on by this double and ambiguous use. When we Judge Bleckley's report was very interesting. The want to prohibit the ringing of bells, for example, judge defended his proposition with all his wit and let us not say it is "enjoined," i. e., commanded; vigor, but the matter was postponed to the next nor worse yet, "enjoined and forbidden," i. e., meeting. One reason advanced against such sum- both commanded and prohibited; but let us say just mary proceeding was the fact that "we make our what we mean in the correct use of the language, obligations, generally, payable in the fall when our forbidden and prohibited. We are no purist nor crops are gathered then we can pay, provided "philogical fancier," but we think that this use of there has been no worm or drought. If there has the word "enjoin " is radically wrong. We do not been, we cannot pay. If there has been some mis-understand Mr. Tucker as advocating the use of fortune to us we want the delay of another year, and "injuncted;" only a careless reading of his obyou may sue us at the spring term following, and servations could lead to such an inference. His get judgment at the following term." But it seems remarks on that coinage were only a sarcasm. to us that the inability to pay is no reason against the right to a judicial determination that the debt is just, is due, and must be paid as soon as the drought and worm let up.

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The addres of Mr. Jones on the salaries of the bench is also full of interest. He says: "Upon a careful tabulation of the statistics I find that the sum of $4,221 represents the average salary paid by the States of this Union to a chief justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals that the sum of $4,100 is the average salary paid to associate justices of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals; and that the average salary paid to circuit judges amounts to the sum of $3,158.

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With the exception of the States of Virginia, West Virginia and Oregon, there is no Commonwealth in this Union which does not pay to its circuit judges larger salaries than those accorded in Georgia. The

NOTES OF CASES.

IN v. 63 231, i tommon that

'N Henson v. State, 62 Md. 231, it was held that

for keeping a bawdy-house, evidence of the general reputation of the house is incompetent. The court said: "Counsel on both sides have with commendable diligence collected in their briefs all the authorities bearing upon the subject, and they certainly present much conflict and diversity of judicial opinion and decision. They consist altogether of cases decided by the courts in this country, and of the conclusions drawn therefrom by our own American text-writers. No English decision is referred to, and we are not aware that the question has ever been decided by an English court; and in considering the question as it arises in this State

and in this case, it must be remembered that the indictment is for a common law offense, there being no statute in Maryland, as there is in many of the States, upon the subject of bawdy-houses. At common law a 'bawdy-house' or a 'house of illfame,' in the popular sense of the terms, is a species of disorderly house, and is indictable as a nuisance. 3 Greenl. Ev., § 184; 2 Whart. Cr. Law, § 2392. Hence this indictment charges that the acts and conduct specified and set out therein, are 'to the great damage and common nuisance of all the liege inhabitants of said State there inhabiting, residing and passing.' The offense does not consist in keeping a house reputed to be a brothel or bawdy-house, but in keeping one that is actually such. In the States which have statutes upon the subject the decisions turn in a great measure upon the construction and particular language of these statutes, and of course to that extent, can have little or no application to the question as it is presented in this case. In others a distinction is drawn between the terms bawdy-house' and 'house of ill-fame,' and they hold that where the latter terms are employed, they are to be taken in their strict etymological sense, and that they put directly in issue the fame or reputation of the house itself, and hence that it is both permissible and necessary to prove that reputation in the only way in which it can be proved. Others again ignore this distinction, and hold the terms to be synonymous. In speaking of all these authorities, Mr. Bishop, after stating the proposition in which they all agree (and to which we assent), that it is competent in all such cases to prove by general reputation the character for lewdness of the inmates of the house and of those who frequent and visit it, though such evidence pertains in a certain sense to hearsay, says: 'Some carry this doctrine a step further and accept the reputation of the house for bawdy, as competent evidence prima facie that it is a bawdy-house. Others, and probably the majority, reject the evidence, in accordance with the humane principle that a man shall not be condemned for what his neighbors say of him.' 2 Bish. Crim. Proc., §§ 112, 113. And in our opinion a majority of the best considered decisions so hold, and upon correct principles, that such evidence is inadmissible in cases like this at common law." Citing Cadwell v. State, 17 Conn. 467; State v. Boardman, 64 Me. 523; Toney v. State, 60 Ala. 97; State v. Lyon, 39 Iowa, 379; United States v. Jourdine, 4 Cranch C. C. 338, overruling United States v. Gray, 2 id. 675; State v. Foley, 45 N. H. 466; People v. Mauch, 24 How. Pr. 276; Commonwealth v. Stewart, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 342. "These decisions all rest, as it appears to us, upon the elementary rule of evidence which excludes hearsay testimony. The common law is studiously careful to exclude such testimony, and does not allow its introduction in order to convict parties on trial for common law offenses. We take it to be clear that a man's general bad character or reputation cannot

