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consequences to the plaintiff: but they are not at liberty to go further, unless it was done willfully, or was the result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them. * * *The tort is aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of exemplary damages." We might multiply the cases on this subject if necessary, all concurring that exemplary damages are awarded as a punishment for the evil motive, or intention with which the unlawful act is done, and as a warning or example to others. The mere fact, that one is forcibly and deliberately ejected from a railroad car, does not necessarily imply that it was done wantonly, or willfully, or with a bad motive, although the act may be in itself unlawful. The case of the Baltimore, etc., Turnpike v. Boone, 45 Md. 344, on which the instruction of the court is based, differs widely from the one now before us. There the company, in violation of its charter, had exacted illegal and excessive fares, and passengers were compelled either to pay the same, or subject themselves to be expelled from the cars. It was under these circumstan. ces the court held that public policy required the corporation should be liable to the highest measure of damages, for the deliberation and force accompanying its illegal conduct. But there are no considerations of public policy that require the application of such a rule in a case like the one now under consideration. On the contrary to entitle the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, according to all the decisions both in this country and in England, the jury must find that the wrongful act was done wantonly, or willfully, or in the spirit of oppression. It is the evil motive or intention with which the wrongful act is done, say the Supreme Court, on which rests the rule of punitive damages. Phil., etc., R. Co. v. Hoeflich. Opinion by Robinson, J.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT ABSTRACT.

WILL-TRUST-PAYMENT OF INCOME.-The second clause of the will of Pardon Copeland is as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath to the said trustees the sum of $10,000, to be paid to them out of my estate by my executors in one year after the probate of my will, in trust, to invest and reinvest the same at their discretion, and to pay over the income thereof from time to time to my son Fisher Copeland as in their judg. ment they may think right and best, during his life, and upon his decease to pay over said principal sum of $10,000 to my two grandsons Harry A. Copeland and Merton F. Copeland, share and share alike, to have and to hold to them and their heirs to their own use forever discharged from all trusts." The only question presented in this case is whether, under this clause, the trustees are entitled to receive from the executors the interest or income of this fund from the death of the testator. It seems to us that the intention of the testator was that the sum of $10,000 should be held by his executors as a part of the general estate for a year after the probate of the will, and that the life tenant was not to be entitled to the income of it during that year; and therefore that the case is not within the provisions of the Public Statutes, ch. 136, § 24. As a general rule, if a residue or a specific fund is given for the benefit of a life tenant, he is entitled to the income from the death of the testator, because such is presumed to have been the testator's intention. Sargent v. Sargent, 103 Mass. 297; Pollock v. Learned, 102 id. 49. But this rule does not apply where the will shows that the testator had a different intention, as for instance, where the will specifies a time for the commencement of the interest or the enjoyment of

the income or use. Keeth v. Copeland. Opinion by Morton, C. J.

[Decided Jan., 1885.]

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INSURANCE-FIRE-EVIDENCE OF USAGE.-The defendant insured the plaintiff "on his stock of rags, old metals, bones and barrels" contained in his storehouse. The plaintiff is a junk dealer, "his stock" sisting of old articles and materials, paper stock, pieces and fragments of all kinds; and it could not be particularly described in a policy or other contract without great prolixity. We think it was competent for the plaintiff to prove that by a usage of the trade the terms "rags" and "old metals" had acquired a broader sifinification than belongs to these words as commonly used. It was an application of the rule that where words have two meanings, one common and the other peculiar and technical, it is competent to show that they were used in the latter sense. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 295; Macy v. Whaling Ins. Co., 9 Metc. 354; Daniels v. Hudson Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416, and cases cited. The usage upon which the plaintiff relied was not a particular or a local usage, but was a general usage of the trade. The defendant asked the court to rule "that a usage or custom of a particular trade, in order to bind the defendant, must be proved by substantive evidence to have been known to them or their agent, and that it was not enough that the jury should presume such knowledge, if they found such a usage to have been of long continuance." The court refused this ruling, and instructed the jury "that the plaintiff must prove that the alleged usage was known to the defendant, and that they would be warranted in finding that it was known to the defendant, if they found upon all the evidence that there was such a usage or custom, and that it was well defined, universal, uniform, and of long continuance." We understand this to mean that the jury might infer the knowledge of the defendant from the universality and long existence of the usage. A usage such as the instructions required having been proved, the defendant's contract is deemed to have been entered into with reference to such usage if known to it. Underwriters insuring by certain words may fairly be presumed to know the mercantile meaning of the words; and the fact of a wide-spread and established use has at least tendency to show that they had such a knowledge. Howard v. Great Western Ins. Co., 109 Mass. 384; Croucher v. Wilder, 98 id. 322. Mooney v. Howard Ins. Co. Opinion by Morton, C. J. [Decided Jan., 1885.]

