hundred pounds for carrying a like load of the same class of freight from Gilman, also in the State of Illinois, to New York, 23 miles of the distance being in Illinois. Both places were on the line of the road, and the freight of Elder & McKinney being carried 86 miles further in the State of Illinois than the like kind of freight of Bailey & Swannell. The Wabash road defended the action brought against it, and asked the trial court to hold the following to be the law of the case:

The court further holds as matter of law that the transportation in question falls within the proper description of commerce among the States, and as such can only be regulated by the Congress of the United States under the terms of the third clause of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.

The court refused to so hold, and found that the facts recited constituted a violation of the statute, and imposed the penalty provided by the law for such unjust discriminations. The company appealed to the supreme court of the State, and there the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. The precise ground upon which the Illinois court held jurisdiction of the case can best be expressed in the language of the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court. The court say:

We understand and simply hold that in the absence of anything showing to the contrary a single and entire contract to carry for a gross sum from Gilman in this State to the city of New York implies necessarily that that sum is charged proportionately for the carriage on every part of that distance; and that a single and entire contract to carry for a gross sum from Peoria in this State to the city of New York implies the same thing; and that therefore when it is shown that there is charged for carriage upon the same line less from Peoria to New York (the greater distance) than from Gilman to New York (the less distance), and nothing is shown to the effect that such inequality in charge is all for carriage entirely beyond the limits of this State, a prima facie case is made out of unjust discrimination under our statute occurring within this State. We hold that the excess in the charge for the less distance presumably affects every part of the line of carriage between Gilman and the State line proportionately with the balance of the line.

If this wise and just interpretation of the Illinois statute had been adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States there would be less necessity for the enactment into law of the pending bill. But the company refused to abide by the decision of the supreme court of Illinois. and brought the case for review before the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Miller, in giving expression to the opinion of the court, said:

Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the foundation of the Illinois statute, it is not the province of this court to speak. As restricted to a transportation which begins and ends within the limits of the State, it may be very just and equitable, and it certainly is the province of the State Legislature, to determine that question.

But when it is attempted to apply to transportation through an entire series of States a principle of this kind, and each one of the States shall attempt to establish its own rates of transportation, its own methods to prevent discrimination in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious influence upon the freedom of commerce among the States and upon the transit of goods through those States, can not be overestimated. That this species of regulation is one which must be, if established at all, of a general and national character, and can not be safely and wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations, we think this is clear from what has already been said. And if it be a regulation of commerce, as we think we have demonstrated it is, and as the Illinois court concedes it to be, it must be of that national character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause of the Constitution.

This opinion renders all the States powerless to check or control the growing sovereignty of railroads. The great bulk of the traffic of the various roads comes within the principle announced by Mr. Justice Miller, and hence Congress, and Congress alone can protect the people from extortion, discrimination, and other railroad corporate abuses.

It

is contended by some that the railroads should not be hampered by any legislation and that they will see that no injustice or extortion is practiced upon the people. That the officers and managers of some of the great railroads of the country are just and honorable men can not be denied, and that they manage the affairs of their roads in a spirit of fairness to the public must, too, I think, be admitted.

But that is no argument against the right or propriety of passing such a law as is contemplated in this bill. They possess a power which, if they choose to exercise it, will spread ruin upon the person or locality that offends them. They have not the responsibility or interest of a government in the people. Their interest in the welfare and prosperity of different individuals or communities may be only incidental, while the government is always direct; and yet, without any interstate-commerce law to regulate and control them, they are more powerful and exercise a more direct influence upon the people than the State. Their power for evil is well illustrated in the building up of the Standard Oil monopoly. It has been fittingly characterized by one author as "The History of a Commercial Crime."

My time is limited and I can not speak at any length upon a condition of affairs brought about by the combination and discriminations of railroads which would permit a giant monopoly to accumulate $100,000,000 in a little less than fifteen years. The history of the manner in which that company has been enabled to accumulate so vast a fortune is enough to make the members of this House, who are the representatives of the people, hasten the work of this conference committee into a law. The people look to the members of this House as their agents to honestly, fairly, and fearlessly guard their rights.

