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between New York and Chicago can afford to carry through freight cheaper than local freight.

The majority of the freight brought from Chicago to the seaboard scarcely pays the cost of moving it, but at the same time I think it is a decided advantage to the railroad to have it, for reasons so often stated I need not repeat them. I wish to say a word about the pooling section, but will not do so now, as I seem to be occupying the time of the Senator from Delaware [Mr. SAULSBURY].

Mr. ALDRICH. Will the Senator from Tennessee allow me to trespass on his good nature, and ask him one question?

Mr. HARRIS. Most certainly.

Mr. ALDRICH. I should like to ask him the same question which was asked of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. CULLOM] yesterday in regard to the case of the Boston and Albany Railroad, freight being delivered to it at Albany of the same character and in the same qualities from half a dozen different places. Take the case, for instance, of a ton of freight from California at a low through rate. Would the portion which the Boston and Albany Railroad should receive on account of that freight fix any limit for freight delivered at Albany by a local shipper, or freight shipped from Buffalo or from Syracuse to go over the Boston and Albany road?

Mr. HARRIS. This bill authorizes two or more common carriers to unite to make an extended long line of transportation, and that long line becomes a carrier independent of and separate from either of the lines and all of the lines that compose it. That common carrier so created by contract has the right of all other carriers to fix and publish its rates from one end of the line to the other, from the intermediate points to the end of the line as long as two or more carriers or companies are involved in the carriage.

Now, take the case that I put where the combined carrier composed of four independent roads fixes a rate of $200 from San Francisco to New York, of $150 from Ogden to New York, of $100 from Omaha to New York. Then the rule would be, as I understand it, that that carrier can not charge for a car-load of freight from any point between San Francisco and Ogden to New York more than $200. It may charge that much under the fourth section. It can not charge more than $150 from any point between Ogden and Omaha to New York. It may charge that much under the fourth section. It can not charge more than $100 from any point east of Omaha to New York. It may charge that much under my construction of the fourth section.

Mr. ALDRICH. I fear that I failed to make myself understood in my question to the Senator from Tennessee. The question I will repeat in another form. If the Boston and Albany Railroad receives a certain sum as freight in the aggregate for the transportation of a barrel of flour from Albany to Boston, that flour having been shipped from Chicago, is that a measure of the compensation which it must charge and receive for a local shipment from Albany to Boston?

Mr. HARRIS. That would depend entirely, in my opinion, upon whether this was a continuous and through shipment from San Francisco to Boston, or whether it was a shipment to Albany and then reshipped to Boston.

Mr. ALDRICH. Suppose it to be a through shipment?

said.

Mr. HARRIS. That I have already answered by what I have already The short-haul provision would only affect that shipment, as I have already explained. It would fall within the last and lowest

through rate made by that carrier.

For a short haul more can not be charged than the maximum of the long haul.

Mr. ALDRICH. But, as I understand the Senator now, the aggregate compensation received in one case would be no measure and no criterion of the actual sum to be charged upon another.

Mr. SAULSBURY. Mr. President, the importance of this bill will not only justify but demands the fullest consideration which the Senate can give toit. It proposes to deal with questions that may affect seriously not only the vast railroad systems of the country, but all other common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. When we consider the number and length of the railroads of the country, the vast expenditure in their construction, and the great number of persons engaged and interested in their operation-to say nothing of the common carriers upon the natural highways, the rivers and navigable streams of the country, and the value of the property, and the number of persons connected therewith-the necessity for due and careful consideration will at once appear. Nearly all our artificial as well as natural highways are mediums of interstate commerce. Almost every railroad, by consolidation with other lines, becomes a part of a system extending over contiguous and even distant States, forming links in chains of railway which bear to market the traffic of distant communities and furnish the means of intercourse and travel for citizens of different States of the Union.

If we look therefore only at the vast interests of the common carriers which may be affected by the bill, it is sufficient to challenge the most careful examination in order that no injury may unwittingly be inflicted upon interests so great, not imperatively demanded for the protection of the people who are compelled to use those mediums of commerce in the transportation of their persons and property from one State to another. In the consideration of this bill it is proper also to take into account the vast amount of traffic, to say nothing of travel, carried on over these railroads and navigable streams, and dependent upon common carriers not only for the means of transportation but also very largely for its value. It has been estimated that our domestic commerce is not less than $18,000,000,000 annually, and much of this large amount is dependent upon the common carriers for transportation and forms a large part of interstate commerce dealt with by the provisions of this bill No member of this Senate does, and I may say no sane man can, desire to see injury inflicted upon the common carriers of the country or the commerce dependent upon them for transportation.