CORPORATION-ASSIGNMENT

OF STOCK-CREDITOR

ATTACHING.-An owner of stock, holding a certifi-
cate thereof in his own name in a manufacturing cor-
poration existing under the general laws of and doing
business in this State, delivered the certificate, with a
printed assignment in blank, signed by him, indorsed
upon it, to the plaintiff for the purpose of transferring
the stock to the plaintiff to hold as security for nego-
tiable paper.
While it so held the certificate, and be-
fore the assignment had been filled out, and before no-
tice of the assignment had been given to the corpora-
tion, the stock was attached by the defendant Willis-
ton, who had no notice of the assignment, as the prop-
erty of the assignor. The certificate contained on its
face the words, "transferable only on the books of
this company, in person or by power of attorney, on
surrender of this certificate." This bill is brought by
the plaintiff to secure its right in the stock, and the
question is whether its title is good against Williston
as attaching creditor of the assignor. There are two
such assignments, the circumstances being alike, ex-
cept that one was made before the statute of 1881, ch.
302 (Pub. Stats., ch. 105, § 24), and the other when that
statute was in force, and that the assignor was the

treasurer of the corporation when the last one was made. It is assumed that the assignments are sufficient to sustain the right of the plaintiff unless they are rendered invalid against attaching creditors by the statutes of this State. Boston Music Hall v. Cory, 129 Mass. 435, and cases cited; Sibley v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bank, 133 Mass. 515. The general act relating to manufacturing corporations in force when the first assignment was made was the statute of 1870, ch. 224 [§ 26 quoted from]. The policy of the legislation of this Commonwealth has been to make stock in corporations liable to attachment by the creditors of the owner. Stats. 1804, ch. 82; 1808, ch. 65; 1846, ch. 45; 1833, ch. 187, § 8; 1864, ch. 229, § 10; 1838, ch. 98; Pub. Stats., ch. 161, §§ 71-73; ch. 171, §§ 44-50; ch. 105, §§ 25, 26, cited. The inference from this course of legislation that the record of the transfer of stock required by statute is for the benefit of attaching creditors is strengthened by the action of the Legislature at its session next after the decision in Boston Music Hall v. Corey, ubi supra, by the enactment of the statute of 1881, ch. 302. Stat. 1884, ch. 229; Fisher v. Essex Bank, 5 Gray, 373; Boyd v. Rockport Mills, 7 Gray, 406; Blanchard v. Dedham Gas Light Co., 12 id. 213; Johnson v. Somerville Dyeing Co., 15 id. 216; Rock v. Nichols, 3 Allen, 342, cited. The question is not presented in precisely the same aspect in the case at bar as in any of the cases cited, but it is the same question. The stock has not been sold or transferred under the attachment, but the right to it was fixed when the attachment was made. The attaching creditor then acquired the rights of a purchaser for value, and the case is to be determined as if the stock had been sold on execution and a certificate of it given to the creditor. At that time the blank assignment had not been filled out or presented for record, and no demand had been made on the corporation for a new certificate; and the attaching creditor had no notice of the assignment. That upon these facts the statute makes the as signment invalid as to him cannot be doubted. The legislative action and judicial decisions upon the subject are conclusive of the construction and effect to be given to the statute. The second assignment is affected by the statute of 1881, ch. 302, which is decisive against the right of the plaintiff. Central Nat. Bank v. Williston. Opinion by Morton, C. J. [Decided Jan., 1885.]

