of cheap transportation, its earnings would be larger, but the per cent. of operating expenses would be increased; and to the extent that there was a net earning on this cheap class of freight just so far the company would be benefited. The long haul at cheap competing rates is really beneficial to the short haul at non-competing rates. It may be that neither alone would maintain the road. If I understand this bill correctly, under it the long lines of railroad passing through different States will have to give up one or the other. It will be practically a regulation of freight within the boundaries of a State and making a barrier of the boundary of a State to the free transmission of commerce.

Since the first road was built in the United States up to this time the railroads have substantially fixed their own rates for service, until to-day the rate is such as was not dreamed of as possible twenty years ago, nor was it believed possible even ten years ago. The whole country is developed. No product has suffered for want of movement. The general railroad management of the country is careful to consider what the cheap unmanufactured products of the country can afford to pay, and make their rates with a view that production shall not be hindered. The rates charged for manufactured goods, almost without an exception, do not affect the producer or the consumer. If the rates of freight upon manufactured articles were reduced one-half the probability is that there is nothing that moves by railroad over the longest line in the country whose price to the consumer would be affected or would be taken into consideration by the manufacturer; but the fractional part of a cent becomes a serious consequence in the long haul to most of the raw products of the country. The higher the maximums the lower the possible minimums.

Thus, in my own State, the maximum rates were 15 cents per ton per mile. With an average cost of 2 cents a mile for movement, which was about the average at one time, 1 ton of freight moved at 15 cents a ton per mile, would enable the railroad to move 14 tous at the minimum rate of 1 cent a ton per mile. There was at that time about 1 per cent. of the business done at the maximum rate, while the other 99 per cent. was done at rates governed by circumstances and influences which the railroad company could not control.

This bill seems to me not only to deny competition by railroads, which exist almost throughout the length and breadth of the country, but to exhibit a tendency to foster water ways to the positive discouragement of the railroad interests. If it aimed but to insure the water lines of communication against the competition of rails. I do not know how a bill could be framed to secure that object better than this one. If railroading is a legitimate business, and if it is only the aggregate of the private property contributed by the stockholders; if it is maintained and operated by the labor of individuals, what justification there can be for depriving the owners of control, and the property of its full earning capacity within the laws as they existed at the time of the original investments, I am unable to see. It seems to me, clearly, it is a violation of the rights of property, and the rights of the laborer to receive a compensation for services performed.

It is also a discouragement of this class of investments. The railroads up to this time have received the peculiar indorsement of being of such a highly beneficial character that the State could exercise the right of eminent domain to the end that the road might be built. If this bill shall become a law its consequences will be most disastrous, in my judgment, to the varied business interests of the country. When you think that most of the products of the country pass one or

more times over its railroads, of the many thousands of people who are engaged in their operation, the many more thousands whose calling depends upon these roads, and the vast volume of business and its great value that moves over them, it seems to me that Congress ought to consider with great care how far these investments, these industries of all kinds, may be disturbed. That they will be largely disturbed it seems to me must be plain to the dullest comprehension. While the railroad companies have practically been as free to manage their business under the common law as those engaged in other callings the country has prospered, accommodations have been given and are given that promote the prosperity of every industry. There has been no taking of property without compensation, no control without ownership, and the anarchists in the history of the country have thus far found little justification in the example of the Government for violent taking of property. There can be no valid objection to police regulation, but only to that attempted regulation which goes to and affects values directly and inevitably.

Mr. CULLOM. I call up the interstate-commerce conference report. I believe it comes before the Senate at this time, but if it is necessary to make a motion I move to take it up.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon, in the chair). The Senator from Illinois moves that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the conference report on the bill (S. 1532).

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate resumed the consideration of the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (S. 1532) to regulate commerce.

Mr. COKE. Mr. President, after fifteen years of agitation, during which the public mind has been enlightened by the most exhaustive and far-reaching discussion, we have reached a point where a conference committee of the two Houses of Congress have agreed upon and reported as a substitute for the two bills submitted to them a bill regulating commerce among the States"-interstate commerce. The question before the Senate is, shall the report of the committee be adopted and the bill passed? Is the bill constitutional? Are its provisions just to the people and to the railroad corporations? Is there a general public demand for a law regulating interstate commerce, and is such a law necessary? If these questions can be answered in the affirmative, as I believe they can, then it is unquestionably true that the conference report should be adopted.