be brought up against him when he is on trial for a specific crime, unless he first opens the way by an attempt to prove his good character. And we hold it to be equally clear that the fact that a crime has been committed cannot be proved by common rumor or general repute. The decisions which hold this evidence admissible (where they are not founded on the language or interpretation of a statute) seem to rest its admissibility mainly upon the ground of necesssity, or rather the difficulty of obtaining direct evidence, because the operations of such houses are necessarily shrouded in secrecy. But when it is open to the prosecution to prove the general bad character for chastity of the female inmates of the house, that it is frequented by reputed strumpets, and that men are seen to visit it at all hours of the night as well as the day, we do not think there can be any very great difficulty in obtaining such direct evidence as will warrant a jury in convicting. If however such difficulty or necessity does in fact exist, a remedy can be easily and speedily provided by legislation changing the rules of evidence for such cases."

In Adams v. Cost, 62 Md. 264, where a person placed his mare at livery, and instructed a servant of the proprietors of the stable to take her out for exercise, such however being no part of the contract of livery, and while the servant had her out for such purpose she died, in consequence of the immoderate riding and carelessness of the servant, held, that the proprietors are not liable. Two opinions were delivered, three judges agreeing in one, four in the other, but both arriving at the same conclusion. In the former the court said: "If a bailee employs others to transact the business intrusted to him, it has been held that his liability only extends to the injury resulting from the negligence of such persons while acting within the scope of their designated duties. If the injury complained of has been occasioned by the misconduct of the agents or servants of the bailee, while not engaged in the performance of the service specially assigned to them by the bailee, the latter is not responsible in damages for any loss resulting to the bailor from such misconduct. White v. Commonwealth Nat. Bank, 4 Brewst. 234; Pelham v. Pace, Hempstead, 223." In the latter the court said: "In Jones on Bailment, page 91, the learned author, in discussing the doctrine of Bailment Locatio Custodia, says: 'If a horse be delivered either to an agisting farmer for the purpose of depasturing in his meadows, or to an hostler to be dressed and fed in his stable, the bailees are answer

able for the loss of the horse, if it be occasioned by the ordinary neglect of themselves or their ser

vants.

It has indeed been adjudged that if the horse of a guest be sent to pasture by the owner's desire, the innholder is not, as such, responsible for the loss of him by theft or accident;' and the author cites Calye's case, 8 Co. 32a, where it was

held that if the horse of a guest at an inn be stolen, the innkeeper is not liable if the horse were put to pasture at the guest's request; but otherwise if the innkeeper had put the horse to grass of his own head. And while the liability of an innkeeper is very different from that of an agister or liverystable keeper, yet the rights and liabilities of the parties in this case are well illustrated by what was decided in Calye's case. The obligation of the defendants was to take reasonable and proper care of the horse while intrusted to their care as liverymen. Smith v. Cook, L. R., 1 Q. B. Div. 79; Sargent v. Slack, 47 Vt. 674. But though such was their obligation, if the plaintiff himself interposed and gave special directions to the servant as to the manner of treating the horse, conferring authority to ride and exercise it, a service that the defendants had not assumed, and it was while acting under such special authority that the accident occurred, the defendants as liverymen clearly would not be responsible. In such case the servant in charge of the horse would not be the servant of the defendants, but that of the plaintiff, pro hac vice. But on the other hand, if the horse was taken out and ridden upon the occasion of its death, by the authority, express or implied, of the defendants, or if its being taken out and ridden was by reason of the want of ordinary care and diligence in the keep of the horse by the defendants or their servants, then the defendants would be liable for the loss of the horse. And these propositions, we think, were fully submitted to the jury in the instructions that were granted by the court below."