The bill deals with the carriers of interstate commerce alone, but as I have already said this designation applies to almost every railroad and navigable stream in the country, so that it may be said that almost all the commerce carried on by rail or water may possibly be affected by the provisions of this bill as well as the carriers themselves. Great, however, as may be the interests to be affected by the passage of this bill it is before us for our action, and we must meet the responsibility imposed upon us, as I have no doubt every member of this body will do, with an earnest desire to deal justly and fairly with every interest involved. That Congress has the power to make rules regulating commerce between the States of the Union will not be denied by any one. Indeed, such power is expressly given in the Constitution, and has never been questioned in any quarter, however much the propriety of its exercise in particular cases and the extent to which it may have been carried may have been doubted.

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution in which this power

was granted by the States to Congress interstate commerce was carried on almost exclusively by the natural highways of commerce the rivers and other navigable waters of the country. No one thought of railroads or other medium of overland transportation, unless the idea of short canals connecting neighboring streams had at that early day been conceived. More than forty years elapsed from the adoption of the Constitution and the grant of power therein to Congress over the subject of regulating commerce between the States before any railroad was projected in the country. It is very doubtful, at least, whether such an unrestricted grant of authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce would have been made had the framers of the Constitution believed that it would be ultimately carried on by artificial highways constructed under State authority. I think it may be safely affirmed that the States never would have consented to surrender the entire control over roads created by their authority within their own limits, even when engaged in interstate commerce by reason of connection with other lines of road.

Almost all the railroads in the country have been constructed under charters granted by the States. They owe their existence and franchises to the States that created them, and generally their charters have conferred upon them exemptions, privileges, and immunities of the most valuable and liberal character. The anxiety of the people of the several States for railroad facilities has induced their Legislatures to grant to these companies all the rights and privileges deemed essential for their successful operation, and not infrequently have granted them pecuniary aid as well as valuable exemption not enjoyed by natural persons. Until very recently no one doubted that the States themselves might exercise a supervisory control over these corporations created by their authority and existing within their own limits and jurisdiction, unless they had deprived themselves of such control by express provisions in the acts incorporating those companies.

But by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States it seems that railroad companies existing under State anthority, and claiming every right which they enjoy by virtue of that authority, may withdraw themselves largely from the control of the power that created them by forming connections with other roads chartered by other States so as to form a part of a continuous line for the transportation of commerce from one State to another.

Now, while I do not believe that the decision referred to "the Wabash, Saint Louis and Pacific Railway Company vs. The People of the State of Illinois" is a correct interpretation of the power of the States

over their

judges more in accordance with the true intent and meaning of the provision of the Constitution relating to the regulation of commerce, still I recognize the decisions of that court as fixing a limitation on the power of the States over the roads which they have created; and the investiture of Congress with the only control that can be exercised over any railroad management, which, by connections and consolidations, forms part of a continuous line of railway over which commerce may be carried on between persons residing in different States of the

own corporations, and think the opinion of the dissenting

Union.

If the States could exercise what I believe their just rights, and protect their own citizens against unfair discriminations and extortions, I should prefer to leave to them the absolute control of dealing with the questions embraced in the pending bill. No State would legislate oppressively upon her common carriers.

The dependence of her people

upon them for transportation would insure the railroads against hostile acts, independent of the potent influence which such corporations are supposed to exert wherever they exist. I have not much doubt that it would be better both for the railroads and the people if this whole question could be dealt with by the States. But since this is not permitted-and no State can now interfere with the operation of any railroad company, however extortionate and unjust, which is engaged in interstate commerce-the only remedy possible is such as Congress may provide.

The question is therefore presented broadly and distinctly: Shall Congress interpose a restraining hand upon these corporations or shall they be permitted to do as they please in their dealings with the vast interests dependent upon them-discriminating, in the facilities which they afford and the charges which they exact, between different persons and communities—exacting from some more than just compensation for services rendered, to indemnify themselves for losses sustained by favors and privileges awarded to others? These discriminations and unjust exactions have brought this question here. Complaints have been made from time to time, many of them perhaps without just cause, and appeals for relief have been heard from every quarter. Shall Congress now attempt a remedy or respond to these appeals by a refusal to do anything to correct abuses?