NEGLIGENCE-ACCIDENT AT STREET CROSSING-EVIDENCE AS TO ITS CONDITION-CHALLENGE TO JUROR.Action of tort for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by a defective highway in the defendant city. At the trial the jury returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. The accident to the plaintiff happened at a street crossing on Sunday evening, Dec. 24, 1882. Two policemen were allowed to testify as to the condition of the same crossing on a Sunday evening between the middle and the last of December, 1882, they having been led to examine it by hearing of an accident to a woman there. The evidence was clearly admissible. There was quite enough to warrant the inference that it referred to the occasion in question. If the jury had thought that it referred to a different Sunday, they no doubt would have disregarded it. (2) The instruction to the jury that "if there were any residents or tax payers in Lowell on the jury such would leave their seats," did not preclude the plaintiff from moving the court to examine them on oath, or deprive her of her right of challenge. Pub. Stats., ch. 170, § 35. As she did not avail herself of the means of inquiry afforded her by the statute, she is not entitled to a new trial as a matter of law, notwithstanding her ignorance that one of the jurors was a tax payer of Lowell until after the verdict. Woodward v. Dean, 113 Mass. 297; Smith v.

Earl, 118 id. 531; Wassum v. Feeney, 121 id. 93. Daniels v. City of Lowell. Opinion by Holmes, J. [Decided Feb., 1885.]

DEPOSIT IN BANK-GIFT-TRUST.-To constitute a

gift there must be a transfer of the fund to the claimant, or at least a transfer of it to the depositor as trustee for the claimant. Sweeney v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 116 Mass. 384, was an instance of the

former. Gerrish v. New Bedford Institution for Savings, 128 Mass. 159, was an instance of the latter. But a declaration of trust by the owner, or a deposit of the fund in his name as trustee, or a deposit in the name of another, will not of itself be sufficient to prove a gift or voluntary trust; there must be some other act or circumstance showing a perfected gift of the legal or equitable interest. Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522. Broderick v. Waltham Savings Bank, 109 id. 149; Powers v. Provident Institution for Savings, 124 id. 377; Eastman v. Woronoco Savings Bank, 136 id. 208. In this case there was no transfer of the fund, no perfected gift of it to the claimant. The supposed donor was the depositor, and as such signed the agreement and was affected with notice of the by-laws of the bank, and received and kept in his possession the deposit book. The by-laws provided that money deposited should only be drawn out by the depositor or some person by him legally authorized, and that no payment should be made to any person without the production of the pass-book; and that any depositor might designate at the time of making the deposit the period for which he desired the same should remain and the person for whose benefit it was made, and should be bound by such condition annexed to his de. posit. The deposit was entered to the credit of the claimant, and the pass-book was in its name, and the following condition was annexed: "Interest to be paid to the order of Urial Sherman. Principal to be drawn by board of said church after the decease of said Urial." The depositor never had any communication with the claimant in regard to the matter, and the claimant did not know of the deposit until after the death of the depositor. The only contract made was between the depositor and the bank. The form of the deposit and the condition annexed were parts of that contract, and in some respects modified it; but as regards the claimant they are nothing more than declarations of the depositor competent only upon the question of his intention. But no inference can be drawn from the form or circumstances of the deposit that the depositor intended to give to the claimant any right or interest in the fund to take effect during his own life, and deprive him of the dominion and control of the property, and prevent him from revoking the gift. Sherman v. New Bedford, etc., Savings Bank. Opinion by Wallen, J. [Decided Feb., 1885.]

LICENSE-HALL TO USE-MAY BE REVOKED.-There was evidence tending to show that the defendant, who was the owner of a hall, entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff by which he agreed to permit the plaintiff to use the hall for dancing parties on the afternoon of four holidays - Thanksgiving, Christmas, Washington's Birthday and Fast day-at a stipulated price for each afternoon. The Superior Court directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that this contract was within the statute of frauds, being a contract for the sale of an interest in land. The question is whether it was such a contract, or merely a contract for a license to the plaintiff to enter and use the hall for the purpose contemplated. A license is a permission or authority to enter the land and to do certain acts or series of acts, the parties not intending to con vey any interest in the land; and it is well settled that such a license need not be in writing, under the stat

