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all of these limitations must be taken into account, and they must all apply to the case-not three or four of them, but all of them. The first, fourth, and fifth of these limitations do not appear to call for any explanation, but the meaning of the second and third may need some explanation.

As I understand them, the words "circumstances and conditions" mean the conditions that govern railway traffic, and the circumstances under which it is transported. To my mind these words are full of meaning. They comprehend all the circumstances and conditions that may justify differences in rates, such as competition with other railroads and with water routes, the volume and character of business at different points, the difference in terminal expenses, and the cost of service in each case. If the words used were "the same circumstances and conditions," ingenious railway gentlemen would be able to show that the circumstances and conditions were never exactly the same in any two cases. And they might also be able to show that they were not "similar," if that was the word used. But the words "substantially similar" impart enough latitude to the comparison to enable the courts to exercise a sound discretion and common sense in passing upon cases that may arise.

So far as any one railroad company is concerned, therefore, the sum which it may charge for a haul from one end of its railroad to the other end becomes the maximum amount it can charge for any shorter haul over that road in the same direction and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions when the shorter distance is included within the longer.

But the question that seems to trouble those who object to the section as it stands is, whether the maximum thus fixed is the sum which a railroad company charges upon shipments originating at and destined to points upon its own road, or whether the maximum is the sum which it accepts as its share of a through rate upon shipments passing over its road which originate at or are destined to points upon another road. It seems clear to me that there can be but one answer to that question. In the first place, the measure of the charge that may be made for the shorter distance is the sum that is charged for a longer distance over the same line and under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. The rates fixed by a railroad company between points upon its own road are clearly rates upon one line, or, in the terms of the bill, the "same line." A railroad company can make and control the rates upon its own road, and the section says that in making such rates the short-haul principle shall be observed. A railroad company can not control rates over the road of another company. But when two or more companies unite in making joint rates over their respective roads, they become in the eye of this bill one line, and this section says that the short-haul principle must be observed in making rates over that line, the two or more roads composing it being, within the meaning of the section, the same line so far as such joint rates are concerned. The word railroad is used throughout the bill and the word line is used only in this section. The courts will be bound to assume that the word line means something different from the word railroad, or it would not have been used in this one instance when the word railroad would naturally have been used if something different had not been intended. The word line means a railroad or a combination of railroads. It means a route. Section 7 of the bill requires the carriage of freights to be "treated as one continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of destination," and this could not be done in the case of ship

ments over connecting roads if the word used in this section was road," instead of "line."

Mr. GEORGE.

me.

Mr. CULLOM.

Mr. GEORGE.

"rail

I wish to ask the Senator a question, if he will allow

Yes, sir.

Does the Senator wish to be understood as saying that it is the meaning of this bill that the long and short haul provision does not apply; that is, that the circumstances are not substantially similar, where one of the points is a competing point and where one is not?

Mr. CULLOM. I mean to say simply this: You take one railroad, if you please, between the city of Washington and the city of New York; that railroad makes its schedule of rates and it publishes, under this bill, that schedule of rates, and so far as its operation on its own road, not in connection with other lines or roads, but on its own road, it is not at liberty to charge more for a shorter distance on that road between here and New York under like circumstances and conditions than it charges from here to New York.

Mr. GEORGE. But the point is this: I understood the Senator to say-and that is what I want to have settled-that if one point from which the shipment is made is a competitive point, either by having a competing railroad or by having water transportation, and the other point from which the shipment is made is not a competitive point, then the circumstances are not substantially similar.

Mr. CULLOM. I do say the facts should be considered.

Mr. GEORGE. Then let me say, that if I believed that that was the meaning of the bill and the courts would assent to it, I would vote against it, because with that construction upon those words the whole provision in the bill in reference to the long and short haul amounts to nothing.

Mr. CULLOM. If it does not amount to anything, it will not hurt anybody.

Mr. GEORGE. I do not want to hurt anybody, but to save somebody by a substantial provision on that subject.

Mr. CULLOM. So do I; but I do not want to humbug anybody either. The Senate, however, by a deliberate vote placed in the bill which was passed by the Senate during last session these words, "under like circumstances and conditions," and did it, the select committee not having reported those words to the Senate in the original bill.

Mr. GEORGE. I do not object to the words. I object to the interpretation which you put upon them. I do not believe that is the true and legal interpretation, and I protest that this bill shall go through here with an authoritative exposition or interpretation of the meaning of these words given them by the Senator. If that be the meaning I am against it.

