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Federal Constitution, to prevent the deplorable evils which would have resulted from the failure to regulate, by a comprehensive and uniform law binding upon all the States, a matter of such vital importance to the administration of criminal law, incorporated into the Constitution the provisions of section 2 of article 4, "a person charged in any State with treason, felony or other crime who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he had fled be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime." The first and all important question is whether the imperative language of this provision imposes upon the several States a duty, the performance of which may be enforced by any tribunal, State or Federal; or whether the duty is one of imperfect legal obligation. That an absolute duty, involving no discretion whether the case is brought clearly within the language and spirit of this provision, was intended to be devolved upon the several States, cannot be seriously questioned. Indeed all the authorities support this view of the question. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 345; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. This duty however has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a duty of imperfect legal obligation, for the reason that there is no constituted legal tribunal vested with authority to enforce its performance. For the purpose of the discharge of this duty the States are independent sovereignties with respect to one another, responsible to no superior, and not subject to the coercion of any tribunal. This duty is the same in its nature as those duties which are imposed by the laws of nations upon the different sovereignties of the civilized world in their intercourse one with another. Such duties are of imperfect obligation, because there exists no common tribunal to which nations can appeal for the settlement of their controversies; no court of judicature vested with the authority to determine their conflicting claims, and with the power of carrying its judgment into execution. The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, settled the doctrine of the exemption of the States and their executives from national or other control in all cases of inter-State extradition. In this case the governor of Kentucky moved the United States Supreme Court for a rule on the governor of Ohio to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause one Willis Lago, a fugitive from justice, to be delivered up to be removed to the State of Kentucky, having jurisdiction of the crime with which he was charged. The motion was overruled, with the concurrence of all the justices in the opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Taney. The decision is summed up in its concluding sentence: "But if the governor of Ohio refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him." To same effect State

v. Brown, 19 N. W. Rep. 429, and cases cited. This case also settled another very important question, namely, that the demand for the fugitive must be made by an appeal to the executive authority of the State, although the Constitution is entirely silent on that subject. The court say at page 102: "The clause in question, like the clause in the Confederation, authorizes the demand to be made by the executive authority of the State where the crime was committed, but does not in so many words specify the officer of the State upon whom the demand is to be made, and whose duty it is to have the fugitive delivered and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. But under the Confederation it is plain that the demand was to be made on the governor or executive authority of the State, and could be made on no other department or officer, for the Confederation was only a league of separate sovereignties in which each State within its own limits held and exercises all the powers of sovereignty, and the Confederation had no officer, either executive, judicial or ministerial, through whom it could exercise an authority within the limits of a State. In the present Constitution however these powers to a limited extent have been conferred on the general government within the territories of the several States. But the part of the clause in relation to the mode of demanding and surrendering the fugitive is (with the exception of an unimportant word or two) a literal copy of the article of the Confederation, and it is plain that the mode of the demand, and the official authority by and to whom it was addressed under the Confederation, must have been in the minds of the members of the convention when thi article was introduced, and that in adopting the same words they manifestly intended to sanction the mode of proceeding practiced under th Confederation that is of demanding the fugitiv from the executive authority, and making it hi duty to cause him to be delivered up."

fusal.

While the governor of a State has in every cas the undoubted power to refuse to comply with th requisition and grant the warrrant, yet it is neves theless his duty to issue his warrant for the appre hension of an alleged fugitive from justice in ever case coming within the scope of the Constitution unless some special reasons exist justifying ar The courts have determined what some these special reasons are. It is important that the should be referred to, not because they can ever I invoked in the courts to support the claim to imm nity from arrest and surrender, but for the reas that it is always in the power of the alleged fug tive to obtain a hearing before the governor of t State in which he has been or is to be arreste either after or before the issuing of the warrant such governor. These rules which have been esta lished by the judiciary for the guidance of exec tive discretion in such cases, though not obligate upon the executive, will yet undoubtedly be c served and followed in all cases in which they m be properly applied. It therefore becomes nec