ute of frauds. Thus a license to enter land and cut timber, or to gather the growing crops, is valid, though not in writing. Whitmarsh v. Walker, 1 Metc. 313. So an agreement for a seat in a theatre or other place of amusement is a license merely. McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray, 211; Burton v. Scherpf, 1 Allen, 133. So ordinarily an agreement for lodgings in a hotel or boardinghouse, though the rooms the boarder is to occupy are designated, does not create an interest in land, but is merely a license. White v. Maynard, 111 Mass. 250. In the case before us it seems to us that the contract has the elements of a license rather than of a contract for the sale of any interest in land. The use of the hall by the plaintiff was not to be continuous, but only occasional, and for a few hours on four separate days. He was not to have the exclusive occupation and control of it. The key was never delivered to him, but remained with the defendant, who on the afternoons it was occupied under the contract opened, lighted and closed it. We think the defendant would remain all the time in the legal possession of the land; that the plaintiff was to occupy it merely as licensee, and would acquire under the contract no interest in the land. It is like the ordinary case of hiring a hall for a night, which does not create a lease, but the person who hires occupies under a license. Regarding the contract in this case as a contract for a license, it is true that the defendant had the power to revoke the license; and the plaintiff could not compel the defendant to give him the use of the hall. But if in revoking it the defendant violated his contract, he is responsible for any damage sustained by the plaintiff by reason of such breach of contract. Johnson v. Wilkinson. Opinion by Morton, C. J. [Decided Feb., 1885.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

WILL-CONVERSION-DIRECTION FOR SALE-DISCRETION AS TO TIME OF SALE.-A testator gave to his children all his residuary estate, together with all rents, interests and dividends arising therefrom, to be divided amongst them equally, and he directed his executors to sell and convert into money his property whenever it should appear to their satisfaction that such sale would be for the benefit of his children, and all the money arising from the sale to be invested for the benefit of his children. Held, that (following Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320) the directions to sell and convert was imperative, and operated from the date of the testator's death. High Ct. of Just., Chy. Div. Matter of Raw. Opinion by Pearson, J. [51 L. T.Rep. (N. S.) 283.]

RAILROAD-GENERAL WORDS IN GRANT-RIGHT of WAY-PURPOSES OF RAILWAY.-By the conveyance to a railway company of certain land purchased under the powers of their act, on which was a stable, the premises were granted, together with all rights, members or appurtenances to the hereditaments belonging or occupied, or enjoyed as part, parcel or member thereof. Some years previously the vendor, for his own convenience, had made a private road on his own land from the highway to the stables, and had used it ever since. The soil of this road was not conveyed to the company, and no express mention of it was made in the conveyance. Held, that the general words in the conveyance gave the company a right of way over the road so long as they used the premises as a stable, notwithstanding that the stables had been purchased for the purposes of their undertaking, and that the company was at liberty to use the stables as such unti such time as they were required for the special purposes of the railway, or were sold as superfluous land.

Kay v. Oxley, L. Rep., 10 Q. B. 360; and Watts v. Kelson, L. Rep., 6 Ch. App. 166, followed. Eng. Ct. of App. Bayley v. Great Western Railway. Opinion by Cotton, Bowen and Fry, L.JJ. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 337.]

WATER- COVENANT-"HOUSE" -ADJOINING CELLARS-PERCOLATION. — The defendants were the assignees of a piece of land which adjoined the plaintiff's and which was subject to a covenant entered into with the plaintiff that no house should be erected upon the land of less value than 400l. The defendants commenced to build two houses or shops, each two stories high, upon the land, but the local board objected for certain reasons to the mode of building. In consequence of these objections the two houses were thrown together by making a communication between them on the ground floor. On the plan as submitted by the defendants to the local board, there was also shown a communication on the upper floor, but this did not appear to have been carried out. As altered, the houses had two separate doors opening to the road, and two separate shop windows fronting to the road. They each had a separate stair-case, but one of them had no kitchen. In the yard behind, which was common to the two houses, there was only one water-closet and ashpit. It was admitted that each of the two houses, if they were to be considered as separate, was of less value than 4001., but that the value of the two exceeded that sum. One of the houses adjoined a house of the plaintiff's. The defendants had fitted their house with pipes which did not communicate with any drain. The water flowing down the pipes settled in the cellar of the defendants' house, and thence percolated through the ground into the plaintiff's cellar, which was on a lower level, and did some injury. The questions were, first, whether a breach of the covenant had been committed; and secondly, whether the injury done to the plaintiff's cellar by percolation of water was an actionable wrong. Held, that the building substantially formed two houses, and not one, and that therefore a breach of the covenant had been committed. Held also, that the defendants, by allowing the water to escape from their cellar, had committed an actionable wrong, and were liable to pay damages. I am not able to make any distinction between the case of Ballard v. Tomlinson, 26 Ch. Div. 194, and the other authorities to which I have referred, and I therefore prefer to follow the well-known case of Tenant v. Golding, 1 Salk. 21, 360, and the long series of cases down to Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R., 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 330, which affirm very distinctly the proposition that, as an application of the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas, any one who collects upon his own land water, or any thing else which would not, in the natural condition of the land, be there, ought to keep it in at his peril, and that if it escapes he is liable for the consequences. This case seems to me to come within that principle. Eng. High Ct. of Just., Chy. Div. Snow v. Whitehead. Opinion by Kay, J. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 253.]

