to deal with them. And because of the sharp antagonism that must come between capital and labor, between organized capital and the people, I rejoice now to find that after a contest of years this Congress is ready to agree to vote for the passage of a bill which so distinctly and unequivocally asserts the power of the Government over these great railroad corporations; and the bill itself, I submit, is in substance only the bill which has been heretofore proposed embodying the power of the common law in respect to the entire subject and conferring upon a commission to be appointed by the General Government the authority to say what in a given case shall be the rate or what in a given case shall be the duty of the railroad when dealing with its customers.

The fourth section, which has been so severely criticised, is, when you come to examine it, simply a declaration on the part of Congress that a railroad corporation when transporting property shall not charge more for the short haul than for the long haul, and, as an abstract proposition, can the validity of that be doubted? That is, in substance, the declaration of the fourth section, with this further provision, suggested by experience, that while this, as an abstract proposition, appears to be perfectly satisfactory, nevertheless, because of the complications and the infinite variety of elements when you come to deal with a subject of this moment and this extent, the commissioners shall have the discretion in any given case to relax the rigor of the rule if they think the exigency of the case demands such action. That is the whole of it. It is easy to criticise it; it is easy to show that this section lacks the explicitness of an arbitrary rule. But it is not the design of Congress to impose an arbitrary rule.

It is rather the design of Congress to enter upon this subject by making a declaration of what they think is the proper rule to apply, and at the same time, wisely and with the circumspection which the subject demands, conferring upon the commissioners, to whom the whole subject is to be committed, a discretion which shall enable them to do justice in any given case. I go, therefore, for this bill, not believing that it is perfect, but believing that we take a very great step in advance when, by the passage of it, we assert emphatically the duty as well as the authority of the Congress of the United States to deal with the whole subject.

Mr. COX, of North Carolina, was recognized, and yielded to Mr. HERMANN.

Mr. HERMANN.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from North Carolina for his courtesy in sharing with me this valued privilege, and I now beg the indulgence of the House while I devote this time in advocacy of the pending bill.

Mr. Speaker, the interests of various portions of this great nation have been ably presented in this discussion, and every virtue, as well as every defect of the measure before us, critically reviewed. Its application to different States has been well illustrated, with its promised benefits or apprehended injuries to the commerce of each.

Representing singly, as I do, a State larger in area than New York and Pennsylvania which have a representation on this floor of sixtyone members; with a greater diversity of interests, and with resources more inexhaustible than both of these great States combined, I conceive it my duty impartially and conscientiously to represent these great interests: to understand the relation and effect of the pending bill to the Pacific Northwest; and thus as far as I can to give voice to the sentiments of the people of the great State of Oregon.

IS C-37

OREGON'S FUTURE COMMERCIAL GREATNESS.

Sir, no State in this Union can more cordially welcome this class of legislation than my own State. Her commercial advancement and internal development, in spite of excessive transportation charges and distance from market, has been indeed marvelous. But a few years since and her position was one of comparative isolation, with little external and less internal commerce. With but 52,465 of population in 1860 it has grown to over 300,000 up to the present moment. With but 5 miles of railway in 1862 there are now 1,180 miles. With only a long wagon road, and a rough ocean route to the Atlantic States as late as 1875, we have now a direct and indirect transcontinental communication by the Northern Pacific, the Union Pacific, the Canadian Pacific, and the Southern Pacific Railroads, with the rapidly approaching completion of the Oregon Pacific road soon to pass through Eastern and Central Oregon, and already receiving and discharging its rich shipments on the Yaquina Bay.

In 1859 the total imports and exports of Oregon in her foreign commerce only amounted in value to $49,512, while in 1882 they had reached the maximum value of over $11,000,000. This great increase is attributable largely to our wonderful agricultural resources, and the energy with which they have been developed. We shall soon rank among the largest grain-producing States of the Union. The far-famed timber of Oregon, similar to that of Puget Sound, challenges the nation in rivalry. The fishery exports, especially the world-renowned Columbia River salmon. rank among the first in quality and extent. The abundance of coal and iron, gold and silver, copper and cinnabar, and great varieties of valuable stone, already constitute leading industries in the State.

