This proclamation was rapidly followed by a series of orders, having in view the establishment and maintenance of law and order in the city. Under the terms of the capitulation, the Spanish authority surrendered to the American command "the Spanish troops,

European and native, with the city and defenses," and there were now within this area approximately 4000 insurgent troops and occupying fortified positions held by the Spaniards at the time of surrender. There was no question as to the limits of the territory held by the Spanish forces at the time of surrender, and no question that the insurgents were not in

CAPTURED GUNS.

cluded by the terms of the surrender as one of the victors, and under its terms the Americans succeeded alone to the Spanish possession. The insurgents, however, insisted that they also had a claim of rights, and based their claim upon the assumption that they were allies of the American force. It was not claimed by them that they were such allies by express stipulation or even recognition, but they did insist that the circumstances of their investment of the city made them so. It was their claim that their participation forced the surrender of the city and that they had the right to participate in its control, independent of the terms of the surrender or the parties to it. The insurgents surrounded the city, except where the Americans were entrenched, holding most of the block-houses and all the outlying Spanish trenches and the approaches to the city.

THE FILIPINOS IN CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.

The business of Manila depended largely upon its commercial intercourse with the interior, and this could not go on without the consent of the insurgents. They also held possession of the city water-works. Their possession and retention was considered dangerous to our command. Aguinaldo afterward complained that he was not notified of the time or plan of the American attack. In this he was in part correct. He was not informed of the plan, but he knew of the time, and intended to force his command into recognition at the time of surrender, as is plainly evident by events preceding the attack.

COMPLICATIONS WITH THE FILIPINOS.

The evening of the 12th, under instructions from Gen. Merritt, Gen. Anderson had telegraphed to Aguinaldo, in substance that the Americans would proceed to the attack without his forces, and that his command should be kept out of the city. This Aguinaldo answered with the memorable despatch, "Too late." This was but a pretense, for there was ample time for him to countermand any

previous instructions he might have given. One of the first acts of Gen. Merritt, then, after the surrender, was to take measures to rid the city of the armed insurgents. On the day of the surrender many of them had been intercepted and

turned back, and others, having gotten within the city, were disarmed. Gen. Anderson was ordered by Gen. Merritt to rid the city of the insurgents, and Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo to withdraw his men at once. Aguinaldo answered him, that he had already sent a commission to present the matter to the Americans, and asked that Gen. Anderson consider the matter with them. There has been some censure of Gen. Anderson from military sources because he recognized this condition, but he had precedent for so doing all through the campaign. Even Gen. Merritt's proclamation had been read to Aguinaldo's commission in parts, and was made in part to conform to their protest. As it was originally drawn, it provided that the Spanish laws governing civil affairs, property rights and the punishment of crime, should remain in force and be administered by local Spanish officers. The commissioners said they could not submit to Spanish officials, and Gen. Merritt provided that American officers should be appointed to hold important offices. Also, when the staff officer brought the order to Gen. Anderson, he asked if he was authorized to use force. The officer did not know, and if it were simply to be a matter of persuasion, it is difficult to see what other course was open to him. When the commissioners met Gen. Anderson, they submitted to him ten propositions, as follows:

1. That the insurgents would retire to a line running from Malate to Paco, thence down the Paco Creek to the Pasig, up the Pasig to the bridge of Aviles, along the Calle Aviles to Santa Mesa; thence through Sampaloc, San Lazaro and Tondo, to the beach at the north. (This would have given them Malate and Paco and important positions on the east and north of the city.)

2. That the Filipinos should retain certain convents in Malate, Paco and the northern suburbs, and should have the palace of the Captain-General in Malacañan.

3. That the Filipinos should have the free navigation of the Pasig for their vessels and the "protection of the Patria." (Nobody knows what the Patria is, or has been able to find out, but subsequent negotiations showed that it had something to do with our protection of their ships in all waters under our control.)

4. That the Filipinos share in the booty of war.

5. That the civil offices be filled entirely by North Americans. (If Gen. Merritt desired to appoint Filipinos to any such places, Aguinaldo suggested through the commissioners that he

would be glad to consult Gen. Merritt about such appointments and to recommend men for them whom he knew to be fit for the places.)

6. That the Filipinos should retain control of the reservoir and pumping station of the water-works.

7. That the Filipino officers should be permitted to enter the city at all times wearing their side arms.

8. That the arms taken from the Filipinos on the night of August 13th should be returned 9. That the American troops should retire within the lines proposed by Aguinaldo, and should not pass beyond those lines with arms.

