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steps the modesty of nature," will be equally, if not more determinedly firm, vivid, and strongly interwoven with the feelings of the heart. Moreover, as we have hitherto affirmed, and, as we now reiterate, not actuated by the spirit of prophecy, but by the influence begotten of a rational reflection, the principle which now guides them, if continued, will enable them to perfect the study of man, and give to America, and the world, not alone what civilization gave to Europe, but what she has never as yet given in any sphere, universal philanthropy, which shall rest on stable foundations, and defy the machinations of the wicked.

ART. V.-OUR SOLDIERS AT HOME AND IN THE FIELD.

1. Report of the Committee of the House of Commons appointed to Enquire into the Condition of the Army before Sebastopol, and into the Conduct of the various Departments of the Government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of the Army. March, 1855.

2. Hansard's Debates, 1855. Debates on the War, Passim. 3. The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army. Third Edition, 1844.

4. Addenda to the same up to March, 1854. Parker, Furnival and Parker. Whitehall: London.

But four short years ago and who so palmy and so proud as England! She had attained, as it seemed, the highest pinnacle of prosperity and strength. Throughout her vast empire there was peace, and while her rule was met with due and profound submission by the millions upon millions over whom it extends in both hemispheres of the globe, foreign countries seemed to be held in deep, admiring respect, if not in awe. Everything appeared to promise a calm and long enjoyment of the fruits of her wonderful industry, enterprize and skill, and of the at length fully pacified and consolidated acquirements of her wars and expeditions in times long gone

by.

In the myriad glitterings and fairy splendours of the Crystal Palace the meridian sun of England's glory seemed reflected, and the self-gratulatory excitement of the time denied all opportunity to the wholesome thought, that perishable as was the material of the Palace, transitory as itself it was, to the full as insecure and precarious might be found the palmy greatness of which that fair-shewing and vast-reaching edifice was in truth no inapt type.

The Crystal Palace has passed away, and the green sward of Hyde Park has resumed dominion over its site, and effaced even to the latest traces of the lofty, and mighty and resplendent erection. Even in like manner has passed away that brilliant shew of palminess and pride, which had as dazzling an effect upon the moral eye as the other upon the physical. True, there has arisen a successor to that other; a structure even more wondrous than before, but far away from the old, and differing in plan, and position and accessories. The omen will scarcely be accepted, for it would go to foretell one more of the great periodical changes among nations-an ending of the greatness and the glory of one empire, and the growing up and predominance of another.

Happily the parallel has not been carried out; and although the well being of our native Ireland has unfortunately not been proved to be a necessary consequence or concomitant of the power and prosperity of England, still we not the less ardently and earnestly hope, that beyond the undeniable circumstance of certain rather sharp but salutary mortifications to overblown pride, and disappointments of exaggerated notions and absurdly inflated expectations, the change will not proceed, at least in our age, whatever there may be in the decrees of Providence for the remote future.

It would be well, however, to take a lesson in time and lay it deep to heart. British power is not that overwhelming, allsubduing thing the British people were not a little inclined to imagine it. British wealth is very great indeed, and has done what seemned wonders, but it cannot, no matter how freely, how recklessly it may be used and expended, accomplish the miracles that were at least tacitly expected. Great Britain, in short, is not, and must not hope to be exempted from the common lot of nations as well as of individuals in this world of change and trial, and must expect, and however unpleasant the experience, must accept and undergo reverses and crosses

when the time appointed for them by Divine Providence happens to arrive. Instead of moaning or grumbling over her experience of this inevitable circumstance of mortal condition, it is for her to look forward with eyes at length fully opened to realities, and with her mind at length sobered down to a truer and juster estimate of the difficulties before and around her, and of the powers and capabilities of other nations. And severe as have been, not the mere disappointments of an exorbitant self-estimation, but the real and practical sacrifices and losses which the struggle in the Crimea has entailed upon her; there can, after all, be little doubt of her ultimate success if she be but true to herself, and not even for a moment yield to the depressing influences of this war's history in its first brief but most bloody page.

One lesson, and an obvious one, has already been taken. The mistake has been at length recognized and declared, of having allowed the military establishments of the Empire to be so reduced during the long and piping times of peace. The expenditure consequent on the maintenance of, let us say, an armed force even so large as to be double that which Great Britain has kept on foot during the last ten years, would yet have fallen short in the aggregate of what she has had to pay since the commencement of the war, for new and hasty levies, untried, undisciplined, and unseasoned, and for hasty enlargements of her transport system, her commissariat system, and all the other means and appliances and requisites of war on a great scale. And it has been wisely determined that no such blunder shall be made again, and that, be the war long, or be the war short, the military force of the country shall never again be permitted to fall so low as it was found to be on the outbreak of the present hostilities.