With a soil of enduring fertility, a timely distribution of rainfall, a climate mild and equable, the heat of summer and the cold of winter tempered by the genial warmth of the Japan current, and with a failure of crops and fruits unknown, these abundant natural riches of the State with her magnificent future possibilities must invite to her shores a population and a capital which will at no remote period place her without an equal in the Union. With such great interests in view it is right and proper, sir, that her people should, as they do, take an anxious, continuous, and intelligent account of the present legislation so far as it may affect them. The greater the development of their manifold resources, the greater the necessity for transportation, State as well as interstate; and hence their well-expressed desire for some radical intervention on the part of the National Government restricting the common carrier in interstate commerce within reasonable rates.

A REGULATOR REQUIRED.

The commercial, industrial, and transportation interests of a country are paramount to all others, if, indeed, they do not include all. When happily blended and balanced we should expect to behold a nation great in proportion to the magnitude of its resources. In the political economy of all prosperous society there are three elements so intimately interwoven in their relations that to eliminate one from the other is to impair and often to destroy all. These are production, transportation, and consumption. Depreciate the capacity of either one and all must suffer. Demand regulates supply, and transportation affects both. Each is jealous of the other. There is a constant antagonism between them.

The common carrier with his capital establishes his own compensa

tion, while production, with its labor, demands a reasonable surplus over transportation as its compensation. As the industries of a country increase and multiply these relations become more and more distinct; the transactions become greater and more intricate, and the rights and responsibilities of each more undefined. The more powerful one in the contest at length dominates. When the carrier reaches this superiority he is tempted to dictate, to discriminate, and to command; prices are fixed; wages established; production regulated; and thus both the producer and consumer are injured. The law of the transporter is the law for all, and in fixing his limits he simply asks, What will the traffic bear? The conflict of these antagonisms tends to disarrangements of business and to unsettle prices, while it offers a premium to the unscrupulous speculator and stock-gambler.

One of the results most complained of is the exaction of a greater charge for a short haul than a long haul under substantially similar circumstances. Another is the practice of pooling, and still another is that of rebates. To correct these inequalities as far as possible is the object of the pending legislation. Without this the advantage in these conflicts is always to organized capital as against unorganized labor and production. To harmonize these conflicts, to remedy these inequalities, and to repress these monopolistic discriminations appears to be the general desire of the American people.

A variety of interpretations have been given the measure before us. Some provisions may be too vague, and should have been omitted, and others more clear and definite substituted.

WHAT ARE "SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONS?"

We can only conjecture how the courts and the commission will construe the phrase "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions."

This is the one least understood and more debated than all the rest. We may illustrate some of the much complained of discriminations between shippers, as well as places of shipment, to which the proposed law must apply.

At New Orleans sharp competition exists by river and from the sea and gulf, and in order to secure this valuable terminal traffic the railway lines from New York via Atlanta to New Orleans, distant about 1,000 miles, charge a rate of 76 cents per hundred pounds, while from New York to Atlanta, on the same line, in the same direction, and about 500 miles shorter, the rate is $1 per hundred pounds. Does the fact of competition in this instance enter into the conditions, so as to make them substantially dissimilar, and hence not subject to the proposed legislation? From Memphis to New York it costs only 90 cents to transport a bale of cotton, while from Covington to Memphis, only 37 miles, on the same line of road, it costs $1.15 per bale. What circumstances and conditions exist here to justify this apparently unjust and unreasonable discrimination? Can the proposed law be so construed as under any circumstances to sustain the existing difference? From the same point one man ships a car-load of valuable quartz rock, and another ships a car-load of building rock. Are these substantially similar circumstances and conditions?" Can a rebate be allowed the man who ships the cheaper rock? Will it be an unjust discrimination? From Spokane Falls to Ellensburg the route of the Northern Pacific Railroad is comparatively of light grade and economic construction; but between Ellensburg and Tacoma the Cascade range is crossed at an immense cost per mile. Can a greater compensation be

charged between these latter named points, this being the short haul, than on the long haul between Tacoma and Spokane Falls? Can a greater rate be charged per mile west of Ellensburg than east to Spokane Falls? Are these under "substantially similar circumstances and conditions?" Can the common carrier in these cases expect from the commission authority to charge less for the longer than the shorter distances? One man is a regular cattle-exporter, and ships thousands of head per year over a railway line, and receives a liberal rebate, or special rate, while another man ships but one load of cattle in the same time over the same road, and to and from the same points.

