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support Wheeler. This gave him one battalion of the 14th Infantry, his three troops of cavalry, and one company each of Washingtons and Californias.
“At about ten o'clock, Ovenshine ordered an advance. The North Dakotas drove the enemy from their front back to the Carmelita convent. Maj. Potter, with Mantile's Battalion, 14th Inf., advanced through the woods to the right of block-house No. 14, and Capt. John Murphy, with his battalion of the 14th Inf.. charged block-house No. 14 and the adjoining trenches. After a desperate fight, the enemy were driven out, but not without inflicting serious loss on us. Capt. Mitchell was mortally wounded leading his company.
“Lieut. Miles, 14th Inf., was first in the enemy's trenches, and followed by only six men, charged into the smoking ruins of the block-house. This was a daring and brilliant feat of arms. At the same time Capt. Wheeler advanced from block-house No. 13, but after coming in view of the enemy's trenches, fell back. A gun of Dyer's Battery was sent to him, but on account of the dense bamboo thicket, it could not do satisfactory service. Shortly before 2 P. M., Maj. Rucker, 4th Cav., joined the cavalry battalion, and relieved Capt. Wheeler of
command. Hearing of the successful advance of the North Dakotas, I telegraphed Gen. Ovenshine to carry out the project I had arranged with him, to attempt to roll up the enemy by a movement from right to left. As there was a long delay in carrying out this order, I repeated it several times by telegraph, and aides were sent with oral orders. It was at last found that he was under a false impression that he had received orders from the Corps Commander. When this misapprehension was removed, he made the movement with complete success. In the meantime I had sent a battalion of the 1st Tennessee, under LieutenantColonel Gracey Childers, to the Cingalon front. They reached that point just as the North Dakotas were clearing the front and driving the enemy into the woods beyond the Tripa. The Tennessee Battalion, crossing said stream, opened on them, as also did Dyer's guns on Battery Knoll. Ovenshine then advanced with his brigade to Pasai, which he found abandoned. Leaving part of his command there, he marched with the rest up the Pasai Macati Road and opened communication with Gen. King at San Pedro Macati, and returning picketed the road. This ended the fighting at the front, but soon after King's Brigade had advanced
TRENCH SHOWING WORK OF WASH
beyond Paco a number of insurgents, who had lain concealed in the town, began to fire on the ammunition carts and hospital ambulances going to the front.
“Anticipating the possibility of this treachery, a small force had been left in Paco under Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce. For a time there was a lively contest in the town. The insurgents were so persistent that nearly all their “nipa" houses had to be burned to dislodge them. Forty-three prisoners were taken, all in ordinary clothing, but unquestionably participants in the savage warfare. While this was going on in the town, a sharp musketry fire was opened on us from a large stone church near the Paco Bridge. I directed Dyer's Battery on the Knoll to reverse his guns and open on the church. It was soon in flames, yet a number of desperate men took refuge in the church tower. It was several hours *** before they could be dislodged, and they kept up their resistance to the last.
“During the engagement, the telegraph men of the Signal Corps did effective service, carrying their lines to the extreme front at San Pedro Macati, Fort Malate and Pasai. Lieut. Kilbourne, who was with the headquarters party, did a brave act in climbing a telegraph pole at the Paco Bridge to string a broken wire, under a cross-fire between desperados in the tower and our artillery. New troops are generally demoralized by firing from flanks and rear. In this contest bullets seemed to come from all directions, but our men continued unconcerned. When I had my headquarters on Battery Knoll, the artillery men and my staff of officers and orderlies were subject to this cross-fire during the entire engagement, and as the enemy used smokeless powder it could only be surmised from what direction the fire came.
“At two o'clock I rode to King's front and found his lines satisfactorily established; then went to Cingalon front and found everything satisfactory there. In this engagement we lost two officers and ninety-five soldiers wounded, and one enlisted man killed. We can only estimate the enemy's loss. Our burial parties interred in their own trenches two hundred and thirty-eight insurgent dead. We took about three hundred and six prisoners, and two very fine Krupp guns, besides a large number of small arms, ammunition and ordnance stores.
“This division had on the firing line in the battle of the 5th instant about 3850 officers and men. We were opposed, as I believe, by about 5000 insurgent Filipinos. Of these, I estimate that 2000 were killed, wounded, captured or scattered. Within two days we had captured Pasig and Pateros, and our scouting parties had gone to the Laguna de Bay."
THE TROOPS OF THE PROVOST GUARD. The troops of the Provost Guard were glad of an opportunity to go to the front. At the call to arms, on the night of the 4th, the 2d Oregon Inf. took positions assigned them at the gates and on the streets of the walled city. On the 6th, three companies, C, G, and K, under Maj. Eastwick, took the field in Paco
district for the day. On the following day they were stationed at the water-works, where they remained until the 10th. Company F was on guard at department headquarters; Company H on duty at the Custom House.
The 13th Minnesota Inf., on the 4th, was under arms, patrolling the streets in their respective districts and guarding the bridges and river front. Filipinos, detected in signaling with lights from house-tops, were fired on. On the 5th, patrols of Company C were attacked by 150 insurrectos, armed with bolos and machetes, when they were re-inforced by the entire company, under Capt. Robinson, and the natives dispersed. Company M was transferred to a station in a church in the Tondo district.
