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LAWTON'S NORTHERN EXPEDITION.
PON his return from the lake expedition, Gen. Lawton was immediately directed to prepare for an expedition upon a larger scale into the country immediately east of that occupied by Gen. MacArthur in whose field would be located Lawton's base of supplies, and from which a supporting column was to join him. It appears to have been assumed that Lawton could go where he pleased with his columns, but that insurgent bands would close in behind him, rendering his communications with Manila insecure, unless protected by a larger force than he
could spare. And such proved to be the case. The Dagupan railroad, along which MacArthur was operating, runs somewhat west of north from Manila. Starting also from Manila a main road runs northerly with a deflection from the north to the east about equal to the westerly deflection of the railroad. Along the general direction of this main road Gen. Lawton was to advance. It is evident that as he proceeded north, he would continually be getting farther from the main line of MacArthur's Division. Upon the east of the Rio Grande from Calumpit north lies an extensive swamp known as the Pinag de Candaba, or Swamp of Candaba. This swamp was intersected in several directions by roads built through it, but was otherwise impassable. All the operations of MacArthur's Division had been conducted on the west of this swamp, while the route marked out for Lawton's column lay to the east of it. The following account of the movement is substantially that given by Gen. Lawton in his report to Gen. Otis:
ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND. Pursuant to orders from the Corps and Department Commander, during the afternoon of April 21, 1899, the 22d U. S. Inf., 1st North Dakota Volunteer Inf., 2d Squadron (Gale's) 4th U. S. Cav., Hawthorne's Separate Mountain Battery and Scott's Platoon (two guns), Battery D, 6th U. S. Art., assembled in the vicinity of La Loma church, about four miles north of Manila. The troops bivouacked for the night, and instructions were given for an early movement in the morning.
Eight companies of the 3d U. S. Inf., under the command of Capt. J. W. Hannay, of that regiment, were encamped about a mile distant and reported for duty with the expedition.
PURPOSES OF THE EXPEDITION. The purposes of the expedition or plan of campaign contemplated the advance of this column on what appeared on most maps to be a practicable road through Novaliches and San Jose to Norzagaray, where a large insurgent force was reported to have their headquarters. In front of Norzagaray, junction with another column, 1200 strong, marching from Bocaue through Santa Maria, was to be made.
After the capture and occupation of Norzagaray, the road leading north from there to San Miguel was to be thoroughly reconnoitered, especially as to the practicability for this column. On the best credited map, this route is repre
sented a good road. San Miguel was supposed to be an insurgent stronghold, and the probable rendezvous of the forces to be defeated, but it was suggested that the 2d Division column, could move on San Miguel along the road east of the swamp, thus making a combined attack with the 1st Division. This Novaliches-San Jose route would promise that this column would get over on the extreme right of the insurgents' left; would invade their country; engage the enemy's forces, and prevent a concentration of the forces in our front upon MacArthur, if not at the same time turn the enemy's flank and disconcert his plans. The combined northern movement of both field divisions, if unable to secure a decisive action against the northern insurgent army, would at
least drive the enemy out of the Tagalog proTRENCHES AT SAN FERNANDO. Photo by Darcey. vinces into northern ones, whose inhabitants were reported unfriendly to the insurrection. At five o'clock next morning, April 22d, the command commenced the march northward, the 3d Inf. joining the column at its formation.
COLUMN MOVES IN LIGHT MARCHING ORDER. The command was equipped in the lightest possible marching order compatible with an expedition of the duration contemplated for this. Ten days' field rations were taken in carts, drawn by carabao, or water buffalo, as was also a reserve of 100 rounds per man of ammunition. One hundred rounds were also carried by each soldier on his person. The transportation was very limited and orders were issued directing the loading of wagons to 3000 pounds and carts 1500 pounds, exclusive of forage for the animals. It was represented that the proposed route was over a passable wagon road, and these loads were considered conservative maxima.
NOVALICHES OCCUPIED. The order of march for the first day placed the North Dakotas in the advance, and Gale's squadron in the rear. The command passed the trenches of the 4th Inf. shortly after leaving the camping grounds of the night previous, and advanced about six miles without incident when the enemy was encountered in small force, being developed by Company H, 1st North Dakotas, the vanguard of the column. Companies A, B, G and I, of that regiment were immediately deployed, and the enemy fell back making but feeble resistance. After driving the enemy about
AGUINALDO AND FOU'R OF HIS LEADING GENERALS. 1. EMILIO AGUINALDO. 2. GENERAL Pow, an influential Chinese official in the insurgent army, and brother-in-law of Aguinaldo. 3. GENERAL PILAR, one of Aguinaldo's ablest officers. 4. GENERAL TORRES. 5. GENERAL GARCIA
a mile, the column was again formed. After proceeding about a mile further, the enemy was again encountered in larger force, and made a determined opposition to our advance, pouring in a strong fire on our front from both sides of the road, principally from the left. The same companies were again deployed, and vigorously engaged the enemy, completely routing them and driving them on through the village of Novaliches, to a point about two miles beyond. Our troops occupied the village about 10 A. M., and a line of outposts was established about the town. Our casualties: Two enlisted men, 1st North Dakotas, wounded, one seriously, and several men overcome by heat.
Considerable difficulty was experienced in crossing the transportation over the Rio de Tuliacan, as the north bank of that stream is of solid rock, and no suitable approach to the ford from that side has ever been constructed.
During the afternoon the pickets of the 22d Inf., on the northeast side of the village were fired on by the enemy who had entrenched about 1000 yards away on a hillside. Shots were exchanged during the whole afternoon, Scott's platoon being brought into action, and the enemy finally silenced with the exception of single shots throughout the night. No casualties.
The town being entirely deserted by its inhabitants, the troops occupied "nipa" huts as quarters for the night. Nothing of value was to be found in the town, practically all stores of rice and other provisions having been removed by the people in their fight. At five o'clock next morning, the 23d, the command was again on the move toward the north, San Jose being the objective point. On leaving Novaliches, the road which up to that village had been, with the exception of the approaches to the ford, passable for wagons and carts, now became a mere footpath, winding its way over rice-fields with their innumerable dykes, which were too high to permit the passage of wagon and cart wheels, without work with pick and shovel at each dyke. Great difficulty was experienced by the rear guard of that day, the North Dakota Regiment, in assisting the carts along. The “road” leads over a succession of hills and valleys, on the former of which the troops and water buffalo were exposed to the burning rays of a tropical sun, and in the latter they labored through jungles and mudholes. The heat was intense, the loads so great (though only absolutely necessary rations and ammunition were carried) and the trail so rough, that it was WOODEN GUN USED BY INSURGENTS. necessary to unbitch the carabao on many of the divides and lead them down to waterholes to soak for a half hour, thus greatly impeding the progress of the train.
Headquarters, the 3d and 22d Regiments of infantry, and Scott's platoon reached the ford crossing the Pasunkambor River, about one and one-half miles south of San Jose, at 3 P. M., having been delayed through not having any official