Is this a "like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions?" Is the carrier guilty of unjust discrimination? Are the circumstances and conditions alike? Is it not cheaper to the carrier to transport and care for ten loads of cattle per day than an occasional one load in a month, and does this not substantially change the similarity of the circumstances and conditions? At Spokane Falls, Arlington, and The Dalles there is no competition with the railway lines, but at Portland, Oreg., there is competition both by rail and ship. From Chicago to Portland the rate is 65 cents per hundred, but from Chicago to The Dalles in Oregon, 88 miles shorter, and on the same line in the same direction the rate is $1.10 per hundred pounds. It costs more to ship from Portland to Arlington, 141 miles, than from Portland to Chicago over 2,200 miles. Baker City, Pendleton, and La Grande, are still on a shorter distance with a correspondingly greater compensation for the short over the long haul. Having water competition at the terminal long hauls, and none at all at the intermediate or shorter hauls, the question of construction arises: Is this transportation of a "like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions?" It is in the "same line, in the same direction, and the shorter being included within the longer distance."

But here

Will competition at the terminal points vary the circumstances? Is this one of the "special cases" in which a less charge may be allowed for the longer haul? The through rate may be at a mere nominal profit, and it may be at a loss; though this has not been discovered. is where the mischief comes in. Some one must pay for this loss. The intermediate shipper instead of being even charged the through long haul terminal rate or some less, which at The Dalles City on the direct line would be about 65 cents, is often charged the local back rate in addition, which to The Dalles is 45 cents, making in this case the through short haul $1.10. The intermediate shippers are taxed to pay the reduced rate to the terminal shipper, and the farther they are from competition the more they pay. The shorter the haul the greater the rate.

THE PEOPLE DEMAND A REMEDY.

Is it any wonder these rate-burdened people should cry out in anguish? The committee of The Dalles City Board of Trade, in my State, Messrs. McFarland, Macallister, and Huntington, complainingly say in their address to the Oregon Senators and myself, "Concerning this through rate no complaint is made, and merchants at the way points are entirely willing to pay the same rates as are charged for the haul to Portland. But the arbitrary local back rate charged is deemed a most unjust and burdensome exaction, falling little short of systematic robbery.” This language, severe as it is, is justified by the statement of grievances borne. Is there no remedy? Shall we quietly fold our arms and look on, while the driving, thriving energy of the great Pacific Northwest

is thus systematically taxed for all the traffic will bear? The most hopeful heart and the most enthusiastic and energetic spirit will in time retire from such an unequal contest. Finding all other efforts in vain, they cast their eyes to this Capitol for a remedy. Their last hope is in the representatives of the people. "Give us relief from this unjust and burdensome discrimination" is their appeal. For one, I think the hour has arrived for action.

The question then for us to consider is: Will this measure accomplish the desired result? Will it in the first place prevent unjust discrimination?

THE LONG AND SHORT HAUL.

Much reliance is professed for the fourth section, which provides: SEC. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance: Provided, however, That upon application to the commission appointed under the provisions of this act, such common carrier may, in special cases, after investigation by the commission, be authorized to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of passengers or property; and the commission may from time to time prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be relieved from the operation of this section of this act.

As a declaration of the purposes of Congress, of the object to be subserved, this section may not be entirely useless; and as a law is construed by a reference to its entirety, this section may shed a light upon all the rest; but still its uncertainty may lead to misconstruction, confusion, and litigation. The intent, the object, however, is clear enough. Transportation must be reasonable. What meaning the word "aggregate" will bear when applied to "compensation for a shorter than a longer distance" is difficult to imagine; as likewise the qualification "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions." Then after prohibiting greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer distance, it provides that this may be done in "special cases. What these special cases are to be is not defined. It may bear the construction that the rate for 1 mile shall not exceed that for another, or the opposite construction, that the transportation company may charge as much for 10 miles of short haul as for 100 miles of long haul, and that it may even charge more in "special cases." It may charge 5 cents a mile on the short haul where the through rate is only 3 cents a mile. Standing alone such a sweeping discretion might be subject to the most glaring abuses, and the real object of the legislation, to "regulate interstate commerce," defeated.

CHARGES MUST BE REASONABLE.

But happily another section, definite and clear, is relied on, in which this discretionary latitude is limited. Section 1 provides that:

All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivery, storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just, and every unjust, unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

This is not a new principle. It is adopted in the legislation of twentysix States and Territories and found efficient. It is incorporated in the constitutions of four States of this Union. It is older still. It is the reiteration of the old and well-known common-law declaration. This

applies to the long as well as the short haul. It is now a part of this