10. That all regulations should be in writing, and to be binding should be confirmed by the commanders-in-chief of the two forces.

Gen. Anderson, in reply, said he had just one condition to make, and that was that the insurgents should withdraw at once to the line he then drew, before there should be any further negotiation. The line ran from the Bocano de Vista to San Lazaro, Cemeterio de Sampaloc to block-house No. 5, block-house No. 6, the Depot des Aguas Patables, the Spanish works beyond San Juan del Monte; thence in a straight line to San Pedro Macati; thence in a straight line to blockhouse No. 14, on

the Pinda Road; thence in a straight line to the beach at Maytubig, south of the Polvorin at Malate. Gen. Anderson yielded to the commissioners in their

NEBRASKA REGIMENT MARCHING INTO MANILA, AUGUST 13, 1898.

request to have the matter submitted to Gen. Merritt, and all appeared before Gen. Merritt. Now, while Gen. Anderson had been told to take sole charge of the matter, Merritt listened to the commissioners and asked for time in which to consider their proposal, promising an answer later.

Leaving Anderson at headquarters, and in waiting, Merritt went out to consult Admiral Dewey. On his return, he ordered Anderson back to Cavite in charge of his command. After much deliberation, Gen. Merritt consented to the following: That, as the insurgents had captured the water-works, they should retain them; that the insurgent officers should enter the city with side arms, but suggested that they should do so without revolvers; that the arms captured from the Filipinos should be returned to them when they left the city. The answer was delayed in getting to Aguinaldo. The insurgents in the meantime were strengthening their positions. Aguinaldo, on receipt of Merritt's communication, sent three propositions in lieu of those previously sent. They asked, first, that the first line designated by his commissioners be the line of separation between the forces; second, that the insurgent vessels be protected by our navy in American waters, or waters

under our control; third, that in case the Americans should return the city to Spain in consequence of the impending treaty, the insurgents should be placed in possession of all they now hold.

THE PRESIDENT GIVES INSTRUCTIONS.

Gen. Merritt left for Paris on August 30th, leaving this letter unanswered. Gen. Merritt had been in the Philippines, or, to speak definitely, on the Newport, in the bay most of the time, a little over a month, and during this time he had announced the policy of the government, and in a large part formulated its measures. Whether wise or unwise, however, the responsibility must rest with his superiors. On August 13th, the day of the surrender, the following despatch was sent to the Adjutant-General at Washington: "Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on the outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of city. Situation difficult. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in forcing obedience in this matter and others that may arise. Is government willing to use all means to make natives submit to the authority of the United States?

MERRITT. DEWEY."

The answer was the following: "MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT, Manila, Philippines: The President directs that there must be no joint occupation of the insurgents. The United States, in possession of Manila City, Manila Bay and Harbor, must preserve the peace, and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means, in your judgment, is necessary to this end. All law-abiding people must be treated alike.

By order of Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General."

GEN. MERRITT REPORTS ON AGUINALDO.

The official report of Major-General Merritt, dated August 31, 1898, has the following bearing upon the relation of the two commands:

As Gen. Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasai Road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations by prearranged plans of mutual attack to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.

After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of my office as military governor, I had direct written communications with Gen. Aguinaldo on several occasions. He recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact; but, notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.

OTIS SUCCEEDS MERRITT IN COMMAND.

Gen. Elwell E. Otis arrived in Manila on August 20th, and when Gen. Merritt was ordered to Paris, he succeeded to the command. He had to take up the unfinished work of Gen. Merritt and he required some little time to familiarize himself with the situation. The insurgent occupation continually increased in

SIGNING DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AT MALOLOS.

aggressiveness-their entrenching and fortifying continually went on, and with it the show of resistance increased. Orders had been issued to the effect that no interference should be made with them, while they did not disturb our lines or positions. There was a prospect that the city water supply might be shut off. Americans desiring to pass the insurgent lines required a pass from the insurgent commander, and the demonstrations of the soldiers became insolent. A few companies of the Colorados were ordered to the water-works, but met with resistance so that they were about to use force when the situation was reported to headquarters and they were ordered back.

When Gen. Otis assumed command, the insurgents while infesting the whole city, had some especial strongholds, notably, Tondo, Paco, Sampaloc, Ermita, and Malate. Gen. Otis sent word to Aguinaldo that it would take some time for him to