change in the risk, unless prohibited, does not per se avoid the policy, unless the change is such as to change the identity of the risk insured. In all other cases, proof of increase of risk must be shown.

opinion merely, upon the issue whether the risk was increased, when that depends upon facts which involve no peculiar science or information, but are within the common knowledge of men. Mulry v. Mohawk Valley Ins. Co., 5 Gray, 541; White v. Ballou, 8 Allen, 408; Durrell v. Bederly, Holt N. P. C. 283; Berthon v. Loughman, 2 Stark. R. 258; Campbell v. Rickards, 5 B. & Ad. 840; Hawes v. New England Ins. Co., 2 Curtis C. C. 230; 1 Arnould on Ins. 572." The case was sent back for trial upon the issue whether the risk was increased by the change.

SEC 254. Rule in Redfield v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co.

SEC. 284. Person liable for safe keeping of property.
SEC. 285. General creditor has no insurable interest.

SEC. 248. The contract being one of indemnity, it follows, as a matter of course, that the person insured must have an interest in the property, and be so situated in reference to it, that an injury thereto, or its destruction, would result in pecuniary loss to him.'

1 Carter v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 12 Iowa, 287; Rohrback v. Germania Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47. An executor or executrix may insure the property in her hands under the will, Phelps v. Gebhard F. Ins. Co., 9 Bos. (N. Y.) 404; an administrator, Herkimer v. Rice, 27 N. Y. 163; heirs at law, Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253; trustees, White v. Hudson R. Ins. Co., 7 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 341; common carriers, bailee, Savage v. Com. Ex. Ins. Co., 9 Bos. (N. Y.) 1; Stilwell v. Staples, 19 N. Y. 401; a tenant, Allen v. Franklin Ins. Co., 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 501; or any person having the custody of property for himself or another, and responsible for its safe keeping, has an insurable interest therein. Redfield v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co., 56 (N. Y.) 354; Bates v. Equitable Ins. Co., 10 Wall. (U. S.) 33; Palmer v. Pratt, 9 Moore 358; Clark v. Protection Ins. Co., 1 Story (U. S.) 109; Norcross v. Ins. Co., 17 Penn. St. 429; F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 11 Leigh (Va.) 354; Higginson v. Dall, 13 Mass. 96; Williams v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 1 Hilt. (N. Y. C. P.) 345 ; Crawford v. St. Lawrence Co. Ins. Co., 8 U. C. (Q. B.) 314; Milligan v. Equitable Ins. Co., 16 U. C. (Q. B ) 314; Van Natta v. Sun. Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Sand. (N. Y.) 490; De Forrest v. Fulton Ins. Co., 1 Hall (N. Y.) 84; St. John v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Duer (N. Y.) 419; Rankin v. Andes Ins. Co., 47 Vt. 144; Wilkes v. People's Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 184; Williams v. Smith, 2 Caines (N. Y.) 13; Perry Co., etc., Ins. Co., v. Stewart, 19 Penn. St. 45. Boston, etc., Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 12 Allen (Mass.) 381; Gordon v. Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co., 2 Pick. (Mass.) 249; Ins. Co. v.

Wagering policies of fire insurance, whether upon the property of the assured or of third parties, are not permitted. They would be illegal, as contrary to public policy, not only as gambling transactions. but as incentives to arson and fraud, nor, viewed in the second light, could it be otherwise than odious to any right-minded person to speculate upon the misfortunes of another. This would, indeed, seem to follow from first principles, and without seeking for anthority, but the rule which lies at the foundation of all contracts of marine insurance here meets us, and appears equally apposite-namely, that the assured, in becoming such, seeks not for gain, but strives only to guard against loss. "Assecuratus non quærit lucrum, sed agit ne in damno sit." Hence, fire insurance is, in its nature, a contract of indemnity. This definition may be considered as generally true, although like most other abstract propositions, when attempted in the law, cases may be imagined in which it may require to be received with some qualification. Such, for example, is that of a bailee not liable for loss by fire, who insures the property of his bailor, in which case the right to effect and recover upon the policy can scarcely be said to be coterminous with the beneficial ownership, so as to entitle the contract to be defined as an indemnity. It will be more correct to say that this contract, like every other which can be defined as an insurance, requires an interest in the assured to support it, or that he must possess, in insurance language, an insurable interest.'