WILL-AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY-SPECIFIC OR RESIDUARY GIFT-1 VICT., CH. 26, § 24.—Testator by his will gave to his son G. for life "my cottage and all my land at S., on the especial condition that no fir or other trees or shrubs thereon (except when actually decayed) be at any time cut down or removed, and that the outside boundary of fences be kept in good preservation, and the plantations, heathers and furze be all preserved in their present state; " and as to all other his freehold manor, messuages, lands and real estate whatsoever and wheresoever he gave the same to trustees upon certain trusts. At the date of his will the testator was seised of a cottage and about twenty-two acres of land at S. He subsequently contracted to buy from his son G. a mansion-house and

about ten acress of land, also at S., but at the date of his death the contract had not been completed. The question arose whether the mansion-house and ten acres of land were comprised in the specific or the residuary gift. Held, that they were comprised in the specific gift. The statute requires that the will should show upon the face of it a contrary intention, that is, an intention that the after-acquired property should not pass. There are two classes of cases of which the books contain examples: one where the words are not, strictly speaking, generic, but really describe a particular property which the testator had at the date of his will, among which Cole v. Scott, 1 Macn & G. 518, may be ranked, where Lord Cottenham read the will as meaning "all the freehold and leasehold estates of which the testator at the date of his will was seised or entitled," and that, as Lord Hatherley says in Douglas v. Douglas, Kay 400, being a reference to something specific, would not be enlarged by the provision of the statute." On the other hand, such an expression as "all the lands of which I am seised in A." must be read as if written just before the testator's death. Doe v. Walker, 12 M. & W. 591. So the word "now"-any property I now possess-read in the same manner, would pass all the property possessed by the testator at the time of his death. Wagstaff v. Wagstaff, L. R., 8 Eq. 229; Dickinson v. Dickinson, 12 Chy. Div. 22; Everett v. Everett, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 581; 7 Chy. Div. 428; Goodlad v. Burnett, 1 K. & J. 341; Re Midland Ry. Co., 34 Beav. 525. Reading therefore this will as though it had been written immediately before the testator's death the words "in their present State" which occur in this devise must be taken to refer to that period, and not to indicate an intention that after-acquired property should not pass with sufficient clearness to amount to that contrary intention which the statute requires. The real difficulty to my mind is to determine whether in fact this gift of specific property contains general words which would pass lands subsequently acquired, or whether it is, as Lord Cottenham considered to be the case in Cole v. Scott, supra, merely a description of certain specific property of which the testator was possessed at the date of his will. I agree with the argument that the mode of trying this question is to suppose the testator at the date of his will to have been possessed of the property which he in fact subsequently acquired, and then to consider if the words are sufficient to pass it. They certainly were not very apt words for that purpose The testator desiring to devise this mansion-house would hardly describe it by the term he uses. However the word "land" is quite large enough to include it, and as the words are "all my land at Stour Wood," I do not see that it could be held on any true principle of construction that this property would not pass. Probably the testator had no intention in the matter. Perhaps he did intend this property to go to his I cannot tell. However he has not indicated that contrary intention required by the statute with sufficient clearness to enable me to say that this property did not pass. There must be a declaration that the property in question passed by the specific devise. High Ct. of Just. Portal v. Lamb. Opinion by Kay, J. [51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 392.]

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CRIMINAL LAW.

