account of the vast slave territory which it would add to the Union. And now Mr. Madison and his Southern and Western friends would have been glad to equalize the matter by the addition of Canada. While the hope of adding Canada to the United States had no part in the causes for declaring the war, yet its acquisition was regarded as a possibility devoutly to be wished for. If this had been a result of the War of 1812, Mr. Madison's name would now be lifted up to fame's pinnacle, on one continent at least. But the thing which was not impossible, and which would have more than compensated New England for all the pains and expense of the war, was prevented by her own bad conduct.

If New York and New England had at the very outset thrown all their strength on the side of the Administration, and rushed into the war with the prayerful impetuosity which characterized them in the Revolution, all Canada would have come into the possession of this Government without a blow from England, or a reverse to the arms of the Union. The New England descendants of the men of 1812 have nothing for which they may be proud of their ancestors in connection with this war. The three charges of resisting the National Government in its lawfully constituted administration, of foreign intrigue against it, of the first organized purposes of secession, they must bear forever, no matter how little truth there may be in some of these charges.

And the existence to-day of a foreign power, with its vexatious traits and troublesome regulations, and aristocratic and monarchic mummeries on the northern border of this nation, must be charged to the

perverseness of their stubborn ancestors of the War of 1812.

New England even put forth her efforts to prevent the Government loans being taken up, but without avail, as the very opposition seemed to stimulate confidence in the ability of the Government; and from the banks, and from David Parish, Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, and less wealthy individuals, the means of prosecuting the war were soon supplied.

Mr. Madison's timidity in the use of doubtful powers was, to some extent, corrected by the bolder spirit of his Secretary of State, but even with this needed spur at his side he soon discovered that with all the power conferred on the Executive, and of which he and his party had always seemed to stand in awe, and view with great jealousy, in time of war he was constantly cramped, and was forced to take advantage of every trace of law and authority, although it might be at the risk of his former principles and conduct.

In 1798, the celebrated "Alien and Sedition Laws were devised by the Federalists, mainly to meet a great emergency, and although one of these acts had expired by limitation during Mr. Adams's Presidency, and the other was mainly as dead from the outset, the Alien Act was now revived and with a supplemental provision actually made a law in July, 1812, by a Democratic Congress. By this measure Mr. Madison gained ground for an authority which he found necessary. In common with most of the Anti-Federalists, he had held the Alien Act to be unconstitutional, and was himself the author of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and the friend and defender of the Kentucky Resolutions of the same character, declaring

war and nullification against the Alien and Sedition Acts. And yet on the authority of one of these revived measures, which he and his party had called infamous above all things, Mr. Madison readily embraced the opportunity of appointing marshals to remove alien enemies to secure points within the country, and out of the way of injury to the cause the country had at stake. Circumstances had made a wonderful difference in the case.

CHAPTER XVIII.

WAR OF 1812-HULL'S SURRENDER-GREAT SUCCESSES OF THE LITTLE NAVY.

NOT

OTWITHSTANDING the want of preparation before the declaration of an actual state of war, the Administration made all possible exertions for a campaign in the summer of 1812, before Britain could have time to obstruct movements on the northern border.

On the 9th of August, 1812, Mr. Madison wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, General Dearborn:

"I am glad to find that you are again at Albany, where your presence will aid much in doing all that can be done for the reputation of the campaign. The lapse of time and the unproductiveness of the laws contemplating a regular force, and volunteers for an entire year, and under Federal commissions, compel us to modify some of our expectations. It was much to have been desired that simultaneous invasions of Canada, at several points, particularly in relation to Malden and Montreal, might have secured the great object of bringing all Upper Canada, and the channels communicating with the Indians under our command; with ulterior prospects towards Quebec flattering to our arms. This systematic operation having been frustrated, it only remains to pursue the course that will diminish the disappointment as much as possible."

It was, indeed, a grand system, and its frustration was the irreparable calamity of the war. When the declaration was actually made, Mr. Madison had entered with great spirit into this Canadian project, as in fact the only feasible one for fighting England without ships, and put forward every means for carrying

it out. In his great anxiety as to a fit military leader, he actually entertained designs of making Henry Clay, commander of the armies; and even if this intention had been put into practice the result could not have been more unfortunate than it was under the leaders selected.

Although England had been chosen as the least deserving of America's enemies, Mr. Madison was by no means satisfied with the course of Napoleon. On the 11th of August, 1812, he wrote to Joel Barlow:

"In the event of a pacification with Great Britain, the full tide of indignation with which the public mind here is boiling will be directed against France, if not obviated by a due reparation of her wrongs. War will be called for by the nation almost una voce. Even without peace with England the further refusal or prevarications of France on the subject of redress may be expected to produce measures of hostility against her at the ensuing session of Congress. This result is the more probable, as the general exasperations will coincide with the calculations of not a few, that a double war is the shortest road to peace."

This was daring enough language for a timid man, and shows how little of Mr. Madison's old affection for France was left. He had forgotten the great burden of gratitude with which "Helvidius" labored and wrestled in 1793, and that against the constituted authority of the land in trying times. Perhaps it may be deemed hardly good-humored to throw this error in his face at this point. But it only serves to give a little more vivid touch to the history of the moment. On the 17th of August, the President wrote to, Mr. Jefferson:

"The seditious opposition in Massachusetts and Connecticut, with the intrigues elsewhere insidiously co-operating with it, have so clogged the wheels of the war that I fear the campaign will not accomplish the object of it. With the most united efforts in stim