And, now, Mr. President, turning to this bill, I desire to say that I am not at all sanguine that it will prove an adequate remedy for the wrongs it seeks to correct. It is the commencement of legislation new to Congress, and deals with questions upon which we have no experience in this country to guide us.

Any legislation upon the subject must necessarily be very largely experimental. What its effect upon common carriers or upon shippers may be, is but a matter at present of conjecture. Time, however, will reveal the defects of the bill, should it become law, and future legislation can remedy its errors. Should action be deferred for years to come, it is doubtful whether Congress would be better qualified to legislate upon the subject.

This bill has been very maturely considered in both Houses and is the result of the best judgment that could be formed upon the subject. If it proves adequate as a remedy for existing evils in the transportation of persons and property, without doing injustice to carriers, it will prove a boon to the country of inestimable value. If it fails as a perfect remedy and leads to future legislation which shall have that result it will be no less salutary and beneficial both to the common carriers and to those who are compelled to use them. Let us turn now to the provisions of the bill to see what it proposes. I shall refer very briefly only to some of the more important provisions of the bill and shall not consume the time of the Senate further than is necessary to indicate my opinion in reference to them.

The first section of the bill defines the class of common carriers to which its provisions apply, namely, such as are engaged in interstate commerce; and exempts from its operation such as are operating wholly within the limits of one State, and then provides that all charges for the transportation of persons and property by such carriers, including all services rendered therewith, shall be reasonable and just, and declares all unreasonable and unjust charges for such services unlawful. No one, I suppose, can object to this provision of the bill. Differences may arise as to what constitutes an unreasonable and unjust charge, but no one will contend that any charge should be made that is not

just and fair. The railroads may not desire that any interference should be had with their right to charge what they please for any service they render, but they will not contend that any injustice is done to them in prohibiting and declaring unlawful all unjust and unreasonable charges which they may make. There is nothing in this section, therefore, to which a valid objection can be made.

The second section prohibits and declares unlawful any discriminations between persons made by common carriers in charges for "transportation of like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." whether such discriminations are made "directly or indirectly by special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device. This provision is designed and will doubtless have the effect to break up a practice which is said to obtain in railroad management of charging large shippers and favorites less than is charged to those who ship less. While the railroads doubtless make more profit from the business of large shippers than is realized from the business of smaller shippers, and perhaps from its bulk can really afford to carry their freight at a less rate, still such discrimination has been a source of constant complaint and has operated to the prejudice of the small shippers by enabling their favored competitors to outbid them for the goods which they thus ship at a lower rate. Such discriminations will, in the judgment of mankind, always be deemed unjust, and the bill wisely and properly seeks to prevent them.

The third section of the bill makes it unlawful for a common carrier "to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic in any respect;" and it also makes it unlawful for any carrier "to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect.' What would constitute undue and unreasonable preference or advantage" or undue and unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" is not specifically declared, and for that reason apprehensions have arisen in the minds of very worthy and intelligent persons that it imposes improper restrictions upon common carriers, and will operate to the prejudice of shippers of certain classes of produce who need special accommodation in the transportation of their goods to market.

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Perishable freights, for instance, require rapid transit in order to prevent decay and loss in marketable value, and it is very natural that shippers of such products should feel anxious that no impediment should be placed in the way of securing the necessary and customary facilities which they enjoy for the speedy delivery of such freights to the markets to which they are consigned.

In my own State, as in many other sections of the country, the cultivation of fruits is a very important industry, and the growers and shippers of fruits, by arrangements with the railroads, have for years enjoyed the necessary facilities for the speedy delivery of their products paratively but little value, and the fruit culture would have to be aban

to market.

doned.

Without such facilities their produce would have com

If it were possible to put a construction upon this section which would prevent the railroads from giving every needed facility for the

rapid

transportation of perishable articles, or impair in the least the opportunities which such shippers enjoy, I could not and would not vote for the bill; but I do not believe such construction possible. It would not be held by any railroad company or any court in the country

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