Besides this great blunder of principle, there were many blunders of detail, some large, some less so, but all of importance and heavy moment, which are likely to be, or at this present time are actually in progress of being corrected. The Parliamentary "Blue Book" to which we invite attention, the first among the texts set forth in the short preliminary index to the contents of this paper, affords ample means and opportunity of estimating the necessity, and in the various cases, almost the degree of required correction.

The "Blue Book" in question, the "Report of the Army before Sebastopol" Committee, as it has been succinctly

entitled in the Parliamentary Offices, needed assuredly no such phrases d'usage to prelude its revelations as those contained in its opening paragraphs. The public were quite and most fully aware of the difficulties in the way of the enquiry-the complication and variety of subjects-number and discrepancies of witnesses-deficiency of means of information on many points, and restricting effect of "considerations of State-Policy."

However, the delay of entering "in medias res" is so trifling as to be scarcely worth remark. The main subject is very speedily entered upon, under the division of two heads, viz: first, the Condition of the Army before Sebastopol," and secondly" the Conduct of the Departments both at home and abroad whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that Army."

The first of these heads is so briefly dispatched that we can afford space to quote in extenso the remarks of the Committee thereupon:

I.

"The Condition of our Army before Sebastopol.

"An army encamped in a hostile country, at a distance of 3,000 miles from England, and engaged during a severe winter in besieging a fortress which, from want of numbers, it could not invest, was necessarily placed in a situation where unremitting fatigue and hardship had to be endured. Your committee are, however, of opinion that this amount of unavoidable suffering has been aggravated by causes hereafter enumerated, and which are mainly to be attributed to dilatory and insufficient arrangements for the supply of this army with necessaries indispensable to its healthy and effective condition. In arriving at this opinion they have made allowance for the unexpected severity of the storm on the 16th of November, and they have not been unmindful of the difficulties which a long period of peace must inevitably produce at the commencement of a campaign. In order to obtain an adequate notion of the painful condition of the army the evidence must be perused; and your committee will only refer to such details as may be requisite to sustain their opinions.

From the 16th of September, when the army landed in the Crimea, until the end of October, or, as witnesses state, until about the middle of November, the troops suffered from overwork and from dysentery, but were not, upon the whole, ill-provided with food. Even at this period there was a want of clothing for the men in health, and a painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded. As the season advanced the causes of sick. ness increased, and the army, with its number of effective men daily diminishing, became more and more disproportioned to the amount of duty which it had to perform.

From the middle of November, this army was, during a period of

many weeks, reduced to a condition which it is melancholy to contemplate, but which was endured both by officers and men with a fortitude and heroism unsurpassed in the annals of war. They were exposed under single canvas to all the sufferings and inconveniences of cold, rain, mud, and snow, on high ground and in the depth of winter. They suffered from overwork, exposure, want of clothing, insufficient supplies for the healthy, and imperfect accommodation for the sick. The fatigue necessarily resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of the siege, the extent at front to be defended, the positions to be maintained, and the works to be undertaken, depended on military considerations, and were decided upon in conjunction with our allies. Your committee regard these matters as beyond the limits of their inquiry."

Why was there a want of clothing for the men in health during the early and lighter period here spoken of, viz: from the landing of the Allied Expedition in the Crimea on the 16th of September, until the middle of November? why was there also during that period a "painful deficiency of all appliances for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded."

These are momentous questions, as indeed are all the questions having reference to the terrible drama being enacted in the Crimea for the last ten months. The Report proceeds to answer them in somewhat of a roundabout fashion, by a kind of general history, or review of the Crimean Expedition itself, mixed up with statements of the constitution and powers of the governmental departments at home and in the East, upon which the responsibility rested of making adequate arrangements for the vigorous and successful prosecution of that Expedition, care of the Soldiery, &c., and after a good deal of particular censure and comment, the Report ends with laying the whole blame upon the Aberdeen administration, which they specially accuse of want of information on most necessary points, want of the most ordinary foresight, and consequent want of preparation for the needs and requirements of the Army.

Whatever may have been the shortcomings and blunderings of the Administration of Lord Aberdeen, it is hardly fair to seek to throw, as the Report of the "Sebastopol" Committee evidently labours to do, all the blame of deficiency of adequate military preparation for the war, upon that administration. In truth, the blame ought not to be thrown upon any particular set of ministers and scarcely upon any cabinet whatever. It more rightfully should fall upon those who really, though not

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