can be free, unless he shall have been freed by him who said, If the Son shall make you free, then shall you be free indeed *.

God created us possessed of Free Will; nor are we, by any Fatal Necessity, drawn either to virtue or to vice: for, where there is Fatal Necessity, there is no crown †.

III. The key to the whole matter, in short, is simply this.

Like many other persons, Mr. Milner has not sufficiently distinguished, between The Free Will of Spontaneous Mental Preference, and The Good Will of freely preferring Virtue to Vice.

By the ancients, on the contrary, who were frequently called upon to oppose the mischievous impiety of Fatalism while yet they stood pledged to maintain the vital doctrine of Divine Grace,

* Liberum itaque arbitrium, et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum, confitendum est nos habere: sed, in malo faciendo, liber est quisque justitiæ servusque peccati; in bono autem, liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab eo qui dixit, Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc verè liberi eritis. August. de Corrept. et Grat. c. 1. Oper. vol. vii. p. 471.

+ Item quod ait a memorato dictum esse presbytero (scil. Hieronymo); Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutem nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin, ubi necessitas, nec corona est: quis non agnoscat? Quis non toto corde suscipiat? Quis aliter conditam humanam neget esse naturam? Sed, in rectè faciendo, ideo nullum est vinculum necessitatis, quia libertas est charitatis. August. de Nat. et Grat. cont. Pelag. c. 65. Oper. vol. vii. p. 289.

this distinction was well known and carefully observed.

The Manichèans so denied Free Will, as to hold a Fatal Necessity of sinning, whether the Choice of the individual did or did not go along with the action *.

The Pelagians so held Free Will, as to deny the Need of Divine Grace to make that Free Will a Good Will t.

By the Catholics, each of these Systems was alike rejected. They held, that Man possesses Free Will: for, otherwise, he could not be an accountable subject of God's moral government. But they also held, that, In consequence of the fall, his Free

* Dicunt illi Manichæi: quia, primi hominis peccato, id est, Adæ, liberum arbitrium perierit; et nemo jam potestatem habeat bene vivendi, sed omnes in peccatum carnis suæ necessitate cogantur. Julian. Pelag. apud August. cont. Duas Epist. Pelag. lib. iv. c. 2. Oper. vol. vii. p. 400.

Οὐκ ἐχρῆν οὖν τὸν ἀποκρινάμενον πρὸς τὸ καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς μέγιστον κακὸν ἔχοντα τὸν λόγον, πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τοὺς Μανιχαίους μέγιστον κακὸν ἀποτείνεσθαι· ἀγνοίας γὰρ τοῦτο σημεῖον, καὶ ἀπορίας ἐλέγχου, καθὰ εἴρηται. Συγχωρεῖ δὲ ἡμᾶς πράττειν ἃ ἑκουσίως αἱρούμεθα κακὰ, οὐ διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως, ἀλλ ̓ ἵνα τὸ ἡμῶν αὐθαίρετον, καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ μακρόθυμον, δειχθῇ· ὧν χωρὶς, οὔτε ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωποι, οὔτε αὐτὸς, ἀγαθὸς ἐνεδέχετο εἶναι ἐπὶ τῆς παρούσης καταστάσεως. Quæst. et Respons. ad Græc. in Justin. Oper. p. 127.

+ Sunt enim quidam tantum præsumentes de libero humanæ voluntatis arbitrio, ut, ad non peccandum, nec adjuvandos nos divinitus opinentur, semel ipsi naturæ nostræ concesso liberæ voluntatis arbitrio. August. de Peccat. Merit. et Remiss. lib. ii. c. 2. Oper. vol. vii. p. 263.

Will was a Bad Will: whence, with a perfect conscious freedom of Choice or Preference, and without any violence put upon his Inclination, he, perpetually, though quite spontaneously, prefers unholiness to holiness; and thus requires the aid of Divine Grace to make his Bad Will a Good Will.

1. To this purpose, again and again, speaks Augustine: and, to this same purpose, Cyril of Jerusalem and Athanasius and Cyprian and Tertullian and Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch had similarly spoken before him.

(1.) Let us hear Augustine.

To live well and to act well, there is in man a freedom of will: but there are also divine testimonies, that, without the Grace of God, we can do no good thing*.

Free Will is always in us: but Good Will is not always in us. For either the will is free from righteousness, when it serves sin and then it is bad. Or it is free from sin, when it serves righteousness: and then it is good †.

