Further on in the Senator's remarks he said, in further reply to my interrogatory: The limitations placed upon the prohibition that is made are very significant, and they must not be overlooked. They require that in determining the sum that may be charged for a shorter as compared with a longer distance, the comparison must be made 1. Between shipments "of like kind of property." 2. Under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." 3. "Over the same line." 4. In the same direction." 5. When the shorter is "included within the longer distance." When the act is to be applied in any given case to measure the charge that may be made for any distance, as compared with a longer distance, all of these limitations must be taken into account, and they must all apply to the case-not three or four of them, but all of them. The first, fourth, and fifth of these limitations do not appear to call for any explanation, but the meaning of the second and third may need some explanation. As I understand them, the words "circumstances and conditions" mean the conditions that govern railway traffic, and the circumstances under which it is transported. To my mind these words are full of meaning. They comprehend all the circumstances and conditions that may justify differences in rates, such as competition with other railroads and with water routes, the volume and character of business at different points, the difference in terminal expenses, and the cost of service in each case. * Mr. GEORGE. I wish to ask the Senator a question, if he will allow me. Mr. GEORGE. Does the Senator wish to be understood as saying that it is the meaning of this bill that the long and short haul provision does not apply: that is, that the circumstances are not substantially similar where one of the points is a competing point and where one is not? Mr. CULLOM. I mean to say simply this: You take one railroad, if you please, between the city of Washington and the city of New York; that railroad makes its schedule of rates and it publishes, under this bill, that schedule of rates, and so far as its operation on its own road, not in connection with other lines or roads, but on its own road, it is not at liberty to charge more for a shorter distance on that road between here and New York under like circumstances and conditions than it charges from here to New York. Mr. GEORGE. But the point is this: I understood the Senator to say--and that is what I want to have settled-that if one point from which the shipment is made is a competitive point, either by having a competing railroad or by haying water transportation, and the other point from which the shipment is made is not a competitive point, then the circumstances are not substantially similar. Mr. CULLOM. I do say the facts should be considered. Mr. GEORGE. Then let me say, that if I believed that that was the meaning of the bill and the courts would assent to it, I would vote against it, because with that construction upon those words the whole provision in the bill in reference to the long and short haul amounts to nothing Mr. CULLOM. If it does not amount to anything, it will not hurt anybody. Mr. GEORGE. I do not want to hurt anybody, but to save somebody by a substantial provision on that subject. Mr. CULLOM. So do I; but I do not want to humbug anybody either. The Senate, however, by a deliberate vote placed in the bill which was passed by the Senate during last session these words, "under like circumstances and conditions," and did it, the select committee not having reported those words to the Senate in the original bill. Mr. GEORGE. I do not object to the words. I object to the interpretation which you put upon them. I do not believe that is the true and legal interpretation, and I protest that this bill shall go through here with an authoritative exposition or interpretation of the meaning of these words given them by the Senator. If that be the meaning I am against it. Mr. CULLOM. The Senator from Mississippi has a right to put whatever construction on those words he chooses, and of course he will do so; but I say, not as the chairman of the committee, but simply as a Senator upon this floor, that those words were put in there by this Senate after the select committee had failed to report them, and they were put there because the original section reported by the committee was too rigid and it was feared that it would interfere with the general commerce of the country, and when they were put there they were put there to mean something, and they do mean something. They mean just what they say, that you shall not charge more for the shorter than for the longer distance on the same line in the same direction under sub IS C-12 stantially similar circumstances and conditions, and those conditions and circumstances may be, if you please, the fact that one place is a competing point and that another place is not, the fact that one place furnishes a large amount of business and the way station does not furnish perhaps more than a car-load, and that it incurs additional expense and all that sort of thing. No court, no commission, and no lawyer can afford to say that those words do not mean anything when they are put in there. Mr. GEORGE With that construction of it, I think the Senator gives away all the beneficial part of the bill. I think that by the construction put upon the clause as to the long and short haul the Senator has destroyed the benefit of that provision. From the foregoing it will be seen that the author of this bill [Mr. CULLOM] and its able manager and principal defender on this floor, acknowledges in unequivocal terms that in determining the sum that may be charged for a shorter as compared with a longer distance, the comparison must be made: 1. Between shipments "of like kind of property;" 2. Shipments "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions;" 3. "Over the same line;" 4. In the same direction;" 5. "When the shorter is included within the longer distance;" and that when the act is to be applied in any given case to measure the charge that may be made for any distance as compared with a longer distance, all of these limitations must be taken into account and they must all apply to the case. Not three or four of them, as so well stated by the Senator, but all of them. And what do we find transpiring on this