On

his official capacity. The warrant is not process of the person holding the office of governor, but a warrant issued by an officer. We all agree that Governor Young had the same power to revoke a warrant issued by his predecessor that he had to revoke one issued by himself." The cases we have been considering are cases in which it has been held to be the moral duty of the executive to revoke a warrant once issued. These rules should therefore be invoked before the governor himself. The fugitive can never avail himself of them upon habeas corpus. If the decision of the executive is against him in cases where the power to grant the warrant exists, the decision is final and subject to no review. But suppose the executive revokes a warrant without any reason for so doing, will it be a good answer to the revocation, on a writ of habeas corpus, that the governor should not have recalled the warrant in the absence of any sufficient reason? In other words, is the power of the executive to revoke the warrant circumscribed or unlimited? both principle and authority the power to revoke the warrant must be considered to be as broad and unlimited as the power originally to refuse the granting of the warrant. The case of Work v. Corrington, supra, is explicit on this point. The syllabus clearly states the decision so far as this question is concerned: "Where such warrant has been revoked by the governor no inquiry will be made in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of the alleged fugitive as to the grounds of such revocation, although at the time of the revocation the fugitive may have been in the custody of the agent of the demanding State." It is therefore the law that the executive has the power not only arbitrarily to refuse the granting of the warrant, but also arbitrarily to revoke it after it has been properly issued. The moment it is revoked the agent of the demanding State ceases to have any authority to retain the fugitive in his custody, and the court on habeas corpus must discharge him. The decision in this case of Work v. Corrington, that the fugitive must be released on habeas corpus, even though he was in the custody of the agent of the demanding State at the time of the revocation of the warrant is unquestionably sound, for the reason that while the fugitive remains within the territorial limits of the State to which he has fled, he cannot be subjected to the laws or control of the State in which he committed the crime. The agent who has him in his custody derives all his authority to hold him and deprive him of his liberty from the warrant of the governor. The moment that warrant is revoked his authority is annulled, and from that moment his detention of the fugitive is unlawful.

sary to inquire what rules have been established justifying the governor of a State in refusing to grant the warrant in cases where he has undoubtedly the power to issue it. Iu the first place if the alleged fugitive from justice is held for crime in the State to which he has fled, and from which he is demanded, the governor has the right to refuse, and should refuse to issue the warrant. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 345; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370; Troutman's case, 4 Zabr. 634; In re Briscoe, 51 How. Pr. 422. He may and should refuse to deliver the fugitive when he is satisfied that the sole object of the prosccution and extradition is to enforce collection of a claim. Work v. Corrington, supra. In this case the court say on this point: "The provision was inserted in the articles of Confederation, and subsequently in the Constitution, to subserve public and not private purposes. The object was to secure the punishment of public offenders, and not to enforce the payment of private claims, whether well or ill founded. To employ this extraordinary process for public purposes tends to secure peace and good order, but to prostitute it to the advancement of private ends is to bring it into great disfavor. True, the theory is that the demanding State will hold the offender for trial, even though he be brought into the State fraudulently or forcibly, and without process, but experience shows that where the end sought is private the accused is rarely brought to trial. No satisfactory reason is perceived why a governor should issue or obey a requisition when he is satisfied that the sole object of the party complaining is to enforce the payment of a private claim for money. Such an abuse of process is equivalent to a fraudulent use of it." In such a case a warrant which has been already granted may be revoked. This was the ground on which the warrant in the case of Work v. Corrington, supra, was revoked, and the court approved and sustained the action of the governor in this respect, and expressed its opinion in these most emphatic words: "For reasons equally strong, a governor from whom such warrant is obtained for the advancement of private ends fails to discharge his duty if he neglects to revoke the provision discovering the fraud." The warrant may be revoked even after the fugitive has been apprehended and is in the custody of the agent of the demanding State, provided he is still within the territorial limits of the State upon which the demand was made. This is precisely what was done in the above case, and the action of the governor was approved by the court. Moreover the revocation need not be made by the governor who granted the warrant. It may be made by his successor in office. In the above case the warrant was issued by Governor Hayes, and was revoked by his successor, Governor Young. | The reasoning of the court on this point is brief, but convincing and unanswerable: "Further objection is made that Governor Young had no authority to revoke a warrant issued by Governor Hayes. But we have seen that the governor acts in

While the conduct of the executive in refusing to issue the warrant is subject to no judicial control, yet his decision in granting the warrant is al ways subject to the supervision of the courts, and unless the case is brought clearly within the scope of the constitutional provision, and the act of Congress passed in pursuance of that provision, the

ishable by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars,
was an offense for which the executive of a State
could issue his warrant to arrest and deliver a fugi-
tive from justice.
GUY C. H. CORLISS.