Mr. CULLOM. The Senator from Mississippi has a right to put whatever construction on those words he chooses, and of course he will do so; but I say, not as the chairman of the committee, but simply as a Senator upon this floor, that those words were put in there by this Senate after the select committee had failed to report them, and they were put there because the original section reported by the committee was too rigid and it was feared that it would interfere with the general commerce of the country, and when they were put there they were put there to mean something, and they do mean something.

They mean just what they say, that you shall not charge more for the shorter than for the longer distance on the same line in the same

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direction under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, and those conditions and circumstances may be, if you please, the fact that one place is a competing point and that another place is not, the fact that one place furnishes a large amount of business and the waystation does not furnish perhaps more than a car-load, and that it incurs additional expense and all that sort of thing. No court, no commission, and no lawyer can afford to say that those words do not mean anything when they are put in there.

Mr. GEORGE. With that construction of it, I think the Senator gives away all the beneficial part of the bill.

Mr. CULLOM. The Senator does no such thing. The fact to-day is-and I want the Senator from Mississippi to hear itMr. GEORGE. I will listen.

Mr. CULLOM. The fact to-day is that there is an utter disregard by the railroads of the country of the circumstance that there are thousands and tens of thousands of shipments made under exactly similar circumstances and conditions where one is discriminated against and another is not, where one place is broken down and another is not, where one man gets rebate and another does not; and the purpose of this bill is to prevent that, in so far as we may be able to do it, without crippling the commerce of the country. Does not the Senator think there is something in it?

Mr. GEORGE. I think there is a good deal in the provision against discrimination and the provision against rebates, but I think that by the construction put upon the clause as to the long and short haul the Senator has destroyed the benefit of that provision.

Mr. CULLOM. The joint through rates, which are made by two or more railroad companies between points upon their respective roads, are made over an entirely different and distinct line from that over which any one of the companies individually makes rates. And they are also made under different "circumstances and conditions" from those which govern and determine rates made over a single railroad.

The two transactions are separate and distinct, neither being necessarily governed by the other. Furthermore, the making of joint through rates is specifically recognized by the bill in the section requiring publicity of rates, and nowhere in the bill can anything be found in relation to the division of a joint rate by connecting roads. I am satisfied, therefore, that the only construction that is warranted by the language of the section is the one I have given it, and that, instead of requiring rates to be measured by the percentage of a through rate which a road accepts, or of requiring through rates over connecting roads to be an aggregation of the local rates over each road, as some have claimed, the section as it stands simply requires that each railroad company shall observe the short-haul principle as to its own rates, and that the same principle shall also be observed by a combination of railroads as to the joint through rates between points upon their respective roads agreed upon by such a combination.

I have received a copy of the New York Times of the 5th instant, containing a long argument against this section by Mr. George R. Blanchard, commissioner of the Central Traffic Association. Mr. Blanchard is a very able man, and has a peculiar faculty for discovering practical difficulties that may arise under this bill. If his questions can be answered satisfactorily, as I think they can be, I feel sure that the bill can stand the test of practical operation reasonably well. In this letter Mr. Blanchard addresses some questions to me, which I will en

deavor to answer in order. In discussing the meaning of the shorthaul section Mr. Blanchard says:

Trattic is received at Fort Wayne:

1. From the Wabash Railway coming from Kansas City. This allows the lowest rate east of Fort Wayne.

2. From the nearer connecting Grand Rapids road. This allows more rate east of Fort Wayne.

3. From resident forwarders. This allows the highest rate east of Fort Wayne. It is a frequent happening that there comes to Fort Wayne, on the same day, one car from each of these sources, none of them being handled by the railways, (because the town grain cones from an elevator), and that the three cars go in the same train from Fort Wayne to the same consignee at New York, but at the said three different rates. It is therefore all transported out of Fort Wayne under substantially like conditions. Will Senator CULLOM kindly answer the following:

1. Would the transportation circumstances and conditions be substantially the same?

2. Is or is not the same rate required from Fort Wayne on the three cars, and if not, what difference may prevail?

3. Does this refer to commercial circumstances and conditions by which each point of origin is to be considered as changing them?

4. His original bill defined this looseness by saying "from the same original points of departure, or to the same point of arrival." How is it to be read now?

My answer to the first question is that, in the case stated by Mr. Blanchard, the transportation circumstances and conditions would not be the same as to the three cars in question, because one shipment originated at Kansas City, another on the Grand Rapids road, and another at Fort Wayne.