:

*Sicut superioribus testimoniis Scripturarum probavimus sanctarum, ad bene vivendum et rectè agendum esse in homine liberum voluntatis arbitrium: sic etiam, de gratia Dei, sine qua nihil boni agere possumus, quæ sint divina testimonia, videamus. -Dictum est libero arbitrio; Fili, noli deficere a disciplina Domini: et Dominus dicit; Ego rogavi pro te, Petre, ne deficiat fides tua. Homo, ergo, gratia juvatur; ne, sine causa, voluntati ejus jubeatur. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 4. Oper. vol. vii. p. 460, 461.

† Semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper

We certainly may, if we will, keep God's commandments: but, because the preparation of the will is from the Lord, we must beg of him, that we may will so much as suffices us to do by willing. Assuredly, we will, when we will: but he causes, that we should will what is good*.

The human will is not taken away by the Grace of God; but it is changed from a Bad Will into a Good Will: and, when it has become a Good Will, it is assisted t.

(2.) Let us hear Cyril of Jerusalem.

Our Self-determining Free Will is evil, though it acts by a Free Choice: for, when we sin, it is by a deliberate Preference of evil to good. The Creator is holy but the creature,

est bona. Aut enim a justitia libera est, quando servit peccato; et tunc est mala: aut a peccato libera est, quando servit justitiæ; et tunc est bona. Gratia vero Dei semper est bona: et per hanc fit, ut sit homo bonæ voluntatis, qui prius fuit voluntatis malæ. Per hanc etiam fit, ut ipsa bona voluntas, quæ jam esse cœpit, augeatur, et tam magna fiat, ut possit implere divina mandata quæ voluerit, cum valdè perfectèque voluerit. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 15. Oper. vol. vii. p. 464.

* Certum est enim nos mandata servare, si volumus: sed, quia præparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus. Certum est, nos velle cum volumus: sed ille facit, ut velimus bonum. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 16. Oper. vol. vii. p. 465.

+ Gratiam Dei,-qua voluntas humana non tollitur, sed ex mala mutatur in bonam; et, cum bona fuerit, adjuvatur. August. de Grat. et Liber. Arbit. c. 20. Oper. vol. vii. p. 466.

by his own proper Choice, has turned to bitterness *.

(3.) Let us hear Athanasius.

After the fall, man's soul, deeming pleasure to be good, abuses the very name of goodness by applying it to pleasure. Henceforth, it no longer moves according to virtue or with any regard to God: but, highly esteeming worthless things, it abusively chooses them; inasmuch as it possesses the Self-determination of Free Will. For, as it can incline to what is good, so likewise it can decline from what is good. Yet, when it declines from what is good, it does so through a through a Free Preference and a Distinct Estimation of the contrary t.

(4.) Let us hear Cyprian.

* Κακὸν αὐτεξούσιον, βλάστημα προαιρέσεως καὶ, ὅτι γε αὐτοπροαιρέτως ἁμαρτάνομεν, λέγει που σαφῶς ὁ προφήτης.—Ὁ μὲν οὖν κτίστης ἀγαθὸς, ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, ἔκτισεν· τὸ δὲ κτισθὲν, ἐξ οἰκείας προαιρέσεως, εἰς πικρίαν ἐτράπη. Cyril. Hieros. Catech. ii. p. 5.

† ̓Αποστᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς τῶν νοητῶν θεωρίας, καὶ ταῖς κατὰ μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἐνεργείαις καταχρωμένη, καὶ ἡσθεῖσα τῇ τοῦ σώματος θεωρίᾳ, καὶ ἰδοῦσα καλὸν ἑαυτῇ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν, πλανηθεῖσα κατεχρήσατο τῷ τοῦ καλοῦ ὀνόματι, καὶ ἐνόμισεν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ἐρασθεῖσα δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ποικίλως αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖν ἤρξατο. Οὖσα γὰρ τὴν φύσιν εὐκίνητος, εἰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀπεστράφη, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι οὐ πανέται. Κινεῖται οὖν, οὐκ ἔτι μὲν κατὰ ἀρετὴν, οὐδὲ ὥστε τὸν Θεὸν ὁρᾷν· ἀλλὰ, τὰ μὴ ὄντα λογιζομένη, τὸ ἑαυτῆς δυνατὸν μεταποιεῖ, καταχρωμένη τουτῷ εἰς ἃς ἐπενόησεν ἐπιθυμίας· ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτεξούσιος γέγονε. Δύναται γὰρ, ὥσπερ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ νεύειν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀποστρέφεσθαι. ̓Αποστρεφομένη δὲ τὸ καλὸν, πάντως τὰ ἐναντία λογίζεται. Athan. cont. Gent. Orat. Oper. vol. i. p. 3, 4.