I have heard no constitutional objection seriously urged to the bill save and except that in the argument of the Senator from Alabama [Mr. MORGAN], which he frankly acknowledged to be at war with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which decisions, I will add, commence with the great case of Ogden vs. Gibbons, in the time of Chief-Justice Marshall, and run in an unbroken line down to this hour, all affirming the sole and exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, whether carried by land or water, to be in Congress. The breadth and comprehensiveness of the power may be seen from the following, which I read from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons vs. Ogden:

"Commerce in its amplest signification means an exchange of goods, but, in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, and various mediums of exchange become commodities and enter into commerce. The sub

ject, the vehicle, the agent, and their various operations become the objects of commercial regulation. Ship-building, the carrying-trade, and propagation of seamen are such vital agents of commercial prosperity that the nation which could not legislate over these subjects would not possess the power to regulate

commerce.

Every decision of the Supreme Court since Ogden es. Gibbon has been in line with the opinion in that great case, so that the doctrine announced in it is to-day as firmly established and as unquestioned as any other in the Constitution or administration of our Government. No single case in the whole range of our jurisprudence can be found which impugns it. It makes no difference how the commerce is carried, whether on land or water, in ships or boats, or in cars, the doctrine is held to be equally applicable. The argument of the Senator from Alabama is an arraignment of this whole course of decision; and if he could convince the Senate that no constitutional power exists in Congress to enact such legislation as is provided for in the pending bill; that it is an infringement of the rights of the States, the Supreme Court of the United States, continuing as, of course, it will, to hold all State legislation which attempts to regulate interstate commerce absolutely null and void, the question would be left, where it now is, in the hands of irresponsible and unrestrained railroad corporations, with power to tax the products of industry of this country at will.

In the inception of the agitation on this subject a denial of the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in the mode now proposed was a favorite argument of those who opposed any legislation on the subject; but in later years, under the light of investigation and discussion, and especially of the later decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which have amplified and extended the scope of the doctrines laid down in Gibbons vs. Ogden to embrace the widened and widening circle of commercial activity and development of this great era, this argument has been so far abandoned as to be rarely heard, and when suggested at all is not pressed or seriously relied on.

The objections almost exclusively relied on against the bill go to its wisdom and expediency and its alleged injustice to the railroad corporations. I do not propose to go into the details of the bill nor to do more than state very briefly my reasons, without elaboration, for the vote I shall cast in favor of it, but undertake to affirm confidently that the intelligent judgment of the country will approve it, not because it is all the people have a right to demand, or because it gives them justice, but because while falling greatly below the standard in both of these regards it is a beginning, it is a good long step in the right direction, which may be added to and supplemented in the future, and by the light of experience perfected so as to be absolutely just and effective. A brief glance at the leading points of the bill as reported from the conference committee will, I think, justify this assertion. They are: First. That all charges shall be reasonable and just.

Second. That there shall be no discrimination between persons or firms, either directly or indirectly, by special rates, rebate, drawback, or any other device, but that all shall be treated equally and alike for

like and contemporaneous service.

Third. That no undue or unreasonable preference or advantage shall be given to any particular person, firm, company, corporation or lo

cality.

Fourth. That no greater compensation shall be charged for the short than for the long haul, where both are made under substantially similar conditions and circumstances over the same line and in the same direction, provided that in special cases, upon application to the com

missioners, they may upon investigation relax the rule; and provided further, that nothing contained in the bill shall be construed to authorize the charge of as much for the short as the long haul.

Fifth. It declares unlawful any combination, contract, or agreement between railroad corporations for the pooling of freights of different and competing roads, or to divide between them the earnings of such roads, provides penalties, and declares each day of the violation of the law a separate offense.

Sixth. It requires all schedules of rates plainly printed, and posted at all depots and stations for public inspection. It forbids any advance in rates as published except upon ten days' notice duly published. Reduction of rates may be made without notice.

These are the leading, salient points of the bill, the remainder of it being mainly administrative in its character and devoted to the methods of enforcing the provisions named.

Now, Mr. President, I assert, without the fear of successful contradiction, that these provisions are in substantial if not literal accord with the common law governing common carriers as known and practiced in the States of the Union so far as the rights of the public and the duties and obligations of the carriers are concerned.

The penalties for violation of the law and the means of enforcing it involve some departure from common-law methods, but this is rendered necessary by the inadequacy of ordinary remedies in the hands of a citizen for the enforcement of the law or the vindication of his rights against powerful railroad corporations. It is this consideration which justifies the appointment of a commission and devolves upon it the important part it is to perform in securing an enforcement of the law.

This bill, except as to remedies, is in substance and legal effect, so far as they are applicable to conditions here, a substantial epitome of the English statutes, which confessedly are only a codification of the English common law of common carriers, the source of our common law on the same subject. There is but one substantial exception to this proposition, and that is as to combinations and agreements between railroad corporations, which, in some cases, are permitted under the English law, but forbidden under this bill. As this fact has been adverted to in the debate in justification of the pooling system here, I will read from an able argument of Mr. Simon Sterne, of the New York bar, made before the House Committee on Commerce, extracts from the English statutes and some of his observations thereon, which show how this phase of the subject has been met in England, from which it will be seen that no argument in favor of the American system of pooling can be drawn from that in England.