The railroads and their managers and agents profess to be friendly to Congressional legislation, and some even go so far as to maintain that it is in the interest of honest railroading to have Congress enact a law regulating the transportation of traffic over interstate roads, and I incline to the opinion that many of the leading railroad managers of the country are honest in the expression of these views; but the bill now before us has been attacked in a manner which, if we were to assume the criticisms to be just, would lead us to believe it the most villainous piece of legislation ever attempted to be forced through Congress. I have studied its provisions with much care, with no prejudice against railroads, and with a desire to fairly and intelligently represent the interests of the people who have honored me with a seat in this House and the interests of our common country. My study and investigation have led me to different conclusions respecting the bill than those of the prophets of ill omen whose forebodings picture the utter destruction of all commerce among the States and gaunt want and despair upon every corner if the bill becomes a law.

I assert what can not successfully be denied, that the sections of the bill which are so fiercely assailed are but the enactment into statutory law of common law principles. The mode of enforcing those sections are different from common law remedies-made so to meet a condition of affairs which was not contemplated at common law. I am not saying that the bill is perfect or that it could not be improved by amendment, but that is denied us. We must take the bill as it comes from the conference committee or reject it. The fourth and fifth sections of the bill seem to be most objectionable, or at least the opposition to the bill is centered upon those sections.

Section 4 makes it unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of the act to charge or receive any greater compensation in

the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or like kind of property under substantially similar circumstances and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer distance with a proviso that in special cases the commissioner appointed in the bill might permit a less charge for a longer than for a shorter distance for the transportation of passengers or property, with the saving clause that these provisions should not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of the act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance. What is there in this section so novel as to cause such a furor of debate over its provisions? The principle is as old as the law of common carriers.

That its application to the regulation and control of railroads and their traffic is not new is apparent from the fact that four States, namely, Arkansas, California, Missouri, and Pennsylvania, have that principle in the constitutions of their States, and Massachusetts and Illinois by statutory law have emphasized its justice and equity. Able and eloquent men like my distinguished friend from Ohio [Mr. BUTTERWORTH], men who can make the worse appear the better reason, may torture the language of that section into something detrimental to the commerce among the States; but, after their brilliant assaults shall have spent their force, plain people will see nothing in this section but the assertion of a just principle of law, made necessary by the unjust discriminations and extortions of railroads.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OATES in the chair). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HOPKINS. I think, Mr. Speaker, that I have some time remaining. I have not occupied thirty minutes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore.

The Chair recognized the gentleman for the fifteen minutes remaining in the time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CRISP. How much additional time does the gentleman want? Mr. HOPKINS. I do not intend to occupy more than thirty minutes if I can avoid it.

Mr. CRISP. I ask consent that the gentleman be permitted to proceed with his remarks.

There was no objection.

Mr. HOPKINS. Now, Mr. Speaker, I had intended to supplement these remarks by an examination in detail of the various sections of the bill, and especially of sections 4 and 5, but the lateness of the hour forbids such an extended examination, and I shall content myself by referring briefly to a few of the important points in connection with them.

The construction which has been placed on section 4 by the conference committee of the Senate avoids all of the difficulties raised by gentlemen who oppose the bill on account of its provision relating to the so-called long and short haul.

That construction will secure to the farmers and shippers of Illinois and the West as favorable rates for through freight, otherwise known as the long haul, as they have now; while under the provisions of the bill all shippers at intermediate points on the line of the road or roads forming the line over which the long haul shipments are made will be protected from unjust discriminations or extortion.

The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CRISP], who presented to the House this afternoon the reasons which actuated the conference committee in agreeing upon the bill in the form we are now considering it, spoke

of the disastrous results to the commerce of the country, and shippers, and the people generally from a war of rates between two or more of the great trunk-line railways at competing points, such as Kansas City, Omaha, or Chicago, for through freight to New York city, or some other seaboard city. What the railroads lose by such wars at these terminal points, it is claimed, are imposed upon the people and shippers at intermediate points on the line of the roads between their Eastern and Western termini, so that the people are the ones upon whom finally the great burden falls. Now, by this section of the bill, provision is made that the charge for the shorter haul on such a line shall not be more than for the longer haul, except in special cases, and whatever the rates at the terminal points of such competing roads may be reduced to all the intermediate points will get the benefit of such reduction. This fact will serve as a most effective check upon the hostilities of competing railroads, and secure fair and uniform rates.