CORPORATION-PURCHASE OF CAPITAL STOCK

-REPLEVIN.

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, SEPTEMBER 23, 1884.

detention of the fugitive will be illegal, and he will be discharged by the court on habeas corpus. In determining whether the governor had authority to issue the warrant it becomes necessary to ascertain first of all to what offenses the language of the Constitution refers. In other words for what violations of law has the executive the power to surrender a fugitive on demand? This provision of the Constitution is very comprehensive. It embraces the case of a person charged with " treason, felony or other crime." The question has frequently been before the courts of the different States and the United States Supreme Court, and the rule which has been enunciated by them all, without a single dissent, is that the executive has authority to arrest and surrender a fugitive from justice who has been guilty of any offense which is punished as criminal by the laws of the demanding State. In re Hooper, 52 Wis. 699; People v. Brady, 56 N. Y. 182; Brown's case, 112 Mass. 409; Clark's case, 9 Wend. 212; People v. Pinkerton, 17 Hun, 199; State v. Stewart, 20 N. W. Rep. 429; Kentucky title of the plaintiff to the property was put in issue by

BUTTON V. HOFFMAN.*

One who by purchase or otherwise becomes the owner of all the capital stock of a private corporation does not thereby become the legal owner of its property, and cannot maintain replevin therefor in his own name.

APPEAL from Circuit Court, Jackson county.

Carl C. Pope, for respondent.

C. F. Ainsworth and S. U.Pinney, for appellant.
ORTON, J. This is an action of replevin in which the

the answer. In his instructions to the jury the learned
judge of the Circuit Court said: "I think the testi-
mony is that the plaintiff had the title to the prop-
erty." The evidence of the plaintiff's title was that
the property belonged to a corporation known as "The
he purchased and became the sole owner of all of the
capital stock of said corporation. As the plaintiff in
his testimony expressed it, "I bought all the stock. I
own all the stock now. I became the absolute owner
of the mill. It belonged at that time to the company,
and I am the company." There was no other evi-
dence of the condition of the corporation at the time.
Is this sufficient evidence of the plaintiff's title? We
think not. The learned counsel of the respondent in
his brief says: "The property had formerly belonged
to the Hayden & Smith Manufacturing Company, but
the respondent had purchased and become the owner
sole owner."
of all the stock of the company, and thus became its

Hayden & Smith Manufacturing Company," and that

v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; In re Voorhis, 32 N. J. L. 141; Fetter's case, 3 Zabr. 311; Leary's case, 6 Abb. N. C. 54; People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 441. As the question involves the construction of the Federal Constitution the judgment of the national Supreme Court is of course final. In Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, it was argued that the provision was not designed to apply to cases of new offenses created by statute since the adoption of the Constitution, especially where such offenses were not made crimes by the laws of the State upon which the demand was made. But the court repudiated this palpably erroneous doctrine, and decided that the constitutional framers had exhibited the deliberate purpose to include every offense known to the law of the State from which the party charged had fled." In re Hooper, supra, the court say: "The From the very nature of a private business corporalanguage of the Constitution of the United States tion, or indeed of any corporation, the stockholders is that the alleged fugitive from justice must be are not the private and joint owners of its propcharged with treason, felony or other crime.' The erty. The corporation is the real, though artificial, person substituted for the natural person who weight of judicial opinion is that these words emprocured its creation, and have pecuniary interests in brace any act forbidden and made punishable by it, in which all its property is vested, and by which it the laws of the State making the demand." In is controlled, managed, and disposed of. It must purPeople v. Brady, supra, the same doctrine is stated chase, hold, grant, sell, and convey the corporate in these words: "The word crime in the clause of property, and do business, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, for corporate purposes, by its corporate the Constitution which has been quoted embraces name. The corporation must do its business in a cerevery act forbidden and made punishable by the tain way, and by its regularly appointed officers and law of a State, and the right of a State to demand agents, whose acts are those of the corporation only as the surrender of a fugitive from justice extends to they are within the powers and purposes of the corall cases of the violation of its criminal law. Felo- poration. In an ordinary copartnership the members of it act as natural persons and as agents for each nies and misdemeanors, offenses by statute and at other, and with unlimited liability. But not so with common law, are alike within the constitutional a corporation; its members, as natural persons, are provision." In People v. Donohue, supra, it is thus merged into the corporate identity. Ang. & A. Corp., expressed: "The language chosen is broad, and §§ 40, 46, 100, 591, 595. A share of the capital stock of a was plainly intended to embrace every criminal of- corporation is defined to be a right to partake, according to the amount subscribed of the surplus profits obfense, and every act forbidden and made punish-tained from the use and disposal of the capital stock able by the law of the State where the crime was committed, and whether such by common law or express legislative enactment." In Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123, it was held that a misdemeanor, pun