INDICTMENT-PLEADING PUBLIC STATUTE― JUDICIAL NOTICES-PUBLIC LOCAL LAWs.-The Constitution of the United States guarantees in criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and so does the bill of rights of this State. Lord Denman says that the first principles of the law require that such charge be so preferred as to enable the court to

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see that the facts amount to a violation of law, and the prisoner to understand what it is he is to answer and disprove. Forsyth Cas. & Opin. on Const. Law, 457, 458; 2 Hawk. Pleas of the Crown, ch. 25, §§ 57, 60. It is the offense which is charged, that is, the act done, which is to be described in the indictment, and not law which is alleged to be violated. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for its violation, by all authority, and the reason is that every one is presumed to know what it is. This indictment concluded "contrary to the form of the act of Assembly in such case made and provided," and that would seem to be all that is necessary in such case. Hale in his Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2, p. 192, says the indictment need not set out the statute unless it be a private statute, whereof the court cannot take notice. The same law is laid down by Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, ch. 25, §§ 100, 101; and in 1 Chitty Crim. Law, 276, 281, the same doctrine' is maintained. In Bishop on Statutory Crimes, one of the latest publications upon criminal law, this statement is made: "It has been perfectly settled that there is no necessity in any indictment on a public statute to recite the statute upon which it is founded; for the judges are bound ex-officio to take notice of all public acts of Parliament, and where there are more than one by which the proceeding can be maintained, they will refer it to that which is most for the public advantage." Bishop adds that if recital be attempted, variance may vitiate, and therefore it is always advisable not to recite. Bish. Stat. Crim., § 395. Courts are created to administer and enforce the law; therefore they do and must take judicial cognizance of all public laws. Whether the law has existence is for them to say, just as fully as it rests with them to say whether the indictment is good or bad, or that the evidence to prove the offense alleged is legally admissible, or otherwise. To the courts alone belong the right of saying whether a statute has been constitutionally and legally enacted. Legg v. Mayor, etc., of Annapolis, 42 Md. 219; Hamilton v. State, ex rel. Wells and Hardesty, 61 id. 14. Ordinarily our laws require nothing more than passage by the two Houses of the Legislature and the signature of the governor, accompanied with the great seal of the State, affixed in the presence of certain designated officers of the Legislature, to make them operative. But the law under which this prosecution is made, after passage by the Legislature and approval in the method mentioned, required submission to the people of Harford county at a regular election, for their acceptance, before it should become operative. And it is the omission to state in the indictment that it became operative through the observance of all the formalities prescribed in the law, which is the ground of demurrer. It was decided in this court in Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 558; Fell v. State, 42 id. 71; and in Crouse v. State, 57 id. 328, that a law like the one now involved becomes a valid law of the State so soon as it received the approval of the governor in constitutional form, notwithstanding its operation was deferred till a future time, and was made entirely dependent upon the acceptance of the same by a majority of the ballots of voters at an election for the purpose of ascertaining their will. Maryland Ct. of App. Slymer v. State. Opinion by Irving, J. [62 Md. 237.]

OUR NEW YORK LETTER.

POINTS ON JAPANESE LAW. [Suggested by a Perusal of W. S. Gilbert's "The Mikado, or the Town of Titipu."]

I have just received from a friend of mine in London the libretto of Gilbert and Sullivan's latest, "The Mik

ado; or the Town of Titipu," now running successfully at the Savoy and to be produced at our Standard Theatre in October. While perusing this libretto I was struck with the intimate knowledge of Japanese law and legal functionaries which Mr. Gilbert displays therein. As we are comparatively ignorant in these matters I have thought that some points concerning them, stated in Mr. Gilbert's luminous phraseology, would be of interest to your readers. The easiest manner for me to give them in intelligent sequence is by a running account of the story of the "Mikado," with extracts from such points as relate to Japanese laws and legal functionaries.

Nanki-Poo, the son of the Mikado, but who has disguised himself as a wandering minstrel in order to press his suit for the hand of Yum-Yum, the ward of a tailor named Ko-Ko, whom the latter wishes to marry himself, has after an absence from Titipu returned to that place to renew his suit because he has heard that Ko Ko had been condemned to death for flirting. On arriving at Titipu he is surprised to find that Ko-Ko, instead of having been executed, has been reprieved and exalted to the rank of Lord High Executioner. The circumstances of the pardon and elevation of Ko-Ko are explained by Pish-Tush, a nobleman, in verses which convey the following information concerning the Japanese law against flirting, and an ingenious device for evading it:

Our great Mikado, virtuous man,
When he to rule our land began,
Resolved to try

A plan whereby

Young men might best be steadied.

So he decreed, in words succinct,

That all who flirted, leered, or winked

(Unless connubially linked),

Should forthwith be beheaded.

