it another cause for war with England, the whole affair was not creditable to him or the party leaders.

It appears likely that after second thought, Mr. Madison did not believe Henry's fabrication. He had paid dear for the whistle, and took care never to mention the case in any of his letters during his long retrospective period. That the British Government had undertaken to divide this country by a party schism at home, there is no evidence whatever beyond Henry's letters to the governor of Canada. That the governor did not consider himself under any obligations to Henry for his self-appointed services is quite evident, and the British ministry refused to recognize and pay for a thing of which nothing was known, and in which there seemed to be nothing.

The President's message on the subject was referred to the committee on foreign relations, and in the report this committee, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman, said:

"The transaction disclosed by the President's message presents to the mind of the committee conclusive evidence that the British Government, at a period of peace, and during the most friendly professions, have been deliberately and perfidiously pursuing measures to divide these States, and to involve our citizens in all the guilt of treason, and the horrors of a civil war."

It may be that these honorable men really thought the "evidence conclusive" that Great Britain was engaged with a discontented faction to form, by her support, a New England confederacy; and that in that section was discovered the first noteworthy nest of treason to the National Government. But it certainly required an intense imagination to see such evidence in this scamp's so-called disclosures. But it furnished another pretext, and helped to push on to the crisis.

On the first day of April, 1812, Mr. Madison sent this little message to a Congress already prepared for it:

"TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES:

"Considering it as expedient, under existing circumstances and prospects, that a general embargo be laid on all vessels now in port, or hereafter arriving, for the period of sixty days, I recommend an immediate passage of a law to that effect."

This was the stroke that broke the camel's back. It was the preliminary step, as the President wrote to Mr. Jefferson.

Four days after this brief message, and nearly a month after Henry had left the continent, Congress passed the required embargo act, to continue for ninety days.

This was succeeded by the next step in the preparation, in a long confidential communication, dated June 1, 1812, from the President to Congress, reviewing the entire ground of the difficulty with Britain.

When the news reached France of the embargo act which was understood to precede a formal declaration of war against England, the thing occurred for which the President was waiting, as indicated in this confidential message-that is, Napoleon by proclamation declared what was superfluous entirely, if it had been done before, as the Administration had tried to make Great Britain and the American people believe had been done. The Berlin and Milan decrees were now really revoked, as they never had been before.

And, according to her promise, oft repeated, England now repealed her orders in council. But when the news reached the United States it was too late, Congress had declared war, and how could it retrace the step, or on what ground could it go forward?

The President's special message of grievances of the 1st of June was referred to the committee on foreign relations in the House, where, on the 3d of the month, the majority reported a manifesto as the basis. for a declaration of war, announcing substantially the reasons found in the message.

The act declaring war was passed in the House by a vote of 79 against 49, and, after two weeks' delay, in the Senate by 19 to 13. At the outset the Senate was actually opposed to the war, and only after much pulling was this result reached with a majority of six votes. Only 17 of the 79 votes in the House for war were from Northern members, or members north of the Delaware River; and only 5 of the 19 Senators resided north of that river, showing only 21 Northern votes out of the entire 68 Northern Congressmen in favor of the war.

The act drawn up by William Pinkney, AttorneyGeneral, who considered the measure premature, was as follows, and was approved by the President on the 18th of June, 1812:

"AN ACT declaring war between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories.

"Be it enacted, &c. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, and the United States of America and their territories; and that the President of the United States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the United States, against the vessels, goods, and effects of the government of the said United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the subjects thereof.”

CHAPTER XVII.

PRESIDENTIAL CAUCUSES-MR. MADISON'S TRADE FOR THE PRESIDENCY-WAR OF 1812-ITS CAUSES-ITS OPPONENTS AND FRIENDS.

A FEW days subsequent to these events, on the

22d of June, Mr. Madison wrote to his friend Jefferson:

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"It is understood that the Federalists in Congress are to put all the strength of their talents into a protest against the war, and that the party at large are to be brought out in all their force."

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On this point the President was not mistaken. A peace party" was at once organized in the name at least of, but it was not confined to, the Federalists. Nor did they wait for the declaration to begin the protest. This they had always been making. On the 30th of May John Randolph of Roanoke published an appeal, accompanied by one of his speeches. in the House, to the people he represented in Virginia, setting forth the evils and infamy of the proposed war, and claiming that it was in the interest of the despot of France, that the Administration and its supporters in this matter were sacrificing this country on the altar of French rapacity. He cried :

"You are enveloped in the toils of French duplicity; and if which may Heaven in its mercy forbid, you and your posterity are to become hewers of wood and drawers of water, to the modern Pharaoh, it shall not be for the want of my best exertions to rescue you from the cruel and abject bondage. This sin, at least, shall not rest upon my soul."

Still many prominent Federalists gave their support to the Administration in a general sense, and especially in such war measures as they deemed likely to lead to a vigorous and successful conduct of the war.

During the preparation for the war another matter demanded the attention of the political leaders, and, in fact, it had no little influence in giving direction to the early steps to the declaration of war. That was the approaching Presidential election. It was stoutly maintained that Mr. Madison submitted against his will to undertake the war on the condition of the nomination and support of his party for another term of the Presidency.

"President Madison was, with much difficulty, brought to acquiesce in warlike measures of a decisive character. He still hoped that war might be avoided, either by negotiation or a continuance of restrictive measures on commerce with Great Britain. But he was soon made to understand that a more decided and energetic action on the part of the national government was determined on by the ardent democrats, whose influence now predominated in Congress. The first presidential term of Mr. Madison was drawing to a close, and the nomination of candidates for president and vice-president, to be supported by the democratic party at the approaching election, was to be made by a caucus of members of the Congress then in session. The leading republicans of the state of New York who were dissatisfied with Mr. Madison's course, had it then in contemplation to nominate for the presidency, De Witt Clinton, who was then lieutenant-governor of that state, mayor of the city of New York, and high in the confidence of the party. His pretensions were sustained by Gideon Granger, the postmaster-general, and other influential democrats.

"In this state of things, Mr. Madison was waited upon by several of the leading republican members of Congress, and informed, in substance, that war with England was now resolved upon by the democratic party, the supporters of his administration; that the people would no longer consent to a dilatory and