of the company to those purposes for which the company is constituted. Id., § 557. The corporation is the trustee for the management of the property, and the *S. C., 20 N. W. Rep. 667.

stockholders are the mere cestui que trust. Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 365; Eidman v. Bowman, 4 Am. Corp. Cas. 350.

the officer, in his return, certified that he had taken a bond "from the within named A., B., and C.," and the property was receipted by "A., B., and C., plaintiffs." It was held that the action was not by the corporation, as it should have been, and judgment was rendered for the defendant. It is said in Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 584, "the corporation is the legal owner of all the property of the bank, both real and personal."

In Wilde v. Jenkins, supra, where a copartnership bought all the property and effects, together with the franchises of a corporation, and elected themselves trustees of the corporation, it was held that the corporation was not dissolved, and that the legal title to the real and personal property was still in the corporation for their benefit.

The right of alienation or assignment of the property is in the corporation alone, and this right is not affected by making the stockholders individually liable for the corporate debts. Ang. & A. Corp., § 191; Pope v. Brandon, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 401; Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 444. The property of the corporation is the mere instrument whereby the stock is made to produce the profits, which are the dividends to be declared from time to time by corporate authority for the benefit of the stockholders, while the property itself, which produces them, continues to belong to the corporation. Bradley v. Holdsworth, 3 Mees. & W. 422; Waltham Bank v. Waltham, 10 Metc. 334; Tippets v. Walker, 4 Mass. 595. The corporation holds its property only for the purposes for which it was permitted to acquire it, and even the corporation cannot divert it from such use, and a shareholder has no right to it, or the profits arising therefrom, until a lawful division is made by the directors or other proper officers of the corporation, or by judicial determination. Ang. & A. Corp., S$ 160, 190, 557; Hyatt v. Allen, 4 Am. Corp. Cas. 624. A conveyance of all the capital stock to a purchaser gives to such purchaser only an equitable interest in the property to carry on business under the act of incorporation and in the corporate name, and the corpora. tion is still the legal owner of the same. Wilde v. Jen-plainant, as a shareholder in the art-union, for an inkins, 4 Paige, 481. A legal distribution of the property after a dissolution of the corporation and settlement of its affairs is the inception of any title of a stockholder to it, although he be the sole stockholder. Ang. & A. Corp., § 779a.

These general principles sufficiently establish the doctrine that the owner of all the capital stock of a corporation does not therefore own its property, or any of it, and does not himself become the corporation, as a natural person, to own its property, and do its business in his own name. While the corporation exists he is a mere stockholder of it, and nothing else. The consequences of a violation of these principles would be that the stockholders would be the private and joint owners of the corporate property, and they could assume the powers of the corporation, and supersede its functions in its use and disposition for their own benefit without personal liability, and thus destroy the corporation, terminate its business, and defraud its creditors. The stockholders would be the owners of the property, and at the same time, it would belong to the corporation. One stockholder owning the whole capital stock could of course do what several stockholders could lawfully do. It is said in City of Utica v. Churchill, 33 N. Y. 161, "the interest of a stockholder is of a collateral nature, and is not the interest of an owner; and in Hyatt v. Allen, supra, that "a shareholder in a corporation has no legal title to its property or profits until a division is made."

In Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 23 Minn. 359, it is held that the corporation is still the absolute owner, and vested with the legal title of the property, and the real party in interest, although another party has become the owner of the sole beneficial interest in its rights, property, and immunities.

In Mickles v. Bank, 11 Paige, 118, it was held that although a corporation was deemed to have surrendered its charter for non-user, it was not dissolved, and would not until its dissolution was judicially declared, and that until then its property could be taken and sold by its judgment creditors.

In Bennett v. American Art Union, 5 Sandf. 614, it was held that "as a general rule, the whole title, legal and equitable (to its property), is vested in the corporation itself," and that the individual members have no other or greater interest in it than is expressly given to them by the charter, and the prayer of com

junction against a certain disposition of its property was denied, because it had no interest in it. See also Goodwin v. Hardy, 57 Me. 143.

It is true that none of the above cases are precisely parallel with the present case in facts, but they are sufficiently analogous to be authority upon the principie that the plaintiff, as the sole stockholder of the corporation, is not the legal owner of the property. He may have an equitable interest in it, but in this action he must show a legal title to the property in himself in order to recover, and he has shown that such title is in another person. Timp v. Dockham, 32 Wis. 146; Sensenbrenner v. Mathews, 48 id. 250; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 809. In analogy to the above principle it was held in Murphy v. Hanrahan, 50 Wis. 485, that the sole heirs of an estate did not have such a legal title to a promissory note given to their father as would entitle them to sue the maker upon it, because the title to it was in the administrator, and they could obtain the title only by administration and distribution according to law. The heirs in that case certainly had as much equitable interest in that note as this plaintiff has in the property in controversy. The want of title to the property being fatal to the plaintiff's recovery in the action between the present parties, other alleged errors will not be considered.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

MASTER AND SERVANT-RAILROAD CONDUC-
TOR AND ENGINEER NOT" FELLOW
SERVANTS."

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
OCTOBER TERM, 1884.

In Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minu. 43, it was held that the sole owner of the stock did not own the land of CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY Co. v. the corporation so as to convey the same.

In Bartlett v. Brickett, 14 Allen, 62, an action of replevin was brought by A., B., and C., as the "trustees of the Ministerial Fund in the North Parish in Haverhill," which was the corporate name. In portions of the writ the plaintiffs were referred to as "the said trustees " and "the said plaintiffs." In the bond, "A., B., and C., trustees as aforesaid," became bound, and

Ross.

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FIELD, J. The plaintiff in the court below is a citizen of Minnesota, and by occupation an engineer on a railway train. The defendant in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, is a railway corporation created under the laws of Wisconsin. This action is brought to recover damages for injuries which the plaintiff sustained whilst engineer of a freight train by a colEsion with a gravel train on the 6th of November, 1880. Both trains belonged to the company, and for some years he had been employed as such engineer on its roads. On that day he was in charge of the engine of a regular freight train which left Minneapolis at a quarter past one in the morning, its regular schedule time, and had the right of the road over the gravel trains, except when otherwise ordered. At the time of the collision, one McClintock was the conductor of the train, and had the entire charge of running it. It was his duty under the regulations of the company to show to the engineer all orders which he received with respect to the movements of the train. The regulations in this respect were as follows: "Conductors must in all cases, when running by telegraph and special orders, show the same to the engineer of their train before leaving stations where the orders are received. The engineer must read and understand the order before leaving the station. The conductor will have charge and control of the train, and of all persons employed on it, and is responsible for its movements while on the road, except when his directions conflict with these regulations, or involve any risk or hazard, in which case the engineer will also be held respousible."