Pish-Tush then goes on to explain that so many executions took place that the following ingenious device was employed to counteract the statute:

And so we straight let out on bail

A convict from the county jail,
Whose head was next

On some pretext

Condemned to be mown off,

And made him headsman, for we said
"Who's next to be decapited
Cannot cut off another's head

Until he's cut his own off."

Nank. What if I should prove that, after all, I am no musician. Yum. There, I was certain of it, directly I heard you play."

Ko-Ko's happiness over his approaching nuptials with Yum-Yum is clouded by the receipt of a document from the Mikado preambling that no executions have taken place in Titipu for a year, and concluding that unless one takes place in a month Ko-Ko shall lose his office. The executioner consults with his advisers as to whom he shall execute. One of them, Pooh-Bah, replies with irresistible logic: "Well, it seems unkind to say so, but as you're already under sentence of death for flirting, every thing points to you."

Ko-Ko acknowledges the force of this argument and is in despair. Suddenly however he hits upon a way out of the difficulty. Nanki-Poo does not care to live any longer, having lost all hope of marrying Yum-Yum. Ko-Ko requests him to allow himself to be executed and he consents, provided he is allowed to be YumYum's husband for a month. This is agreed to, and the act closes with a general chorus of re'oicing.

The second act takes place in Ko-Ko's garden. Yum-Yum is engaged on her bridal toilet. Ko-Ko enters excitedly and announces that he has just ascertained that according to the Mikado's law, when a married man is beheaded his wife is to be buried alive. Yum-Yum objects to being buried alive at her husband's execution only a month after the date of her marriage, because it is "such a stuffy death." NankiPoo magnanimously renounces her and furthermore consents to be executed at once in order that Ko-Ko may remain in good standing with the Mikado whose unexpected approach is heralded. There is however another hitch, Ko-Ko is so tender hearted that he cannot bear to kill an insect, let alone Nanki-Poo, so he decides to let Nanki-Poo and Yum-Yum, without whom Nanki refuses to continue in this dreary world, escape and then to make affidavit before the Mikado that the execution has taken place.

This plan would have worked very well, except that the Mikado knows of his son's disguise, and on reading the name Nanki Poo in the death warrant he accuses Ko-Ko of having compassed the death of the heir apparent.

"

"I forget the punishment," says the Mikado meditatively. Something lingering, with boiling oil in it, I fancy. I think boiling oil occurs in it, but I'm not sure, I know its something humorous, but lingering, with either boiling oil or melted lead, Ko-Ko. If your majesty will accept our assurance, we had no idea our logical - Mik. I'm really very sorry for you, but it's an unjust world, and virtue is triumphant only in theatrical performances."

It is further explained in prose that mikado, seeing no moral difference between the dignified judge who condemns a criminal to die, and the industrious mechanic who carries out the sentence, has rolled the two offices into one, and every judge is now his own executioner."

Yum-Yum and Nanki-Poo manage to meet unobserved. In the course of their conversation some interesting Japanese legal points are developed when Yum-Yum tells Nanki-Poo that she does not love Ko-Ko; yet it would do no good to refuse him because he is her guardian, and would not allow her to marry NankiPoo. The latter says: "But I would wait until you were of age.'

Yum. "" You forget that in Japan girls do not arrive at years of discretion until they are fifty. Nank. True, from seventeen to forty-nine are considered years of indiscretion."

They continue in a strain which shows the strong feeling of caste prevailing in Japan:

"Yum. Besides a wandering minstrel, who plays a wind instrument outside tea-houses, is hardly a fitting husband for the ward of a Lord High Executioner.

Fortunately however Nanki-Poo and Yum-Yum are overtaken by messengers from Ko-Ko. Nanki-Poo consents to return if Ko-Ko will marry Katisha, who has been pursuing Nanki for years, and free him from her importunities. Katisha is not beautiful of face, but she has, to use her own words, a left shoulder blade that is a miracle of loveliness, and her circulation is the largest in the world. Ko-Ko agrees to marry her, and on the return of Nanki-Poo, is pardoned. He ingeniously explains his affidavit concerning Nanki-Poo's execution to the Mikado.

"When your majesty says, Let a thing be done,' it's as good as done-practically it is done-because your majesty's will is law. Your majesty says, 'Kill a gentleman,' and a gentleman is told off to be killed. Consequently that gentleman is as good as dead-practically he is dead-and if he is dead, why not say

80."

Of course the Mikado sees the logical force of KoKo's argument, and all ends happily.

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