WE

THE ENGLISH SOLICITOR.

E have heard the English solicitor described as a "lawyer without law," but accurately as this description hits the great mass of London solicitors and a large number of the country practitioners, there is still to be found in the "lower branch of the profession" a proportion of sound and stable advisors, well versed not only in the practice but the theory of the law. These men mostly congregate in the country towns and cities of the second class, and have a family practice composed entirely of conveyancing, varied with an occasional heavy suit. Removed from easy access to counsel, they have formed habits of independent thought and study, and are undoubtedly the most learned, though the least obtrusive section of their guild.

The London solicitor or his brother of the large provincial cities is quite another species. Compelled by dire necessity, as an articled clerk, to "cram" some few law books prior to his "final," he dates his emancipation from the day when he received his certificate, and has since thrown books, like physic, to the dogs. He is purely and wholly a man of business, and pays his counsel for law exactly as he pays his clerks for copying. If ever, by chance, he finds himself cornered and compelled

to give a legal opinion offhand, he remembers that good sense is generally good law, and following this rule he seldom errs. But though his legal resources may not be great, his knowledge of the commercial world and its ways is surprising. The promoter and the stockbroker understand the stock exchange, the merchant knows the secrets of trade, the banker feels the pulse of capital, but the solicitor, like Lord Bacon, takes all knowledge for his province, and will give you points on any subject you like, from mines to horse-racing.

Another distinct and fast increasing type of solicitor is the advocate. In London he has little scope, and with a few brilliant exceptions, the metropolitan advocates are no credit to their confraternity, but in the country there is a large class of business open to him. The local county courts and police courts are the fields where he wins his spurs, and many a man has thus formed the nucleus of a first-rate business. The solicitor who goes in for advocacy must of course keep up a little reading, but as a rule, a perusal of the weekly notes and of the few professional journals answers every purpose. Gradually his name gets known, clients flock to him, and bring not only county court cases but Supreme Court actions and conveyances. The old stagers who at first regarded him as an interloper are compelled to get off their high stilts and accept him as their equal. Next he adds to his practice the emoluments of some local office a town clerkship, registrarship, or what not. Getting older and staider he hands over the advocacy to his junior or quietly drops it. Long before his death he has become one of the institutions of the town, knowing and known by every body, and when at last he joins the majority the corporation will walk behind the hearse, and folk will say, "another landmark gone!" The practice he built up will support the incompetence of his successor for a generation, and the mere stick who forty or fifty years hence will be laid by his father's side will have figured for a lifetime as a lawyer in good practice upon the merits of his father's name. Such are the slow but sure rewards of professional success in a country where the relations of client and attorney often merge into those of lifelong friendship and esteem.

No sketch, however hasty, of the English solicitor would be complete without some notice of his relations with counsel. The three necessary thorns in his life are clients, clerks and counsel, and the greatest of these is counsel. The half yearly fee lists of his standing junior cut huge cantles out of his profits, but these are well earned and cheerfully paid. It is against the big men, the haughty silken Q. C.'s, that he sometimes feels bitter. He has been too often left in the lurch by these dignified frauds to join in those magniloquent eulogiums of the purity, the disinterestedness, the devotion to clients, and in short, the general moral grandeur of the English bar, which are so frequently pronounced by the members thereof. He remembers poor Smith's case, which he feels cer

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