I read from page 121 of arguments and statements before the House Committee on Commerce. Mr. Sterne quotes at length section 90 of the English Railway Clauses Act," which reads as follows:

Whereas it is expedient that the company should be enabled to vary the tolls upon the railway so as to accommodate them to the circumstances of the traffic, and that such power of varying shall not be used for the purpose of prejudicing or favoring particular parties, or for the purpose of collusively and unfairly creating a monopoly, either in the hands of the company or of particular parties, it shall therefore be lawful for the company, subject to the provisions and limitations herein, and in the special act contained, from time to time to alter or vary the tolls by the special act authorized to be taken, either upon the whole or any particular portion of the railway, as they shall think fit: Provided, That all such tolls be at all times charged equally to all persons and after the same rate, whether per ton per mile or otherwise, in respect of all passengers and of all. goods, or carriages of the same description, conveyed or propelled by like carriages or engines passing only over the same portion of the line of railway under the same circumstances. And no reduction or advance in any such tolls

shall be made either directly or indirectly in favor of or against any particular company or persons traveling upon or using the railway.

Then he proceeds:

The railway clauses act" of 1863 made all agreements between railway compantes, either in the way of working arrangements or for purposes of consolidation, lease, or of any other device by which railways had down to that period extended their powers, subject not only to the sanction of their shareholders, but subjected sach agreements also to the supervision of the board of trade, in its twenty-fifth clause, in these words:

"The agreement shall not have any operation until it is approved by the board of trade, and the board of trade shall not approve the agreement without being satisfied of its having received the sanction of meetings of the respective companies, as aforesaid."

And here allow me to observe parenthetically that the board of trade of England is a branch of its executive government, the president of which is a member of the cabinet, and not a voluntary organization.

Even after the consent of the board of trade is obtained it is provided by the twenty-seventh section of this act that at the expiration of the first or any subsequent period of ten years after the making of the agreement, the board of trade may, if they are of the opinion that the interests of the state are preju-s dicially affected thereby, cause the same to be revised, and the board of trade may require the companies who are parties thereto to publish sneh notice of any intended revision of the agreement as the board of trade might direct, and the board of trade may modify the agreement in such manner as may seem expedient for the protection of the interests of the public, and may declare the modification to be part of the agreement, and the same shall be read and take effect accordingly,

All the powers under these acts to be exercised by the board of trade were by the subsequent act of 1873 transferred to the railway commissioners appointed under that act.

Speaking of the English railway commission, on page 124, Mr. Sterne

says:

Now, it is proper to observe right here that this commission is not at all what an American railway commission has down to this period of time been.

The railway commissioners appointed by the various States are, with scarcely an exception, a mere perpetual committee of investigation to advise the Legislature as to the infringement of laws by the railway corporations and to recommend remedies. They have no judicial powers. On the other hand, this English railway commission is in every sense a court of justice. The difference between it and the ordinary courts of Westminster Hall is not one of power, but of limited jurisdiction; it does swift and prompt justice, and appeals from this body are within the jurisdiction of the commission itself. The act creating this court is known as the "regulation of railways act of 1873 (36 and 37 Vietoria, ch. 448). It creates a court of three judges, one of whom is a railway expert, the second a lawyer, and the third a statesman. The terms of the act creating this commission are, first, a transfer to this body of all the powers which have been given to the board of trade and to the court of common pleas, of supervision of contracts and enforcement of liabilities and duties: a general investiture of jurisdiction under the railway and canal traffic act of 1854, to Investigate and redress all cases of undue or unreasonable preference or advantage in favor of or against any particular person or company, or of any particular description of traffic, or by which any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever is created; the enforcement of through rates; the enforcement of all requirements with reference to the publication of rates; the railway commissioners are clothed with the power to require the companies to distinguish in suh books how much of the rate is for the conveyance of the trails and how much for terminal charges, instead of imposing that duty upon the private freighter,

The commissioners likewise have power to hear and determine any question or dispute which may arise with respect to the terminal charges of any railway company, where such charzes were not fixed by any act of Parliament, and to decide what is a reasonable sum to be paid to any company for loading unloading. Covering, collection, and delivering, and other services of a like nature, and making the decision of the commissioners under this section binding in all courts and in all legal proceedings whatsoever (see, 15), Allagreements between railway companies and canal companies, or between railway companies themselves, are made subject to the revisory powers of the commission. A month's publication of any proposed agreenient between railway companies is required, so that it shall be deposited for public inspection at the office of the don, Edinburgh, and Dublin Gazettes. The act gave to the commission full Elaborate provision is also made for publication in the Lonpower of inspection of the railways themselves, and of all their books, papers.

commissioners.