very floor in reference to the meaning of these specific words and to the construction that must be placed upon them? We find the honorable Senator from Mississippi [Mr. GEORGE] rising in his place and declaring that if this clause is to receive the construction placed upon it by its author, that then, to use his own language The whole provision in the bill in reference to the long and short haul amounts to nothing. And further, that If that is the meaning of your bill I will vote against it. It is due, however, to the Senator from Mississippi that it should be stated that he favors the bill as I understand, but differs with the honorable Senator from Illinois, its author, as to the construction these words must receive. That the construction, however, placed upon them by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. CULLOM], its author, is the correct one, and that which will be given it by the courts in the event of this bill becoming a law without amendment of this provision, I do not doubt for a single moment. That is the construction which the conference committee evidently, yes avowedly, intended the section should receive. Mr. GEORGE. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him? Mr. GEORGE. Unless I was unfortunate in expressing myself, the Senator from Oregon has attributed to me as attaching too much importance to the construction placed on that clause of the bill by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. CULLOM]. Of course I disagree with him and very radically; but still, even if he were correct in his construction of the bill, though I would be opposed to that provision of the bill, yet I regard that there is enough merit in other parts of the bill for it to receive my support, even with the construction put upon that clause of it by the Senator from Illinois. I mean to say, that the bill is not satisfactory to me; it does not go as far as I would like to go in the direction of restraining the power of the railroads; but I shall not stand still and refuse to take one step in the direction of correcting abuses because I can not take all the steps that I desire to take. Mr. HOAR. I am tempted to ask the courtesy of my honorable friend from Oregon to allow me to read, in precise connection with the point he is now making, a letter from a conferee on the part of the House. Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon. I will yield to my friend from Massachusetts as soon as I say a word in answer to the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. GEORGE]. I have already stated that I simply quoted what the Senator from Mississippi had said to the Senator from Illinois in the debate on Monday. I stated in the same connection that I understood the Senator from Mississippi favored this bill because he thought there was much merit in the bill outside of this provision. Mr. GEORGE. I did not want to be misunderstood. Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon. I said I understood that he differed from the construction placed on the bill by the Senator from Illinois. Mr. GEORGE. I did not want it to be understood that even with these difficulties in the bill, if the long and short haul provision is as imperfect as the Senator from Oregon seems to think it is, for that reason alone I should vote against the bill, because there are other very valuable provisions in the bill which would induce me to give it my support notwithstanding the imperfection of that clause, even if it were as imperfect as the Senator from Oregon thinks. I do not think it is that imperfect. Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon. I yield now to my friend from Massachusetts. Mr. HOAR. I think it may be quite interesting to the Senate to have an authoritative statement of the interpretation put upon this clause by the Representatives of the other House. I have taken pains to obtain one which is very brief and which I should like to read in connection with the point my friend is making: COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DEAR SIR: Your favor of January 4 only reached me last evening. You propound three interrogatories, which for convenience are repeated and answered. Judge REAGAN and Mr. WEAVER, the other House conferees, being absent, of course I cannot authoritatively speak for them, but I believe that their views coincide with those herein expressed by me. First This is the first question Do you understand that the prohibition in the fourth section of the bill, as amended in conference, will prevent the common carrier from receiving a larger sum in proportion for a shorter than for a longer distance, or only that the amount of the entire freight for the less distance shall not exceed the amount of the entire freight for the greater distance on a similar article, under similar circumstances? This is the answer: I understand that the fourth section will prevent a common carrier within the meaning of the act from receiving a larger sum in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or property for a shorter than for a longer distance, over the same line in the same direction; in other words, "the amount of the entire freight for the less distance (included in the greater distance) shall not exceed the amount of the entire freight for the greater distance, on a similar article, under similar circumstances." Second. Suppose a thousand barrels of flour be taken from Chicago to Boston, and be thence conveyed to Europe, and another thousand barrels of flour be taken from Chicago to Boston or Worcester, a point nearer Chicago, on the same line, destined for home consumption, are these substantially similar circumstances within the meaning of the bill? In other words, does a mere difference in the destination of property create the dissimilar circumstances and conditions contemplated in section four? In my judgment, the difference in the case cited by you would not create dissimilar circumstances. Third. Does the existence of competition at the end of the longer distance which does not exist at the end of the shorter on the same line, make a difference of circumstances and conditions within the intention of the framers of the bill? In my opinion it does not. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, Hon. GEORGE F. HOAR, United States Senate. CHARLES F. CRISP. Mr. CRISP is one of the conferees on the part of the other House. The conferees on the part of the House of Representatives disclaim, as far as this gentleman can speak for them, the interpretation of the bill put on it by the conferees on the part of the Senate. Mr. PLATT. May I say a word? Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon. Certainly, Mr. PLATT. I hardly think it is fair to ask of any one of the conferees what his interpretation of the clause would be upon certain general propositions for this reason, which is manifest, that no man in the Senate or upon the conference committee can determine in advance what the construction of the courts will be on those words, "similar conditions and circumstances," until all the facts of the particular case are made out. Every shipment, whether there be competition or not, would be surrounded by its own set of facts. Competition might be one of the facts which would enter into the question of determining whether the conditions were substantially similar; but I think no man can say that competition existing at a certain point would determine that question. It seems to me that all anybody on the conference committee or otherwise can say is this: If you will present to me all the facts and all the circumstances which attend a particular shipment of goods as compared with another shipment of goods, then I can say for myself what I think the true construction of the statutes would be as to that particular matter: but none of us can say more than that. Mr. HOAR. But when we have a question pending involving whether great, vast commercial transactions in this country can continue, we are entitled, as it seems to me, to know whether the persons who propose a measure upon which that depends understand their measure one way or the other, or whether they propose that the continuance of that great commerce shall be referred to four or five commissioners to be appointed by the President of the United States and to depend upon their interpretation of a bill. Of course, in every case that can possibly be conceived, it would not be fair to these conferees to ask them to determine the particular case in advance; but when a great, general rule is affirmed by this bill, prohibiting the making of a rebate on hundreds of millions of dollars of commerce on which the prosperity of great sections of this country depends, whether the gentlemen who drew this language consider that that is stricken down by the bill or that it is not stricken down by the bill, or that the question whether it is stricken down by the bill or not depends on what five men appointed by the President of the United States may happen to think of it, is a fair question to put to these conferees. And when we find that the conferees differ, I think we are entitled to have it made plain to persons who think that there should not be a 5 per cent. rebate for the foreign commerce of Boston, or that it is unjust, to have the bill so drawn that the gentlemen who differ from them shall not claim that it does not mean what they want it to mean, as the Senator from Mississippi says he wants it to mean, and the Senator from Tennessee. The gentlemen who think that it ought not to be done are entitled, in my judgment, to have it put into the bill, so that he who runs may read that it shall not be done. That is my point, and I think it is fair to ask the gentlemen who wrote this language what they mean by it. If we find that they do not agree we ought to pause and have language on which they will agree. Mr. PLATT. But this question manifestly can not be settled in adTake the law as it stands without any such bill, the question as to whether the 5 per cent. rebate constitutes a reasonable rate under the circumstances is a question which now, if anybody contests it or claims otherwise, must go to the courts and must be determined by the courts. vance. Mr. HOAR. My friend will pardon me for saying that the question does not go to the courts whether a road is charging too little to anybody. Mr. PLATT. It goes to the courts whether they are charging the other parties too much. Mr. HOAR. That is another thing. Mr. PLATT. When they allow the 5 per cent. rebate to Boston the parties who claim that they are charged too much can go to the courts and have them say what rates are reasonable. So with all railroad rates, they must be reasonable; and you can not imagine any case in which that question may not be taken, and must not be taken, if there is a controversy about it. to the courts. Now, is it any worse to take it to the commission in the first place than to the courts? Mr. TELLER. Under the bill they can take it to the courts in the first place. Mr. PLATT. Certainly. Let me say one thing more with regard to the question which the Senator from Massachusetts proposes because it so much affects the port of Boston. I would say that the question of export trade was one of the elements to be considered and to exercise its influence in determining the question of similar conditions and circumstances; but that it determined it of itself, I would not be prepared to say. Mr. HOAR. If the Senator from Oregon will pardon me once more I shall not interrupt him any further. The Senator from Connecticut, a member of this conference, says that that is one of the circumstances on which the unlikeness of conditions and circumstances is to depend. Mr. PLATT. One of the facts. Mr. HOAR. The three House conferees, as far as this gentleman understands their opinion, say it is not, that that is absolutely fixed by the bill, which prohibits rebates. Mr. MITCHELL, of Oregon. I am glad to have so clear and emphatic an illustration injected into the belly of my speech by this controversy between different Senators and the expression of these differences of opinion as to what this section means, of the position I have been trying to enforce on the Senate, that the provisions of the bill in reference to the question of long and short hauls are vague, uncertain, and no two lawyers place the same construction upon them. Therefore it is left to each individual Senator to read and examine the bill for himself and arrive at his own conclusion as to what the bill means, taking into consideration all the while the fact, which has been developed here and now, that the very men who framed this bill, the conferees of the |