Updegraff, 21 Penn. St. 513; Fenn v. N. 0. Ins. Co., 53 Ga. 578; The Southern, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 42 Ga. 587; Oakman v. Dorchester, etc., Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 57; Cumberland Bone Co. v. Andes Ins. Co., 64 Me. 466; Honore v. Lamar F. Ins. Co., 51 Ill. 509; Warren v. Davenport F. Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 44: Tallman v. Atlantic, etc., Ins. Co., 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Cases (N. Y.) 354; Rohrback v. Etna Ins. Co., 1 T. & C. (N. Y. S. C.) 339; Manley v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 1 Lans. (N. Y.) 20; Ins. Co. v. Chase, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 509; Russell v. Union Ins. Co., 4 Dall. (U. S.) 421; Dohn v. Farmers' Joint Stock Ins. Co., 5 Lans. (N Y.) 275; Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 25; 10 id. 507; Lawrence v. St. Marks F. Ins. Co., 43 Barb. (N. Y.) 479; Ins. Co. v. Baring, 20 Wall. (U. S.) 159; Seagrave v. Union Marine Ins. Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 305; Anderson v. Morice, L. R. 10 C. P, 58; Knox v. Wood, 1 Cowp. 543; Phillips v. Knox Co. Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Ohio 174; Sweeney v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 20 Penn. St. 337; Barker v. Marine Ins. Co., 2 Mass. (U. S.) 369; Brown v. Hall, F. C. (Sc.) 560; Ellis v. Safone, 8 Exchq. 546; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Janes, 49 Miss. 86; Cone v. Niagara Ins. Co., 60 N. Y. 619; Waring v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 506; Hill v. Secretan, 1 B. & P. 315; Goulstone v. Royal Ins. Co., 1 F. & F. 276; Protection Ins. Co. v. Hall, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 411; Locke v. North American Ins. Co., 13 Mass. 61; Converse v. Citizen's Ins. Co., 10 Cush. (Mass.) 37; Harris v. York Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Penn. St. 641; N. E. F. & M. Ins. Co., v. Wetmore, 32 Ill 22; Hand v. Williamsburgh, etc., Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 41; Curtis v. Home Ins. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S.) 485.

'Straccha de Assecurationibus, pt. 20, No. 4.

Personal nature of insurance contracts.

SEC. 249. The contract is personal, and insures, not the property, but the assured against loss by its destruction, consequently, does not pass as incident to the property, therefore, unless assigned with the consent of the insurer, it becomes inoperative when the interest of the assured in the property ceases. From this it follows that the assured must have an interest in the property, as well when the contract is entered into, as at the time of loss. "These policies," said Lord Chancellor KING, in a case before him," "are not insurances of the specific things mentioned to be insured, nor do such insurances attach on the realty, or in any manner go with the same as incident thereto by any conveyance or agreement, but are only special agreements with the assured against such loss or damage as they may sustain. The party insuring must have a property at the time of the loss, or he can sustain no loss; and, consequently, can be entitled to no satisfaction." "These policies are not in their nature assignable, nor is the interest ever intended to be transferred from one to the other without the express consent of the office." "Besides the appellants' claim is at best founded on an assignment never agreed for until the person insured had determined his interest in the policy by parting with his whole property, and never executed until the loss had actually happened." His Lordship thereupon dismissed the bill, and his decree was affirmed in the House of Lords.'

In another early case, an insurance had been effected in the Handin-Hand Fire Office, for a term of seven years, by a person having a term of six and a-half years only then to run. The obligation was, "to raise and pay out of the contribution stock the sum of £400 to the assured, her executors, administrators and assigns, so often as the house should be burnt down within the said term, unless the directors should build the said house, or put it in as good a plight as before the fire." Upon the back of the policy was an indorsement, that if the policy was assigned the assignment must be entered within twentyone days after the making thereof. After the expiration of the six

'Illinois Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Marseilles Mfg. Co., 6 Ill. 236; Murdock v. Chenango Ins. Co., 2 N. Y. 210; Wilson v. Hill, 3 Met. (Mass.) 66; Swift v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Vt. 305 n.; 2 Bennett's F. I. C. 466; Graham v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 2 Dis. (Ohio) 255; Gilbert v. N. American Ins. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 43. If the insurerer parts with his interest before loss, and is entirely divested thereof, his insurable interest is gone and the policy is absolutely void. Hidden v. Slater, etc., Ins. Co., 2 Cliff. (U. S. C. C.) 266.

Lynch v. Dalzell 3 B. & Par. Cas. 49.

Ladd Ins. Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 554.