The final construction which will be placed upon the words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions" must of course be left with the courts and the commission. Any construction given to them by a member in debate can not be authoritative or binding. They are placed in the section to give such flexibility to charges on the long and short haul as will not interfere with the commerce of the country. Railroad managers who were examined before the Commerce Committee of the Senate all agreed, it is said, that as a general proposition, as much should not be charged for the transportation of passengers or freight on any railroad for a short as for a longer distance. This section then is in harmony with the views of expert railroad men. The exceptions mentioned by them before the Commerce Committee of the Senate are provided for by the powers given the commission to authorize a less charge for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property.

Mr. REED. Then you differ with the gentleman from Georgia in that interpretation?

Mr. HOPKINS. I am not the keeper of the conscience or of the judgment of the gentleman from Georgia. I am simply giving my construction to this bill.

Mr. REED. And which differs from that of the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. HOPKINS. That may be.

Mr. REED. I wish to draw attention to the divergency.

A MEMBER. Why is the commission authorized to sit in Washington?

Mr. HOPKINS. That is a question I can not answer. Washington is the seat of the National Government, and it would seem proper that the meetings of the commission should be here. But the bill provides that the commission shall go to Chicago or Cincinnati, or anywhere else.

Mr. STEELE. At the expense of the Government.
Mr. HOPKINS. But in the interest of the people.

Section 5, which relates to pooling, is buta re-enactment of the common-law principle. It seems to me there is no member of this House who will maintain that it is right or just to permit railroad companies to engage in pooling when it is a violation of the interests of all other industries. It is an offense at common law, and has been so decided in the State of Ohio and in the State of New York, and has been so decided wherever the question has been fairly put to the courts.

I am aware that railroad managers claim it is in the interest of cheap

freight rates, but it will be difficult to make any man believe that such combinations benefit any body other than those who are parties to them. Had I the time I would gladly show the results of the pooling contracts prohibited by this bill. But I am reminded that my time has expired. The bill, Mr. Speaker, may be crude, and experience may teach us that it should be amended and modified. If such be the case no person will more cheerfully correct by further legislation any errors or defects in the bill than myself. The railroads of the country have worked wonders in the settlement of our Western States and Territories and in the development of our interstate commerce, and I would not knowingly strike down any of their legitimate rights or cripple them in carrying on this great commerce. What, for one, I wish to do, and what I think the members of this House wish, is to so regulate them in the transportation of passengers and freight from one State to another that they can work no injustice upon each other or the public, and that reasonable rates shall be secured to all classes of shippers and those engaged in the transportation of goods for a short or long distance over any of their lines. I reserve the remainder of my time.

The SPEAKER. The Chair does not know whether the gentleman from Illinois has any time left or not. The present occupant of the chair understands that the floor was yielded to the gentleman from Illinois by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. O'NEILL], and that when his time expired, on the request of the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. CRISP], it was extended.

A MEMBER. Until he had finished his remarks.

The SPEAKER. And having done that, the Chair thinks the gentleman has no time remaining.

Mr. CRISP. Before we proceed to the further consideration of this conference report, I should like to obtain, if possible, some understanding as to when a vote can be had on this proposition. While, of course, I do not wish to be understood as desiring a vote before reasonable opportunity has been given to members to express their views, I do feel the necessity of early action on this subject, so that other business which is pressing may be considered by the House. If there could be any intimation or agreement as to when the vote could be taken, it would greatly convenience members and relieve me of the necessity of calling the previous question on my own responsibility.

Mr. O'NEILL, of Pennsylvania. The gentleman from Georgia might perhaps postpone until later in the day the effort to reach an agreement in regard to taking the vote. At that time we may be able to see how many gentleman desire to speak. We are now just resuming the debate at 2 o'clock. At 5 o'clock this afternoon there will be perhaps some indication as to the members who may still desire to speak, and when the debate may be closed without shutting any one off. Mr. WEAVER, of Iowa. I have no objection to the early conclusion of the debate on this question; but I should be opposed to any arrangement by which those of us who desire to talk against this bill would be deprived of the privilege of doing so. that the rule is to recognize, first, members of the committee; and if we make any agreement now, they may consume all the time, depriving all other members of the House of the right to say one word

It is well understood