The 2d Battalion, 1st Tennessee, on the 5th, left camp. and proceeded in the direction of the water-works, having an engagement with the enemy and returning to station. The 1st Battalion of the same regiment, on the 5th, took part in an engagement with the Filipinos in Paco district, returning to station on the 6th. The 3d Battalion of the same regiment proceeded to the Presidio of Manila and Bilibid Military Prison, remaining there until the evening of the 6th. The 23d Int., as already mentioned, participated in the taking of the water-works, under command of Maj. Goodale, on the 7th.
THE OPERATIONS OF THE FLEET. When firing began, on the night of February 4th, the signals agreed upon by the army and navy commanders could not be given until daylight, and firing from the fleet without them would have been as dangerous to the American forces, whose positions could not be known, as to the Filipinos. On the coming of day, the Admiral's ship lay directly in front of Manila, between the city and the German cruiser Irene and the Spanish transport Alava. The Monadnock lay
about one mile off Fort Malate, and with the coming of day commenced firing ten-inch shells on the enemy's south line, blowing out the breech-block of one of her guns during the engagement, having one man killed and two wounded. Her fire, directed by Lieut. E. E. Kelly, 1st Company U.S. V. Signal Corps, lasted through the forenoon of the 5th, and was very effective, destroying villages and killing many Filipinos. In the afternoon, the
Charleston relieved the Monadnock CALOOCAN FROM LA LOMA CHURCH.
and continued the firing during the remainder of the day and night, and the day of the 6th, using six and eightinch guns. She was again joined by the Ilonadnock, when they patrolled the beach as far south as Paranaque, setting villages on fire and driving the Filipinos from their trenches. The Charleston remained in this service until the 9th of February, when she was relieved by the Buffalo, which held the position throughout the
remainder of the campaign. On the morning of the 5th, the Charleston was lying off the block-house near the mouth of the Vitas River, on the north side, about 1000 yards from shore, and during the forenoon, with ten-inch shots, enfiladed the Filipino line in front of the Kansas Inf. until she relieved the Monadnock, the Concord taking her position. The Callao, “Tappan's battle-ship," as Admiral Dewey was fond of calling this little boat, patrolled the beach on this side, her firing being directed by Lieut. C. M. Gordon, 18th Company, U. S. V. Signal Corps. The Callao patrolled close in shore, using three-pounders and rapid-fire guns, her fire being directed on the blockhouse. During the afternoon, the Concord fired six-inch shells on the Filipinos in front of the Kansas lines, continuing the bombardment on the 6th. An eight-ench shell from the Concord was thrown into the church at Malabon, occupied as headquarters by the enemy, and exploding, completely demolished it. By ten o'clock of the 6th, the Callao had so destroyed the block-house at the mouth of the Vitas River that it was taken with a detachment of twenty men under Lieut. Ball.
The Concord and Callao held their positions until the 9th of February, when, an advance being made on Caloocan, the Monadnock came up to assist in shelling the Filipino lines. In this engagement the Concord and Callao fired about thirty
LIECT. WEBB'S GUNS ON SANTA MESA HILL, SHELLING BLOCK-HOUSE NO. 7 AND SAN JUAN BRIDGE. shots. On the 25th of February, these two ships were relieved by the Bennington and the Helena. The latter was, like the Callao, a light draft boat, and with her did patrol service, intercepting and capturing many of the insurrectos' boats carrying supplies to their lines.
The activity of the land forces made it difficult to direct the fire, but the moral effect, as well as the destructive energy of the navy guns was of very great assistance to the Americans. The fleet in the harbor had a reputation for invincibility which of itself was as valuable as regiments of fighting men in sustaining the splendid courage of our troops, and disconcerting the confidence of the Filipinos. Not only in the first two or three days of battle was the navy of such consequence, but all through the weeks of campaigning in the vicinity of Manila which followed.
As a result of the operations of the first week the American lines had been advanced in all directions outward from the city, and extended from a point beyond Caloocan southeasterly to the San Juan River, and thence easterly to the pumping station which it was a vital necessity to hold firmly. The towns of Pasig and Pateros, situated in a marshy district on the river, had been occupied and our southern line pushed forward to Malate. The Corps Commander, Gen. Otis, however, had not the force to occupy and adequately guard so large a district, and on the south of the river the line was gradually moved back to San Pedro Macati. Pending the arrival of re-inforcements nothing could be done except to hold such territory as was deemed absolutely essential, with occasional extensions to chastise the insurgents when they became too bold. This involved constant changes of position of our troops, especially on the south side of the river, which it would be confusing to attempt to follow, and the taking, abandoning, and retaking of many villages. The behavior of the natives was very trying. They were practically all sympathizers of Aguinaldo, and the men were with the army so far as they could be furnished with arms. As there were many more men than arms there seemed to be a constant change in the personnel of the rebel army, a simple change of clothing sufficing to transform a ferocious warrior to a peaceful citizen, and vice
versa. When our army approached a townı everything that could be made to do duty as a white flag was displayed. When we entered, all the inhabitants declared themselves “amigos,” and blessed the Americans. When we departed the white flags came down and they were all “insurrectos'' again. The rules of civilized warfare were disregarded. If, in skirmishing, the Filipinos killed an American cut off from his command, they shot him to pieces, often so that his body could not be recognized. The natives were not altogether united, however. On the 12th of February the Macabees and other natives of the Pampanga province near Malolos, sent a messenger to Gen. Otis, offering to desert Aguinaldo, and join the Americans with 3000 organized troops, armed and equipped, and needing only rations. They claimed that they had fought against Aguinaldo as allies of the Spanish. For prudential reasons the overtures were not accepted. At a later period some of the Macabees were employed as scouts.