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enemy attacked the outposts there. The commanding officer seemed to have made no adequate preparation for combat. Gen. Wheaton immediately deployed the whole force, amounting to about 400 men, along the railroad track, and pushed by hand the armored train lying there into position to command the ground east and north of Guiguinto. The enemy now attacked by firing from all the bamboo thickets and timber near the station and north and east of the depot. Fire was opened upon him from the six-pound rifle, and the Hotchkiss revolving cannon and the two machine guns on the armored train. The whole infantry line opened fire, and before daylight the enemy was driven off and dispersed.
Gen. Wheaton then proceeded to Bigaa, taking the troops at Guiguinto with him and leaving the detachment 4th Cav. to guard the station, until relieved by troops sent from Malolos by the Division Commander. The armored train was pushed by hand. The enemy was driven from the vicinity of Bigaa, and taking the troops there, excepting detachment left as guard, the General proceeded to Bocaue. Upon arriving within a mile of that place he found the troops yet engaged. He opened fire on the enemy with machine guns and attacked him with infantry, deployed in the extended order, and drove him in flight in the direction
THE ADVANCE ON MALOLOS. of Santa Maria and east of Bocaue. It was found that there had been a spirited combat at Bocaue, and the four companies of infantry there and in the vicinity had preserved the railroad track intact and had inflicted loss upon the enemy. It was also learned that the three companies of the Oregon Regiment at Marilao had been attacked by about 400 rebels, who were driven off. The telegraph line between Bocaue and Marilao had been cut in several places, and it was not until afternoon that the line was restored. The enemy had attacked in considerable force all the places held by troops, from Marilao to Guiguinto inclusive. He was beaten off everywhere by daylight and driven from the vicinity of all the stations before 6:30 A. M. The General ordered four companies of the 2d Oregon from Malinta and two from Marilao, and with two companies at Bocaue assembled at that point two battalions of the regiment and had there the entire Minnesota Regiment. Major-General MacArthur sent from Malolos one 3.2-inch gun and one Hotchkiss revolving cannon. At daylight, on the morning of the 12th of April, a move was made upon Santa Maria with this force. Fire was opened upon the position and entrenchments of the enemy at that place with artillery, and the
infantry advanced in the extended order. The enemy-eleven companies of infantry—offered a feeble resistance, and fled north and east of Santa Maria. Strong detachments were sent on all north and east roads. They pursued the enemy in every direction, but were unable to come up with him, as he had dispersed. The command returned to Bocaue, during the afternoon, and from there the troops were sent to the several stations they occupied before the enemy's attack upon the points, held by the troops along the railroad track. From information obtained from prisoners and from escaped Spanish refugees, it was learned that this attack upon our communications was made under the orders and supervision of Aguinaldo, who was at Santa Maria the 11th of April. The loss of the enemy, as near as could be ascertained, was about 250 killed and wounded.
Thanks are due Col. O. Summers, 2d Oregon Volunteer Inf., for prompt cooperation and to Capt. H. C. Catell for able assistance, also to 1st. Lieut. F. D. Webster, 20th Inf., Aide-de-camp, and 1st Lieut. H. E. Ely, 22d Inf., Acting Assistant Quartermaster and Acting Chief Surgeon. Maj. Bell, U. S. V. Engineers, of Major-General MacArthur's staff, rendered valuable services on the 12th of April, and had charge of an important reconnaissance from Santa Maria.
In the latter part of April, Gen. MacArthur was instructed by the commanding general to renew his pressure upon the insurrectos, and drive them from Calumpit and San Fernando, which had become their headquarters.
HALE'S OPERATIONS FROM MALOLOS TO CALUMPIT. The country from Malolos to Calumpit is level for the most part. A wagon road runs five miies northeasterly to Quingua, bordered with a fringe of woods most of the way, with open fields on both sides. For half a mile about Quingua, the country is covered with woods, but just before reaching the woods there was half a mile of open space defended by trenches—the scene of the battle of Quingua. Around the town itself was a strong line of trenches. The Quingua River flows westward past the north edge of the town of Quingua, and the south edge of the town of Pulilan toward Calumpit, eight miles west of Quingua.
The railroad runs northwest from Malolos to Calumpit, through a rich farming country like the English downs. Five miles from Malolos it crosses the Bagbag River, which here flows southwesterly. The railroad has an iron bridge, the
GEN. WHEATON AT MALOLOS. Photo by Lille. farther span of which had been dropped into the river by the insurrectos,-a fact discovered by Maj. Bell in a reconnaissance from Malolos. A mile and a quarter further on, the road crosses the Rio Grande de la Pampanga on a fine iron bridge, the condition of which was unknown. Three hundred yards above and northeast of the broken Bagbag Bridge, the Bagbag River is formed by the junction of the Quingua River, flowing from the east, and the Calumpit River, a narrow,
deep, canal-like stream extending from this junction northwesterly parallel to the railroad to the Rio Grande, thus forming a connecting link between the two rivers.
The town of Calumpit lies in the rectangle formed by the railroad, the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, the Calumpit and the Bagbag, being thus surrounded on three sides by rivers said to be unfordable. It was
known to be very strongly OREGON BOYS ON THE FIRING LINE. Photo by Lilie. fortified by entrenchments built in a practically continuous line along the river banks, covered in some cases with bomb proofs, and other cases with loopholed breastworks, having individual coverings for each rifleman. The railroad enbankment was also converted into a parapet for firing in either direction, and was gashed with trenches cut across it, to fire on troops advancing along the road.
The Americans fully appreciated that the capture of this place, so strongly fortified, both by nature and the insurgents, was a serious problem—the most difficult yet encountered. The insurgents regarded it as absolutely impregnable. Buencameno, one of their leaders, stated in a letter to Aguinaldo, picked up on the battle-field after the capture, that “Calumpit will be the sepulcher of the Americans," and he was certainly justified in this opinion by the strength of the position.
The original plan was for the 1st Brigade to work up the railroad, Hale's Brigade moving due north from Malolos across the Quingua River, and thence westward to the Calumpit, from which position it could partially enfilade the trenches along the Bagbag, near the railroad bridge in front of the 1st Brigade, and thus enable the latter to effect a crossing. The Quingua part of the fight was not premeditated, but events so shaped themselves that the 2d Brigade had to go to Quingua and fight its way along the Quingua River, past Pulilan to Calumpit, and so attack the city in that way.
Before the march commenced, Maj. Bell went with a cavalry troop in the direction of Quingua, to reconnoiter the river. At the camp in Malolos, at six o'clock on the morning of April 23d, a heavy firing was heard coming from the direction of Maj. Bell's expedition. The firing being so heavy and continuous, as to indicate something more than a mere brush with an outpost, Gen. Hale immediately sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, of the 51st Iowas, to send two companies to Maj. Bell's support, and, as the firing did not abate, increased this to four companies. A cavalryman rode in and reported that Maj. Bell had sent for a