The second question is: "Is or is not the same rate required from Fort Wayne on the three cars; and if not, what difference may pre

vail?"

In answer, I say that the same rate or charge is not, in my opinion, necessarily required from Fort Wayne on each of the three cars, because they do not pass "over the same line" from point of shipment to place of destination within the meaning of the bill. The line from Kansas City to New York must observe the short-haul rule, and must not charge more from Fort Wayne than from the first point on that line west of Fort Wayne to which that particular combination of carriers makes joint through rates. The combination of carriers making joint rates from points on the Grand Rapids road to New York must observe the same rule. The shipment originating at Fort Wayne would be governed by the charge made from the next point west of Fort Wayne on the road between Fort Wayne and New York. The same rule must be observed in all these transactions as to each separate line, but the differences between the amounts actually received for the haul from Fort Wayne to New York in each case must depend upon the circumtances in each case.

I think Mr. Blanchard's third and fourth questions are sufficiently answered by what I have already said. In the same letter he propounds several questions to the Senator from Iowa [Mr. ALLISON] which I desire to notice. He quotes the following statement which the Senator is reported to have made:

When the Boston and Albany, New York Central, and Lake Shore combine and fix a through rate from Boston to Chicago, they can not charge more between Boston and Buffalo than the aggregate charge. That gives a wide latitude. It allows a charge of as much for 50 miles as for 500, though no more.

So far as the fourth section is concerned, the Senator from Iowa is reported to have said it.

Mr. Blanchard then asks: "How can the rate from Boston to Chicago be charged to Buffalo?"

My answer is that, if the combination of carriers named by the Senator agrees upon and publishes a schedule of joint rates between Boston and Chicago, the charge made to Buffalo must not exceed the sum charged to Chicago, but it may be the same, so far as this short-haul section is concerned. The prohibition made by this section is simply against charging more in the aggregate to Buffalo than to any point beyond Buffalo on the line composed of the three roads named. The charge to Buffalo must not exceed the amount charged to Chicago; but that is not all. It must not exceed the charge to any point between Buffalo and Chicago to which the combination composed of these three carriers makes joint rates.

If the charge to any of the intermediate points is less than the charge 'to Chicago, such smaller sum becomes the maximum amount that can be charged to Buffalo instead of the Chicago charge. This is as far as the short-haul section affects the charge to Buffalo. When a question is raised as to the right of the carriers to charge as much to Buffalo as to Chicago or to the next point west of Buffalo, that must be determined by the commission and the courts under the requirements of the bill that all rates must be reasonable and that no unreasonable preference must be given to any particular locality.

Mr. Blanchard's second question is: "Why is it the rate to Chicago rather than to Cleveland or Omaha which may be charged from Boston to Buffalo, and why is it any of them?"

It is to be presumed that under the requirements of the bill such joint through rates as those under consideration would be established and made public by the carriers. The illustration said to have been given by the Senator from Iowa referred to shipments over a line from Boston to Chicago composed of three railroads. The charge to Omaha does not govern the rates made on that particular line, because Omaha is not on the same line."

The charge made to Buffalo must not exceed the charge to Chicago, nor to Toledo, nor to Cleveland, nor to Erie, nor to the first point west of Buffalo on that line to which the three carriers named make joint rates. In this case the first requirement of the short-haul section is that the charge to Buffalo shall not exceed the charge to Chicago, which would be the largest amount that could be charged. But the maximum would be decreased as the charges to points between Buffalo and Chicago decreased, so that the smallest sum charged to any point beyond Buffalo would really become the maximum amount that could be charged to Buffalo.

Again, Mr. Blanchard asks:

If they can charge as much from Boston to Buffalo as three lines combined may charge from the same or further points to Chicago, why can not the charge be as much as six lines combined from Boston to San Francisco?

There is nothing in the short-haul section standing by itself that would prevent the same charge being made from Boston to Buffalo that is made from Boston to San Francisco, if we can assume that no smaller charge is made to any point between Buffalo and San Francisco. When the six carriers combine to make joint rates between Boston and San Francisco they become a different line, and not the line that we were talking about or that the Senator from Iowa is charged with having talked about, from Boston to Chicago. The charge this different combination could make to Buffalo would be limited first by its charge to San Francisco, then by its charge to Ogden if that was less, then by its charge to Omaha if that was less, then by its charge to Chicago if that was less, and finally by the lowest charge made to any point west

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