When the freight train left Minneapolis on the morning of November 6, 1880, there was coming toward that city from Fort Snelling, by order of the company, over the same road, a gravel train, termed in the complaint a wild train, that is a train not running on schedule time any regular trips. The conductor, McClintock, was informed by telegram from the train despatcher of the coming of this gravel train, and ordered to hold the freight train at South Minneapolis until the gravel train arrived. South Minneapolis is between Minneapolis and the place where the collision occurred. The gravel train had been engaged for a week before in hauling in the night gravel to Minneapolis from a pit near Mendota, for the construction by the company of a new and separate line of railroad between St. Paul and Minneapolis, and the freight train had during this time been stopped by the conductor, on orders of the train despatcher, upon side tracks between Minneapolis and St. Paul Junction, for the passage of the gravel train. But on the night of November 6, 1880, he neglected to deliver to to the plaintiff the order he had received, and after the train started he went into the caboose and there fell asleep. The freight train of course did not stop at the station designated, but continuing at a speed of fifteen miles an hour, entered a deep and narrow cut 300 feet in length, through which the road passed at a considerable curve, and an a down grade, when the plaintiff saw on the bank a reflection of the light from the engine of the gravel train, which was approaching from the opposite direction at a speed of five or six miles an hour, and was then within about one hundred feet. He at once whistled for brakes and reversed his engine, but a collision almost immediately followed, destroying the engines, damaging the cars of the two trains, causing the death of one person, and inflicting upon the plaintiff severe and permanent injuries, for which he brings this action.

On the trial the conductor of the gravel train testifled that at the time of the collision he was under orders to run to South Minneapolis regardless of the plaintiff's train; that having twelve cars loaded with gravel, his train stalled before reaching the cut where

the collision happened; that he then separated his train in the middle, took six cars to Minnehaha station, went back with the engine for the other six cars, and was coming with them through the cut when the collision occurred; that the gravel train had run in the night about a week, and that when he could reach Minneapolis before the starting time of plaintiff's train he ran without orders, otherwise upon orders, and had met or passed plaintiff's train at the same place about every night during the week.

It is evident from this brief statement that the couductor on each train was guilty of gross negligence. The conductor of the freight train was not only required by the general duty devolving on him, as oue controlling its movements, to give to its engineer such orders as would enable him to avoid collision with other cars, but as we have seen, he was expressly directed by the regulations of the company, when running by telegraph or special orders, to communicate them to him. Had these regulations been complied with, the collision would have been avoided. The conductor of the gravel train allowed it to be so overloaded that its engine was incapable of moving it at one portion of the road before reaching the cut; and when in consequence he was obliged to leave half of his cars on the track while he took the others to Minnebaba,he omitted to send forward information of the delay or to put out signals of danger. Having for the week previous passed the freight train at nearly the same place on the road, he must have known that by the delay there was danger of collision. Ordinary prudence therefore would have dictated the sending forward of information of his position or the putting out of danger-signals. Had he done either of these things the collision would not have occurred.

The collision having been caused by the gross negligence of the conductors, the question arises whether the company is responsible to the plaintiff for the injuries which that collision inflicted upon him.

The general liability of a railroad company for injuries caused by the negligence of its servants to passengers and others not in its service is conceded. It covers all injuries to which they do not contribute. But where injuries befall a servant in its employ, a different principle applies. Having been engaged for the performance of specified services, he takes upon himself the ordinary risks incident thereto. As a consequence, if he suffers by exposure to them, he cannot recover compensation from his employer. The obvious reason for this exemption is that he has, or in law is supposed to have them in contemplation when he engages in the service, and that his compensation is arranged accordingly. He cannot, in reason, complain if he suffers from a risk which he has voluntarily assumed, and for the assumption of which he is paid. There is also another reason often assigned for this exemption, that of a supposed public policy. It is assumed that the exemption operates as a stimulant to diligence and caution on the part of the servant for his own safety as well as that of his master. Much potency is ascribed to this assumed fact by reference to those cases where diligence and caution on the part of servants constitute the chief protection against accidents. But it may be doubted whether the exemption has the effect thus claimed for it. We have never known parties more willing to subject themselves to dangers of life or limb, because if losing the one or suffering in the other, damages could be recovered by their representatives or themselves for the loss or injury. The dread of personal injury has always proved sufficient to bring into exercise the vigilance and activity of the servant.

But however this may be, it is indispensable to the employer's exemption from liability to his servant for the consequences of risks thus incurred, that he should

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